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ABSTRACT 
Confl ict and Cooperat ion in Persian Gulf is tiie best possible and thie most apt illustration 
of regional and international politics in the Persian Gulf . This holds true to politics in, of and 
about the region since the the emergence of this region as an international sub-system, i.e. at 
the latest af ter the wi thdrawal of the British forces east of Suez in 1971 and the imposition of 
oil embargo in 1973. 
The British wi thdrawal set in motion the above two currents. As many as seven 
Shiekhdoms decided to merge into a single sovereign unit . But at the same time twoshiekhdoms 
viz., Qatar and Bahrain, who participated in the negotiat ion to coalesce into a single state, opted 
out—the reason which underlined their exit was that tradtional rivalries between the two 
prevented them f rom reconci l ing to each o the r ' s staus in the power-sharing arrangement. Thus 
confl ict and cooperat ion have been the hallmark of regional politics in the Persian Gulf ever 
since its emergence as an international sub-system. 
Confl ict and cooperat ion are complementary to each other, rather than being opposit es. 
Issues pertaining to cooperat ion have in themselves been the cause of strains in relations 
between two or more states, in the Arab Peninsular region. At the same time, the need to 
conform a common threat jointly, has diminished mutual riv,alries. 
This is why most conflicts in the region ar§ among member states of the GCC. These 
are mainly boundary disputes . Yet. the countries forming the GCC have exhibited cooperation 
in most sustainlable manners . For, they have all been vulnerable to external threats. Hence, there 
is an ever exisi t ing complusion to cooperate amongst themselves . 
Common history, the Arab character, religious bonds and similarity of political systems 
have bound the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf into a cooperat ing unit. At the same time 
the vicissi tudes and compuls ions of modern day inter-state polit ics have militated against the 
un i fy ing role of traditional forces. 
No less s t rong are the 20th century compuls ions of maintaining peaceful bilateral 
relat ions, which, in turn, act as the forces of inter-state cooperat ion. This has prevented the 
mil i t r izat ion of regional disputes. Of course, the region has witnessed two of the most 
important wars—the first being the longest of the century and the latest, most devastating. The 
latter can be aptly called a World War in terms of the number of the participating countries. Yet, 
one notes that a major i ty of the countless disputes, in the region have fallen short of turning 
into ful l - f ledged wars . 
Interest ingly, conf l ic ts in the region have s t imulated cooperation. The Iran-Iraq war, 
which was the major st imulant for the formation of the GCC, is an example in point. Similarly, 
coopera t ions have not been able to end confl ic ts in the region. That the GCC member-states 
have not devised a mechanism to resolve disputes among themselves once and for all being 
a vivid example. 
Confl ic ts and cooperat ion in the Persian Gulf are typically regional in nature. Superpow-
ers deliberately s tayed away from influencing the course of border disputes, particularly in the 
Arab peninsula region. On the other hand, they tried yet fai led to influence the course of the 
Iran-Iraq war and later the Persian Gulf crisis. However in the case of the former, they 
succeeded in using the suituation thrown up by the war to make adjustments in their policies 
vis-a-vis d i f ferent actors in the region. The two also succeeded in coordinating their policies 
toward the war in order to avoid mutual conf ron ta t ion . 
But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused a shi f t in US policy toward Persian Gulf 
confl icts . The invasion translated into a war between the US and its allies on one side and Iraq 
on the other. But this could happen only when US fai led to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw 
from Kuwait using int imidatory tactics. Thus the Persian Gulf war too was an example of a 
supe rpower ' s fa i lure to inf luence the course of a regional crisis . 
As far as Coopera t ion is concerned, Superpowers , and for that matter any extra regional 
power , could not b e c o m e part of any organisation in the region. As a matter of fact, GCC, the 
only s ignif icant fo rum of regional cooperation, aims to shroud any obvious cooperation with 
the US, wi th a v iew to preempt domestic opposi t ion to it. 
It is the afore-ment ion perspective which forms. Implicit ly as well explicitly, the major 
theme of this research work . 
Chapter I g ives an overview of regional conf l ic ts . In particular, it deals in detail with 
all the boundary disputes in the region. This issue may not have been aclequately discussed in 
the fol lowing chapters . 
The latter, concent ra te on specific instances of conf l ic ts and cooperation. Chapter I also 
discusses ideoligical and political conflicts in the region which may not have been grave enough 
to turn into mili tary confronta t ions . But these conf l ic ts did contr ibute to the few full-f ledged 
wars that occured in the region. At the same t ime, these conf l ic ts have also been down-played 
by protagonists in the regional drama for the sake of poli t ical expediency. This aspect of 
Persain Gulf confl ic t has been dealt with in the chapter . 
Chapter II t r ies to locate the superpowers ' interests , roles and strategies in Persian Gulf 
confl icts as well as their policies towards each other in a regional conflict. The chapter seeks 
to study the impl ica t ions of a regional conflict on supe rpower policies and vice versa. The 
chapter also assesses the superpowers ' policy of ending, manag ing and controling a regional 
confl ict and the amount of success acheived in do ing so. 
Chapter III g ives a detailed discription of the Iran-Iraq war from different angles. It 
specif ical ly tries to re -examine the accepted and establ ished perception of the causes of the war, 
the atti tude of the neutral Persian Gulf states and that of distant neighbours towards the war 
and the scope of the superpowers" Persian Gulf policy dur ing the war. It also assesses the 
implicat ions of the War on the belligerents, and regional and extra-regional states who were 
directly or indirectly af fec ted by the war. 
Chapter IV endeavours to analyse var ious facets of the cooperation among the Arab 
count r ies of the Persian Gulf under the aegis of the GCC. It also makes an attempt to specify 
the nature of the cooperat ion among the countr ies in quest ion before the inception of the GCC. 
T h e chapter looks into factors that led to the format ion of GCC and places them in descending 
o rder of importance . 
Chapter V attempts to examine if the Persian Gulf crisis was precipitated by events 
wh ich occured immediately before the Iraqi invasion or whether it was a pre-conceived plan. 
This chapter at tempts to make a dist ict ion between the "events" leading to the invasion 
and the "causes" behind it. The chapter also delves into a number of other issues, such as 
w h e t h e r the US prompted Iraq to invade Kuwait to take on it later ?, whether the regional 
count r ies gave in to US pressure or whether they really wanted US intervention ?, whether the 
UN played an impartial role in the Gulf cr is isor if it was piggybacked by the US ? and whether 
I r a q ' s defeat served the purposes of the US and its allies in and outside the region. 
Last but not the least, this work hopes to s t imulate fur ther researches on the subject-
matter , analysing the political dynamics of the Persian Gulf region from conflict-cooperation 
angle with a view to analyse how do the two forces shape regional politics and not the other 
w a y round. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conflict and Coopera t ion in Persian Gulf is not, as a mat ter of fact, one of the several 
aspects of ttie regional and international politics in this region. Rather, it is the best possible 
and the most succinct i l lustration of these. Since the emergence of this region into an 
international sub-system, i.e. after the withdrawal of the British forces east of Suez in 1971 and 
with the imposition of oil embargo in 1973, politics in, of and about the region can conveniently 
be described as that of conf l ic t and cooperation. 
It was in fact, the British withdrawal which set in motion these two forces. As many as 
seven shiekhdoms decided to unite into a single sovereign unit, but not without two shiekhdoms 
viz., Qatar and Bahrain, backtracking from the process of the integration of the smaller 
shiekhdoms. If those who are now the consti tuents of the UAE set aside border disputes and 
dynastic-cum-tribal r ivalr ies among themselves in an appreciable display of cooperation, Qatar 
and Bahrain opted out of it mainly because they could not overcome these very traditional 
rivalries that existed be tween them. 
The British presence may have not laid the foundation of intra-regional cooperation but 
it did prevent innumerable disputes among its protectorates f rom escalating, beside thwarting 
an Iraqi attempt to occupy Kuwait or parts of it. There existed the Iran-Iraq boundary dispute 
and the one over foment ing of internal discontentment in each o ther ' s territories while the two 
countries were independent of British influence in the region. But these were typically bilateral 
issues as the rest of the region remained insulated from them. Needless to point out, these very 
disputes had a far wider implicat ions for other regional countries af ter the British withdrawal. 
Beside, the British wi thdrawal was followed by the Iranian occupat ion of three islands of the 
UAE, which was not only the first major case of regional conflict so far as it set in the big power-
small power dichotomy in the region, but it was also an indication of conflagration of the 
regional disputes which were by and large low keyed till then. 
However, regional cooperation was not entirely missing in the years immediately 
fol lowing the British wi thdrawal . What probably dist inguishes the Persian Gulf from other 
regions is that confl ict and cooperation have gone hand in hand there. Imposing the 1973 oil 
embargo, regional countr ies displayed that the unity on common issues comes into force 
t ranscending exist ing disputes . Even Iran, which did not join the countries who had imposed 
arms embargo, led them f rom the front to see the oil prices quadruple . 
Thus, common history, the Arab character, religious bonds and similarity of political 
systems have bound the A r a b countries of the Persian Gulf into a cooperat ing unit. But these 
have not turned the region into a confl ict-free zone either, at var ious occasions the vicissitudes 
and compulsions of modern day inter-state politics have diminished the unifying role of 
traditional forces. This is wha t is the paradox of conflict and cooperat ion which the region is 
beset and blessed with . 
As the traditional uni t ing forces have begun diminishing, the 20th century compulsions 
of maintaining peacsfu! bihiteail relations have come in as the t'actors behind inter-state 
cooperat ion, that at least 
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prevents the mil i t r izat ion of the regional disputes. Of course, the region has witnessed the two 
most important wa r s—one being the longest in the ensuing century and the later the most 
devastat ing as well as more aptly called a World War in terms of the number of the participating 
countr ies—yet one can note that most of the disputes, which are countless, in the region have 
not turned into full f ledged wars . Utmost, the disputes among those Arab Peninsular countries 
who 
are the part of the Persian Gulf region, have turned into border skirmishes that too few and far 
in between. 
Interest ingly, the expediency to act as group part icularly to deal with the common 
regional threat and the outside world has given birth to regional and institutionalized coopera-
t ion— the GCC. To an extent , regional cooperation preceded the formation of the GCC. It 
existed in an uninst i tut ionalised form in spheres of commerce ,communicat ion, oil, technology, 
education etc. in the 70s and paved the way for the format ion of this regional organization. 
Also, the GCC is not the only platform for regional cooperat ion. The member-state of the GCC 
have formed a cartel in OPEC as well in OAPEC. 
GCC has not enforced an ideal state of cooperat ion among the member states. But no 
other regional organizat ions , more so the international organizat ions, have succeeded in 
achieving the Utopia. This because none of these happen to be supranat ional . Therefore, when 
the national interest come indi rec t clash with regional interests, the former prevails. Be it noted 
that the national interest of each country is the main determinant in the setting up of a regional 
organizat ion by the concerned countries. So giving it precedence over regional interests is the 
obvious choice to a member-s ta te . 
Thus the impor tance of the GCC as a successful instrument of regional cooperation must 
be seen In whatever little it has achieved and not in its fai lures. Does not the GCC represent 
the finest example, and probably the first, of poli t ico-mili tary protectionism, albeit with 
external help if the EEC is an example of economic protect ionism? 
Yet, the coopera t ion in the region has not been able to end the conflicts in the region. 
Thus, the GCC member-s ta tes have not fond out a mechanism to resolve disputes among 
themselves for once and all. They have not made even a single serious effort in this direction. 
Of a few disputes, the G C C has succeeded in resolving, were brought to it only when they 
threatened to go out of control , endangering regional securi ty as well as the existence of the 
GCC. This makes one conclude that there is a lack of will to resolve the existing disputes. This, 
also points to the fact that there exists no unders tanding to prevent the disputes among the 
member states f rom turning into a crisis. 
Confl icts in the Persian Gulf are typically regional. The need to mention this point arises 
out of the fact that in their penchant for examining every Third World conflict from the prism 
of Superpower confronta t ion learned scholars (not all of them), have overlooked this 
phenomenon. Thus if the superpowers deliberately stayed away from influencing the course of 
border disputes, pnrlicuJarJy in the Arab peni.nsuJa region, they tried and failed to influence the 
course of the Iran-Iraq war or the Persian Gulf crisis. They s imply managed to read jus t their 
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policies towards the neutral countries, the belligrents and each other vis-a-vis the situation 
created by the Iran-Iraq war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait turned into a war between the US and 
its allies on one side and Iraq on the other only when the latter could not force Saddam Hussein 
to withdraw from Kuwait, yet another example of a superpower's failure to influence the course 
o f a crisis. It is held that US wanted to wage a war against Iraq from day one to an extent that 
it had indirectly prodded Saddam to invade Kuwait. But was not Saddam's refusal to withdraw 
more the result of sheer miscalculation than the success of the US strategy to lure him into 
fighting a war? 
The conflicts in the Persian Gulf have been ver^'much regional in nature not only because 
the superpowers played absolutely no role in their eruption and a limited role in ending them 
but also because these disputes have stemmed from a combination of the regional history, 
geography (physical set up) and ideologies. The wars in particular in the region have been the 
results of regional ambitions o f the a^ressor country. 
It is in this perspective this research work is being carried out. It tries to identify- the 
causes and the characteristics of regional disputes/war, the nature and extent of the superpowers 
involvement in these and the undercurrents of regional cooperation. Frankly, it must be 
admitted that this work does not qualify to be called a "research'' in so far as it does not look 
into the issues pertaining to the regional cooperation and conflict from a new angle. It claims 
to be a research work on the basis that it reviews the existing literature on the subject matter 
and infers some conclusions which substantiate some of the existing perceptions on the subject 
matter and beg to differ from some o f these. 
Nor is this work a 'micro-research', which a true research work must be. The topic of 
this work and the period covered make it imperativ e to discuss such a large variety of issues that 
a 'micro research' could be conducted only by ignoring some vital issues. Part of the reason in 
not conducting a micro-research lies in the fact that such a work, as the researcher has observed, 
tends to become more enumerative than analytical. However, the researcher does not intend to 
take recourse in the above-mentioned argument to shroud his shortcomings, if any, of not 
enumerating an event. 
The researcher has often indulged in repetition o f a particular fact and argument in more 
than one chapter. WTien each chapter in a research work is treated as a single unit while all of 
them are inter-linked, the repetitions are bound to occur. However, undue repetitions, if any, 
is entirely the fault of the researcher. 
Last but not the least, If history is actually the autobiography of historians, a research 
work in political science, particularly in the branch of international politics, is also the reflection 
of the researcher's personality. Thus, like the Behaviourahsts, this researcher does not claim to 
have produced a vaiue-free study. 
CHAPTER I 
C O N F L I C T S IN T H E PERSIAN G U L F : A N OVERVIEW 
As regards the regional conflicts, the Persian Gulf is distinct from other regions of the 
world, less in terms of their seemingly endless number and more due to their varying patterns 
and intensity-level. 
History, coupled with the topography of the region, has given birth to a number of 
territorial disputes. As the cradle of wor ld ' s two confl ict ing civil izations Arab and Persian each 
conf ined to separate terri torial boundaries, the region is the center stage of the conflict between 
the two oriental ideologies. While some countries still stick to centuries old Islamic conserva-
tism, the grassroots of their socio-political system, whi le a few other have embraced 19-20th 
centuries ' Social ism, of course with added Arab-Islamic characterist ics. This has given birth to 
inter-state radicalism vs. Islamic conservatism in the region. With the emergence, or re-
emergence of Islamic radicalism during the last one and a half decades, the region is affl icted 
with Islamic conservat ism versus Islamic radicalism rivalry. The Arab peninsular countries 
representing Islamic conservatism are embroiled in ideological rivalry with both the radical 
right (Islam), represented by Iran, and the radical left, represented by Iraq. No less antagonistic 
are the radical right and the radical left, although this confl ic t has been overshadowed by 
terr i tor ial ,Arab-Persian and Shia-Sunni rivalries between Iran and Iraq, the countries repre-
senting, respectively, the abovementioned radical s treams. 
It is in this perspect ive that this study endeavors to a detailed and analytical account of 
regional confl icts in the Persian Gu l f ( l ) . 
T E R R I T O R I A L DISPUTES 
A) B O U N D A R Y DISPUTES: 
1) T H E S H A T T - A L - A R A B DISPUTE: 
This dispute is between Iran and Iraq. It is over the an 80km of the estuary of the river 
Shat t -Al-Arab, which divides the land boundaries of the two countr ies (2). A tributary of the 
rivers Euphrates and Tigris , the Shatt-Al-Arab, 205 km long with an avg. breadth of 548 meter, 
has historically been under Arab control, excpet those few occas ions when the Persian empire 
was in control of the same and the land adjacent to i t(3). 
The demarcat ion of boundaries being an unknown practice during ancient and medieval 
times, the possession of the Shatt shif ted alternately between Arab rule and Persian empire 
withthe migrat ion of people and or due to the shif t ing loyalt ies of the people, inhabiting the delta 
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of the river, f rom one power to the other one. Therefore , there are little on record about the 
dates of the " sh i f t s " in, and the duration of control over, the Shatt . Given the pract ice of non 
relinquishment of claim from the Shatt by one of the disputants even when it happened 
to lose it, the authenticity of the historical accounts and off icial records, except those of 
relatively modern period, can not be considered authentic. 
However , there is a fundamental d i f ference between the nature of conflict over the Shatt 
dur ing the medieval days and that of present t imes. Earl ier the Shatt was the part of dispute over 
the entire landmass east of it, while in the 20th century, rather the 2nd half of this century to 
be more precise, the Shatt alone is the major source of confl ict . 
This change has taken place due to growing strategic importance of the river after the 
discovery of oil in Iraq coupled with the expansion of trade between Iraq and the countries 
l inked to it by sea routes. The r iver 's eastern side is I raq ' s chief oil export outlet to the Persian 
Gulf waters. Laying overland pipelines through Syria and Turkey and constructing commercial 
port at Umm-e-Qasr , Iraq reduced its dependence on the Shatt route by half. Yet, the oil shipped 
through the Shatt estuary constitutes the mainstay of Iraqi economy(4) . Besides, to Iraq the 
Shatt is a permanent route for the supply of oil ,while the pipelines carry the threat of closure 
by the countries these pass through. Interest ingly, both Turkey and Syria closed down the Iraqi 
pipel ines passing through their territories. 
To Iran, the Shatt waten.vays faci l i tate direct access to the ports of Khorremshaher and 
the industrial complex around Ahwaz. However , for Iran the commercial and economic 
importance of the Shatt reduced when thepro t Bandar Abbas and Kharag island were developed 
as the chief sources of its o i l ' s outlet(5). The river is important to Iran for denying Iraq the 
control over it given the lat ter 's dependence on it. It also enables Iran to supervise the Iraqi 
navigation through it. 
Iraq claims that not only has the Shatt been historically the part of Arab rule but since 
the t ime of the beginning of the practice of boundry demarcat ion between Ottoman and Persian 
empires, its sovereignty over it ( the Shatt) has always been acknowledged by Persia in exchange 
for Arab recognit ion to its control over the adjacent landmass. 
Iran rejects Iraqi claim on two counts. First, Iraq is not the successor state of the 
Ot tomanempire .Therefore it is not entitled to extend any claim over the fo rmer Ottoman 
terri tories. Second, the old treaties, which recognised the Ot toman ' s empire ' s control over the 
Shatt , now stand illegal for not being in accordance with the existing international law. 
The successive Iranian governments swear by the international legal principles of the 
midl ine of the river channel constituting the natural boundary of two states separated by a river. 
The Iranian side fur ther claims that after s igning in 1975 the Algiers agreement to this effect , 
Iraq is under the international obligation to abide by the 'Tha lweg ' principle. 
As against this, I r aq ' s position has been that since according to internatirmal law obligations 
undera treaty are not unilateral, therefore it was just i f ied in abrogating the Algiers treaty in 
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1980 when Iran indulged in the violat ion of those clauses of the treaty which provided for the 
return of three border villages in Khurramshahar regions to Iraq by Iran. 
Amid claims and counterclaims, occasionally escalating into borderconflagrat ions(6) , 
the Shat t -Al-Arab dispute has quite a good number of t imes been negot iated over. These 
negot ia t ions culminated at least into four major treaties(7). 
T H E PEACE TREATY OF 1639 : This treaty was signed, fo l lowing the Turkish conquest of 
Basra, in 1639 between the representat ives of the Ottoman and the Persian empires . Under this 
treaty, Persia accepted the Turkish suzerainty over the Shatt and some areas peopled by the 
Arabs on its eastern side. The Persian empire retained the f reedom of navigat ion and right of 
economic exploitation of the river(8). 
T H E SECOND ERUZERUM T R E A T Y : This treaty was concluded under the goodoff ices of 
Great Britain and Russia on May 31, 1947 in the Turkish city of Erzerum. Under this treaty ; 
a) the Turkish empire ceded to Persia the city and harbor anchorage of Muhammara and the 
island of Khizr (now Abadan) and Persia ceded some territories in the province of Sulaimaneyah 
and Zubabeb; and, b) the Ottoman empire was allowed to retain control over the Shat t ' s width 
up to the deep water marker of the eastern shore, sans the terri tories of Muhammarah and the 
islandof Khizr. 
The treaty was, however, later rejected by the both the part ies . The Ot toman empire held 
that the treaty did not extend the Arab sphere of control to the eastern shores of the river. 
Fol lowing the refusal, Britain and Russia recognized Ottamanian sovereignty over the whole 
of the river in an 'explanatory note ' (9). Taking strong exception to the 'explanatory note ' , 
Persia retrogatively annulled its assent to the treaty. With this the boundary commission, set up 
under the treaty to fix the boundaries , was also dismantled. 
T H E CASTANTINOPLE P R O T O C O L 1913: The Constant inople Protocol was signed among 
Russia, Great Britain, Persian and Turkish empire (lO)This treaty re-establ ished Turkish 
control over the entire width of the Shatt and around the waters of Muhammara and Khizr. The 
middle of the river channel was fixed as the boundary. 
T H E T R E A T Y OF 1937: The heralding of Pahaivi rule under Reza Shah in 1921 put the 1913 
treaty and the earlier ones in jeopardy as the Shah refused to abide by any one of them. He did 
not recognize the Basra port Directorate, established by Iraq to supervise negotiat ions on the 
Shatt according to the 1913 treaty. The rejection of the treaty resulted in border skirmishes 
be tween Iran and Iraq (11). The Shah also refused to give recogni t ion to Iraq in resentment 
against ' I r a q ' s control over the Shat t (12) . 
The matter was brought to the notice of the League of Nat ions on Nov.29 , 1934. The 
League appointed a rapporteur, an Italian diplomat, to mediate be tween the two parties to find 
a negot ia ted sett lement to the dispute. In part due to the e f fo r t s of the rappor teur and in part 
as a result of the Middle East pact, initiated in 1935 by Britain and Russia to resolve the 
boundary disputes, an Iran-Iraq border treaty was signed on July 4 , 1 9 3 7 in Tehran . The treaty 
reaffirmed ^ 
Iraqi jur isdict ion over the east of the Shatt and save the areas around the Iranian port of 
Muhammara and Abadan the border ran along the Thalweg. In addit ion to this, Iran was granted 
four miles anchorage zone of Abadan. Principle of freedom of navigation was established. The 
transit fee was to be used for the maintenance and expansion of shipping lanes and a provision 
was made for the conclusion of a convention for joint administrat ion of the Shatt shipping and 
related activities within two years of the s igning of the agreement . 
DISPUTE IN T H E 1960S : The fo l lowing two decades af ter the s igning of the 1937 treaty 
marked a relative calm on the Shatt f ront . The two countr ies turned fr iends by joining the 
CENTO in 1955. In 1959, the Shah, however , reiterated Iranian claim over the eastern side of 
the Shatt, accusing Iraq of not adhering to the Thalweg pr inciple . In response, the then ruler 
of Iraq, Gen. Qasim, renewed his claim over Abadan, Muhammara and other Arab territories 
under Iranian control as per the 1937 treaty. In 1959, the Shah unilateral ly abrogated the treaty 
of 1937 (13). Frequent outbursts of border clashes during the late 1950s and early 1960s were 
repor ted. Iran continued accusing Iraq of backtracking from set t ing up the convention of the 
jo int administrat ion of the Shatt as agreed upon under the 1937 treaty, misappropriat ing the 
transit fee and using it in the construct ion of hotels and airport and not paying the dues (14). 
Iraq putforward the Iranian attempt to forcibly impose its jur isdict ion over the Shatt as 
the main reason behind not setting up the boundary commiss ion by it (15). 
It would be too far-fetched to conclude that Iran began abett ing Kurdish rebellion in the 
f irst half of the 70s to bargain a favorable sett lement on the Shatt. For to keep Iraq pre-
occupiedwith its internal affairs might have stemmed as well from the Iranian strategy to 
neutral ize Iraqi threat on its own borders, to weaken Iraq internally and to intimidate the Arab 
powers from forming an anti-Iranian strategic consensus in collusion with Baghdad. 
However, this did help Iran in reinforcing a link between the Kurdish problem and the 
Shatt issue as Iraq offered to cede the estuary to Iran in return of Iranian assurance to stop 
suppor t ing the Kurdish rebels. Following a green signal from Iraq, the Algerian president who 
was hosting O P E C ' s annual summit being attended by the Shah and the then Iraqi vice-president 
Saddam Hussien mediated between the two. The , Algerian ef for t s led to the signing of the 
Algiers Agreement . The treaty provided for the establishment of the boundaries along the 
Tha lweg and the Iranian side was called upon to keep its hand off from the Kurdish rebellion 
(16). 
The Algiers treaty had a major drawback. It was a political agreement instead of a border 
se t t lement in the true sense of the term. Hence, its sanctity and durabil i ty were doubted that too 
in view of the fact that it was signed by Iraq under compulsion and by Iran from the position 
of s t rength. 
Thus on Sept. 19, 1980, Iraq unilaterally abrogated the treaty with its President Saddam 
Hussein torn the text of the treaty apart in Algeria. Both the venue, the same place where Iraq 
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was subjected to sign the humiliat ing treaty, and the t ime— by then, it is said, the decision to 
attack Iran on the 22nd of the same month was already taken—conf i rm that the tearing of the 
treaty was an exhibition of Iraqi decision to settle the issue on batt leground beside meeting other 
object ives(17) . 
T H E I R A Q - K U W A I T D I S P U T E : 
Next to the Shatt , the most outs tanding dispute in the region is the one between Iraq and 
Kuwait over the two islands of Bubiyan and Warbah. The whole of Kuwait in itself is disputed 
due to I raq ' s claim that this country has historically been the part of Basra region under Ottoman 
rule. Iraq did not forego its claim over Kuwait in exchange for massive Kuwaiti financial support 
dur ing the Iran-Iraq War. Nor has it done so until now despite being battered in the Persian Gulf 
War . The official map of Iraq shows Kuwait as its 17th province and there have been repeated 
Iraqi incursions in the Kuwaiti territory in scant disregard to the latest demarcat ion of Iraqi-
Kuwait boundaruies by the UN Boundary demarcation Commission. 
Barely a week af ter the independence of Kuwait, Iraq began contemplat ing the takeover 
of the whole country through the use of force. It had also begun amass ing troops on the 
internat ional borders(18) . However , theBrit ish and Saudi threats to resort to force to protect 
the independence of Kuwait prevailed upon Iraq to drop the idea. 
Before invading Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq might have made little effor ts to regain 
Kuwait , but it continued to eye Bubiyan and Warbah.On times, it proposed to relinquish its 
claim on the whole of Kuwait if the latter returned the two Islands, even on lease. 
Bubiyan and Warbah are close to the junction of Kuwait and Iraq.Bubiyan lies within 
one mile of Kuwait shore and within five miles of I raq 's . Warbah is approximately two miles 
f rom the Kuwaiti shore and less than a mile away from Iraq. The two islands are strategically 
vital to the disputants. They command a narrow strip of water which the Iraqi ships must pass 
through to arrive at the port of Umm-i-Qasr . They contain huge deposi ts of oil. And I raq 's 
control over them would extend its Mari t ime boundaries to a far larger area of the Gulf sea-bead 
underneath which lies oil in abundance. 
Iraq has stuck to coercive diplomacy on the islands issue. It occupied the island twice 
in 1970-71 and built a road through the Kuwaiti dessert territory of the Persian Gulf in 1972 
and made limited military forays in 1977. Kuwaiti sovereignty over the two island is recognized 
under a bilateral agreement with Ottoman empire in 1932, whereby Iraq accepted Kuwai t ' s 
suzerainty over them. 
Amid military hiatus in early 70s, there also came a phase when the two countries tried 
to settle the issue amicably. In the mid-70s , Saudi Arabia mediated to work out a mutually 
agreeable solution. The set t lement of this crisis came in sight when the Arab states exerted 
pressure on Kuwait to lease half of the Bubiyan to Iraq and withdraw its claim over Warbah. 
However , Kuwaiti government ' s opposiiton to this plan eluded the solut ion. Kuwait was agreed 
to lease both of the islands to Iraq for ninety nine vears(19). 
T H E O M A N - U A E D I S P U T E : 
The dispute between Oman and the UAE is on a 10 mile long coastal strip along the 
borders. The border between the UAE and Oman in the Al-Khaki region are still undemarcated 
and, therefore , contain the seeds of the eruption of a dispute in future(20) . 
Oman dates its sovereignty over the coastal strip back to mid 19th century saying that 
it has tradit ionally been used by one of its tribes as grazing land. The dispute over the area in 
quest ion erupted when the oil was discovered there. The UAE started oil explorar t ion in the area 
in 1974 which which Oman opposed by claiming the region as its territory. In 1977, oil was for 
the first time extracted off shore in the area(21). Kuwait ignited the dispute further by 
helpingRas-al-Khaima establish an oil refinery in the disputed area.Oman demands a land 
corridor connection between its mainland and Musandam Peninsula throughAl Fujairah and 
Shar jah (22) 
D I S P U T E S A M O N G T H E UAE S H E I K H D O M S : 
Disputes within the UAE, which is a single politcal unit, bear all the characteristics of 
the ones between two or more states (23). The seven Sheikhdoms which const i tute the UAE are 
tied up in a lose confederat ion with each of them maintaining a sort of soverignty over its 
boundar ies . There lacks a central authority to decide about the boundary disputes and 
demarcate the boundaries among themselves. The member-Sheikhdoms have entered into 
boundary demarcat ion treaties with other states of the region in sovereign capaci ty. 
The dispute between Sharjah and Dubai is over a portion of land situated five km inside the 
la t ter ' s territory where Shar jah has constructed a large shopping and business center there. This 
conflict reached alarming proport ions in the late 70s, and an armed confl ict looked, even the 
breakup of the confederat ion, inevitable. This crisis was averted due to President Sheikh 
Z iyad ' s intervent ion who managed to persuade the disputants to refer the case to a panel of 
European 
lawyers. 
The Musandan peninsula is another disputed territory, involving Ummal Qaiwain and 
Fujairah as well as the UAE as a whole and Oman, the most peculiar of exist ing border conflicts 
in the world. A val ley dividing Ras-Al-Khaima and Saharjah is also a under dispute between 
them. The disputed territory is reported to have huge deposits of phosphate(24) . Shar jah and 
Fujai rah have also fought over the boundary demarcat ion issue. In one of such battles in 1972 
about two dozen soldiers f rom both the sides were killed(25). 
T H E S A U D I - I R A Q DISPUTE : 
Though far from being finally settled, the Saudi-Iraq boundary disputehas remained 
subsided due to an agreement reached between the two countries to consider the disputed land 
as neutral zone. This agreement was signed by the two governments on July 2 , 1 9 7 5 . However, 
the dispute is vulnerable to being exploited as a pretext to launch military aggression by one of 
them against the other. In other words, the state of political relations between Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia shall determine the intensity of this dispute. 
D I S P U T E OVER T H E BURAIMI OASIS : 
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The dispute over the Buraimi Oasis is between the UAE and Saudi Arabia on one hand, 
and Abu Dhabi and the UAE on the other. The Oasis, divided between Oman and the UAE, is 
a few hundred kms inside the southern corner of the Persian Gulf . It consists of nine villages 
inhabited by a population of mixed tribal origin. The dispute has arisen due to the absence of 
the practice of boundary demarcat ion in the past and the changing loyalties of the inhabitants 
be tween the contenders(26) . 
The dispute has been a bone of contention following its increasing strategic importance 
in the wake of changing polit ical and economic scenario in the region af ter the First World War. 
The Buraimi oasis, via Wadi-Al-Jazzi , controls access to the coast of Dhahran and Interim 
Oman, the oasis is also the pr imary water resource for Abu Dhabi and contains a substantial 
deposit of oil. This conflict came to the fore for the first time in 1933 when the Saudi government 
awarded oil concession to A R A M C O in the region lying between the eastern and the western 
extents of Abu Dhabi. 
Britain which was then representing Oman ' s and she ikhdoms ' interests challenged the 
Saudi authority to grant concess ion, on the basis ofAnglo-Ot toman convent iuon in 1913 and 
Anglo Turkish convention in 1914, which described the territory as the part of Oman and the 
Sheikhdoms: 
This dispute was almost settl led in 1936 as the parties to the dispute acceded to a 
proposal by Britain to demarca te the oasis among themselves .However , the outbreak of the 
Second World War prevented a formal agreement to this ef fec t . 
The issue was raked up again by the Saudi government in 1949 in a note to Britain in 
which " the sovereignty over the greater part of the territory lying between the base of the Qatar 
peninsula and the South eastern corner of the Persian G u l f was claimed(27) . The Buraimi 
const i tuted a major portion of the terri tories claimed by the Saudi government . 
The oasis was occupied by Saudi Arabia in 1952. The British Protectorate also 
recognized the Saudi occupat ion so long an agreement could not be reached at between the 
disputants . The negotiat ions between Oman and Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi issue began in 
1954. They agreed to hold negot ia t ions in the presence of a third party in Geneva. These talks 
took place in in 1955 but nothing tangible could copme out of it also. The failure of Geneva talks 
was fol lowed by the expulsion of Saudi forces, stationed since 1952, f rom Buraimi in the same 
year. An attempt by the UN in 1953 to resolve the dispute by sending a fact-f inding mission 
under Herbert de Pibbibng also failed(2S). 
It was not before the beginning of the 70s did the possibility of sett lement arise. In the 
first quar ter of the 70s the disputants showed the willingness to resolve it through negotiations. 
As a result, Saudi Arabia and the UAE signed a border agreement on July 29, 1974. Under 
this agreement : 
1) Saudi Arabia renunciated its claim over Buraimi in exchange for a corridor to the Gulf in 
Khor-Al-Udaid and also a t r iangular strip of land on Abu Dhabi ' s eastern border near Qatar. 
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2) Rich Zararah (Sabah) oil field was divided between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
3) Oman was given three and Abu Dhabi six of Buraimi vil lages (29). 
(B) OFFSHORE D I S P U T E S : 
IRAN'S CLAIM O V E R B A H R A I N : 
Iran 's claim over Bahrain, a group of 33 islands si tuated between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabian coast, (30) dates back to the 19th century. Though the is lands did not constitute the 
part of the Persian empire for most of the times, it never recognized Bahrain as a country nor 
its 
protectorate , the Great Bri tain (31). However, this confl ict too, as did the other ones, 
accentuated following the discovery of oil in Bahrain in the 1920s (32). 
Iran stakes claim over Bahrain on the basis of the latter having been the part of the Persian 
empire from a period preced ing the advent of Islam in Arabia til the Portuguese occupation of 
the island in 1507(33). Bahra in was a Portuguese colony far about a perion of hundred years 
before returning to Pe r s i a ' s sovereignty from 1602 to 1782. 
Since 1702, Bahrain has been ruled by Arabs and from 1862 by the British power. 
However , the Iranian side cla ims that Britain never established its sovereignty over Bahrain and 
in principle recognized Persia as the legitimate sovereign(34). 
The Iranian claim is disputed. The treaties signed between Britain and the ruler of 
Bahrain refer Bahrain to as an " independent country" with British jurisdict ion on its foreign 
affairs . 
Iran raised the issue fo l lowing the Britain 's decision to wi thdraw from the Persian Gulf 
in 1968. It opposed negot ia t ions among nine trucial Sheikhdoms, which included Bahrain, for 
a confederat ion. It, instead, demanded the return of the island to Iran. 
Interestingly, af ter the British withdrawal the crisis made a headway towards the 
solut ion against all expecta t ions . During 1968-69, Saudi Arabia used it good offices to convince 
Bahrain and Iran to settle the issue peaceful ly. The Shah 's visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
broke the 
ice, paving the way for an announcement by the Shah on Jan. 4, 1969 that "Iran would forgo 
its claim over Bahrain if the people of Bahrain do ot want to jo in my country" . 
The two countr ies also decided to refer the issue to the UN. The then General Secretary, 
U Thant , appointed Vit tor io Winas Peare Guicciardi, the then Director General of the UN of f ice 
in Geneva, as his personal representative to head a fact-f inding mission. The mission visited 
Bahrainbetween March 30 and April 18 ,1970. In its report the mission maintained that people 
of Bahrain wished for an independent state. Subsequently, the UN passed a resolution on May 
11 1970 declaring Bahrain as an independent country. The resolution was accepted by the Shah. 
T H E I R A N - U A E D I S P U T E : 
The dispute between Iran and the UAE is over Abu Musa and two Tunb islands, lying 
midway between the two countries. This dispute is the result of the overlapping of the territorial 
claims (35). Abu Musa is situated at 43 miles from Iran and 35 miles from the coast of Shra jah . 
The greater and lesser Tunbs are situated about 20 miles from the Iranian island of Qeshm(36). 
The area became a source of potential crisis after the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf 
region. However, until the British withdrawal (by then these islands had become strategically 
s ignif icant too) the dispute was limited to s taking of the claims and counter claims. The 
dispute virtually started in 1969 when Iran objected to the grant ing of oil concession to 
Occidental Petroleum' in Abu Musa and an area three miles under the its territorial sea limits 
by Umm-Al Qaiwain on Nov. 16,1969. Sharjah fol lowed the suit by granting concession on Dec. 
20, 1969 to 'Butte Gas and Oil ' in the island and on its territorial waters . Sharjah also extended 
its sovereignty over Abu Musa by a royal decree, dated Sept. 19, 1969. 
The islands are vital for Iran and the UAE for dif ferent reasons.These are important to 
the UAE as they contain vast deposits of oil. For Iran the islands are important from political 
and securi ty point of views than the economic. Iran possesses enough oil reservoirs to be allured 
by the oil underneath the islands. But a physical control over them can immensely reinforce 
I ran ' s posit ion in the Strait of Hurmuz. Though the importance of the islands to Iran has not 
receded as such with the passage of time, it was certainly greater on the eve of the British 
pullout, which provided Iran an opportunity to indulge in a muscle-f lexing exercise by vir tue 
of its geographical , military and demographic preponderance over the Arab Sheikhdoms 
await ing independence. 
Iran occupied the islands on Nov. 30 1971, a day before the British withdrawal . 
Encouraged in part by Bri ta in 's reluctance to restore the islands to their rightful owner and in 
part by the U A E ' s helplessness, the Shah was able to negotiate a favorable agreement with the 
la t ter .According to this agreement, the UAE recognised I r an ' s military control over the 
islands(37). 
However , the agreement, which is still relevant, is not the final settlement as both Iran 
and the U A E regard it a temporary measure and each of the two, as a matter of principle, 
considers them an integral part of their territories. A Memorandum of Understanding signed 
between the two countr ies two days after the Iranian occupat ion read "neither Iran nor Shar jah 
will give up its claim to Abu Musa nor recognize the other pa r ty ' s claim"(38). 
The Islamic regime did not abandon the Shah ' s occupation of the islands, instead decided 
to retain it which was a manifestation, as an observer views, of continuing with the S h a h ' s 
national security policy in connection to the islands (39). 
T H E O M A N - I R A N DISPUTE: 
This dispute now stands settled. The area under quest ion was a narrow strip of water , 
21 nautical miles wide between Iranian islands of Jazirat Larak and the Omani islet of great 
Qioin(40). Of 21 nautical miles of this waterway, a 6 nautical mile stretch falls under the 
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Iran and Oman signed a treaty on July 25, 1974 which divided the common boundaries 
into respective territorial waters on the Thalweg pr inciple .However , even then some points of 
demarcat ion do not strictly conform to this principle. For ins tance, the 21st demarcation point 
is 4.40 nautical miles closer to Oman than Iran. 
The ful l - f ledged demarcation of the offshore boundaries between these countries is also 
subjected to the delimitat ion of the offshore boundaries be tween Oman and Ras-Al Khaymah 
as well as between Oman and Sharjah. 
The absence of delimitation of boundaries between Oman and the two UAE Sheikhdoms 
carries a threat that any concession by the former to the latter two in delineating their o f fshore 
boundaries shall tamper with the Oman-Iran agreement of 1974. 
T H E D I S P U T E B E T W E E N KUWAIT A N D SAUDI A R A B I A : 
The dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is regarding the neutral zone which 
consists of small islands of Umma-Al Maradim and Qaru in the upper part of the Persian Gulf. 
These islands A R E SITUATED 16 and 25 miles off the costs of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
respectively. 
The dispute over the two islands started over the grant ing of the oil rights when the oil 
was discovered in the region. However, a set t lement, though temporary, prevented the 
escalat ion of the dispute. The two countries under the treaty of Uqair of 1922 decided to 
consider the islands as 'neutral zone ' . Since then the dispute is limited to the difference of 
interpretat ions over the terms and conditions of the 'would be final set t lement ' . 
Kuwait wants to regain its sovereignty over the islands whi le Saudi Arabia has proposed 
for co-sovereignty, meaning the partition of the neutral zone by half between them. 
Although a permanent solution remains elusive since 1922, the issue has never escalated 
into a serious political or military crisis(41). 
T H E B A H R A I N - Q A T A R DISPUTE : 
The dispute between Bahrain and Qatar is over the Hower islands. Sixteen in number, 
Hower being the largest of them, these islands are barren.Located over the village of Zubarah 
of Qatar in the Bay of Salwa in the south-east corner of the Persian Gulf, Hower islands are 
scantly one mile off from the Qatar peninsula from where it can be reached by foot at low tide. 
Bahra in ' s claim over the islands is based on it being the traditional home to the ruling family. 
In the wake of the dwindling oil resources in Bahrain and Qatar, the Hower islands aire 
increasingly becoming vital for the two countries because of vast reservoir of oil these 
possess(42) . 
However , the dispute has so far not turned into a major political, diplomatic or military 
hiatus between the two countries. It is, rather, confined to occasional reiteration of claim over 
the islands by each party, and accusing the other of conducting military maneuvers (43). 
T H E SAUDI A R A B I A - I R A N DISPUTE : 
The Saudi Arabia-Iran dispute was over Al-Arbiyah and A1 Farsiyeh islands and the area 
between the two islands. The two countries resolved the issue in 1968. Under an agreement, 
the boundaries were divided into three main segments . The median line between the opposite 
coasts consti tuted the boundaries in the southern segment . Saudi Arabia retained rights over 
Al-Arbiyah and Iran over A1 Farsiyeh (44). The median line principle is also applied in the 
demarcat ion of boundaries in the northern segment with the island of Kharag placed under 
Iranian jurisdict ion on the condition that the non-oil deposits will be shared by Iran with Saudi 
Arabia(45) . 
T H E I R A N - K U W A I T DISPUTE : 
The dispute between Iran and Kuwait pertains to the delimitation of bouridary in the 
upper part of the Persian Gulf waters. They have failed to resolve it through negotiat ions. 
Instead, by granting oil concessions and carrying out other activities in the region in question 
both Iran and Kuwait have maintained a semblance of control over the upper Gulf . 
Also, Kuwait has refused to recognize I ran 's sovereignty over the Kharag island, 209 
miles off the Kuwaiti mainland. Iran dismisses Kuwaiti sovereignty over the Faylakh island, 15 
miles from the Iranian mainland. 
T H E IRAN -QATAR DISPUTE : 
According to a bilateral agreement signed on Sept. 20, 1969, Iran and Qatar have 
demarcated their of fshore boundaries " in accordance with international Law and the Law of 
sovere ignty" . The two countr ies ,however, have yet not decided about the status of a number 
of islands lying on the either side of the boundary delimitation mark. Beside this, the northern 
terminal point is still undemarcated, pending the delimitation of Qatar-Bubiyan offshore 
boundar ies . 
SAUDI A R A B - O M A N : 
Saudi Arab and Oman extend confl ic t ing claims over the water whole of the Umm 
Zammul and the surrounding territory in the undemarcated border area covering the northwest 
riches of the Rub-Al Khali region. 
I D E O L O G I C A L CONFLICTS 
The Persian Gulf region is the hotbed of a variety of ideologicalconfl icts . These range 
f rom the geo-cultural ones, such as Persianism vs. Arabism, to the one between an indigenous 
and the alien ideologies, such as L-^ft Radicalism vs. Arab Conservatism, to intra ideological 
ones, such as Sheism vs. Sunnism or Radical Islamvs. Conservative, or Puritanical , Islam. 
P E R S I A N I S M V E R S U S ARABISM : 
Separated by the Persian Gulf waters , Iran and the Arab countries represent Persian and 
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Arab. ideologies respect ively. Each of the two ideologies denotes to a distinct language, 
cul ture and ethnicity. 
Even Islam, the common religion of the peoples on both sides, has failed to blur the 
d i f fe rences and animosity between these two ideologies. In fact, Persia was the only defeated 
power which did not give up its pre-Islamic cultural ethos and the tradtional language for the 
ones represented by the conquer ing Islamic forces from the Arab region. This happened despite 
the fact that the people of Persia embraced Islam in overwhelming number , and a large majority 
of them willingly. 
Newly converted Musl ims of Persia saw to it that they retained their language and culture 
by reducing the sphere of Arab ic language and Islam to religious aspects of their lives only (46). 
The Arab Muslims and their Iranian counterparts are since then culturally and ethnically 
apar t (47) . 
As against the case of Iran, Islamic conquests in Iraq and Syria and Egypt led to the 
replacement of the lat ter 's tradit ional Aramaic and Coptic languages respectively by Arabic. 
Even Arabic became one of the principle languages beside Greek and Latin, Roman and 
Byzant ine empires fol lowing the Islamic conquests there(48). 
The Arab rule in Persia did not, however, last long enough to have been able to replace 
an ancient nationalism with Arab ism. After regaining the control f rom Arabs, The Persian rulers 
revived Persian nationalism and thrived on its animosity to Arabism over successive centuries 
in order not to let the Is lamic concept of transnationalism, based on the unity of ' U m m a h ' (the 
Musl im community the world over), under 'Khi lafat ' ru le inf luence people of Persia. 
The geo-political factors have played a significant role in abating the Arab-Persian 
r ivalry. Each national ideologies grew in different geographical set t ings, segregated by a fairly 
large body of sea water, wi th well defined political boundaries. 
However, the post Wor ld War II, rivalry between Iran and Arab countries are more 
terri torial than cultural in nature. The Arabism of Nasserite variety in the 60s espoused the 
concept Arab as 'One Na t ion ' stretching from Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The Saddamite 
variety espouses revival of the 7th century Arab empire which included today ' s Iran conquered 
in 638 A.D. in the battle of Qadis iya. Saddam described the Iran-Iraq war as the replica of the 
bat t le of Qadisiya and potrayed his country as the defender of Arab nationalism against the 
"Persian racism"(49). 
The Shah of Iran in the 70s re-claimed the UAE, Bahrain and parts of Kuwait , Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia on the basis of the erstwhile Persian rule of these regions. If the Shah attempted 
to establish physical control over Arab territory, the Islamic government , which repalced the 
Shah, is said to have tried to expand the boundaries indirectly,by aspiring for Iran-like 
revolutionary changes in the Arab countries of the Perasian Gulf and subsequently subordinat-
ing the new governments to its central authority on the pr inciple of "Islam knows no 
boundar ies"(50) . 
16 
During the 70s, both Saddam Hussein and the Shah projected themselves as the mirror-
image of Arab and Pers ian heroes, respectively. Saddam portrayed himself as Nebuchadnezzar 
and the Shah as Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire. 
However, ideological rivalry between Iran and the Arab countr ies is not real but has been 
evoked to give subs tance to the typical 20th century inter-state aspirat ions for domination, 
inf lunce or national defense . That is why when these interests are served in maintaining peaceful 
relations, these ideological ly antagonistic countries become fr iendly.For instance, the Shah 
mend ties with the Arab monarchies and Iraq (with the latter since 1975 by signing Algiers 
Agreement) in the 70s. 
In other words , the ideological rivalry has been evoked when the relations between the 
two sides have deter iora ted .This has not initiated the deteriorat ion of relations as the case 
would have been. 
During the 50s, 60s and much of the 70s, factors other than the Arab-Persian rivalry 
dominated the relations be tween Iran and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. In the 50s, Iraq 
and Iran enjoyed very f r iendly relations by virtue of being the members of CENTO.So were the 
relations between Iran and the Arab countries in the 70s,except for a couple of years in the 
beginning of that decade, s t renghtend further by their common orientat ion towards the US. Iran 
rescinded its claim over Bahrain in 1972. It helped Oman to quell Dohfar resurgence.Saudi 
Arabia agreed to take up the responsibili ty of "policing" the Gulf along with Iran even though 
it largely mistrusted and envied the latter. Despite being apprehensive of the Shah ' s hagemonic 
designs, the smaller s ta tes looked to it as their protector against the threats from the Soviet 
Union and radical Iraq, a co-Arab viewed with a lot more skepticism than Iran. Iran was amused 
by the imposition of 1973 oil embargo against the US and other allies of Israel and led the Arab 
countr ies from the f ront in the subsequent quadrupling of the oil prices. 
Thus the Soviet threat , common affinity with the US, threats from radical powers of the 
region and the oil took much of the st ing out of the ideological rivalry between Arab countries 
and Iran in that decade . 
In the 80s, the advent of Islamic government to power in Iran and its bid to export Islamic 
revolution to the Arab countr ies were interpreted by the latter as a manifestat ion of Persianism, 
l inking the Iranian designs to Tehran ' s historical claims over the Arab World. 
However, in reality the Persian-Arab ideological rivalry had by and large diminished 
af ter the Shah ' s depar ture . Imam Khomeini ' s rhetorical pronouncements on export of revolu-
tion did not smack of terri torial expansion. Nor did they accompany the threat of an armed 
attack to overthrow monarchica l governments . 
The Islamic I r an ' s policy towards its Arab neighbors dur ing the Iran-Iraq War can not 
be dubbed as a militant expression of Persianism. If Iraq tried its best to color the war as a rivalry 
between Arab and Persian ideologies, Iran saw to it that Iraq did not succeed in its effort .Iran 
described the war as ' J i h a d ' , the term which also applies to the the defeat of Persia at the hands 
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of Arabs in 638 A.D.The portraying of the war in terms of Arab-Pers ian rivalry was not in the 
interests of Iran as one of its war object ives was to win over the Arab masses in the name of 
Islamic brotherhood so that they could rise in revolt against their own governments in an 
expression of religious solidarity with Persian people. 
The Arab s ta tes ' support to Iraq stemed from realpolitik than ideological considerations, 
such as the espousal of Arab cause by Baghdad. In such a scenario, the ideologically driven non-
bell igerent Arab states would have sought total humiliation of Iran. On the contrary, once the 
chances of the spreading of the war to their territories receded, they preferred a stalemate 
between Iran and Iraq or the end of the war in a draw with both the belligerents returningexhausted 
and militarily weak. The Arab states also wanted that from the war Iraq emerged as a docile and 
humble power, obl iged for their financial assistance to it, and not as a military giant turning to 
settle its territorial scores with them. The glorification of Arabism did not certainly call forsuch 
a policy. 
The Arab states outside the Persian Gulf region did not def ine their posit ions in the war 
on the basis of Arab-Pers ian rivalry. This is illustrated by the fact that barring Egypt and Jordan, 
most of the non-Pers ian Gulf Arab countries, from PDRY to Algeria , supported the Non-Arab 
Iran. 
That the Iran-Iraq war was the very epitome of an ideological rivalry is further 
invalidated by the fact that a considerable section of the the Arab populat ion of Iran supported 
the country they were the citizens of and thousands of Iranians residing in Arab countries did 
not sympathise 
with I ran 's war. Given a large scale set t lements of Arab people in Iran and the Iranians ' in Arab 
lands, the ethnicity and ideology based support of these peoples to the bell igerents must have 
cut across the national and regional boundaries . 
At present, The Arab-Pers ian rivalry is not all that overt in nature. However , It has not 
entirely disappeared. The Islamic government has not abandoned Iran 's historical claims over 
Arab territories, as borne out by the raking up of the Abu Musa and Tunbs issue by it with the 
UAE in mid-1992. On quite a few occasions, the Iranian clerics have claimed to be the spiritual 
leader of the people of Bahrain and the UAE as well as the people of Iranian origin live in these 
countr ies . This can hasten one to conclude that the Persianism in the guise of Islam or the 
vice-versa cont inues to be an important foreign policy agenda of Iran. 
The controversy over the name of the region is the most vivid example of Arab-Persian 
rivalry in the 1990s. The Islamic government of Iran is not even ready to name it as ' Islamic 
G u l f a proposal that is acceptable to the Arab states. Whereas , the Arab governments have 
s ince the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war ceaselessly called it as 'A rab G u l f in total disregard to 
the fact that it has been referred to as 'Persian Gu l f in historical and off icial Arabic language 
records(51) .The I ranian media refer to the GCC as (P)GCC. It is surpris ing that the GCC 
member states have not responded by putt ing the prefix ' A r a b ' before the word ' G C C . 
The fact that the Arab countries and Iran are predominantly peopled by Sunnis and Shias 
respectively has created an impression that the Arab-Persian animosity has sectarian connota-
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t ions. This prognosis is a largely untested logic. Going by this logic, the Arab Shias should have 
identified themselves with the Persianism practiced by the people of the same sect in Iran. So 
have done the Iranian Sunnis vis-a-vis the Arabism. In o the rwords , the Arab-Persian rivalry can 
acquire a sectarian dimension only by repudiating its very basis. 
Also, Sheism is not an anti-Arab creed since it was the off ic ia l creed of the Persian empire 
and later of Iran and the largest concentration of its fol lowers is in Iran. As a matter of fact, 
Sheism took birth in the Arab land as a result of di f ferences over the sucession after the death 
Prophet Mohammed, an Arab . Needless to say, Hazrat Ali , w h o m the Shias, the word Shia 
literally meaning his ' sympath izers ' , claim as the true successor of the Prophet and who is held 
in the highest esteam among the revered Islamic figures by them, was also an Arab. 
IRAN'S I S L A M I C R A D I C A L I S M VS. IRAQ'S B A A T H I S T RADICALISM : 
This ideological confl ic t has a definite geographical character being confined to Iran and 
Iraq only. Iran is the only proponent of the radical Islam in the Persian Gulf and none other than 
Iraq practices Baathism in that region. 
As Iran has acquired the reputation of an Islamic state and Iraq as the only follower of 
Baathism, roughly the Arab replica of Socialism if not exactly the Marxism Leninism, this rivalry 
is principally the one between a religious idelogy and a secular one. Yet, when the Baathism 
confronts the Iranian Is lamism, it too takes recourse in Islam. The Arab ethnicity of the prophet, 
the revelation of the Holy Quran in Arabic, a recognition to this l anguage ' s superiority over the 
non-Arab languages, and the introduction of Islam in the Arab region so that the brave, 
adventurous and enl ightened Arabs could spread it all thorough the world are used by Iraq as 
Arab challenge to I r an ' s self-proclaimed role of the champion of Islamic cause in the 20th 
century. 
The very secular nature of Baathist doctrine comes in the handy for Iran to dub Iraq 's 
ruling regime as " inf ide l" . Iran is doubly compelled to launch rel igious propaganda against Iraq 
as it conforms to its broaders t ra tegy of instigating the Sunnis, beside the the Shia population, 
of Iraq against Saddam regime. 
It is not poss ible to dissociate this stream of idelogical rivalry from the Iran-Iraq War 
and the historical antagonism between the two states. Had there been no war between them, they 
would have cshed in on their rivalry in their quest for regional dominance, in interfering in each 
o ther ' s internal a f fa i r s particularly in the context of Kurdish rebellion, which has been 
spearheaded by both the secular and the Islamic groups in Iraq as well as in Iran, and in 
legit imizing their respect ive stands on the boundary disputes. 
This ideological rivalry has not always been incompatible . This is borne out by the fact 
that the Baathist government of Iraq granted fifteen years asylum to Imam Khomeini, more so 
it extended support to his s truggle against the Shah and o f fe red him to use Shie religious 
centers, Najaf and Karbala , in Iraq as the base for the same. However , it can not be denied that 
the Baathist support to Imam Khomeini ' s Islamic struggle s temmed from "enemy 's enemy is 
fr iend" logic than from any ideological solidarity. 
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But, the Baathist support to Islamic struggle in the pre revolut ion days points to the fact 
that the Baathist-Islamic radicalism rivalry can at times be subordinated to the existing patterns 
of inter-state relations and internal (both in Iran and Iraq) and external environment. 
This is fur ther re inforced by the fact notwithstanding the confl ict ing nature of two 
doctrines, Iran avoided demeaning the Baathism as a whole so as not to displease the war ally, 
Syria, the other Baathist state in the Arab world. Interest ingly, In its defamation campaign 
against Iraq, Iran has targeted the ruling regime of Iraq more than the Baathism. 
ISLAMIC R A D I C A L I S M VS. ISLAMIC C O N S E R V A T I S M : 
This conflict is of Immense academic interests as it centers around the issues concerning 
Islamic state and government , political rights of people under Is lam, mode of political change, 
and the Islamic 
economy. 
Iran's Islamic radical ism quotes from the Holy Quran and other Islamic sources to dub 
the Arab monarchies as "un-Is lamic" and prove that Islam provuides for a government by a' 
religious personality "able to rule" and "supported by the p e o p l e " (52). 
The Persian Gulf monarchies maintain that the Holy Q u r a n ' s concept of state calls for 
the establishment of a "wel fa re state" and not a particular form of government or state. 
Islamic radical ism of Iran exhorts people to uproot an unpopula r government as this is 
their Islamic duty whi le the Arab conservatism quotes Quranic verses, asking the people to 
remain faithful to their country and government. 
Islamic radicalism of Iran highlights people 's right under Islam to participate in the 
public affairs while the Arab conservatism considers people rights are confined to being 
properly looked af ter by their government and provided basic necessi t ies of life. 
similarly, the I ran ' s Islamic radicalism is for equal distr ibution of state 's resources and 
income among people and describes the government as custodian of these resources while the 
Islamic conser\ 'atism of the Arab countries interprets that the s ta te ' s total control over the 
means of economic product ion is the logical extension of the gove rnmen t ' s right to act as the 
custodian. 
Taking a leaf f rom Islamic principles, the Iranian government describes the conservative 
regimes as "un-Islamic' because of these being unpopular and ruled by non-religious personali-
ties, deriving the source of their power from the tribal setup than from the people as single unit 
of the political system. 
As against this, the Arab regimes accuse the Iranian government of being sectarian and 
racial, aiming at creating a wedge within the Islamic community of the world, creating instability 
in neighboring Muslim countries, and involved in a large-scale oppression of people of Islamic 
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subsects other that the Shia and Non-Muslim minori t ies inside the country. 
Interest ingly, the two ideologies bear a few similari t ies too. For instance, both the 
ideologies do not support Westminster model of democracy . Nor do they maintain that the 
Quranic concept of an able and popular government necessi tates periodical elections (53), the 
party system and a constitutionally recognized opposi t ion. 
On the quest ion of rights o fwomen , non-Musl ims and aliens, the two camps practice the 
policy of "denia l" in violation of the Islamic principles in this regard. 
This ideological conflict veers around political and to a limited extent social and 
economic issues. The Shia-Sunni differences over ' F iqh ' ( Is lamic jurisprudence), such as the 
interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah or the per forming and the timing of prayers, have 
not cropped up. 
This confl ict is a ideological conflict in the true sense of the term and not an inter-state 
rivalry in the guise of an ideological conflict: Al though it is widely held in the case of Iran that 
behind the veneer of " e x p o r t of ideology", there lies inherent its territorial ambitions in the 
region. 
This percept ion can be discounted on the ground that I ran ' s high profile campaign for 
"export of ideology", aiming at overthrowing the un-Is lamic governments , is not matched by 
its little role in foment ing, sponsoring and sustaining the rebel forces, many of whom are also 
inspired by the Is lamic revolution, in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Undergoing a 
process of political chaos and instability soon after coming to the power and later entangled in 
a war with Iraq, the Iranian government was hardly in a posit ion to and capable of doing 
so.Thus, it del iberately limited its campaign to a great deal to rhetorics only in the hope that 
the Arab people on their own would succeed in toppling the monarchical governments .Only in 
a few cases, such as in 1980 coup attempt in Bahrain and strikes in Shia-dominated areas of 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the aftermath of the sucess of the Islamic revolution, could the 
Iranian involvement , that too latent, be established. 
A ful l -blooded Iranian involvement would have resulted into the eruption of a large scale 
rebellion spreaded all through the region, instead of the stray cases of politically motivated 
violence conf ined to a few countries and few places in the each of them. 
Throughout the war , Iran relentlessly propagated for the export of revolution through 
press, broadcasts , and speeches of clerics and other leaders (54). But on the other hand it 
refrained from expanding the war to the non-bell igerent Persian Gulf countries even when 
provoked by Iraq to do so. Iran even decided not to retal iate against the shoot ing down of its 
foura i rc ra f t s by Saudi Arabia in 1984. I t sa t tackon the ships of Arab countries in 1987 was more 
symbolic than real. This proves that Iran 's rehetorics about the export of revolution was not 
matched by an aggeressive stand agaisnt the Arab allies of Iraq in the region. 
Af te r the end of the Iran-Iraq War, particularly in the 1990s, the relations between Iran 
and its conservat ive neighbors have improved with Iran having almost abandoned its export of 
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revolution policy. 
Principally, Iran still regards the conservative socio-political system of the Arab Gulf 
states as un-Islamic but does not give vent to its feeling through radio broadcasts or in policy 
pronouncements . In this decade the most contentious aspect of the ideological rivalry between 
Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies is the issue of the status of Mecca and Madina, where the 
two holiest of Islamic shrines are situated. 
Consider ing the twin cities as belonging to the Muslim the World over, Iran refuses to 
recognize Saudi sovereignty over them. It has urged the Saudi government to hand the 
administrat ion of the shrines to a confederat ion of all the Muslim states. Iran also has the desire 
to keep the ideological conflict alive, not with a view to antagonise the Arab neighbors but 
publ ic consumption and to retain its claim as the only Islamic state in the world. 
A R A B R A D I C A L I S M VS. A R A B C O N S E R V A T I S M : 
Iraq and South Yemen represent the Arab radicalism and the monarchical Arab govern-
ments of the Saudi peninsula the Arab conservativism. Form South Yemen ' s side, this dispute 
ref lected in its opposi t ion to the independence of trucial states after the British withdrawal and 
their membership to the Arab League. It also got manifesated in South Yamen ' s military and 
financial support to the Dohfar rebellion in Oman. 
South Yemen pursued its boundary disputes with Oman and Saudi Arabia in the cloak 
of ideo log ica l r ival ry ins tead of a d o p t i n g mil i tary pos tu res or i ndu lg ing in direct 
confronta t ion.This is why it never asked for Soviet Union ' s help, available in the form the 
la t ter ' s military presence on its ports, with a view to establish its control over the disputed 
regions. 
Beside giving unfl inching support to the Dohfar rebellion, spearheaded by the 'Popular 
Front for Liberat ion of Oman (PFLO), later named as the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Occupied Gulf (PFLOG), the National Front government of South Yemen described the Dohfar 
movement as the extension of its revolutionary struggle in the Persian Gulf. 
However , fo l lowing the suppression of the Dohfar movement in 1975, South Yemen 
deviated from its radicalism in favor of entering into formal relations with the monarchical 
governments . Saudi Arabia-South Yemen diplomatic relations were established in 1976. In the 
late 70s, South Yemen established diplomatic relations with Qatar and Bahrain and in 1982 with 
Oman too. With Kuwait and the UAE, which had diplomatic ties with South Yemen since late 
60s and the early 70s respectively, South Yamen closed ranks on political and economic fronts 
(55) . These two countries became Aden ' s largest trading patterns and principal aid givers in the 
Persian Gulf region. 
In fact, Before 1975, the Arab-Israeli War and the oil embargo had paved the way for 
rapprochement between South Yemen and the Gulf kingdoms. But this was overshadowed by 
Y e m e n ' s total support to the Dohfar movement . The defeat of the movement let pragmatism 
take 
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precedence over ideology. South Yemen found the conservative regimes as a source of 
economic aid and diplomatic entree in the Persian Gulf politics. 
The radical threat to the Arab neighbors from the Baathist Iraq always persisted in some 
form or other but remained subsided in the two decades preceeding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. Both the rivals used to verbally criticize each o ther ' s ideology but neither did Iraq 
resort to helping radical forces within the monarchical states nor did the monarchical govern-
ments utilize their financial clout to help the Kurdish rebellion inside Iraq. 
In fact, the conservat ive states were more concerned at the dangers of Iraqi expansion-
ism, basically a Pre-Baathist characterist ic, than at an covert or overt attempt on I raq ' s part to 
create internal instability (56). The incidences of I raq 's direct military actions against neighbor 
Arabs are far more than those of support ing leftist movements or rebellion in these countries. 
This proves that Iraqi military invasions or threats were based on the object ives other 
than the ideological ones. These object ives can be summarized as the control over oil resources 
and the expansion of national frontiers by Iraq. Otherwise, had the occupation of Kuwait had 
an ideological connotation only, Saddam Hussein would have pulled his forces out of it after 
install ing a pro-Iraq democrat ic government instead of annexing it. 
The Geo-strategic dimension, bereft of any ideological flavor, of Iraqi confrontat ion 
with the Arab states is fur ther highlighted by the contrast in Iraqi objectives of attacking Iran 
in 1980 and Kuwait ten years later. The nature of Iraqi attack against Iran, particularly the 
deployment of force and the limited number of battalions used in initial days, show that I raq 's 
main aim was not to occupy Iran but to create political chaos, leading to the removal of the 
Islamic government. 
Even Iraq did not off icial ly announce the annexing of the Iranian territories it conquered 
during the war, although liberation of the Khuzestan, peopled by Arabs and claimed to be the 
part of Iraq under Turkish rule, was one of Baghdad ' s official war objectives. 
On a number of occasions the relations between the Iraq and its Arab neighbors were de-
ideologised. The relations in the 70s can be described as friendly and in the 80s as very close. 
There were irritants and constraints but none amounted to the deterioration in the relations. 
Commonalty of interests, including the realisation fact that they belong to the same 
ideological camp in Arabi-Iran rivalry, overcame the ideological constraints in the bilateral 
relations. Iraq was courted by the conservat ive states to contain the Shah in the same way as 
the latter was used to checkmate the Baathist threat. 
On the Arab-Israeli issue and that of the oil embargo, Iraq joined hands with the 
conservat ive regimes and after the Egypt ' s ouster f rom the Arab fold, Iraq tired to win over 
these regimes to prop it up as the new leader of the Arab world. 
The Islamic revolution and the outbreaking of the Iran-Iraq War fol lowed in quick 
succession. The threat these events posed to Iraq as well its Arab neighbors brought them 
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closer, with the conservative s tates providing financial support to Iraq to the tune of $50 billion 
and 
Baghdad claiming to have fought the war on behalf of all the Arab countries of the region. 
The relations between Iraq and the conservative Arab states since the former ' s invasion 
of Kuwait remain severed and soured. As a result, the ideological rivalry has again cropped up, 
but in a changed form if not the substance. 
Saddam Hussein 's t irade against monarchical governments is now more on Islamic lines 
than the Baathist. However , it would be too early to presume that Saddam Huseein has finally 
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shunned the Baathism at least in the sphere of his relations wi th the neighbor Arabs. But what 
can be said with a measure of authority that at present the ideological rivalry is a reminiscent 
of the 1980s' Is lamic conservat ism vs. Islamic radicalism between Arab states and Iran and not 
a reflection of the Iraqi radicalism vs. Arab conservatism. 
DYNASTIC RIVALRY 
The Persian Gulf is the arena of another form of conf l ic t also, that is among the rulers 
of Arabian peninsula. This conflict lacks the "personality cu l t " as is found in the one between 
Hafiz-Al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. Rather it is a cont inuat ion of age-old dynastic rivalries. 
The conflict over the Buraimi Oasis between Saudi Arabia and Oman is inter-linked with 
the dynastic rivalry be tween the rulers of the two countries. For King Fahad the oasis is the 
matter of ancestral pr ide . For Sheikh Ziyad it is the symbol of pride too as it has been his 
ancestral home and the place where he spent his formative years . 
In the case of Sheikh Ziyad of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rasheed of Dubai,the dynastic 
conflict between them revolvs around the issue of the respect ive claims to the post of the head 
of the state of the U A E . Ziyad extended his claim for and secured the top slot on the ground 
the Rashid 's family occupied second position in the tribal hierarchy before it moved out from 
Abu Dhabi for Dubai and settled there in the early 19th century. Sheikh Saqar bridles at being 
contended with a lower niche in comparison to the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
Both Qatar and Bahra in opted out from the negot ia t ions on the proposed federation of 
nine trucial states at the eve of the British withdrawal mainly because Al-Khalifa of Bahrain and 
al Thani of Qatar were not prepared for a position lower in rank to that of the other one ' s in 
the power arrangement . 
C A U S E S OF CONFLICTS IN T H E P E R S I A N GULF 
The causes of the var ious conflicts in the Persian Gulf are rooted in the history, politics 
and geo-strategy of the region. 
HISTORY: 
History, both distant and the recent, is described as the ma jo r source of the outbreak and. 
continuance of both ideological and territorial conflicts in the region. 
The boundaries of present states have always been in a state of flux in the past, hence 
overlapping claims over a particular portion of land and islands by two countriers and in some 
cases more than that. The Ottoman empire stretched, in the Persian Gulf region, over today 's 
Kuwait, parts of Iraq and Iran. The Persian empire, which Iran represents, included the UAE, 
Bahrain and a number of islands presently under Kuwai t ' s and Saudi Arabia ' s control. As a 
result, Iraq extends its c la ims over both Kuwait and the areas adjacent to the Shat t ' s estuary. 
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Iran, on the other hand, jus t i f ies its claim over the UAE and Bahrain. 
The territorial disputes in the region are the continuation of those existing since long. 
The Shalt dispute, fought over by the Ottoman and Persian empires over hundreds of years, is 
the most notable among these. 
Changing loyal t ies of the people of the disputed area f rom one disputant state to another 
and the human occupat ion in an area shif t ing from the people of one ethnicity in a particular 
period to the people of some other ethnicity in the other per iods have given birth to 
contentious claims. 
Came the European powers and they divided the region in "spheres of inf luence" in total 
disregard to the historical , ethnic and geographic reali t ies(57). These "spheres of influence" 
emerged as sover ign states after the British withdrawal. But the withdrawal alsoled the mother 
countries to revive their claims on these newly independent states as these happened to be the 
part of their historical boundaries . 
T E R R I T O R I A L N A T I O N A L I S M : 
One of the negat ive ef fec ts of the Arabs ' contact with the European powers has been the 
inculcation of a s t rong sense of territorial nationalism among the former. In the pre-colonial 
days, this practice was limited to Ottoman and Persian empires. The Saudi peninsula was by and 
large ignorant of terri torial nationalism of the western kind. But the growing consciousness of 
statehood has inter locked the peninsular states into rivalries which did not exist in the past; for 
example, disputes on sovereignty over the continental shelf bed and territorial water. The 
national consciousness prevented the small Sheikhdoms from coalescing into a single political 
unit and even ensued confl ic ts among various consti tuents of a state, for instance, the UAE. 
POLITICAL S Y S T E M : 
Since most of the regional countries are not democrac ies , people, the media, interest 
groups and armed forces do not keep a check on their gove rnmen t ' s territorial designs(58). It 
is not to deny that the boundary disputes do not exist be tween two democracies, but the 
possibility of the f lar ing up of these disputes into ful l - f ledged conflicts is remote in the case of 
two democracies . 
In fact, the non democrat ic countries have glorified wars to establish political legitimacy. 
In some cases the ruling regimes have deliberately stayed away f rom finding a peaceful solution 
to the their d isputes out of the fear that granting some concess ions to the opponent power 
during 
the peace process may lead to a public revolt. This was one of the underlying reasons behind 
I raq ' s refusal to pull out of Kuwait when the war with allies and the likely defeat had become 
inevitable. A meek surrender than a valiant defeat at the hands of a far stronger military power 
ran a greater risk. 
G E O G R A P H Y : 
The intricate geo-structure of the Persian Gulf region is alone the cause of many a 
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confl ict . Iraq would have had hardly any objection to demarcate its boundaries with Iran along 
the Shatt through the Tha lweg method had the access of this oil export ing country to the sea-
lanes not passed through the neighbor 's side of the Tha lweg. 
Most of the islands in Persian Gulf waters fall within the 12 nautical territorial water 
limits of more than one state. Persian Gulf is shallow with its average depth being 40 meters. 
Because of these reasons all of the seabed is the continental shelf is subjected, according to the 
contemporary international law, to economic exploitation by almost all the countries of the 
region. The width of the Persian Gulf is far less than the prescribed limit of 200 nautical miles. 
The result : over lapping of rights over resources underneath the waters . 
The western side of the Persian Gulf is more shal low. This results into the formation of 
a large number of islands that lie within the territorial jur isdic t ion of the majority of the coastal 
states on the westewrn side and are, therefore, subject to mult i lateral disputes. 
It is relatively deeper on the Iranian side. Therefore , there are fewer islands on this side. 
This compells Iran to eye on all those islands on the western side coast which fall well within 
Teh ran ' s territorial limits. The problem is fur ther compounded due to the fact that an island 
consti tutes the part of land territory of a country, extending, thereby, its territorial water limits 
farther. 
The Tha lweg method od the settlement of a part icualr d ispute does not suit to the Persian 
Gul f ' s typical geo-physical conditions. The employing of this method implies physically 
dividing a number of islands. Added to this is the problem that f rom where the medianline be 
measured, the coastl ine of the main territory of a country or the coastl ine of the islands that that 
county 
possesses . 
The oil factor fur ther complicates the issue. The part ies to a territorial dispute are not 
prepared to relinquish their claims overis lands fa l l ingunder the i r sovere ign jurisdiction as these 
islands and the seabed over 12 nautical miles all around it contain a large oil reservoirs (Bubiyan, 
Warbah and Huwar , Abu Musa and Tunbs) (59). 
Accords pertaining to island disputes do not qual i fy as ideal and permanent settlemeijts. 
There lies inherent the possibility of violation, annulment and varying interpretation of these 
accords by either of or both the states. Both Iran and the UAE describe Abu Musa and Tunbs 
as the integral part of their territories although they have already s igned ah agreement according 
to which the former enjoys military control of them and the later the economic and the 
administrat ive control. 
The s igning of treaties on the Shatt and their abrogat ions have followed one after the 
other s ince the 17th century. A number of agreements on boundary disputes are half-baked. 
They at best have frozen a dispute for the time being instead of providing a permanent solution 
(Saudi Arab-Kuwai t agreement on Neutral Zone). 
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Yawning asymmetr ies in size and mili tary strength between the disputantsis one of the 
main causes behind the boundary disputes assuming the form of military conflagrat ions. 
Interest ingly, the large-sized s tates 'mindset is that they are not prepared to recognize their tiny 
neighbors as a state of equal status in the internartional community . The military prowess of 
these countries induces them to undo what they consider an injust ice done to them by the British 
powers . This approach underlines I raq 's behaviour towards Kuwait and that of Iran towards the 
UAE or Bahrain. 
The s t ronger powers ' urge for regional supremacy is the by-product of the above-
mentioned asymmetr ies . The Shah occupied the U A E ' s islands knowing that the UAE did not 
have the capabil i ty to withstand the Iranian assault . The same force worked behind Iraqi designs 
in Kuwait . The annexat ion Kuwait would project Iraq as a formidable land-sea power vis-a-vis 
other Arab states of the region and Iran was an important part of Saddam Husse in ' s over all 
strategy behind invading Kuwait. 
The regional motives, however, have been the source of conflict between the two 
symmetrical powers also. Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Shah, despite maintainig friendly 
relations, were reluctent in co-sharing the role of the regional policeman. Saudi Arabia 
thoroughly opposed Iranian intervention in Oman to suppress the Dohfar movement though it 
in itself was threatened considerably by the likelihood of Dohfars ' victory. Saudi Arabia also 
expressed reservat ions to the American decision to bestowthe responsibility of policing the 
Persian Gulf on the Shah. 
A replica af Iran-Saudi Arabia relations was those between Iraq and Saudi Arabia during 
the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia never liked the prospects of an outright victory of Iraq. And 
one of its object ives to help Iraq financially was to neutralize Iraqi claim of defending 
the Arab world all alone. 
A m o n g enemies , Iran and Iraq have competed for this status by containing each o ther ' s 
inf luence among the Arab peninsular countries, through entering an arms race and trying to 
outmaneuver each other on regional issues 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICTS 
AN OUTGROWTH OF HISTORICAL CONFLICTS : 
This prognosis , although true to a large extent, needs to be re-examined as histoi-y may 
not be the both a factor in all the conflicts and not a factor at all in some specif ic confl icts . 
In most of the cases of territorial disputes in the region the causes of their origin is found 
in the history. This approach is wittingly or unwittingly influenced by the historical rights the 
disputant states advance to the territory in quest ion. For example, the reasons behind these 
disputes are general ly stated to be the absence of the practice of boundary demarcat ion, shif t ing 
tribal loyalties and human migration from and to a disputed area. But these very factors at a same 
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t ime deny the historicity of a dispute due to following reasons. 
First, since the boundary demarcat ions were not common in the past and those carried 
out by the imperialist powers were arbitrary, the modern nation-states in the Persian gulf are 
not the legal and typical case of successor states. Second, if the human migration was a 
cont inuous 
phenomenon in the past, a portion of land which a state claims on the basis that it was the part 
of the territory of its mother state during a particular period might have been the part of the 
mother state of the other state dur ing some other period (s). 
Also, in the past the disputes in the region were tribal not the terri torial . The wars in 
those days were fought not for the extension of boundaries but for conquering tribe or tribes 
by another tribe. The possession of land the defeated tribe inhabited was, therefore, the result 
not the factor behind the outbreak of those wars . The territorial jur isdict ion of a state were 
determined by the loyalty it received from tribes. Thus, the territorial boundaries of a state were 
not necessarily contiguous as is the case with modern nation states. Thus, the intra-tribal wars 
of the old days are not a precursor of present territorial disputes in the Persian Gulf .The only 
dispute which fits into the description of a historical dispute is that over the Shatt between Iran 
and Iraq. 
Most of the territorial disputes in the region are the outcome of the geo-strategic factors. 
These have erupted after the discovery of oil or as a result of eco-strategic requirements of a 
20th century nation-state (60), whi le a dispute of historical magnitude generally happens to be 
an ever persist ing phenomenon. But in the case of the disputes in the Persian Gulf region it seems 
that their historical antecedents have been re-discovered by the disputants to give sustenance 
to theirclaims. This is fur ther substantiated by the fact that the territories which are strategically 
and economical ly not important have not been the bone of contention between the two states. 
Al though in a region undemarcated in the past, each portion of land can be a subject of dispute. 
As matter of fact, the boundary disputes in the region are the product of a recent history, 
the unnatural demarcation of the s tates and carving out of a web of small states on the western 
shore of the Persian Gulf by the colonial powers. With tribal loyalties being the main 
determinant 
of the territorial boundaries of Arab peninsular states during the pre-colonial days, some tribes 
have not reconciled to the fact that a tribe dominated by it in the past is now the part of another 
state fol lowing the arbitrary demarcat ion of the region in the 18th, 19th and the early 20th 
centuries . The coming up of small states on the western shore of the narrow body of Gulf waters 
has created the disputes over the demarcation of the territorial water and right over the 
continental shelf among themselves and with Iran on the other side. 
T H E S U P E R P O W E R S R I V A L R Y : 
Of the Third World confl icts those in the Persian gulf region were hardly an extension 
of superpowers rivalry. All the disputes preceded superpowers rivalry in general and their 
rivalry in the Persian Gulf, which started after the British withdrawal except in I ran ' s case, in 
part icular
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These are local in nature and they had not involved the superpowers on the opposite 
sides. All the confl ic ts in the Arab Peninsula are between the countries which belong to the US 
bloc. Thus the US pract iced neutrali ty and either of the disputant sides did not generally seek 
Soviet support, leaving, therefore , a little room for the superpowers ' involvement . 
The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, the one involving the countries of opposite global 
power blocs was a low-prof i le dispute when the cold warwas in its hey day. Iraq 's invasion of 
Kuwait took place when the Soviet Union had almost retired f rom global politics. Although the 
war between Iraq and Iran was fought when the New cold war was in full swing, but partly due 
to I ran ' s antagonism vis -a-vis the superpowers and partly due to the fact that the threat of Iran 
emerging, if it happened to win the war, into a regional power independent of supoerpowers 
domination, the two superpowers sided with Iraq. 
The US has not shown any interests in resolving the boundary disputes among its allies. 
It did not consider these disputes detrimental to its policy of containment of the Soviet Union 
as the chances of ei ther of the part ies to the dispute turning to the Soviet Union for support were 
almost unlikely. 
The role of the superpowers in the conflict prevention has been negligible. They did not 
make any endeavor joint ly or separately to resolve any of these imbroglios, except once while 
cooperat ing to assure the adopt ing of the Security Council Resolution 598 which turned out to 
be the basis of the end of the Iran-Iraq War. But, the acceptance of the resoltuion 598 by Iran 
was an independent decision and not a result of any external pressure. In the termination of the 
Iran-Iraq war, therefore , the role of the superpowers was confined to faci l i tat ing the adopting 
of the resoltuion 598. 
The superpowers did play the role of the confl ict-manager directly as well as indirectly. 
Common bond with the US restrain the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf from escalating their 
boundary disputes. Both the superpowers perceived the regional confl ic ts as issues of local 
s ignif icance, therefore ref ra ined from using these in their global confrontat ion. This way they 
prevented the internat ional izat ion of these conflicts (61). 
L A R G E L Y N O N - V I O L E N T : 
Majority of the confl ic ts in the Persian Gulf have been non-violent . Only four of them 
viz. , the Iranian occupat ion of Abu Musa and Tunbs, the Iran-Iraq dispute over the Shatt in the 
70s, the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian Gulf War fall 
in the category of violent disputes . 
The territorial dispute, in particular, has strictly been a diplomatic duel, with a few of 
them occasionally escalat ing into border skirmishes such as the one between Oman and Saudi 
Arabia in 1955, Iran and Iraq dur ing the 70s over the Shatt and Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 
September 1992. 
The Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi aggression of Kuwait look on the face of it a war over 
boundary disputes but actually the issues behind the outbreak of these crises were other than 
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what normally do not const i tute the part of a territorial dispute. As regards the Iran-Iraq war, 
it started immediately a day after Iraq abrogated the 1975 Algiers agreement, while the side 
which started the war was Iraq not Iran. The issues which prompted military action were I raq 's 
aim to topple the Islamic Revolution, to pre-empt an internal resurgence by the Shie population 
and to emerge as the leader of the Arab World by defeat ing its traditional enemy Iran, which 
af ter the revolution had begun to look dangerous to the internal stability of each of the Arab 
countr ies of the Persian Gulf . 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not an outburst of the brewing up of the tension over 
contentious Bubiyan and Warbah islands, an issue which, otherwise, did not rake up throughout 
the Iran-Iraq War and two years after its end. A boundary dispute with a potential to culminarte 
into an invasion or a war must have hardly been a subsided one in the preceding decade. 
That the conflicts in the Persian Gulf have not turned volati le is explained in the very nature of 
these conflicts. The territorial conflicts are more technical than political which entail a 
negotiated settlement than a military solution. Some of the confl ic ts are under the process of 
set t lement and, therefore, by and large subsided. As far as the conflicts over the exploitation 
of natural resources and extension of territorial jurisdiction are concerned, the parties know 
that the use of force to realize their object ives would not give legitmacy to their claim. 
The settlements of these confl icts through the use of force is harmful in cost-benefit 
calculations also. As far as the Arabian peninsular countries are concerned, they run the risk of 
ruptur ing security ties and economic and political cooperation among themselves by doing 
so . 
The smaller countries with a limited manpower and an underdeveloped economic base 
are vulnerable to a long war . Recognizing their relatively weaker military strength and the lack 
of strategic depth, they ensure it that they do not provide the stronger power an excuse for 
s tar t ing a war(62). In a few cases, these conflicts could not f lare up due to the militarily weaker 
s ta tes ' passive reaction to a stronger power ' s aggrandizement . The UAE did not resist Iranian 
occupation of its islands. In 1977, Saudi Arabia allegedly occupied some o f t h e disputed islands 
in the neutral zone between it and Kuwait but the latter decided not to retaliate. In the wake 
of Saudi attack on its military post in September 1992, Qatar did not offer any resistance. It, 
instead, used political means, such as thretening to withdraw from the GCC. to avert the crisis. 
Before the Iraqi invasion the Kuwaiti government tried to use diplomatic means and financial 
resources, to an extent of agreeing to give in to Iraqi demand of oil price hike and waiving off 
its debts to it, to avert it. The UAE, whose three islands Iran had occupied, maintianed most 
cordial relation with Tehran in the Iran-Iraq war. 
In the perception of the Arab peninsular countries the securi ty threats to them emanated 
f rom outside powers viz., Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Soviet Union. The common threat perception 
restrained them from blowing up the intra-regional dispute in order to exhibit unity and 
solidarity 
among themselves to extra regional threats. 
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T H E IRAN-IRAQ A N D T H E PERSIAN GULF WARS — A N EXCEPTION : 
The Iran-Iraq War quest ioned the merit of generalizing the Third World wars. Experts 
have held that a war be tween the two Third World countries tends to become a swif t and short 
a f fa i r on two counts viz., possession of highly sophisticated weapons by them and economic 
inabili ty to sustain a long war . Contrary to this, the Iran-Iraq war was the longest war of this 
century fought between the two countries possessing sophist icated weapons . Their economies 
underwent a decline but not to the extent of persuading them to end the war. Instead, they 
managed their economic af fa i rs in a way that these provided sus tenance to the war . Iran did it 
by developing a self-reliant economy based on optimum use of its industrial base and manpower 
strength and Iraq with the help of foreign assistance and by imposing economic 
austeri ty. 
As regards the Persian Gulf War, Iraq saw its invasion of Kuwait as a quick fix to its 
economic woes. The economic embargo did not force it to wi thdraw from Kuwait when the war 
with the allied forces had become inevitable and the invasion of Kuwait begun to look an 
economic misadventure. Four years of the imposing of the economic embargo, which has 
severely bitten it part icularly the poor section, has yet not dampened I raq ' s resolve to exhibit 
that it can withstand such hardships. 
This particular case bring home two lessons. First, economic constraints still do not 
happen to be a factor inf luencing a Third World leader 's war -making decision howsoever 'real" 
these might be. Second, a Third World country has an inbuilt economic strength to fund a war 
and its people an unders tanding that the economic deterioration resul t ing from the war is not 
an abnormal development . 
These ful l-f ledged wars in the Persian Gulf underline a major d i f ference between aThird 
World War and the one in the Industrialised World. That d i f fe rence is in attitudes of the two 
peoples towards the war . In Industrial ised World the people are haunted by the would be 
disastrous effects of a war on their economic well being as well as the security of their lives, 
part icularly of the armed forces personnel . They, therefore, p re fe r that the war is avoided. In 
the Third World, the patr iot ic zeal and in some cases religious fervor have developed a pro-war 
att i tude among the people . In the Iran-Iraq war, local populace const i tuted a major chunk of 
the Iranian army (63). In the Persian Gulf War, people voluntarily jo ined the Iraqi army. Third 
World People 's unfa i l ing support to their government even though defeated fur ther substanti-
ates this hypothesis. Af te r Iraqi defeat popularity of Saddam Hussein has remained more or less 
intact, barring the aberrat ion of about a fortnight- long revolt by Kurds and the Shia people of 
marshland. But they had resorted to rebellion to cash in on to defeat their political opponent. 
It was not a rebellion s temming from an anguish against a government which brought 
humiliation 
to the country. 
The case of v ic tor ious America was altogehter different . Af t e r a few months of euphoria 
and despite the fact that the US army did not suffer even one tenth of the expected casualties, 
people began to question the American rationale behind f ighting some one else 's war. The 
defeat of the hero of the war , George Bush, in the presidential election created an impression 
that not a grand victory but its negative effects determined Amer ican people ' s attitude towards 
the war . 
The above-ment ioned wars have re-started the process of Isiamization of War(64). The 
approach to war of the Iranian army against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and that of the Iraqi army 
against the Multinational Forces is marked for religious fanat ic ism, indifference to death and 
a cult of martyrdom (65). These two wars also invalidate British Historian John Keeqen 's theory 
o f " abolition of bat t le" which visualizes that due to modern w e a p o n s ' capacity to over-kill and 
kill brutally, there would grow a disil lusionment with the war among soldiers(66). However, 
in the case of the two wars , patr iot ism, loyalty to the government , religious zeal, and sacrificial 
urge offset the fear of modern weapons brutality and increased so ld iers ' enthusiasm for a war. 
However, the Iran-Iraq war substantiates the content ion that modern wars , even those 
involving a Third World country on each side, can not be won. Both Iran and Iraq did not meet 
their primary war object ives . Yet the realization of this fai lure dur ing the course of the war did 
not let them stop the war . The short-term gains, a few major mili tary breakthroughs, some 
posit ive effects of the war on internal f ront—socia l cohesion and political consolidation — and 
the fear of people ' s backlash in case the war was stopped, kept them proceeding ahead. 
The Persian Gulf War reaff i rmed the contention that there is no one- to-one correspon-
dence between a victory and the objectives of a starting a war . The US victory in the Persian 
Gulf War was total, yet not all its war objectives were mater ia l ized. On one hand, the US 
succeededin liberating Kuwait , refurbishing its dominance over the regional states, the United 
Nations, European allies and the world as a whole for that mat ter , but, on the other, it failed 
to oust Saddam, decimate Iraqi military strength and turning it into a docile power . 
A R M S AND C O N F L I C T S IN PERSIAN GULF : 
Persian Gulf is the wor ld ' s largest arms recipient according to the region-wise breakup. 
This tends one to draw a link between arms acquisition and the eruption and escalation of 
var ious disputes and the conf l ic ts in the region. But this, in most of the cases, does not hold true. 
As regards the boundary disputes, the disputants" arms spree and the resultant strengthening 
of their defense network have not prodded them to settle their scores through the use of force. 
The Persian Gulf countr ies launched a massive arms acquisi t ion drive in the 70s, but they, in 
the same decade, settled most of their disputes also. Arms p layed a role in the Iran-Iraq War 
and the Iraqilnvasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, in both the cases arms (purchases and arms 
race) were not the cause of the war but an instrument to carry this on. 
The arms acquisi t ion has not generally caused a spurt in regional disputes mainly because 
it has been defense or iented. Militarily stronger powers have played the role of regional 
pol icemen (Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 70s), protecting smal ler s ta tes ' security, with whom 
they happen to be in dispute with on territorial issues. The sources of arms supply have been 
either common or those f rom the same bloc, who have, in turn, ensured that regional allies do 
not use these arms to f ight among themselves. In additon, arms race in the region has proved 
to be a deterrence also. 
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T H E PERSIAN G U L F COUNTRIES AND THE R E G I O N A L AND INTERNATIONAL 
S Y S T E M S : 
Most of the Persian Gulf conflicts have failed to inf luence the regional and international 
systems with the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War being an exception. The disputes 
within the Arabian peninsula did not change the political landscape of the region, disrupt 
friendly ties among the disputants, lead to their division into Soviet and American power blocs 
and prevent the format ion of the Gulf Cooperation Counci l . 
As against this, as far as the regional system is concerned, the Iran-Iraq war established 
the preponderance of regional threat (from Iran) over the external one (from the USSR), 
s t imulated the rapprochement between Iraq and other arab countr ies of the region, led to the 
formation of a common security system and poJiticaJ and economic union, the GCC. As regards 
the Internationa! system, the Iran-Iraq war became the first such case where the USSR and the 
US were not seen pitted against each other. The war was a non-issue in the starting or the 
whipping up of the Second Cold War.It was indeed a prelude to its end. 
The Persian Gulf War altered the International system by checkmating the evolution of 
a multi-polar world order in favour of a unipolar one headed by the US, arresting the drift ing 
of the center of gravity from the hands military power to economic powers and preventing the 
breaking up of the West Europe-US alliance fol lowing retrenchment of the Soviet Unionfrom 
an active role in internbationl politics. 
C O M M O N B O N D S A N D CONFLICTS IN PERSIAN G U L F : 
Confl icts among the Arab peninsular countries are subordinated to the commonalty of 
political and economic interests. With monarchey being the common form of the govenrment 
thorough out the region, these governments are not engaged in abett ing and fomenting internal 
str ifes in one another countries. For, they hold that any radical or revolutionary political change 
in one country will have a far-reaching cross-border implicat ions. Instead, these governments 
have in establishing the G C C evolved a regional mechanism of quelling internal dissension by 
sharing intell igence information and pledging not to allow radical elements any facilities in 
o n e ' s terri tory. 
The oil is another source of regional cooperat ion among the Arab countries of the 
Persian Gulf. More or less common impact on them of the energy scenario in the industrialized 
world has struck a great deal of policy coordination on price and production of oil, leading to 
the formation of a cartel within the OPEC. The smaller oil producers have some resentment 
against Saudi-pr ice moderat ion and over-production pol icy, but they have not let their 
resentment grow out of propor t ions . 
Saudi Arabia , which has the potential to become the destabi l is ing power to the regional 
system owing to its geographical , economic and military superiori ty over neighboring coun-
tries, has acted as ' p a t ron ' and not as a confrontat ionis t . It has sought to evolve a system of 
regionalcooperat ion to carve out the niche of a regional power for itself.In addition, the 
common regional threats, either Iran or Iraq or Israel, have expedi ted Saudi Arabia to bring the 
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rest of the countries of the peninsula together. In the process, Saudi Arabia has either settled 
its disputes with others or has not let them to remain an irritant in its relationship with the latter. 
T H E G C C AND T H E S E T T L E M E N T S A N D SUBSIDING O F DISPUTES : 
G C C ' s formation ensued the sett lements of a few confl ic ts at least.This regional body 
has been instrumental in the resolving disputes between Qatar and Bahrain on Huwar island in 
March 1982 and Fash-Al-Dibal in 1986, and between Oman and PDRY (in 1986). However, 
more than resolving disputes among the member states(67), the G C C has arrested the process 
of the eruption of conflicts as the member-states avoid giving publici ty to these lest they impinge 
on the existence and the funct ioning of the organizat ion. 
T E R R I T O R I A L DISPUTES A R E DEVOID OF E X P A N S I O N I S T DESIGNS : 
A good number of disputes in the region do not carry the seeds of expansionist designs. 
This is borne out by their "give and take basis" sett lement. For instance, according to the Saudi 
Arabia-Bahrain agreement 1958, Bahrain relinquished its sovereignty over Abu Safah island in 
exchange for the Saudi of fer to share the revenues with the former . Under Saudi Arabia-Iran 
agreement on of fshore boundary agreements, the two countries distr ibuted among themselves 
the Firaydun and Marjan oil fields and gave half effect to Kharag island with each agreeing to 
have an equal share in oil and other offshore exploitation (68). Abu Dhabi and Qatar settled 
their dispute over Bundaq oilfield by agreeing to establish common sovereignty (69) over it. 
T H E L I K E L I H O O D OF T H E R E C U R R E N C E OF T H E R E G I O N A L DISPUTES : 
The recurrence of majori ty of the regional disputes is by and large an improbability, but 
in the present circumstances only. Since most of them are far f rom being settled or are vaguly 
set t led, their recurrence can not be ruled out if and when the regional scenario undergoes a 
drast ic change. 
The Saudi case offers an interesting example. Saudi Arabia is involved in the largest 
number of boundary disputes. But it has underplayed them for the sake of maintaining a ' fa ther 
f igure ' posit ion among smaller states. What if a country or most of them reject Saudi 
' pa t e rna l i sm ' . Saudi Arabia, then, would re-enact these disputes to intimidate its erstwhile 
f r iends so as to maintain its regional power status. 
Importance of Bubiyan and Warbah islands has heightened to Iraq with the transfer of 
its port Umm-E-Qasar to Kuwait by the UN Boundary Commiss ion. It is now more pressed more 
than ever not to relinquish its claim and on these islands. 
The dispute over the Shatt has since last many centuries kept on recurring mainly because 
the agreements on them have been signed by one of the parties under duress. Therefore, the 
moment situation changes in favor of the party at the receiving end, it deviates from its 
commi tment . Saddam gifted the Shatt to Iran during the Gulf War but that decision was purely 
c i rcumstant ia l . He might have regretted his decision after the end of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait . 
With the Umm-E-Qasr port having been given to Kuwait and Iraqi access to sea has quenched 
fur ther , the revival of the Shatt dispute would sooner or later const i tute a major policy objective 
of Iraq. 
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Most of the boundary set t lements are incomplete. The northern terminal point and a few 
islands between Iran and Qatar are still left undemarcated despite the fact that this issue settled 
as per a boundary agreement between the two countries in 1969. In the case of Iran-Bahrain, 
Makhilu, Jabrin and Muharraq are left unsettled in the 1971 boundary set t lement between them. 
A few terminal points were not delimited under l ran-Oman boundary agreement in 1974. These 
may be the fresh source of confl ic ts in the future. 
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CHAPTER II 
S U P E R P O W E R S A N D T H E PERSIAN GULF CONFLICTS 
Conflicts in the Persian Gulf haven ' t been the replica of the Cold War as the most of Third 
World ones during the 70s and the 80s are describedas and unders tood to be. The superpowers, 
or either of the two, played,direct ly or indirectly, a limited role in abetting a conflict in the 
P e r s i a n G u l f c r i s i s b e i n g an e x c e p t i o n ) . M o r e than c o n f r o n t i n g 
eachotherhesuperpowerscoopera ted during the two major wars which have been fought in the 
region since the 1970 and did not always end up support ing the rival sides. 
But this does not mean that the superpowers and their relations remained unaffected 
bythe conflicts in the Persian Gulf region. These conflicts told upon their respective policies 
towards the region as well as their bilateral relations. 
This chapter looks into the various facets of the respective policies of the superpowers 
on regional confl icts . 
T H E U N I T E D STATES AND T H E R E G I O N A L CONFLICTS 
The United Sta tes ' approach to the regional confl ic ts has been pegged to its over 
al lpolicy-object ives in the region. Thus the containment of the Soviet Union, consolidation of 
political and strategic leverage in the region, security of and stability of the allies, the security 
of Israel, the national securi ty and the oil have constituted the main undercurrents and contours 
of US policy. 
T H E POLICY 
C O N S O L I D A T I O N OF L E V E R A G E : 
This explains the United States pre-occupation with the regional crises,On the one hand, 
regional confl icts threatened to restrict US political influence, if the Soviet Union exploited the 
opportuni ty to come to the rescue of either of the sides at disputes or if these resulted into the 
emergence of regional power . On the other hand, these crises came as an opportunity to the US 
to demonstrate itself as a credible, reliable and a long-term security partner of the allies( 1). This 
is why on every such occasion, the United States has taken it as its unilateral duty to protect 
its allies. However , the scope to play this role has been dependent on the magnitude of the threat 
to the allies and US interests in the region. 
In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, since the Persian Gulf States were notdirectlyinvolved 
and the US did not want that any of its actions causedlran to at tack themili tari ly-weaker states 
of the Arabian Peninsula , the US limited its role to guarantee an 'over- the-hor izon ' security to 
the allies, to shore up their military build-up and to intimidate Iran of grave consequences if it 
tried to drag its the allies into the war. 
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However , the Persian Gulf crisis did not only tlireaten the annihilat ion of one of the US 
allies, Kuwait , and Iraqi control over the 50 percent of the eorld oil reserves, but it erupted at 
a t ime when the US, in the absence of the Soviet challenge, could exploit the situation to 
establish its hegemony throughout the world. Thus, unlike as in the I ran-Iraqwar . the US took 
part in the Persian Gulf crisis. The Iraqi defeat at its hands was seen to serve US dominaiton 
of the region too. The prospect of defea t ing Iraq could have replaced the Saddam regime by a 
Pro-Amer icanone . At least, it would have subverted a regional threat and turned it into a docile 
power . 
In the 1980s, the US responses to the Persian Gulf crises by and large met its objectives. 
The Arab allies came to tune their foreign policies to the US interests in the region, reflected 
in the eschewing of their opposi t ion to the US policy of Israel during the Iran-Iraq War, 
uninterrupted flow of oil at pala table price to the US and its Western allies from the region and 
a discreet approval to the US naval deployment beside some strategic facili t ies. 
However , the US hegemony was not absolute. The Arab allies were less receptive to 
those US interests which clashed with their interests. This was reflected in the all ies ' giving 
inact ive support to the US Middle East peace attempts, their unwil l ingness , to an extent the 
refusa l , not give the US the s t ra tegic access the way the latter wished and expressing their 
worr ies about the US naval presence in thr Persian Gulf (2). 
In the post-Persian Gulf war era, the US geo-political presence in the region is far more 
formidable than ever. The allies now do not have any inhibition in providing the US strategic 
faci l i t ies . Nor do they rebuke an overt security cooperation, as they did in the 80s, with the US. 
This is, of course, a different matter that incidentally the US now may not be interested in 
fo rming a formal strategic grouping in the region due to the fact that the rationale behind such 
a securi ty grouping is serves no purpose nowadays as there is no global and regional power to 
contain or compete with(3) . 
The Persian Gulf allies have welcomed the PLO-Israeli Accord which is being supported 
and supervised by the US, despi te vehemently opposing a peace proposa l—Camp David 
A g r e e m e n t — of similar nature not long ago and despite the fact that one of the signatories to 
the accord—the PLO— had turned an enemy to them for its support to Iraq during the Persian 
Gulf crisis. Thus, among the many factors responsible for the change in these countries' 
perception of the Middle East Peace, the most discernible one is their compulsion toaccommodate 
US interests in gratitude to its role in l iberating Kuwait and stall ing the possible escalation of 
the Iraqi invasion. 
Wi th the Soviet Union no more on the scene not only as an adversary but also as a 
country and its successor , Russ i a ' s , unwil l ingness and incapabili ty to chal lenge the US in the 
region, the US hegemony in the region is for the time being f irmly es tabl ished. This factor 
has also deprived the regional al l ies of the clout over the US i.e. p laying one superpower 
against the other. 
How long would the US hegemony last in the region is a matter of debate. The crushing 
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defeat of Iraq by the US can restrain the powers, like Iran, from aspiring for regional supremacy. 
But the case may be eaxct ly opposite also. The Irony is that the defeat of Iraq did not culminate 
into the toppling of the Saddam regime and its substitution by a pro-American regime. Even it 
did not reduce Iraq to a doci le power. Charles William Maynes sums up the US dilemma as " 
Iraq will still be located where it is, will still possess its large oil resources and will still harbor 
the regional aspirat ions that recent Iraqi government has developed. If Iraq is destroyed, Iran 
and Syria will become more serious security problems"(4). 
One may point out that if Iraq continues to remain a regional threat to the US allies it 
would serve the US interests by containing the tendency among ther allies to become 
independent of the US on securi ty Issues. However, the point to be pondered here is that would 
the US repeat what it did about three and half years ago if a s imilar crisis recurs in the Persian 
Gulf region. Gett ing f inancial ly squeezed day by day, the US treasury will not permit 
Washington to play such role. And the erstwhile allies might not be always willing to support 
and finance the next Amer ican military adventure. There piay be little domestic support for 
another outsized and expens ive American crusade. 
T H E AMERICAN S E C U R I T Y : 
Ensuring the securi ty of the allies during a regional confl ic t has been directly related to 
the American securi ty(5) . For any extraordinary regional development resulting from US 
recklessness is bound to diminish Washington 's political inf luence, which constitutes an 
integralpart of the its securi ty in the region, and can, probably, lead to the dismantling of the 
strategic facilities it en joys in the region. 
Giving its securi ty a precedence over all other considerat ions, the US has not discounted 
even taking on its allies. This was demonstrated when the US official ly threatened to take 
military action in case of the "s t rangulat ion" the oil suppllis to it during the 1973 oil embargo. 
The unofficial calls to use force was even at an upbeat (6). 
The US reaction to the two Persian Gulf wars was guided by the security factor as much 
as by the other factors . Though apparently the US regional securi ty doctrine, called "Strategy 
Consensus", floated in Spr ing 1981, aimed at constituting a geo-poli t ical grouping to contain 
the Soviet Union,it must have been mooted by the US on the presumpt ion that in the wake of 
the Iranian threats the regional states would welcome it (7). Dur ing the Iran-Iraq War, the US 
aim was to intensify the mili tary cooperation with the Persian Gulf allies. Accordingly, the US 
received from Qatar s torage facili t ies for weapons, lubricants, jet Fuel and medicine. Bahrain 
provided it port call and naval mooring facilities. Exchange of information with Saudi Arabia 
increased and Kuwait went for additional arms purchases f rom it(8). 
During the Persian Gulf War II, the US sole objective w a s to destroy Iraq militarily and 
economically. The economic embargo against that country was imposed considering that 95 
percent of its foreign exchange came through the oil exports. The oulet of Iraqi oil exports could 
easily be stopped by the US by blockading oil shipments through the Strait of Hurmuz or and 
through Jordan whi le its two allies, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, were there to close down the oil 
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pipelines from Iraq. Even then, the US was pre-determined to fight Iraq. For, it icnew, sanction 
could erode Iraq economical ly and the quality of its military. But the possibility of Iraq 
continuing as a regional heavy-weight , a chemical weapon power and a country on nuclear 
threshold, could have always existed. Thus, the war with Iraq, which was destined to serve a 
number of other important objectives as wel l— destruct ion of its military strength, its 
d ismemberment and the removal of Saddam Hussein — was viewed as better option in the 
interests of the US global security. 
That the US has decided to continue economic embargo against Iraq and it has activated 
the UN to dismant le Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons facil i t ies demonstrates that the single 
most important object ive at work is to reduce the Iraqi determinat ion and ability to defy US 
security in the region. 
The US pol icy towards the wars in the Persian Gulf region has not served all of its 
security interests. The 'St ra tegic Consensus ' proposal was rejected by the allies. Though faced 
with the Soviet threat , the US allies could not be persuaded to cooperate with two main 
consti tuents of the proposed consensus; Egypt —with which they had severed diplomatic ties— 
and Israel— with which they were official ly at war. As regards the US-Persian Gulf military 
cooperat ion, the facil i t ies the US was extended fell short of US aspirations and was no match 
to its commitment to the allies security. 
The US mili tary action against Iraq served its security interests by not only bruising Iraq 
but also as a warn ing to the others in the region, part icularly Iran. But it has also made it 
obligatory upon the US to resort to s imilar action in the region and elsewhere to punish an 
aggressor in the fu ture . Failure on this count would give a big jolt to the US control over the 
regional security system. It is hardly expected that the US will always be in a position to send 
5 ,00,000 troops to stop an aggression. 
SECURITY OF T H E ALLIES: 
The security of allies has been the key to the US policy towards the regional conflicts. 
During the Iran-Iraq War the security of Saudi Arabia—^which was envisioned by the US as a 
substi tute for the fallen Shah and a bulwark against Soviet expansion and ambitions in the 
reg ion—became paramount to the US, as writes Perlmutter Amos "Saudi Arabia has become 
a key Gulf state in the vision that passes for the US Middle East policy. Like Berlin, it has taken 
on aspects of piece of US real estate; like Berlin the; US will defend Riyadh"(9). 
Thus the Reagan administrat ion removed all barriers, put up by Carter,in the way of the 
US arms supplies to the region. The sale of the AWACs to Saudi Arabia in June 1984 was aimed 
more at in t imidat ing Iran froni spreading the war than deterring the Soviet Union(lO). 
The US off icial neutrality towards the Iran-Iraq War did not indicate any lack of 
commitment towards the al l ies ' security. In Fact, the US commitment worked as deterrence on 
Iran that by engaging the Arab Gulf states in the war it should not risk to pitch itself against a 
far s t ronger power with a formidable navel force in the region, the US (11).Throughout the war. 
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the US maintained a high-profi le presence in the Persian Gulf waters which with the receding 
of the Soviet threat came to be directed against Iran. The US even encouraged the Persian Gulf 
states to repulse Iranian attack when and if it came, assuring them of its direct involvement in 
such a scenario. Thus, when Kuwait, in 1986, requested for the protection of its ships from the 
Iranian attack, the US agreed to thuough a little bit belatedly. A short of war confl ict that 
subsequent ly got underway between the US and Iran showed that the former was never 
indif ferent to take on Iran for the sake of the allies' securi ty. 
Needless to say that the security of allies was one of the underlying factors behind the 
US decision to go to a war against Iraq. This can be 
gauged from the fact that not only was the liberation of Kuwait the major objective of the US 
but it wanted to restore the Al-Sabah family to power as no regime other than Sabhas in that 
country would have been totally beholden to it. The US resolve to bring back Sabahs to power 
was in sharp contrast to US inconsistency in this other cases. It has not insisted that the former 
Cambodian government must return to power . It has also not insisted that the Afghan 
government , which the Soviets overthrew, be re-installed. 
T H E SECURITY OF ISRAEL : 
The regional confl ic ts have come in handy for Washington to defuse Arab opposit ion to 
its Israeli Policy. The US has used the arms supplies and its securty commitments to the allies 
as an instrument to diminish the lat ter 's opposi t ion to the US-Israeli relations. An eight-year 
war in the region and the resultant increase in the dependence of the regional Arab countries 
on the US caused a proport ionate decline in their ability to inf luence US policy on Arab-Israeli 
issue. 
This is not to say that the US support to allies in the conf l ic ts was reciprocated in form 
of the la t te r ' s support to the US Middle East peace policy. The US success on this front , in fact, 
was that the d i f ferences over the Palestinian issue did not mar Washington 's close military, 
poli t ical and economic cooperat ion with the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. The two actors 
reached an unders tanding on not to let their conflict ing percept ions of the Palestinian Issue 
becoming an irritant in their bilateral relations. 
But this was done not without the US accommodat ing Arab concerns. It chose Saudi 
Arabia and not Israel as the regional pol iceman after the downfa l l of the Shah although Israel 
was more reliable, politically stable, and militarily stronger ally in comparison to Saudi Arabia 
to clinch this role. The US policy makers held that Israel as a regional policeman would 
beunacceptable to Arab Gulf states all and sundry. The US pressure on the allies to accept Israel 
in the role of the pol iceman of the Persian Gulf could have st irred internal rebellion aginst the 
Persian Gulf monarchies(12) . 
The US also adopted a balanced stand on the Palestinian Problem, such as advocating 
for Palestinian autonomy within Israel. Compared to the US view of the future of Palestine in 
the preceding three decades, the US propsal for Palestinian autonomy under the Camp David 
agreement , 1978, marked a pro-Palest inians change in US policy although it was seen through 
out the Arab world as just opposite. 
However, in the Persian Gulf crisis the US exploited Arab dependence on it to foil 
S a d d a m ' s ploy to link Iraqi wi thdrawal from Kuwait to that of Israel from the occupied 
terr i tories(13). In fact, the securi ty of Israel was one of the objec t ives of US war against 
Iraq(14) in so far as the American object ive to destroy Iraqi chemical and nuclear facilities 
aimed at 
prevent ing Iraq from emerging into another nuclear power, beside Israel,in West Asia(15). 
OIL : 
The ' o i l ' has consistently determined the US policy towards regional confl ic ts . When the Iran-
Iraq war began in 1980, the US had all 
The reasons to take interests in the war as it had threatened to ensue the 'Third Oil 
S h o c k ' , which could have been caused by the stoppage of oil supplies f rom the combatants as 
wel l as the non-combatants in the region(16) . 
However , since the oil suppl ies , as expected, were not disrupted as the world-wide 
recess ion accentuated and, as a result , f rom 1981 the oil imports f rom Arab countries reduced 
remarkably , for instance f rom 31 percent in 1973 to 7 percent in 1983 in US total imports(17), 
the Iran-Iraq War only marginal ly affected the US(18). Dangers to the supply of the little 
amount of oil the US imported, also diminished as the closure of the Strait of Hurmuz by Iran 
becamea distant possibility af ter the latter was told to face US retaliation in such an eventuality. 
Iran also lacked the means to launch air str ike on a scale necessary to cause extensive damage 
to Saudi and Kuwaiti oil instal lat ions (19). 
Yet , the oil continued to f igure as an important factor in the US pol icy of preventing the 
Iranian victory. The US adminis t ra t ion noted that an Iranian victory would give Tehran a 
command ing position in the Persian Gulf, enabling it to intimidate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to 
st ick to price and production discipl ine. Furthermore, despite the decline in oil importsfrom 
the Persian Gulf region, the US still required access to Persian Gulf oil. The Persian Gulf states 
were an export market worth tens of bil l ions of dollars. It was, therefore , in the interest of the 
US and other industrialized countr ies that the Persian Gulf governments handled their consid-
erable foreign exchange holdings in a manner that will not disrupt currency markets. For this 
a constant flow of oil in whatever amount became essential. 
The fear of Long term disrupt ions, and resultant panic-buying, skyrocket ing of prices in 
spot markets also retained US interests in the war as it was not ready see the complacency of 
the 1975-78 period repeated. Such a scenar io was inevitable in the case of total disruption of 
oil suppl ies from the Persian Gulf region. For this would have increased the burden on the non-
O P E C sources where oil product ion was costlier, and caused depletion in the oil stockpiled(20). 
E u r o p e ' s and Japan ' s vulnerabil i ty to the Persian Gulf oil reduced marginally only in compari-
son to that of the US during the war . Thus , a disruption in Persian Gulf oil f low to these regions 
w a s bound to affect negatively the economies of the US key trade partners . The US disinterest 
in the Persian Gulf oil, while West Europe ' s continued dependence on it would have put the 
N A T O solidarity in jeopardy. 
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As far as the Persian Gulf crisis is concerned, "many commenta tors believed", in the 
words of Maynes, "the s imply mentioning the word "oil" was enough to explain American 
deployment in the Guir'(21). That area contains more than the two-thirds of the wor lds ' known 
petroleum reserves and it is in the interests of the US and the oil consuming states from West 
Europe that no single state gains control of the whole area. This s t ra tegy was centra! to the US 
decision to go to war against Iraq. The purpose was partly met in the early days of the crisis 
when the US deployed enough force to deter an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. Yet, I raq 's 
control of Kuwaiti oil and the absence of those two countries ' oil from the international market 
caused extraordinary price hike. To leave Kuwait in Iraqi possession would have meant that the 
then oil-prices would not stabil ize at a time the Persian Gulf oil would regain eminence in the 
global supply.Thus US decided to eject the Iraqi Kuwait out of Kuwait through military action, 
even though an threat to pr ice and supply of oil tended to come true as a result very war the 
US was threatening to unleash to abort 
Iraqi occupation of a huge amount of oil reserves and the daily product ion in Kuwait . The Iraqis 
had mined the Kuwaiti oil wel ls and if faced with the prospects of defeat , they were to blow it 
off . Iraq was expected to destroy Saudi and other Persian Gulf Sta tes ' oil facil i t ies by missile 
or air attack also(22). 
However, it is d i f f icul t to asses that whether I raq 's will to int imidate the neighboring oil 
producing states has dampened or not after its defeat . But, its mili tary strength is still a threat 
to reckon with to Saudi Arabia and more so to smaller states. So the l iberation of Kuwait would 
have brought the oil market back to normalcy but the virtual th rea t— a regional s ta te ' s control 
of and influence on the price and supply of o i l— has not ceased to exist . 
The United States vested interests lies in preventing Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran from 
acquir ing enough military s trength to pose a serious threat to the international oil market. This 
needs constructive control on arms shipment to the area. The USA has failed on this count. It 
was the largest arms suppl ier to region in previous two years. Its arms supplies to the region 
in the last couple of years surpass all the previous record. So would be the case as the arms deals 
bound to take place in the coming years materialise. Even if the US wants to check arms 
prol i ferat ion in the region, it can not do it all alone. There would be China, France, Brazil and 
Germany who, allured by the prospects of vast commercial benefi ts , would readily agree to fill 
the vacuum. 
T H E SOVIET F A C T O R : 
In the 70s, the United States was in an advantageous posit ion vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
in the Persian Gulf. For the threat from the other superpower was l imited to its ability to aid 
and abet radical movements in the Arabian peninsula, which, except in Oman, were not 
tha tawesome.Whereas Iraq, the only pro-Soviet Union state in the region, was not a potential 
source of undermining US position in the Persian Gulf given its( I raq ' s ) relatively far weaker 
military prowess than that of its adversary and the US most formidable ally, Iran. 
However, the si tuation changed dramatically at the fag end of the 70s.The success of 
Is lamic revolution in Iran, as perceived the policy makers in the US, st imulated the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanis tan(23) . As says Harris, "the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghani-
Stan was a venture w h i c h probably could have not occurred b e f o r e the Iranian revolut ion" (24) . 
Then came the Iran-Iraq War. It was seen by the US policy makers as an opportunity to 
the Soviet Union to expand southward to gain control of the oil by extending military support 
to Iran against its own ally, Iraq. It was also presumed that the Persian Gul fs ta tes would instead 
of resist ing the USSR cooperate with it. The Soviet threat was real. Its troops and planes in 
Afghanis tan, which could be stationed in southern Afghanis tan to bring the Strait of Hurmuz 
within the str iking range, its fleet in the Indian Ocean and its foothold in South Yemen and 
Ethiopia vested the USSR with the capability to execute such plan(25). 
Thus the US responded to the Iran-Iraq War through the Soviet prism. The Carter 
doctrine, procla imed on January 23, 1980 in the Pres ident ' s State of Union message, which 
threatened to repel an outside military aggression in the Persian Gulf region through military 
action if necessary(26) , was 
meant agaisnt the Soviet movement into the area on behalf of Iran. Creation of Rapid 
Deployment Force, the proposing of Strategic consensus plan (27), supply of A W A C s and other 
equipment to Saudi Arabia were the logical extension of the Carter doctrine and were pegged 
to the Soviet as well as the Iranian threats, the former to the US and the latter to its allies(28). 
It was only by threatening Soviet union of dire consequences if i tparticipated in the war 
alongside Iran, the US entered a dialogue with the Soviet Union on practicing neutrality in the 
war by both of them. Also, the US did not want to provoke the Soviet Union until it was engaged 
in securing release of its diplomatic officials held as hostages by Iran(29). During those days 
the US strategy was to minimize the Soviet influence in Iraq. Although US did not have 
diplomatic relations with Iraq it used the network of French, German and Japanese ties and 
commercial connect ions with Iraq to wean Baghdad away f rom Moscow. The US, therefore, 
is said to have special ly told the its West European allies to provide arms and ammunition Iraq 
needed to fight the war . 
Accord ing to some observers the Soviet threat led the US to appease Iran in the initial 
years of the war . In case of the war with the USSR the logist ic support f rom Iran would have 
been of immense help. The US administration wanted that Iran, at least, remained neutral in 
such a war(30) . 
That the Is lamic Republic of Iran did not join the Soviet bloc came as relief to the US. 
The US did not make any attempt to topple the Khoemeini regime and install a US-friendly 
government to regain its influence in a country bordering the USSR (31). Washington also 
opposed I ran ' s d i smemberment resulting f rom an Iraqi victory and indicated that it will not 
tolerate I raq ' s permanent retention of Iranian territories. The US policy makers thought that 
in these c i rcumstances the Soviet Union would try to come closer to Iraq shedding its,, 
d i f ferences with that country. Af ter all, this would be not be a difficult task for the USSR as 
the two countries were tied by treaty of Friendship and cooperat ion, the US policy makers 
viewed. 
The USSR would have taken the political change in Iran as a net loss to it by rendering 
a sensitive and exposed sector of the Soviet periphery less secured. At this jucture the USSR 
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could come to the rescue of Iran, who would have welcome it as the only way out to save itself 
from Iraq. The US military officials also did not discount that in such an eventuality the Soviet lln 
might have intervened in the name of the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty of 1923, which was 
considered valid by the USSR despite its rejection by Iran. 
Well, the US did directly intervene in the war on behalf of Kuwait by re flagging its ships 
endangered by I r an ' s Si lkworm missile attack. The Soviet factor was central in prompting the 
US to come to Kuv^'ait's rescuee.Washington had initially vacil lated when Kuwait approached 
it. It decided to enter ta in the Kuwaiti request only when it was known that Soviet Union 
had leased three tankers to Kuwait sailing under Red flag and guarded by the Soviet navy. 
Fearing, thereby, political encroachment in its sphere of inf luence by the USSR, the US 
administrat ion quickly moved and in March of 1987 placed eleven Kuwaiti tankers under US 
N a v y ' s escort . 
The US agreed to escort tke Kuwaiti ships as by doing so the chances of a direct 
confronta t ion with the USSR were unlikely as the latter had 
itself agreed to protect the Kuwait Ships against Iran. In the ensuing skirmishes with Iran,the 
US did not try to spread its military operation to the Iranian lands in these circumstance 
thesecuri ty concerns could have forced the U S S R t o abandon its 'neut ra l i ty ' to US-Iran clashes. 
The United States viewed the toppling of the conservat ive Arab regimes as the main 
object ive of the Soviet activism in the Middle East(33). In the light of this, the US evloved its 
relations with the Persian Gulf countr ies ,avoiding to look to close to them lest it brew 
resentment among the people of the region, opening the gate for greater activism on the part 
of the USSR. 
Later on, the USSR withdrew its support f rom the weak and unorganized political 
movements and moved to establish government- to-government level relations with the regional 
countr ies . But this did not end the US ordeal as this move of the Soviet Union was interpreted 
as an encroachment in the its sphere of inf luence. The US took a series of steps to outmaneuver 
the Soviet Union. These steps included large scale economic and military assistance to, and 
increasing intel l igence, information and propaganda activities in, the region. 
How far the US succeeded is diff icul t to asses. It prevented the Soviet Union from 
expanding southward , it is said. But did the USSR ' s invasion of Afghnais tan intend so. Most 
probably it did not. First of all, the Soviet Union knew that expans ionbeyond Afghanistan would 
result into a direct confronta t ion with the US, given the vital geo-strategic importance of the 
region to the latter. There fore , whether the Carter doctrine would have been invoked or not or 
the Iran-Iraq War would have taken place or not, the Soviet Union could not commit the mistake 
of get t ing entangled into a direct and nuclear war with the US by extending beyond Afghanistan. 
Second, the Persian Gulf oil was not vital to the Soviet Union to meet its domestic requirements 
of oil and denying the US access to it. It was later proved that Soviet Union was self-sufficient 
in oil. It might have needed the Persian Gulf oil to use it for itself and sell domestically produced 
oil, which was costl ier , to the oil importing countries. But this policy did not require seizure 
of the Persian Gulf oil. Instead the USSR could buy the needed amount of oil from the Persian 
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Gulf countries who were not averse to selling oil to it to shore up their declining revenue. In 
fact, the US adminis t ra t ion ' s exaggerated reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanis tan was 
based on a CIA report which claimed that by the year 1985, the Soviet Union would become 
a net exporter 
of oil. Statistical informat ion, however, did not substant iate that claim. The report was , 
therefore, politically motivated. 
As regards the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet Union did not en joy that much clout with Iran 
to have intervened in the war on behalf of it. Nor did an Iranian victory look to serve Soviet 
interests. The USSR could not have liked the defeat of Iraq, the only Soviet ally in the region. 
The Iranian victory was bound to encourage Islamic resurgence in the Central Asian republics. 
It would have also emboldened Iran to aid the rebellion in that region. 
The US succeeded in not letting the USSR to make inroads in its influence in the region. 
But, at the same time, in the normalization of relations between Arab monarchies and the USSR, 
the US lost a source, the Soviet specter, of gaining leverage in the region. 
Lastly, one can point out the "mel lowing" of Soviet power since mid-1980 as the proof 
of the US success . But this happened due to the developments whose occurrence was 
notinfluenced by the US Persian Gulf policy. The 
death of three aging/sick Soviet leaders in quick succession, Gorbachev 's accession to the 
power, who, forced by economicproblems, initiated his count ry ' s disengagement f rom regional 
conflicts, western policies on Euro-missile deployment , technology trade and Soviet immigra-
tion created invcentive for significant changes in M o s c o w ' s policy in the Persian Gulf and other 
parts of the g lobe(34. 
THE STRATEGY 
To meet its object ives at s take in a conflict in the Persian Gulf , theUS has adopted di f ferent 
strategies, from non-intervent ion and covert intervention to direct intervention and mainte-
nance of military presence in and around the region with a view to avoid the intervention as well 
as to intervene quickly if the need to do so becomes inevitable. 
NON-INTERVENTION: 
The US responded to the British withdrawal f rom the region by refraining from taking 
direct responsibil i ty for the security of the region, let alone assume Britain's role. Despite the 
fact the US had already taken the first step towards playing a direct role in the region as early 
as in the 1940s by establ ishing close working relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia(35) , it did 
not have a military base in the region to fill the vacuum created by the British wi thdrawal . 
American air facil i t ies at Dhahran had been abandoned in the 1960s and only the small 
MIDEASTFOR remained to represent the American security commitments in the region. 
Wash ing ton ' s perception of events and situation in the region were filtered through Iran and 
Saudi Arabia and the American dilemma in Vietnam tended to discourage direct involvement . 
The consequence was the "twin pillar" strategy, enunciated in the Nixon doctrine, propounded 
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in 1969 to minimize the role of the USas the world policeman by delegating the same 
responsibil i ty to regional powers viz., Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was chosen for this 
role because of it possessing the wor ld ' s largest oil fields and its influence over the smaller 
states. Iran was perceived by the US as a mili tary partner in this arrangement who would 
intervene in regional 
crises destabi l is ing to the US interests in the region. Thus Iran directly intervened in Oman to 
repulse the Duhfar rebell ion. As many as 5,000 Iranian troops were engaged on Duhfari 
bat t lef ie ld at any one time in the mid 70s and the US made F-5 Phantoms and destroyers in the 
Iranian inventory were used to curb the nat ional is t - turned-Marxis t rebellion (36). 
I r an ' s military build up in the 70s meant the extension of her security perameter to the 
approaches of the Persian Gulf. The supply of F-14s with Phonics by the US to Iran missile ware 
aimed at giving the latter a stand-off capabil i ty to engage the enemy outside I ran 's airspace 
(37) .The nature of mili tary cooperation be tween Iran and the US, the complimentari ty of the 
two countr ies ' weapon systems, the degree of the US military assistance and the identical 
policies pursued by the two countries in the region portended that in times of crisis, demanding 
direct intervention on the part of the US, the Iranian facili t ies would be available for 
unrest r ic ted use. 
US M I L I T A R Y P R E S E N C E : 
A f t e r 1979 i.e., a f ter the collapse of one of the p i l lars—and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
War, the US did not abandon its 
non-intervent ionis t approach to regional conf l ic ts . It, instead, adopted the policy of threatening 
to intervene and bui lding up a capability to intervene' in the region at short notice if the situation 
so demanded (38). This policy was the part of the strategy to deter regional enemy ' s design to 
deny the oil to the US (39) on one hand and to win the conf idence of the allies against the 
regional threat on the other . Of course, the Soviet threat was given precedence to the threat 
f rom a regional power . And often US found the suspicion aroused by Soviet Intervention in 
Afghan i s tan than the Iran-Iraq war as the basis of the deployment of the RDF and the obtaining 
of the s trategic facil i t ies in the region(40). 
The US military presence signaled that its neutrali ty in the Iran-Iraq war did not stem 
f rom an inabili ty to intervene. The US navy was ordered to open to fire at any target whose 
actions were of threatening nature. The capabi l i ty to carry out such an aggressive plan against 
the regional countr ies kept on being enhanced through out the 80s— from creat ing the 
M I D E A S T F O R and the RDF to the C E N T C O M . The last military command structure encom-
passed 19 Afr ican and Asian countries. Rout ine military exercises were carried out to practice 
the seizure and retention of oil bearing areas by landing troops with naval and air support . The 
American fleet in the Persian Gulf included the Constellat ion aircraft carrier, several cruisers, 
destroyers and fr igates and the Guadalcanal landing helicopter carrier. The US deployed more 
than 20 large ships in the area which was the "largest naval group assembled by the USA since 
the Vie tnam War"(41) . On the top of all, the Diego Garcia, although 2,200 miles from 
Harms,was an indispensable naval support base as s taging area for P-3 reconnaissance 
aircraft and alter for B-52 bombers. 
The US also won several strategic rights from the fr iendly governments . These included 
the stocking of pre-posit ioned equipment, the building of intell igence facilities, the acquisition 
of over flight and landing permission and docking rights. Sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia aimed 
at entrenching the US in the region as the US administration saw the requirement of a long-term 
US technical forces support for the AWACs as a means to expand American military presence 
in Saudi Arabia. The United States liked to possess naval and air bases in the region to deter 
a regional enemy from creat ing a situation that could have necessitated direct interventionby 
it. 
However, securing strategic facilities in the region proved hard to come by due to the 
al l ies ' reluctance, to an extent of total refusal in the case of some countries mainly Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabiawas emphatical ly against the presence of US troops on its land. Even it pressurized 
the smaller states not to accede to the US demand for bases. For example, Sultan Qabus was 
offered $ 2.1 billion by Saudi Arabia in exchange for denying basing rights to the RDF. The 
amount was equal to what the US proposed to give to Oman. Saudi Arabia also prevailed upon 
Bahrain to restrict US access to its bases(42). 
The Persian Gulf states viewed any land basing and substantial presence of the US in the 
area as a source of instability in the region. Moreover, the "we will seize the oil if we need it" 
rhetoric of the US made the Persian Gulf allies fear that the US land based presence could 
one day become a threat to their own security. US Congressional opposit ion to arms sales to 
the regional countrries had caused a mistrust in the minds of the regional allies about the US 
sinceri ty. The mistrust reached new proport ions in 1984 when the Democrat ic party opposed 
the over-committ ing of its forces in the Persian Gulf, even in the event of an crisis there, by the 
US. 
The US naval deployment was aimed at meeting the Soviet threat while the regional allies 
considered the Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf an unliely scenario. The regional govern-
ments, in fact, opined that the granitng permanent strategic facil i t ies to the US by them could 
indeed make the USSR aprehensive of their moves. 
However, these states welcomed the US 'over- the-hor izon ' presence which made a 
deterring effect on the regional threats. The total absence of the US military presence in and 
around the region would, the allies viewed,encourage hostile powers to commit aggression, an 
event these countries wanted to prevent by denying the US direct presence in the region. 
The US policy of non-intervention was more strictly fol lowed in tackling Iranian 
terrorism. The US refrained from using its military might to deal with the hostage crisis. Nor 
did it threaten Iran of military action on thisissue. A covert military operation was unsucessful ly 
made to rescue the hostages. But the nature of this operat ion underl ined the US policy of not 
exposing the lives of its nationals in reprimanding an enemy (43). 
D I R E C T INTERVENTION : 
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Avoidance not the renunciation of direct intervention has been the US strategy towards 
the regional confl ic ts . Direct military intervention has been considered a priority in situations 
where stakes are high enough to warrant such action. These si tuations may be the need to 
achievenarrowly defined objectives that can be accomplished rapidly and decisively with 
relatively small or large force and to prevent the hostile regional powers from interpreting its 
policy of non-intervention as incompetence.This is why despite deploying its naval forces, 
adequate enough to tackle a regional threat, the US brought in ground forces to punish Iraq in 
the Persian Gulf crisis and deployed land base aircrafts, in form of AWACs, in Saudi Arabia as 
these actions were the more formidable means to increase operational capabilit ies than was the 
deployment of the naval forces. 
Thus, when inaction on its part could have lent credence to the allies ' doubts about 
clandest ine connect ion between the US and Iran fol lowing the revelation of Iran-Contra arms 
deal(44) , the US decided to escort Kuwaiti tankers. It went on to do so even expecting that its 
fal l-out could be in the form of Iranian attacks on the US ships. Iranian missiles set on fire an 
Amer ican owned tanker the re-f lagged tanker anchored in Kuwait i water on October 15 and 16, 
respectively. Not only did the US retaliate but it went on broadening the rules of the engagement 
of its force to permit assistance to all neutral ships. 
Similarly, whi le calling for a diplomatic solution to the crisis started by Iraq by 
threatening to occupy Kuwait in July 1990, the US also indicated that it would not hesitate to 
take military action against Iraq if it attacked Kuwait . The US state department noted: "we do 
not have any defense treaties with Kuwait .... but we also remain committed to supporting the 
individual and collective sel f -defense of our fr iends in G u l f (45). 
Before the Iraqi Invasion, the US deployed a naval task force in the region. Before the Persian 
Gulf states could decide whether to invite the foreign forces or not, the US, it is reported, had 
begun exerting pressure on 
Saudi Arabia to a l low its force to land on its territories. A few days a f t e r the Iraqi invasion. Bush 
reiterated his coun t ry ' s commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf (46). The 
statement coincided with the arrival of the US troops in the region which showed that the Bush's 
s ta tement was not a mere verbal exercise to pressurize Iraq to wi thdraw from Kuwait but it was 
a prelude to the despa tch ing of its armed forces. The US forces swell to the strength of 
2 ,000,000 by the end of Oct. 1990, these possessed all the modern and sophist icatedweapons. 
By Oct., the US counted on the possibility of Iraqi withdrawal under international political, 
d iplomatic and economic pressure combined with its coercive diplomacy. In early November, 
Bush declared that he was increasing the number of American troops in the Persian Gulf by 
150,000 and had begun to seek support for a UN Security Counci l Resolution to permit it to 
use force against Iraq. It would not be out of place to mention that even Bush did not bother 
that he had to seek Congressional approval to wage a war. In fact , by continuously sending the 
coun t ry ' s armed forces to the Persian Gulf region and st icking to his decision to fight a war, 
Bush was trying to leave the Congress with no option but to give its assent. 
The US approach to the Persian Gulf crisis points to the fact that subjugat ing a regional 
threat to its securi ty or that of its allies constituted the basic object ive of the US policy and it 
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did not hesitate to intervene even directly, if only that way this objective could be achieved. 
The Iran-Iraq war and the Persian Gulf war examples show that the nature of threat 
determines the US reaction to a regional conflicts. I ran 's attack on neutral ships in 1987 looked 
to disrupt the supply of oil only, the US, therefore, confined its clashes with the Iran in the Gulf 
waters . It did not wage a ful l - f ledged war against Iran. As against this, the Iraqi threat was 
many-dimensional . The Us feared that if the iraqi aggression was not repulsed Iraq would 
establish a 
permanent control over Kuwait and its oil, become a permanent source of danger to Saudi 
security and other smal ler countries as well, and emerge into a mili tary and political giant in the 
Persian Gulf region. The US response was also proport ionate to the potentiality of the threat . 
It decided to go who le -hog against Iraq. 
However, it is diff icul t to establish how far has the US policy of direct 
intervention been ef fec t ive in relation to the US regional interests . The US ability to deter a 
regional threat by using force or threatening to use it is capt ive to the targeted power ' s 
response. Two instances can be cited here. The US under took only a covert operation to f ree 
its nationals held as hostages by Iran. The US could have had little difficulty in applying full 
military power against Iran but, it refrained from doing this because of doubt that the resolute 
Ayatol lah Khomeini would not budge even if Iranian petroleum industry was destroyed, Iranian 
ports blockaded, Iranian armed forces decimated, Iranian holy places targeted, and if his own 
life 
( Imam Khomeini) and the life of thousands of Iranians jeopardized . Similarly, the US-Iraq War 
in a sense underlined the failure of US coercive diplomacy in kneel ing down Saddam.Here one 
may argue that US attack on Iraq was not the last resort. Rather , it was the choicest option as 
the US did not want mere Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait . True , but did not the presence of one 
of the wor ld ' s most- t ra ined armed forces next door that too all set to wage a war fail 
to compel a Third World power to retreat? Well, Iraq could not avoid the war because of fear 
of a popular backlash or a military coup, but this drives home a point that Iraq gave the internal 
threat a precedenceover the one from the wor ld ' s largest mil i tary power . 
The US limited intervention, such as the one against Iran in 1987, 
and the ful l - f ledged one, the one against Iraq about three and a quarter years ago, carries some 
weaknesses . Limited intervention helps achieve short-term object ives only, which may be 
disproport ionate to military and economic cost of the military operation and the international 
criticism such action invites. A full-fledged intervention pins hope among the allies and the fear 
among opponents of the repetit ion of that performance. But in the changing national interests 
perceptions, the intervention may not remain a ready-made choice to tackle a similar situation 
later. The inaction in those circumstances would put the ers twhi le interventionist power ' s 
reputation in great jeopardy among the allies and enemies al ike. 
US POLICY OF CRISIS P R E V E N T I O N 
The nature of a particular crisis, the implications of its resolution or continuation 
for the US interests and the US leverage with the parties to dispute determine US policy of crisis 
prevention in the Persian Gulf. 
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US did not want the Iran-Iraq war ending with Iranian victory or, for that matter , that 
of Iraq. It was, therefore , interested in the cont inuat ion of the war . Yet, it in order to prevent 
the Soviet Unionfrom wrest ing the initiative repeatedly called upon the bel l igerents to 
terminate the hosti l i t ies.Thus, the main object ive of the US crisis prevention during the war was 
to deny the USSR an opportunity to act as arbi ter than to bring about peace(47). The prospect 
of hi jacking of peace initiatives by the Soviet Union in the region was extremely harmful to the 
US interests as this could have rectified Soviet Union ' s post-Afghan intervention image in the 
eyes of the Arab Gulf monarchies. 
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, the US main aim was to prevent the spreading of 
the war and the Soviet involvement in it. Lacking total leverage over both the bel l igerents , who 
did not even have diplomat ic relations with the it, the US was not in position to dictate peace. 
Thus, owing to its inabili ty to play the role of a peace broker, the US directed its e f for t s to 
prevent ing the escalat ion of the war. 
During intital days of the war, the US was preoccupied with securing the release of its 
nat ionals held as hostages by Iran. The war came as an opportunity to criticise Iraq, to win the 
Iranian goodwill and to get its nationals f reed in exchange for weapons and spare parts to Iran. 
Even a few years after the outbreak of the war , the US interests in its cont inuance 
remained unchanged for a number of reasons. First, s ince Iran dominated the war, a set t lement 
would have,very likely, been on Iranian terms. Second, the end of the war could have vindicated 
I ran ' s posit ion. Third, the oil suppllies f rom the region continued uninterruptedly, not 
warrant ing the need of an urgent peace. Fourth, the Iranian threat came in a handy to the US 
to increase 
its leverage with the Persian Gulf countries. Fifth, the US naval deployment was suff ic ient to 
meet any untoward si tuation, such as the blockade of the the Strait of Hurmuz by Iran. Sixth, 
any concession to Iran for seeking a peaceful end to the war would have annoyed the Persian 
Gulf allies. 
In the decade preceding the outbreak Iran-Iraq war, the US strategy was to stay away 
from resolving regional conflicts. The Persian Gulf region was beset with the confl ic ts which 
were mainly the territorial disputes in nature. The Carter administration as well as the previous 
ones found that these did not pose any ma jo r threat to the US interests,with Washington 
bel ieving that the Persian Gulf was an area of economic and commercial activity only. With the 
Arab-Israel i issue being the matter of pr imary concern to the the US, it kept itself aloof f rom 
next door confl ic ts (48). 
The US crisis prevention lacks objectivity. The UNSCR 598, which was vir tual ly the 
handiwork of the US, did call on both Iran and Iraq to cease-f i re and withdraw their forces to 
international boundar ies . But,since at that t ime Iran was in control of a vast Iraqi terr i tory, the 
resolution in effect called for the withdrawal of the Iranian forces. 
Coercion was the main instrument of the US crisis prevention in the Persian Gulf crisis. 
The little time it lost in deploying its forces in Saudi Arabia, the way it activated the UN to pass 
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resolut ions, including the one authorizing it to take military action, and the manner it paid no 
heed to regional and international efforts for a peaceful end to the crisis indicate that the US 
was in a hurry to resort to war. 
An active policy of crisis resolution or prevention by the US has been beset with certain 
constraints also. The GCC, for example, has restricted the scope of the US mediat ion in the 
crisis erupting among the member-states. The understanding that has evolved among the GCC-
states is that thay should not refer to their disputes to a third party and take them to international 
forums, like the UN in whose peace-seeking campaign the US plays the most influential role. 
The US diplomacy in the Persian Gulf has suffered f rom its preoccupation with the Arab-
Israeli issue. The US role in ending the Lebanon crisis and the Iran-Iraq war o f fe r a good 
contrast . In the Iran-Iraq war , the US policy focused on prevent ing it from spreading. Whereas, 
in the Lebanon crisis, Reagan administration launched a high-profi le diplomatic initiative soon 
af ter Syria moved its missile in Lebanon and the Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters in July 
1981. It called Philip Habib, distinguished American diplomat of Lebanese -American back-
ground, out of ret irement. Habib arranged a PLO-Israeli cease-f i re along the Lebanese -Israeli 
border . The US was instrumental in the terminating the hostili t ies between Israel and the PLO, 
l i f t ing of the Israeli siege on Beirut, negot ia t ing and arranging the withdrawal of the PLO from 
Beirut and being the main constituent of the Multinational Force that arrived in Lebanon in 
Augus t that year to assure the evacuation of the PLO (49). 
Af t e r the terminat ion of hostilities the US came out with a comprehensive peace plan, 
known as the Reagan Plan(50). Thus the US obsession continued with Arab-Israel i issue 
a l though the Iran-Iraq war at the eve of 1982 posed a more serious threat to the US interests 
as Iran had begun to dominate the war . 
T H E F O R M E R SOVIET U N I O N AND R E G I O N A L CONFLICTS 
T H E POLICY 
The USSR ' s policy towards the Persian Gulf confl icts were guided by two elements viz., 
ideology and realpolitik, their application being subjected to which of two served the Soviet 
foreign policy goals most in the given circumstances. 
I D E O L O G Y 
In the 70s, The USSR was placed in a suitable situation to pursue its policy towards the 
inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the Persian Gulf in keeping with its Leninist-Marxist 
foreign policy. The US withdrawal from Vietnam, the c leavages in the NATO and its ( USSR's) 
increased conventional and military capabil i t ies led the USSR to proclaim that it would render, 
when it was necessary, military support to the people subjected to military aggression (51), as 
i l lustrated in Breznev ' s report to the 24th Party Congress in March 1971 (52). 
It was reported that the Soviet Union shipped arms, through PDRY, to the Duhfar 
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resurgents in their war of national l iberation against the Sultan of Oman. But, later on, with 
the waning of the s t ruggle , the Soviet Union became cautious in its commitment to that 
movement . 
Though data are not avai lable to ascertain that whether the Soviet arms supplies to PDRY 
meant to be passed on to resurgents(53) or not, the USSR did not assist the Duhfars during their 
suppression by Oman with the help of Iran. Seeing that the liberation movements in the region 
lacked the needed infras t ructure and popular base to bring about radical political changes, the 
Soviet Union embarked on the second policy option; reconciliation with the non-socialist 
regimes. This almost abandoned Soviet link with the Marxist movements in the region. 
In fact, the Soviet Union made the revolutionary state and not the movement as the main 
subject of its ideology-bound foreign policy. The PDRY, where a radical movement came to 
power in November 1967, was then the automatic choice. Strategically, South Yemen ' s offer 
of extending USSR anchorage off the Island of Socotra and access to the port and airport at 
the Aden was considered vital by the Soviet Union for gaining a foothold in the Indian Ocean. 
South Yemen was an entry point to the Arabian peninsula for the Soviet forces landing from the 
east . The USSR also hoped that PDRY would be also be helpful in spreading Marxist revolution 
in the heart of the peninsula and the Persian Gulf . In addition, PDRY was useful as a surrogate 
s tate particularly in the si tuat ion where the USSR wanted to shroud its involvement(54). 
The other regional state which was extended support by the USSR in its struggle with 
the pro-US states was Iraq. However , the Soviet support to Iraq was not always unqual i f ied and 
unwaver ing . Since Iran was a greater s t ra tegic prize, the U S S R ' s did not want to ruin its ties 
wi th it inspite of whatever little inf luence it had had on the Shah and later on the Khomeini 
regime. During the t ime of the Shah, the Soviet Union did not hold a pro-Iraqi view on the 
quest ion of Baghdad ' s border dispute with Iraq. When the Iran-Iraq war began, the USSR 
adopted a volte face, an approach very unlikely of a superpower towards its ally. It publicly 
opposed Iraq. It assured Iran that it had no intention to disfavor it for Iraq. It went on imposing 
arms embargo on Iraq. Beside, the deterioration in Soviet-Iraq relations, the main reason 
behind the Soviet Union pursuing this course at the beginning of the war till the next two years 
w a s the fear that an outr ight defeat of Iran would lead to the col lapsing of the Khomeini regime 
and its replacement by a pro-Western government(55) . 
It was only when Iran refused to join the Soviet bloc and the possibility of a not-too-
fr iendly Iran defeat ing its only ally in the region arose did the USSR tilt back to Iraq, most 
notably by resuming arms supply to it. In later years, the Soviet Union supplied to Iraq weapons 
l ike Scud missiles which were instrumental in turning the tide of war in favor of Iraq after a gap 
of about five years. 
When the Persian Gulf crisis started, the Soviet Union had already abandoned the 
ideological foundation of its foreign policy. Though the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
wi th Iraq was very much in vogue, the Soviet Union 's commitments to it or any other ally for 
that matter had turned mor ibund af te r the end of the Cold War. Only a few gl impses of the 
U S S R ' s cold war fore ign pol icy were seen, such as its decision not to participate under the US 
banner in a war against its ally and its refusal to call back its military advisors f rom Iraq. 
REALPOLITIK 5 
The Soviet realkpoli t ik in the regional conflicts was based on the objective of repairing 
its relations with the side opponent to its ally in a confl ict , even if it amounted to a deviation 
from the Leninist-Marxist foreign policy principles. Thus , despite helping South Yemen 
indirectly in its 1979 war against YAR, the USSR also embarked on a policy of rapprochement 
with the Sana to take the advantage of the Yemenis ' unhappiness over Saudi domination of 
them and over the US policy of not directly supplying them arms. 
The USSR signed a major arms deal with YAR (56). It rescheduled and partly wrote off 
Y A R ' s debts and tried to wean the latter away from Saudi Arabia and the US. 
The Soviet Support to the national liberation movement s in the Persian Gulf region 
waned gradually. The most notable example of this was Soviet indecision to help the Duhfaris 
out when they were being suppressed at the hands of the Iranian forces and the British advisers 
in the mid-70s. Since the U S S R ' s assistance to the Duhfar is was channeled through the PDRY, 
the Soviet role in susta ining the movement got contained when the PDRY accepted, in March 
1976, Saudi financial assistance in return for normalization of relat ions with Oman (57). In the 
80s, a major shift in the Soviet policy appeared with the Soviet Union preferring state-to-state 
relations with all of the non-Marxis t countries with an aim to limit the US role in these 
countr ies(58) . 
As regards the Iran-Iraq War, the realization that it w a s nei ther the result of imperialist 
designs in the region (59) nor did the class struggle play any role in the origin and conduct of 
the war, rather nat ional ism, t radi t ions and religion determined the course of events, made the 
Soviet Union not to def ine its role in the war on the basis of its old policy formulations vis-a-
vis the Third World confl ic ts (60). The Soviet policy towards the war was dictated by the 
viciss i tudes of its relations with the US only. It, therefore, at the outbreak of the war clarified 
that it would not brook an Iranian defeat even at the hands of its own ally—Iraq. This position 
was altered in favor of Iraq later to cash in on the re- in tegra t ion of Iraq to the Persian Gulf 
poli t ics. Support to Iraq increased the possibility of expanding its influence in the region (61). 
In fact, marginalisat ion of American influence was the main goal of Soviet involvement 
in regional confl icts . In order to achieve this, the USSR did not hesitate in deviating from its 
commitment to its ally. For instance, when Iraq seized a narrow strip of Kuwaiti territory in 
March 1973, Moscow asked it in clear terms to retreat(62) . 
Contrary to the claims of Hawks in the US, the oil did not constitute a central element 
in the Soviet Policy towards Persian Gulf conflicts. The Soviet tilt in favor of Iran in 1980-82 
was seen as a Soviet design to intervene in the war and subsequent ly seize the oil fields in the 
region. In fact, most of such apprehensions were made on the assumption that the Soviet Union 
would soon become dependent on the Persian Gulf oi l (63) . 
• These assumptions were embarrassingly inaccurate. The Soviet Union was averse to 
resort to this opt ion. It had calculated that aggression in the Persian Gulf would lead to the 
superpower confrontnt ion. The Soviet Union had, as early as 1980, tried to remove such doubts 
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by proposing in December that year a f ive-point formula to establish peace in the Persian Gulf 
region(64) . 
It is true that f rom the early 1980s the USSR launched a drive to conserve energy and 
told its East European all ies that it could not increase its oil exports to them above the 1980 
level, but to interpret this as oil crisis in the USSR of such magnitude that the seizure of oil 
resources in the Persian Gulf had become imminent is a pure fantasy. Nor is it any less illogical 
to think that the USSR, who had told its allies to go e lsewhere for oil, would suddenly for their 
sake invade the Oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf and risk a world war. Even the possibili ty 
of an all iance between the USSR and the oil-rich countr ies to deny the oil to the West, as feared 
the policy makers in the US, did not exist. The Arabs saw the USSR as a competitor in the world 
oil market , of ten work ing at cross purposes as demonstra ted by the Soviet Union when it 
assured, during the 1973 embargo, the US and Europe to supply them the oil and in 1982 when 
it played a major role in bringing down the oil prices. 
T H E US F A C T O R 
The Soviet Union saw most of the confl ic ts in the Persian Gulf as either instigated by the 
US or used by the latter as a pretext to encircle it and el iminate its influence in an area of 
enormous s t rategic impor tance to it (65). 
The Soviet Union was more apprehensive on this count in the case of the Iran-Iraq War 
as it heralded the era of massive US naval deployment in the region and coincided with the 
ensuing of the Second Cold war. The Soviet leaders repeatedly described this war as senseless 
and fratr icidal for having served the interests of the US provided it a pretext to consol idate its 
military presence in the region(66). 
The Soviet react ions to the Persian Gulf conf l ic ts , in the context of its relations wi th the 
US, were , therefore , to resist the US on one hand and cut into the US influence on the other. 
This strategy culminated into a policy of compet i t ion with the US without escalating it to the 
point of a direct conf ron ta t ion . Thus in the I ran-Iraq War, the USSR ' s official stand was the 
'neut ra l i ty ' so as not to allow the US a chance to directly intervene in the war. The USSR also 
readily agreed to the US proposal for mutual non- involvement in the war. The USSR, in additon, 
was for a join ef for t by them to resolve the cr is is(67) . 
Thus the USSR preferred moderate means and moderate targets to serve its interests in 
the region, inf luencing the course of the war in such a way that the US was denied of establishing 
a foothold in Iran, a s t ra tegic prize for the USSR af ter the S h a h ' a ouster. Beside this, other 
Soviet object ives were prevent ing Iraq from Joining the US bloc and using Iraq as an instrument 
to improve relat ions with the Arab Gulf countr ies to reduce US leverages with them. 
The US factor determined the Soviet sh i f t s in the Iran-Iraq war. It decided to side with 
Iran in the early s tages of the war in order to prevent the US from seizing the same opportunity 
by supplying arms and ammunition to Iran. U S S R ' s tilt towards Iraq later was aimed at 
s temming the g rowing US and the Western inf luence in that country. It resumed its arms 
supplies to Iraq to lessen Iraqi dependence on the Western arms. The Soviet move also s temmed 
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f rom its perception of US limitations in tiie region. The Soviet Union knew tiiat its support to 
Iraq could not be countered by the US by changing sides. Nor was there even a remote possibility 
of Iran jo ining the US to counter balance the Soviet support to Iraq. 
T H E S T R A T E G Y :FROM N O N - I N T E R V E N T I O N TO D I S E N G A G E M E N T 
The USSR's role in the Persian Gulf conflicts was non-interventionist . During the 
Yemen war, during PDRY-Oman crisis and in respect of national liberation movements , the 
USSR resigned itself to merely providing military wherewithal to the party it supported. Even 
the nature of Soviet support to national l iberation movements was quite low profile. It 
suppor ted 
these movements from behind; through the surrogate states. 
The risk of military collision with the United States was the single most persuasive factor 
de te rmin ig Soviet Un ion ' s this particular att i tude. In most of the regional conflicts either both 
of the superpowers were on the opposite s ide of the spectrum ( PDRY-YAR wars and PDRY-
Oman conflict) with, moreover, Washington showing a high level of interests. This reminded 
the USSR of the risk of a conflict if it intervened militarily to help out the party it was 
suppor t ing(68) . The fading away of the ' de t en te ' and the arrival of Reagan increased the the 
danger of superpowers confronta t ion, forc ing the Soviet leadership to reassess the wisdom of 
tak ing an expansionist course. By that t ime, the dangers of Intervention had outmatched the 
benef i t s of the expansion of its Third World empire. 
The decision not to intervene on behalf of the Socialist regimes and allies was also caused 
by a shift in the USSR policy i.e. cult ivating oil rich capitalist-oriented states in place of weak 
Marxis t -Leninis t regimes(69). Then, of course , there were confl icts in the region, such as the 
Iran -Iraq war, which did not fit in the class war model, a pretext used by the USSR to intervene 
in Afghanis tan , that would have necessi tated Soviet intervention. 
To see that its retreat did not s ignal to the US its weakness , the USSR opted for 
mainta in ing an ability to intervene if the need arose. Thus it deployed as t rong fleet in the Indian 
Ocean, troops and planes in Afghanis tan and established strategic and political footholds in 
South Yemen and Ethiopia. While, at a same time, the USSR also saw to it that its unwill ingness 
to intervene from allies ' side did not cause an erosion in its political influence in the region. It 
cont inued to supply arms and send military advisors, both technical and combat personnel, to 
the fr iendly countries in the conflict zone(70) . 
Faced with severe economic constraints , the USSR began from the mid-80s a dramatic 
retreat f rom the Third World confl icts , ref lec ted in its total disengagement from the revolution-
ary processes in the Third World (71) to greater emphasis on the state-to-state relat ions with 
the non-social ist states, and cooperation wi th the US on the Third World confl ic ts . 
The Soviet Union could hardly sustain its activism, particularly in the spheres of arming 
its allies and matching the US military deployment (72). In 1989, i.e., on the eve of Malta 
Summit , Gorbachev slashed naval deployment in the Mediterranean by more than half which left 
Moscow with a handful of warships, one or two submarines and a few auxiliaries. Gorbachev 
did not try to improve poor facil i t ies in South Yemen and Syria. The USSR also offered the US 
to negotiate on naval conf idence-bui ld ing measures and proposed strategic and conventional 
arms control. 
The deteriorat ing economy also diverted the attention of policy makers in the USSR to 
internal issues and formulat ion of a foreign policy which would permit their government to 
address their domest ic woes more effect ively . Economic restructuring enhanced the need of 
access to the western technologies and expertises. This, in the first place, demanded reduction 
of tension with the US by abandoning all sorts of military and political competit ion with it. 
The mess in Afghanis tan brought home the point that military activism was politically 
errornous and economical ly costly to have compliant governments . Enhancement of good 
neighborly relations with the bordering states like Iran and close ties with non-socialist and the 
pro-US states in the Arabian peninsula was regarded as equally effect ive in strategy achieveing 
this objective. 
Growing unrest in the Central Asian republics also explains Moscow ' s policy to shun 
confrontat ionis t at t i tude towards the Arab governments and Iran. Being the Muslim states these 
countries could in retaliation exploit the potential for instability and separatism in the Central 
Asian region(73). 
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, the USSR tried to disengage itself from it by maintaining 
a sort of neutrality. At the beginning of the war, it imposed arms embargo against Iraq with 
which it was tied up in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperat ion. Af ter the mid 80s, the Soviet 
Un ion ' s neutrality turned pro-Iraq as it emerged I raq ' s main supplier of arms (74). However, 
a longside arming Iraq the USSR tried to rebuild its relations with Iran. This process included 
a visit by the then foreign minister, Eduard Sheverdandze, to that country. Sheverdandze was 
the only dignitary from the Superpower countries who was granted a meeting with the Iranian 
spiritual leader, Ayotal lah Khomeini . 
The Soviet Un ion ' s involvment in the escort ing of the Kuwaiti tankers in 1987 marked 
a little aberration in its policy of disengagement . But the Soviet involvement in the escort 
operat ion does not qual i fy to be an act of military activism compared to the nature and 
object ives of its previous engagements in and outs ide the region. It was a low-profi le 
engagement . The Soviet Union deployed only small fr igates, lightly armed minesweepwers, and 
supply ships in the operat ion. The U S S R ' s involvement remained a non-violent activity 
al though its own ships in the Persian Gulf waters came to be attacked by Iran. On May 6 ,1987, 
Iranian gunboats damaged a Soviet Fighter en-route to Saudi Arabia . On May 17, one of the 
tankers of the USSR had leased to Kuwait hit a mine. But on both the occasions the Soviet Union 
did not retaliate, 
Even it did not increase the level of its force in the Persian Gulf . 
The Soviet Union gave the crisis prevention central emphasis in its foreign policy agenda 
for the Persian Gulf region, provided it served it in compet ing with the US for inf luence. The 
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crisis-prevention became an effect ive means in tiie region for the USSR to allay the fears of 
"Soviet threat" among the Arab peninsular countries. It also helped the Soviet Union create the 
image of a genuine peace broker in the Arab-Israeli confl ict . 
The centrality of crisis prevention in the Soviet policy became visible in the 1980s. 
However , if in the first half of this decade the Soviet pol icy of crisis prevention aimed at 
compet ing with the US in the second half of that decade it was an outcome of its retreat from 
the competit ion. In other words , form the aprt and parcel of its activism in the Persian Gulf in 
the early 80s, the crisis prevention policy in later 80s turned into a reflection of Gorbachev 's 
disil lusionment with the Soviet globa]ism(75). 
Particularly, Gorbachev maintained that the policy of crisis escalation through military 
expansionism and polit ical activism in the crises-prone pockets in the region threatened to 
boomerang . For, the resultant competi t ion with the US was a b igger threat to the Soviet security 
and interests. This hypothesis directed Gorbachev 's focus on de-stabil izing the potential of 
Third World confl ic ts(76) . 
The main thrust of the Soviet crisis-prevention was the creation of a peace and stability 
in the region leading to the withdrawal of the US naval deployment from the region. This aim 
was central to all of the Soviet peace proposals : from the one by Breznev at the Indian 
parl iament in 1980, which called for undertaking by the superpowers not to intervene in Persian 
Gulf conflicts, to the one by Gorbachev for the creation of nuclear free zone in the region and 
the gradual withdrawal of foreign bases and fleet. 
The Soviet Union eithet tried carved out for itself the role of an equal partner in a 
multilateral solution to a crisis or it advocated a bilateral solut ion to a conflict with both the 
superpowers abstaining f rom playing a direct role in the peace processes. 
Right from the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq hostilities, the Soviet Union ' s position was that 
the war was harmful to the interests of both sides. It was interested in an early end of the war 
because it feared that the weakening and the toppling of the Khomeini regime would result into 
the re-establishment of Amer ican military presence in Iran. Later, when Iran persisted with 
prosecut ing the war , the Soviet Union opposed it because the Iranian threat had caused the 
Persian Gulf states to seek closer military ties with the United states. 
Although an end of the war implied that both the countr ies would flood the market with 
oil, causing downward pressure on the oil prices (77), but the l ink between continued fighting 
and the growing US political and military domination of the region was more harmful to the 
Soviet interests than the perceived threat of the loss of Soviet oil revenues. 
USSR ensured the adopt ing of the UN resolution 598 of 1987, which called for the end 
of hostilities, even though it opposed imposing the sanct ions on Iran so as not to antagonize 
Iran. The Soviet Union also helped in resolving the post-war d i f fe rences between Iran and Iraq. 
In 1990, it proposed a meet ing of the Soviet, Iranian and Iraqi foreign ministers in the USSR 
for this purpose(78) . 
Barring those US sponsored peace efforts in which the USSR played the second fiddle, 
the Soviet crisis prevent ion diplomacy failed. For, its peace propsals were more often than not 
directed against the US and,' therefore, were rejected by the latter. Breznev 's peace plan 
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bypassed Afghanistan entirely while calling for the removal of foreign military bases from the 
Persian Gulf region and " Adjacent islands". Dreznevplan in essence indicated that the Soviet 
Union would remain in Afghanistan, but the US should get out of the Persian Gulf and Diego 
Garcia(79).Then, with the Cold War at its peak, it was doubtful that even Soviet proposal to 
negotiate with the US on Afghanistan issue would have been successful. The US would have not 
agreed to link Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to reduction of its naval forces in the Indian 
Ocean and the Soviet Union could not be expected of offering anything more generous than this. 
Beside this, the Soviet Union came out with only a few peace proposals during the Iran-Iraq War 
and talked more about peace in policy statements etc. which were more an 'image builili .o' 
exercises than a serious effort towards the settlements o f regional disputes. 
U S - S O V I E T R E L A T I O N S A N D P E R S I A N G U L F CONFLICTS 
Mutual relationship was the major determinant in the superpowers involvement in the 
Persian Gulf conflicts. Thus, following were the aims and objectives of their policies towai'ds 
each other vis-a-visa regional conflict, —avoiding the development o f situations in whiich the risk 
o f direct confrontation might have become significant.—avoidance o f appearing defeated by the 
actions of rival and —appearing successful in the defense of clients. 
C O M P E T I T I O N 
Outdoing each other was the main thrust of their actions and interactions in the regional 
conflicts. But, it was in all respects a peaceful competition with one superpower ahering its 
position if it looked to prove dangerous enough to provoke the other one. Thus in other v. or i s 
competition without confrontation was the end of their policies. To quote Janice Grosstein 
"Both are struggling to avoid direct confrontation which might grow out of the escalation o f the 
regional war... and in their struggle they are partners as well as adversaries" (80). 
The competition was directed not to concede anj-thing to the adversary in one's own 
sphere of action(81). Hence, this urge resulted into a mutual misperception of each other's 
moves despite an understanding to avoid direct confrontation. When the Iran-Iran W a^r broke 
out, the US feared that the Soviet Union had the capability to intervene militarily on behalf of 
Iran to influence the outcome of the fighting against it (US) . It, therefore, reminded the USSR 
that the Carter Doctrine would apply to a Soviet intervention in Iran too. Whereas, the Soviet 
Union cast doubts on the US neutrality in the war, fearing that in order to get American hostages 
released, Washington might switch from neutrality to an open support to Iran. 
This shows that despite the fact that both of the superpowers had declared neutrality in 
the war and were concerned with the security o f Iran in the early phase of the war, they because 
of their prejudicial interpretation of each other's motives confronted than cooperated. 
C O O P E R A T I O N 
In some respects the interests of the superpowers in the case of conflicts in the Persian 
Gulf were common. For example, both of them wanted that the border disputes in the region did 
not flare up. Or both of them wanted that the Iran-Iraq War did not spread to the Arab Gulf 
countries. In that war both agreed to maintain a neutral stand. Then, they, since 1982-83. began 
backing Iraq and helped its defense build-up (82). In the wake of repeated Iranian attacks on 
Kuwaiti tanlcers both the superpowers provided Kuwait naval escort and they finally cooperated 
with each other in the United Nations to pass the Security Council Resolution 598 which called 
for the end o f the war. 
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In the Iran-Iraq War, the superpowers cooperat ion in part emanated from the fact that one of 
the combatants , Iran, was not asociated with either of the two power blocs(83). As a result , the 
superpowers ended up supporting the same side as they did while criticizing Iraq for s tar t ing 
the war in the early stages of the war and thereafter backing it against Iran. 
But more than that, their cooperat ion was caused by I r an ' s hostile atti tude towards both 
the superpowers . The Iranian victory against a Soviet ally could not be an automatic gain for 
the US. Nor would have this been so for the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the prospects of 
I ranian victory threatened to be the mutual loss. For the US, it was bound to lead to the 
emergence of a regional power and the rise of Islamic as well as She ' i fundamenta l i sm(84) . For, 
the USSR, the Iranian victory could have been the source of encouragement to the r ising Is lamic 
fundamental ism in Central Asian republics and a moral victory for the rebel Mujahideens in 
Afghan is tan . To quote Kaw Mar i ta ' s words : 
"For such confl ic ts they may be said to stand on the 
same side of the mirror. In sum, bipolar rivalry 
had not necessari ly locked the United States and 
the Soviet Union in a tit-for-tat action-reaction cycle". (85) 
S U P E R P O W E R S ' CONFLICT R E S O L U T I O N POLICY 
Superpowers ' role in resolution of conflicts in the Persian was limited. For instance, in 
the Iran-Iraq War, the QIC, the Arab League, Algeria and to some an extent the UN and the 
N A M figured as major actors involved in seeking an end to the war than the US or the 
USSR(86) . They ( t h e superpowers) at best tried to manage instead of prevent ing the regional 
conf l ic ts . Of larger interest to them was that a particular conflict did not escalate to a point that 
a nuclear war between themselves could have became inevitable. 
The end of the Iran-Iraq war is said to be a consequence of the de-escala t ion of 
superpowers ' rivalry. It holds true so far as the reduction of the tension be tween the two 
superpowers saved the UNSCR resolut ion 598, which turned out to be the basis of the end of 
the war, from being vetoed. But the question arises did the resolution play any role in ending 
the war? As soon as the resolution was passed, Iran categorical ly rejected it. Iran accepted it 
as a face-saving when in the wake of Iraqi victories and its war-weariness the specter of defeat 
had begun haunting it (87). So the end of the war was not due to fact that the supe rpowers had 
come out with a proposal acceptable to both the bell igerents. 
Even t h e ' new detente ' and the end of the Iran-Iraq war can not be interl inked as the latter 
was not a proxy war. In this war each belligerent was independent of superpowers ' inf luence 
in 
taking crucial decisions including the one to terminate the hostili t ies. 
The superpowers peace proposals , mooted separately, by and large fai led. These were 
designed to secure ally 's interests and, as a result, faced rejection by the other party to the 
dispute. Whereas, the objective of securing a peace-arrangement between the disputants sides 
by a superpower which did not serve the interests of the adversary diminished the chances of 
jo int effort . 
L I M I T E D ROLE 
In fact, the Persian Gulf confl icts were unique in the sense that they were not pegged to 
the superpowers confrontat ion(88) . As a logical consequence to this, the superpowers ' role in 
these was limited. The wars and confl icts erupted without being instigated by the superpowers . 
The regional actors were at best inf luenced not directed by the superpowers in managing their 
confl ic ts . The conflicts in the region usually erupted for the reasons which bore little 
s ignif icance to superpowers confrontat ion. Very often the parties to conflict themselves tried 
to keep a distance from the superpowers as their collusion with the latter was used to be 
domestical ly unwelcome (89). This ingrati tude on the part of the clients coupled with the rise 
of regional powers, suspicious and restful of extra-regional penetration, further marginalised 
the superpowers ' involvment in the confl icts in the region. 
T H E S U P E R P O W E R S A N D T H E B O R D E R DISPUTES 
In dealing with regional conflicts, the preceding discussion covers only those that which 
have turned into into ful l-f ledged wars . The low-profi le border disputes have automatically 
gone un-mentioned. The reason for this is that the superpowers approach to them was not 
s imilar to their approach towards those of the first category of confl icts . 
U N I T E D STATES A P P R O A C H 
As for the US is concerned, its policy has been to see that the border disputes, most of 
which are among the GCC member countries, do not flare up. Since, all the GCC-member states 
together make the major trading partner and strategic and political ally of the US, the latterdoes 
not want instability, arising out of territorial disputes, in the region which might force it to side 
wi th one of the party to the dispute and hence worsen its political and trade ties with the country 
it s ides against. Successive US administrat ions feared that the USSR, which enjoyed diplomatic 
relat ions with at least three of the eight states of the Arab peninsula, would make most out of 
such situation. 
T H E USSR's A P P R O A C H 
The Soviet Union ' s approach dif fered from one conflict to another. In the Arab 
peninsular region, it liked the surfacing of border disputes among the US allies forcing the US 
to take side and, in turn, giving it a chance to throw its support to the other par ty . But, s ince 
such an opprtunity did not arise, the Soviet Union pursued an altogether d i f ferent policy. It 
devised the Asian Formula in the 70s which aimed at the substitution of the exist ing military 
political groupings with a regional one excluding the outside powers. The Asian formula 
st ipulated cooperation among the regional states revolving around the renunciation of force, 
respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the development of intra-
regional economic ties. 
As regards the Iran-Iraq border disputes, the USSR almost skipped over this issue in its 
relat ions with both of the disputants . Careful to nurture close ties with both Iran and Iraq these 
countr ies , it decided not to support ei ther of them on border question. 
The soviet Union did not alter its policy when the Shah 's military build up and his 
intransigence agianst Iraq on the question of border dispute increaed. Rather than taking sides 
the USSR counseled restraitns and called for a negotiated sett lement. Cautuion characterized 
U S S R ' s policy of arms t ransfer to Iraq dur ing those days, lest it led to the outbreak of a war. 
It maintained that its arms sales to Iraq were linked to that country ' s internal security problems. 
More or less same was the U S S R ' s approach to I ran 's dispute with the U A E over three 
islands. On this question, the USSR did not adopt an official position although its allies Libya 
and Iraq condemned the Iranian action as an invasion of the Arab land. As a matter of fact, the 
Soviet encyclopedia identified the disputed islands as Iranian. The USSR at that time had 
attached considerable importance to maintain friendly ties with Iran after the Shah ' s assurance 
that it would not let Iran to become a military base agianst the USSR(90) . 
In the case of boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, the USSR adopted an 
impartial stance. It again refrained from support ing its ally in this dispute in exchange for the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuwait(91). 
Thus it can be said that al though one of the parties to many a dispute in the region were 
the camp follower of the USSR, the latter did not come forward to support them in their 
conf l ic ts with the pro-US states. Instead, the USSR tired to win the goodwill of both the 
part ies . 
To sum up, the superpowers had a little role to play in border disputes. These disputes 
never reached an alarming proportions also to ahve invited superpowers ' involvement . Some 
of the disputes were settled through regional mechanism—the GCC—. There existed an 
unders tanding of sort among the regional countries to avoid to seek superpowers help in settling 
their disputes. Some of the states settled their territorial disputes in their own favor by using 
their superior power, whi le the weaker powers reconciled with it, instead of aaproaching to the 
superpowers for redressal . In the 1960s and the 1970s, Saudi Arabia secured territorial 
concess ions from Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Oman. In 1971 the Shah of Iran seized greater and 
lesser Tunbs and forced the ruler of the Shahr jah to acquiesce in to the Iranian occupation of 
the Island of Abu Musa in return for a financial sett lement. But, in none of these cases the 
countr ies at the receiving tried to invlove either of the superpowers for res tor ing the status quo. 
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CHAPTER III 
T H E IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
The Iran-Iraq war — the most sanguinary one of the 20th century — broke out on 20 
September 1980 as Iraqi aircrafts and army mounted a full scale assault inside Iran. But, 
according to Iraqi c la ims the war had actually started around a fortnight ago when the Iranian 
ground forces crossed the international border on September 4 the same year to launch an attack 
on Iraq. 
Notwi ths tanding the conflict ing claims of the two countries on the actual date of the 
outbreak of the war , the nature and intensity of the armed bouts between the two armies prior 
to 20th September Iraqi attack were at best the border skerimishes. The invioablity of 
theinternational border was for the first t ime transgaressed on 20th September only, as Iraqi 
aircraf ts made deep penetrat ion inside Iranian territory. Thus, in legal sense, the war started on 
that day only. 
T H E ORIGIN 
The origin of the war should be not traced beyond its immediate past. A good number 
of wri t ings, however , attribute the origin of the war to the centuries-old sectarian and 
ideological rivalry be tween the two countries (1). They date it back to historical developments , 
like the victory of the Arab Islamic forces over the Persian empire in the battle of Qadisya in 
637 AD (2), the spreading of Islam and the Arab culture in Persia (637 to 750 AD) (3), the 
s tar t ing of 
cultural and lingual antagonism and the territorial disputes during the medival period when 
today ' s Iraq ad Iran were being ruled by the Ottomans and Pahalvis, respectively. 
However , it is superf luous to see a symboism between the Arab-persian rivalry and the 
Iran-Iraq war. Ideological ly, the Post-Islamic revolution Iran did not represent the monarchiesof 
Persian empire. The Is lamic revolution was the first ever event in the history of Iran towards 
the abandoning of 'Pe r s i an i sm ' for a broader goal; assumption of the mantle of the leadership 
of 
Islamic ' U m m a h ' which cuts acorss geographical, racial, sectarian and lingual limitations. The 
'Ba th i s t ' Iraq, did revel in espousing the cause of Arabism, but it too did not represent the 
contours of Arabism of early medival and medival periods. 
It would be equal ly errornous to describe the war as a menifestat ion of age-old boundry 
disputes between Iran and Iraq. Historically, the two countries never fought a full-scale war on 
the boundry disputes . These disputes cropped up to dangerous proportion a number of times 
in the past but each t ime these were settled through diplomat ic means(4). In other words, the 
history of border d isputes bewtween the two countries belies the outbreaking of a war. 
Their past has unboubtedly been confl ict-raven but it can not be described as the main 
factor behind the wa r bewtween Iran and Iraq. For, the war is not an evolut ionary process. It 
is, as a matter of fact , an instrument which is resorted to when pacif ic means to sett le disputes 
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exhaust or both or one of disputants find launching a war more rewarding to their/its national 
interests. 
Had the historical rivalry been the cause of the Iran-Iraq war, wars could have been a 
regular phenomenon between the two countries as they have more often than not been hostile 
to each other. A war would have certainly broken out during the Shah 's time when the relations 
between the two countr ies were strained no less than what these were after the accession of the 
Is lamic govenrment to the power in Iran. The war erupted in the af termath of the seizure of 
power in Iran by the Islamic revolutionaries and the resultant developments inside Iran and 
throughout the Persian Gulf region. Thus these developemtns would have been more important 
a factor behind the war . 
T H E CAUSES O F T H E WAR 
1) T H E P E R C E I V E D T H R E A T P R O G N O S I S : 
It is commanly held that the foremost objective behind the Iraqi aggression was to 
forestall the chances of the spreading of I ran ' s Islamic revolution over to Iraq where Shias 
consti tuted the major i ty and were inclind towards the spiritual leader of their community, Imam 
Khomeini . In the event of the success of revolution, led by the Shia clergy next door, the fear 
of insurrection of Sh i ' e resurgence loomed large. In addition, Ayotollah Khomeini was, those 
days, exhorting the people in Iraq to unseat Saddam Hussein whom he described "an enemy 
of Islam and all Muls ims"(5) . 
The Shi ' e upsurge in Iraq got a new lease of life in the aftermath of the victory of the 
Islamic revolution.The She ' i organisation "Al-Dawa ' Al-Is lamiyah", founded in 1968 by Sayid 
Musheer Al-Hakim A1 Tabatabai in Najaf , and "A1 Mujahideen, founded in Baghdad in 1979, 
carried out a series of bomb blasts and other subversive activities in the late 1979 and the early 
1980. 
Yet, it is doubtful that the perceived fear of the spread of Islamic revolution was really 
as a factor potential enough to have necesi tated a pre-empet ive action on the part of the Iraqi 
government . First, the Shie uprising was not a new phenomenon for the Saddam government. 
It surfaced as early as the Baathist regime came to power in 1968. Shias of Iraq resented, many 
a time violently, their suppression and the underminig of the authority of Sh i ' e clergy by the 
Baathist government(6) . 
Second, The success of Islamic revoluiton in Iran did not alter the nature and course of 
the She ' i opposit ion into a nat ion-wide armed revolt. The pro-Iran Sh i ' e resurgence in 1979-
80 was conf ined to She ' i religious centers in Iraq. It had not acquired apopu la rcha rec te r either. 
At best, Ayotol lah Khomein i ' s call to the Iraqi people to rise to revolt against the Saddam 
regime had inspired Shiasof Najaf , which is the most-coveted place for Shia community the 
world over and where Ayotol lah Khomeini had spent 14 years of his exile and was revered as 
spiritual leader by the local people (6b). Otherwise, the Arabic-speaking Shias, scattered all 
over Iraq, were not much amused by his call. 
Third, the ohe ' i resurgence had not turned militant. It, by and large, was a feeble. 
localised and semi-militant movement(7) . 
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Fourth, by the time Saddam attacked Iran he had already succeeded in quell ing the the 
S h i ' e resurgence. Many of the 'A1 D a w a ' leaders, activists and their supporters were exectued 
in early 1980 (8). People of Iranian origin, numbering about 15,368 number, were 
expel led from the country(9) . 
Fif th, Saddam Hussain could i l l -afford to launch an aggression agaisnt a neighbour had 
the country internally been s t r i fe-s t r icken. 
Sixth, Khomein i ' s vow to export his revoluion to Iraq was rehetorical . There is little 
evidence to suggest that the Iranian government fomented the Shie reurgence by giving training 
in subeversive activites to the rebels or providing them any f inancial 
and military assitance(lO). 
Seventh, Khomen i ' s call did not have any special sectar ian appeal or was not targetted 
at a part icular country. An overview of his speeches and wri t ings suggest that he called upon 
the Muslim ' U m m a h ' as a whole to topple the anti-Islamic and puppet governments in all the 
Muslim 
countr ies and not only in Iraq. Nor did he specifically address the Sh i ' e people of Iraq (11). 
Last but not the least, Iran af ter revolut ion was undrgoing a period of internal chaos and 
disorder . It had inherited a week industrial base and a disarraryed administrat ive set up from 
the Shah. The armed forces were used to be considered loyal to the ousted Shah. Thus the 
internal condition in Iran were harldy conducive to enable its government to divert its resources 
and energy towards abett ing cross-border terrorism.(12) Notwi ths tand ing the appeal of the 
Islamic 
revolut ion in Iraq, the Iranian government policy towards Iraq lacked the agressiveness that 
charectar ised Shah ' s policy towards Iraq. 
2) T H E P E R C E I V E D O P P O R T U N I T Y PROGNOSIS : 
It was not the 'perceived threa t ' f rom Iran but the ' pe rce ived oppor tuni ty ' that the ouster 
of the Shah and Islamic I ran ' s internal condit ion presented to Iraq explains Saddam ' s September 
20 act (13). The prevai l ing regional scenar io coupled with deve lopments in Iran was the right 
moment to material ize the Jong held Baathist dream of p lay ing the role of revolutionary 
vengurad of the region (14). 
Subjugat ing Iran, then a threat to the monarchical reg imes of the Arab World, Saddam 
Hussain could till the leadrship void created by the exit of Egypt . Also, Iraq, which was on the 
fo re f ron t of the movement to oust Egypt f rom the Arab fold and had burried its hatchet with 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya (15), badly wanted to give a military dimension to its newly found 
political role in the region. 
A swif t victory over the demoral ised and disarrayed armed forces of Iran would have, 
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in one stroke , turned Iraq into the saviour of the Arab states of the Persian Qulf- established 
its iniiitray superiority in the region and reaffirmed the i m p o r t a n c ^ ^ f l l i r j j i ^ ^ l s i i g i ^ ^ t i o n as 
the -
gateway to the Arab world security from the East(16). ff^f \ 
Saddam's decision to attack Iran would have been state of 
a f fa i r s in Iran. The military prowess of Iran took a nosedive as a direct consequence of the 
success of Islamic revolut ion. The armed forces were disorganised fol lowing the large scale 
purging of the pro-Shah elements from it. Some 10,000 senior off icers were sacked and the 
conscript ion of a lot more was reduced(17). In the place of sacked armed forces personnel , who 
were experienced and well- t rained, the young people, without any previous experience, were 
be ing recruited. The defence preparedness received further jol t with the cancellat ion of worth 
$ 12 b arms deal with the erstwhile ally, the US. The weapons in the Iranian inventory had 
become sitting ducks in the wake of the shortage of spare parts (18). Over and above, the 
mili tray concentration on the Iran-Iraq border was reduced by half so as to increase the 
deployment in Kurd-domianted areas in the north and the areas adjacent to the former Soviet 
Union (19). The revolution had altered the Iran-Iraq military balance of power as " r a the r than 
a s t rong Iran facing a week and isolated Iraq as earlier, a s t rong Iraq appeared to face a week 
and divided 
I ran"(20) . 
Politically, Iran was undergoing a transitional fhase. The Islamic forces were consolidat-
ing control over the str ings of government and administrat ion by el iminat ing the Pro-Shah 
elements and isolating the one-t ime revolutionary allies such as the Tudeh Party and the 
Mujahideen-E- Khalq, who , in turn, were enviouis of c le rgy ' s rise to power . In the afore-
ment ioned circumstances, a military attack from Saddam was bound to receive support from the 
dissidents . It would have also led to the staging of a military coups by the dissdents , supported 
by the Iraqi government . 
Not the strength and capabili t ies of the enemy country alone but the conf idence in one ' s 
own strength to achieve a decisive victory determines the outbreak of a pre-planned war. Iraq, 
as stated above, was polit ically and economically stable and mili tari ly strong. Tariq Aziz, I raq 's 
wa r Foreign Minister, wri tes in his book that the Iraqi government decided to go to war only 
a f te r calculating that Iraq was in perfect position on all counts to win it(21). Over and above, 
Saddam Hussein was also confident of absence of an opposi t ion to his at tack from the 
superpowers , not to talk of any attempt by the superpowers and the regional countr ies to force 
Iraq to stop the war (22) . 
3) T H E T E R R I T O R I A L DISPUTES: 
The long-standing dispute over the soverignty over the river 'Sha t t -Al -Arab ' (23) and 
Iraqi territorial claims over I ran ' s Khuzestan province (24) were someway or other an issue 
behind the war. The war preceded the renewal of Iraqi claim over the entire Shatt and the 
Khuzestan province. Saddam Hussein went to the extent of unilateral ly abrogat ing the the 1975 
Algiers agreement between the two countries, which established 'mid-wate r ' as the demarcat-
ing line between the two countr ies ' boundaries, three days be fore at tacking Iran. Since the 
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boundry dispute is tiie Iraqi version of the cause of the war, it must not be taken as it is. A cross-
examinat ion of the Iraqi contention proves that the boundry dispute was more a ' p r e t ex t ' than 
a ' c a u s e ' . 
To begin with, the boundry issue was not a bone of contention between the two countr ies 
during most the t ime between the installation of the Islamic government and the outbreak of the 
war . When the Islamic government came to power, Saddam Hussein assured it that it would 
abide by the Algires agreement on the question of boundry demarcat ion. It was as late as 
September 7 ,1980 the Iranian Charge ' D ' Affa i r s was given a notice that either Iran should hand 
over the terri tories claimed by Iraq or face an Iraqi military at tack(26). On 17th of the same 
month, Saddam abrogated the traety. Thus a boundry dispute could not in a span of a fortnight 
ripe to an extent that a war had become imminent . 
Also , as against the past, the Iraqi government did not make any effor t to resolve the 
issue through negotiat ions(26). Had the war preceded unsuccessful negotiat ions, then only the 
wag ing of war to setlle the dispute could have been jus t i f ied. The boundry dispute was not also 
an issue of grave concern to the Iraqi government . It was propped up only in retal iat ion to the 
alleged Iranian involvment in Iraq. So says Tariq Aziz in his book "but when Iran at tempts to 
over throw the revolutionary nationalist system in Iraq... . then the persuit of the issues of 
terr i tories , the Shat-al-Arab even that Arabistsn will not be wrong atti tude f rom poli t ical point 
of v iew"(27) . 
T H E GENISIS OF T H E WAR 
The Iran-Iraq war is described as the war of two nationalist ideologies, the Arab and the 
Persian (28). This rivalry has ehthinic and lingual connotat ions as Iraqis are Arabs and the 
Iranians are Aryans, . The teo peoples respectively speak Arabic and Persian. But, the war in 
querst ion could hardly have been a war of ideologies because of the fact that one of the the 
war r ing countr ies i.e. Iran, had in part to come out of Shah legacy and in part to carve out a 
larger role for the country in the regional affairs , d isfavoured its Persian charecter for a supra-
national 
charecter by indentifying itself with Islam.(28) 
The Islamic government criticised the Shah ' s policy of indent i fying Iranians as Arayans. 
Imam Khomeini , instead, traced an I ranian 's identity to the religion he or she fol lowed and to 
the advent of Islam in the country than its thousands of years old racial connect ion. 
Even I raq ' s did project the war as as a s truggle for re-establishing Arab supremecy over 
' A j a m ' ( n o n Arab) races. But this policy s temmed more out expediency than any ideological 
compuls ion . The Arab sentiments were exploited to muster the support of Arabic-speaking 
Shias, the Arabic speaking Kurds and the Arabs in Iran, to jus t i fy I raq ' s historical claim over 
the Khuzes tan province of Iran, to win the support of Arabs and to project Iraq as the protector 
and the defender of the Arab World. 
This war can not be termed as a Shia-Sunni war either. Like its Persian charecter , the 
Is lamic governmen ' of Iran also downplayed its Sb.e'i identity. With a view to establish among 
Mulsim Uminah, pre-dominantly Sunni, of its Islamic credentials, the Iranain government 
aspired for Shia-Sunni unity. Ayotollah Khomeini had indeed taicen a few bold steps in this 
regard. As the spiritual leaders of the Shia community of the world, he asked the Shias to shed 
their differences with the Sunnis. For instance, he allowed that Shia could say Namaz in Sunni 
mosque and perform it the way Sunnis performed it, even behind a Sunni Imam (the prayer 
leader). 
Ayatollah Khomeini also diferred from Shia Ulema ( religious scholars) in many ways. 
In his speeches and works he referred excessively to the teachings and sayings of Prophet 
Mohammmed than those of the fourth Caliph, Ali, and 12 Shia Imams, contrary to the general 
practice among the Shia Ulema. The Is lamic revolution was also a departure from the Shia 
c le rgy ' s preference to the policy of non-interference in the state of affairs of a despot. Otherwise 
the Shi 'e c lergy 's stand was that only Imam Mehndi, who is seculsion since many centuries, 
would would by appearing again, eradicate injustice and supresssion from the wor ld . 
The war was not a manifestat ion of the Shia-Sunni rivalry because the Shia population 
of Iraq remained loyal to its government . So were the Sunnis of Iran to their government (29). 
To quote Selernee Micheal , "loyality to the present states and governments has proved stronger 
than the religious affinity and distinct ethinic indentit ty"(30). 
A R M E D CLASHES PRIOR TO T H E W A R 
The full-scale Iran-Iraq war preceded a series of border skerimishes, s tar t ing from April 
1980. According to the Iraqi claim the seeds of war were swon by Iran on 1st April 1980 when 
its agents among Iraqis hurled bomb at the Iraqi deputy prime minsiter Tariq Aziz in Baghdad 
Universi ty (31). On April 5 bombs was hurled at the funeral procession of those killed in April 
1 incident. The Iraqi embassy at Tehran was also attacked during the summer 1980(32). The 
consual te of the Iraq was attacked on October 11 and 26 and Novemeber 1 and 7 in 1979 (33). 
Accord ing to Iraqi sources, in a span of six months, i.e. between 1979's winter and the 1980's 
summer there took place 249 cases of violat ion of Iraqi airspace by the Iranian aircrafts , and 
244 
cases of firing across the border and on the border posts and an equal number of artillery 
shell igns by the Iranian armed forces(34). 
The Iranian sources date back the Iraqi aggression to May 4, 1979 when in a major 
assault on Iranian vil lages scores of people were killed and around 6,000 rendered homeless. 
On November 30 1979, parts of Bosinir and Abadan townswere attacked. Iraq mounted another 
attack on Nafashah in March 1980. There was heavy artelliary shelling on Kirmanshah on April 
4 the same year. On April 12, the Iranian town Qasar-e Shirin was attacked. 
On September 4, Iranian armed forces fired artillery shells at the Iraqi city Khanqan and 
Mandlai from the disputed border area of Al-Quas (35) in retaliation to the rocket attacks on 
the city of Meharan. Heavy exchange of fire was reported on September 10 and September 14. 
This also resulted into the occupation of Zainul Qyas by the Iraqi forces. The last round of the 
border skerimishes was fought on 19th September, a day beofere the full f ledge war started. 
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T H E C O U R S E OF T H E WAR 
1) T H E FIRST P H A S E : IRAQ LAYS T H E SEIGE OF IRAN: 
War of attrition along tiie border apart , the ful l - f ledge war between Iran and Iraq started 
on 20-21 September with Iraq launching a broad-f ront offensive across the Shat t -Al-Arab at 
four points . 
(1) In the north between Qasr-E-Shir in and Naf t -E-Shah with a division strength of 10,000. 
(2) The fur ther south at Mehran wi th a s t rength of 3,000. 
(3) Towards Dezful (36) . 
(4) Around the oil ports of khur remshaher and Abadan in the Persian Gulf (37). 
It was a ful l-scale war in terms of the areas covered. Yet, Iraq did not deploy as large 
a force as warranted . This was probably due to the fact that Iraq had not d iscounted the 
poss ibi l i ty of retreat ing in the w a k e of e i ther superpower ' s opposit ion to the Iraqi attack, 
leading them 
to mili tari ly intervene, or an Israeli attack in the West or Syria, a long time Baathist foe, joining 
the war f rom the Iranian side. 
Iran retaliated by carrying out air raids into Iraqi territories. Iran amassed a large ground 
forces compris ing the Revolut ionary Guards (Pasdaran) , the Mustazfeen, regular army person-
nel and the border tribal militia, equipped with light medium weapons and small artil lery. F-4 
Phan toms ,F-5Es Cobra Hel icopters were used by Iran to make low-level interdict ion raids on 
ma jo r Iraqi cities viz., Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkukh. Strangely, Iran did not use its air power 
to bomb the invading armies of Iraq. It also did not provide enough air cover to its own army 
s t randed on borders . The main objec t ive behind the Iranian strategy to make deep raids into Iraq 
was to target vital economic instal lat ions therein as well as block the supply line to Iraqi forces 
f ight ing in Iran. 
A state of stalemate fo l lowed af ter a few days of the start ing of war . The Iraqi strategy 
to launch a broad front of fens ive did not pay off due to the failure to commit a suf f ic ient ly large 
army on the war front . The Iraqi array failed to capture vital strategic posit ions, including the 
ci t ies of Dezfu l , Ahwaz and Khorramshaher , in Iran (38). 
This phase of the war was dist inct in many ways to the course the war undertook 
a f te rwards . The war in this phase was almost directionless. Despite succeeding of t and on in 
overcoming Iranian resistance, the Iraqi army showed self-restraint in advancing fur ther and 
pre fe r red to conf ine to border areas only(39) . This shows that Iraq aimed at achieving limited 
victory only instead of over running the whole of Iran. I raq 's l imited object ives were to create 
internal chaos in Iran, cause the col lapse of the Islamic government, occupy the Arab-dominated 
Khuzes tan province of Iran and establ ish control over the river Shatt .(40) 
T H E S E C O N D PHASE (September 1981- 1984) : IRAN FIGHTS BACK: 
T h e Second phase of the war began with Iran bouncing hack. It re-captured the 
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terri tories it had lost to Iraqi forces and forced them to retreat, which was the first major Iraqi 
reversal in the war(41) . Long and frequent halts in Iraqi at tacks during the 1981 summers 
(42)gave Iran needed time to regroup its armed forces and increase their numerical strength to 
outnumber the invading army. Since Iran had failed to deploy a large army in the first year of 
war, which was being re-consti tuted, it suffered a considrable loss of lives at the hands Iraqi 
forces(43) . 
In December 1981, the Iranian army captured key crossroads linking I raq 's entire 
southern borders. Iraq made a month long effort to recapture the junction but failed (44). 
Another major breakthrough was achieved dur ingear ly and mid 1982. In February -March 1982 
Iranian army regained control over Dezfu l -Shouzsec tor (45) . Khorremshaher was also regained 
in 1982.(46). Finally, the Paasdaraan, largely the teen-aged boys, called " h u m a n w a v e s " , 
managed to cross the international border in June 1982. The Iranian government decision to 
take the war into I raqaimed primarily at unseating Saddam Hussein from power and also 
abetting 
Shia resurgence in Iraq. 
Till 1984, Iran continued launching several " h u m a n w a v e " offensives in Iraq. However, 
the Iranian army failed in breaking into Iraqi defenses .It made an abortive attempt to the seize 
the port of Basraand failed to move into the northern oil f ields near Mosul and cut the Basra 
town from the rest of Iraq. The Iranian bid at Basra cost thousands of casualties. In the Majnoon 
sector alone the Iranian army suf fered 15,000 to 20,000 casual t ies (47). 
However, the human wave assaults did not leave Iraq without the fear of loosing a 
considerable port ion of border areas to the Iranian army. Thus , Saddam offered unilateral 
ceasef ire which Tehran obviously rejected. But, the i l l -equipped (48), ill-trained and inexperi-
enced army failed to enter Baghdad. It could not penetrate the s t rong defense line of Iraq, spread 
through 180 km border . The Iranian a rmy— over-zealous, spiri ted but poorly coordinated — 
made a number of miscalculated attempts. Iraq put up a st iff resistance owing to its superiority 
in weapon system. The Iranian army also lacked in planning the battle field strategy. For 
instance, Iraqis foi led the Iranian grand offensive at Majnoon sector by diverting the water from 
river Tigris and Huwarza through a canal to create an air field lake around the Majnoon islands. 
When in March 1984 the Iranian troops wade through the Marshland in a planned quick push 
through a gap in the Iraqi third and fourth armies, the swampy batt lef ield deterred their progress 
and made hundreds of them sit t ing ducks to Iraqi f ighters (49). 
At the end of the year 1984, it appeared that both the armies were at disadvantage when 
invading and good in defense . Writes Chr i s tophers . Raj of the Institute of Defence Studies and 
Analyses, New Delhi , " if at first Iraq had miscalculated in launching an invasion of Iranian 
territory, it now seemed Iran had equally badly miscalculated in taking the war across the Iraqi 
te r r i tory" (50). 
T H E T H I R D P H A S E : T H E W A R OF E C O N O M I C A T T R I T I O N : 
The war of economic attrition was started by Iran instead of Iraq as is generally believed. 
This phase of war is said to have begun with Iraqi attack on I ran ' s Kharag oil terminal (51) in 
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spr ing 1984. However, Iran had launched the war of economic attriiton as soon as the war broke 
out. It resorted to it again in 1983 also by launching Va-Fajr -4 air attack around Kurdish 
mountain near the Iraqi town of Punjwan on October 20 that year. The main Iranian objectives 
under lying this attack were to damage the Iraq-Turkey-Mediterranean pipeline through which 
dpassed much of I raq ' s export bound oil and to render its Kirkuk oil field ineffect ive (52). In 
response to Iranian attack, Iraq bombed the Iranian town of Dezful , Marzed, Suleiman and 
Behbehan. 
Beside bombing Iranian oil facili t ies, Iraqis also laid down mines at the approaches to 
the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini , 80 km east of the river Shatt) and damaged the unfinished 
Iranian-Japanese joint Petro-Chemical ventures a the same place. 
The Iraqi attack on the Kharag turned the Iran-Iraq battle from a ground affa i r into an 
air war. However , Iran, like Iraq, did not switch over to air warfare . It conducted at least three 
of its "human waves of fens ives" between 1985 and 1987 . None of them translated into major 
breakthroughs. The only success of these offens ives was that Iraqi army was encircled in its own 
land anddenied of a chance to intrude into Iran. 
It was the diminishing possibility of re-entering Iran that led Iraq to make a strategic shift 
i .e. the launching of the war of economic attrit ion through missile attacks and air raids.The Iraqi 
strategy was to damage the Iranian oil facil i t ies which facilitated 90 percent of Iranian oil 
exports and earned Iran 80 percent of its revenues. In Such an eventuality Iran could have been 
unable to meet its defense-civi l expendi ture and settled for peace on Iraqi terms, the Iraqi 
government 
planned. 
T H E T A N K E R W A R : T H E GULF IS E N G U L F E D : 
Failing to wreck enough damage to the Iranian oil installations,Iraq did not spare Iranian 
oil tankers and cargo ships. These attacks statr ted from May 7 1984 (53). Iran fol lowed the suit . 
In early months of the 1984 summer, the Iranian jets attacked as many as five ships bound for 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia(54) . In the ensued war the tankers of the Arab countries of the Persian 
Gulf , Panama and Greece were also hit. Iraqi missiles also hit, unwittingly, the tankers of the 
fr iendly Persian Gulf states (55). A total number of 67 tankers ships got attacked in the year 
1984 alone(56). While the total number of the tankers/ships hit during the tanker war period 
mounted to as much as 150 (57). 
In 1985, more Iranian ships and oil installations were targeted. Since Iran could not give 
Iraq the taste of its own medicine as due to the closure of the river Shatt the Iraqi oil tankers 
did not show up in the Persian Gulf waters , it retaliated by launching yet another ground 
of fens ive in March 1985. 
Tehran Succeeded to cut Basra-Baghdad highway (58). The airlift of arms from Egypt 
renewed Iraqi forces" f i repower to enable it to push the Iranian army back to borders. By this 
t ime Baghdad had also begun using chemical weapons against the Iranian army. In February 
1986, Iran made the most successful ground offensive. The Iranian army comprising 10,000 
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revolutionary guards crossed the Shatt Al-Arab, in small boats, into the Fao peninsula which 
was captured in less than the twenty-four hours(59). 
Later, reorganizing its army and deploying added numbers of arms brigade, Iraq halted 
Iranian advancement towards Basra. The two armies laid idle face-to-face for the next two 
months before Iraq decided to drop the move to lay siege of the Iranian army and diverted its 
thrust to I ran ' s ' economic targets once again. In July-August the same year, Iraqi missiles 
repeatedly attacked Iranian refineries at Shiraz, Isfahan and Tabr iz with the Kharag terminal 
be ing hit more than hundred t imes.(60) Air/missile raids were also made at Tanker terminals 
at Siri Island, situated south of the Persian Gulf, and Larak Island in the Strait of Hurmuz.(61) 
The Soviet missiles as well as Exocet missiles, the latter supplied by France and were the 
latest weapons inducted into Iraqi armory, enhanced Iraqi capabi l i ty to extend the range of its 
operat ion to a forement ioned targets(62) . 
The Tanker War entered its most crucial phase af ter I r an ' s January 6-8 assault—the 
Kerbela 5 offensive pn Basra. Although this offensive incurred a human toll of 40,000 to Iran, 
it was the second major victory for Iran af ter the one at Fao in 1986. 20,000 Iraqi soldiers also 
lost their lives while defending the city. Though the casual t ieson Iraqi side was half to those 
su f fe red by the Iranian army, it was quite a big loss for a country whose population was only 
one-four th of I ran 's . The Iranian army also forced half of Bas ra ' s 1,000,000 population to 
f lee(63) . 
But the event of most far-reaching significance during the Tanker War was, probably, 
the US acceptance of Kuwaiti request to protect its oil tankers f rom I ran ' s indiscriminate firings 
in the Persian Gulf waters . Kuwait approached the US to re-f lag its oil tankers on January 17, 
1987(64) . The US decided to escort 11 Kuwaiti tankers on July 22, 1987. On July 24, US-
f lagged Kuwaiti super tanker struck a mine (65). On Aug. 24, two Iranian vessels were fired 
by a US destroyer, Kidd (66). On the night of October 8, an Iranian boat fired on American 
petrol heIicopters(67). In retaliation, the American hel icopters fired and sank three Iranian 
petrol boats 15 miles south west of Farsi Island (68). On October 16, the US-Flagged Kuwait 
sh ip " S e a Isle C i t y " was hit by an Iranian missile while it was in Kuwaiti territorial waters (69). 
The US navy destroyers retaliated on October 19 by gut t ing an Iranian derelict oil rig. Iran 
responded by fir ingmissiles in Kuwai t ' s island terminals on October 22 (70). 
The Iran-US br inkmanship was a turningpoint in the war . The US entry internationalized 
the war. Besides US, Netherlands, Britain, France and Belgium also took part in the actions by 
deploying their naval forces at the US services. The Persian Gulf countries provided the US the 
naval facilities(71). 
The US-Iran hostil i t ies were the beginning of the end of the war . Threatened by the 
prospects of the US going whole-hog, Iran resorted to re-concil iat ion. It signaled its willingness 
by giving a second thought to the UN resolution 598, which it had opposed tooth and nail till 
then . 
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T H E WAR OF CITIES : THE WAR E X T E N D S B E Y O N D BATTLE FIELDS: 
Barring a pause of first four years of the beginning of the war, the cities of the two 
countr ies were pounced by missiles and subjected to repeated air raids. This was despite the fact 
that the two countries refrained from at tacking civilian targets.They had also signed an 
agreement to this ef fec t , brokered by the UN, on June 12, 1984(72). 
The attacks on cities began in 1985 when ground engagements reached A state of 
s ta lemate . It was started by Iran with art i l lery attacks on southern Iraqi cit ies of Basra, 
Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mandali , and Khanaqin. In return, the Iraqi air force bombed the partially 
constructed nuclear plants at Bushehr and a steel plant in Ahwaz, beside heavily pounding 
Tehran and 40 other Iranian cities. 
The air superiority and the possession of chemical weapons facilitated I raq ' s regular 
raids on Iranian cities. I ran ' s strategy in the war of cities was to offset the cumulat ive cost of 
the 
Human Waves of fens ives (73). However, the casualt ies on the Iranian side in the war of cities 
were no less. Also, the air offensives on Iraqi cities proved counter productive in the sense that 
these affected Iraqi Shias too, eroding the sympathy that they had for the country ruled by their 
sect . Iran could also not withstand Iraq 's superior i ty in air. 
T H E LAST P H A S E : 
The 'war of ci t ies ' re-erupted in early 1988. This time it was startedby Iraq. Iraq took 
the advantage of the low morale of Iran. Iranian ground forces had despite lying siege around 
Basra for the last two years or so failed to conquer the city. Domest ic discontentment against 
an unfru i t fu l war had begun appearing. The moderate elements in Iranian politics were wary of 
carrying on an endless war at the cost economic dislocation, international isolation, human 
losses (74). 
I r aq ' s strike capability had increased t remendously after fresh supply of arms from the 
West European sources at the behest of the US, and also from the Soviet Union. I r an ' s military 
prowess was deplet ing. However, despite all these odds, Iran made a last-ditch e f for t north of 
Iraq in the autumn of 1987-88. Iraq, in turn, fired 150 Scud-B missiles (modif ied by East 
Germans by extending it range and reducing the payload)(75) . Iraq also used SSMs and Soviet 
f ighter aircrafts in pounding at civil and economic facil i t ies in Iran. A total number 10 to 11 
thousands deaths were reported on the I ranian side (76). 
I ran ' s autumn offensive boomeranged. Iraq sprayed chemical weapons on Halabja town 
as the Iranian forces entered the city. Hundreds of Iranian armymen died and twice as much were 
in jured. The Iranian army began retreating. The autumn fiasco followed the loss of Fao 
peninsula by Iran on April 16-17 1988. A f t e r Fao the Iraqi army also recaptured Shalamheh, 
Meharan and Majnoon from Iran. 
Al though the Iraqi army was only able to regain the control of its own,terr i tor ies , the 
setback suffered by Iran culminated into its acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598. 
On June Ayatollah Khomeini appeared on national TV to announce the end of hostil i t ies from 
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I r a n ' s side, a decision which to him was liice quaff ing the bitter drink of poison(77). 
However, I ran 's face-saving should not be read as an outright victory for Iraq because 
none of the Iraqi military objectives came to be met at the end of the war. Iraq could not occupy 
even an inch of the Iranian land, not to speak of Arabic-speaking Khuzestan. Iraq only regained 
the terri tories it had lost to Iranian army a couple of years ago. In this respect , Iranian 
pe r fo rmance was relatively better. Not only did Iran liberate its territory overrun by the Iraqi 
a r m y ' s soon after the outbreak of the war, but it intruded into the Iraqi terri tories along the 
border and retained them under its control for over five years. 
Thge logic that there was a qual i tat ive difference between the Iranian military gains 
th roughout the war and that of Iraq at the eve of the end of the war since the latter forced Iran 
to cease hostili t ies does not sound authent ic . First, a direct l inkage between I ran ' s acceptance 
of ceasef i re and the Iraqi victory can not be establisherd. Despite Iraqi victories on the 
homeground , the chances of fresh Iraqi moves inside Iran leading to the occupation of whole 
or 
parts of Iran and the toppling of the Is lamic government did not really exist. Recognizing its 
weakness to fight a war inside Iran, Iraq was not prepared to risk its success back home. Second, 
on several occasions during the war Iraq had also offered to end the hostility in the same way 
Iran did. 
I raq ' s political objectives could also not materialize. From the throes of war the Islamic 
Government emerged stronger. The opposi t ion to the new government took a back seat . Iranian 
peop le threw their total support behind the Islamic government . Iraqi Pre-occupat ion with the 
wa r told on its leadership urge as it turned a country financially and morally indebted to the Arab 
countr ies and isolated from regional the affa i rs . 
However , compared to Iraq, Iran was more embarrassed. Ayatol lah Khomeini had to 
undergo the trauma of acepting a proposal which he had rejected as "discr iminatory" and 
resolved to defy it "until victory". The war also turned out to be a 'vol te face ' for Iran. After 
hav ing occupied Iraqi territories during much of the latter half of the 80s, Iran had to content 
wi th withdrawing from there unceremoniously, leaving thousands of its soldiers consumedby 
the chemical weapons and many more rendered physically disabled and detained. 
There general perception of the reasons behind I ran 's defeat needs to be re-examined. 
T h e yawning gap in the military capabil i t ies of the two countries is described as one of such 
reasons(79) . At the end of the war Iraq was reportedly enjoying 4:1 superiori ty in tank, 3:1 in 
art i l lery and 10: 1 in aircraft . 
But, at the same time, it must be borne in mind that Iraqi military superiority never really 
helped Iraq. For instance, when Iraq was at the receiving end in the war it maintained military 
super ior i ty but to no avail. Had the mili tary superiori ty determined the course of the war, Iraq 
would have won it much earlier. 
Lack of coordination between the regular army and the revolutionary guards as well as 
logistical diff icult ies, such as shortage of arms and spare parts, were also not a factor in the 
defeat of Iran for the reason stated above. These were the problems which Iran faced since the 
very beginning of the war , yet it was able to push back the Iraqi army from its territory and then 
overpower the Iraqi defenseon the Iraqi side of the internartional border. These mattered in 
I r an ' s inability to tread I raq ' s inner defense around Baghdad and Basra. 
Internal political and economic instability is also advocated to be one of the causes of 
Iranian defeat . It is d i f f icul t to gauge the intensity of political and economic turmoil in Iran at 
the eve of the end of the war . But one may anticipate that in case there prevailed political and 
economic uncertainiries in Iran, there would have been a widespread protest against the 
gove rnmen t ' s sudden decision to end a war af ter shedding so much of the blood of the people. 
But that nothing of that sort happened cert i f ies that economic hardship, human agony and the 
war-wear iness had not resulted into resentment and disi l lusionment. Even People ' s approval of 
their government ' s decis ion to end the war s temmed from their commitment to state and the 
government . 
The Iranian economy was also not in a topsey-turvey condition.All through the annals 
of war I ran 's economy had been very resilient. In the year of the end of the war, the economy 
had 
improved a bit also. The Iraqi attacks on Iranian tankers, cities and economic installation had 
scaled down, enabling Iran to export more oil than in the previous years. 
T H E IRAN-IRAQ WAR A N D T H E S U P E R P O W E R S 
T H E UNITED STATES: 
The major object ives of the United states with respect to the Iran-Iraq war remained 
unchanged, no matter the war continued for eight years and during this period the off ice of the 
president in the US was held by three incumbents. These major policy objectives were; the 
securi ty of oil supplies, the containment of the Soviet Union and the denial of victory to Iran. 
The policy US adopted to pursue the afore-mentioned object ives was,however , subject-
ed to significant changes in tune with the changing fortunes of the war— the changing oil 
demand and supply pattern and the U turn in Soviet-US relations at the fag end of the war(80). 
Interestingly, each combatant accused the US of launching an Imperialist-Zionist war 
against it through its proxy, the other combatant . However hard this argument is stretched, the 
role of the US in the outbreak of the war can not be even slightly established. It did not have 
any leverage with either of the belligerents; the post-Shah government in Iran being in total 
enmity with it and Iraq being a Soviet ally. Furthermore, destability in the region was further 
harmful to the US which had very recently lost a trusted ally in the Shah, was contemplating 
' second oil shock ' and was also pre-occupied with the specter of Soviet Un ion ' s southward 
expansion after the la t ter ' s occupati.on of Afghanis tan. 
T H E EARLY N E U T R A L I T Y : 
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In view of these reasons, the US instant response to the war was that of 'neutra l i ty ' . It 
hoped that its 'neutra l i ty ' will also deny the Soviet Union an alibi to take side in the war(81). 
The US was also made to adopt a neutral stand by the bell igerent states as they showed an 
unwil l ingness to involve it. Neither of the two sought arms assistance, economic aid and 
poli t ical support from the US. 
However, The US ' impar t ia l i ty ' in the war did not mean " inac t ion" or "disinterest". Thus 
clar i f ied the US Secretary of State, Muskie. "to be impartial is not be inactive : to declare that 
w e will not take side is not to declare that we have no interest at s take" (82). Rather, US took 
keen interests in f inding a solution to the war but at the same time it was also aware of its 
l imitat ions as manifested in the US Adminis t ra t ion 's official s tatement, "the war between Iran 
and Iraq is one of the few conflicts where we do not have any ally or at least friend we can lean 
on" (83) . 
The US did not show any panic as the war broke out. It did not increase the military 
presence in the region. No more naval fleet was sent to Arabian waters. Nor was any 
wherewi tha l added to solitary American naval fleet, then consist ing of two carrier battle groups, 
in the 
Arab ian sea (84). The US think-tank was also divided over the issue of providing military 
assistance. to the Persian Gulf allies which were under the threat of being dragged in the war. 
T H E SHIFT T O W A R D S IRAN : 
Strangely, a pro-Iran shift was witnessed in American neutrali ty about a month of the 
beg inn ing of the war. The US expressed its opposition to an Iraqi victory which led to the 
d ismemberment of Iran as this would have resulted into the emergence of a Soviet ally as a 
regional power. The US did not want to take any action which would have irked Iran which had 
held its diplomatic staff as hostages. The US overtly expressed its opposit ion to Iraq. President 
Carter exclaimed, "Iraqi force had exceeded the war object ives, which was to take control of 
the Shat t-al-Arab waterway and not the Iranian terri tory" ( 85) The US opposi t ion to Iraqi 
a t tempt to occupy parts of Iran grew to an extent that the State Department warned that the 
se izure of Khuzestan " w o u l d not be c o n d o n e d " . 
The Deputy Secretary of the state Warren Christopher clarif ied that US 'neutral i ty ' 
would not come in way of an attempt to dismember Iran. "We certainly would be strongly 
opposed to any dismemberment of Iran", he added. The then US Secretary of State also 
descr ibed the Iraqi attack on Iran as " invas ion" . 
With getting the hostages being the main concern of the US, the Carter Administrat ion 
o f fe red military assistance to Iran which is known as "arms for hostage deal". President Carter 
declared that "if the hostages are released safely we would make delivery of those items which 
Iran owns— which they have bought and paid for" ' (86) . Even, the Carter Administrat ion 
remained stuck to the deal in all seriousness despite opposition f rom the West Asian allies (87) 
and from the Congress back home (88). 
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The US also tried to help Iran by o f f e r ing spare parts tghe latter badly needed to sustain 
its American war machine. Advisors of Carter had told him to supply arms and ammunit ion to 
Iran to keep the arms race with the Soviet union, which was then the largest arms supplier to 
Iraq alive(89), alive. 
T H E PRO-IRAQ POLICY 
The US debunked its neutrality or what is described above as 'a pro-Iran sh i f t ' in favor 
of a pro-Iraq policy in the event of Iraqi reverses in the war . If an Iraqi victory was not in the 
interests of the. US, the threat the propsepc ts of an Iranian victory posed were greater . In 
adopt ing a thorough anti-Iran posture, the US was also encouraged by the the Soviet fai lure to 
b reak ice with Iran. The US government realized soon that not only had Iran not made any 
posi t ive gestures towards the Soviet Union but it had also given a lukewarm response to 
M o s c o w ' s advances in this regard. 
The efforts to improve relations with Iraq took off as ear ly as March 1981 on the then 
US Secretary of State Alexander Ha ig ' s ini t iat ives (90). In March 1981, the Deputy Assistant 
Secre tary of State Morris Draper toured Baghdad to brief Saddam of the US pol icy in the 
region. The US allies in the region, with w h o m Iraq had by that t ime developed close relations, 
played 
an important role in bringing the US on the Iraqi s ide. The US also wanted to cash in on the 
deter iorated Soviet-Iraq relations (91). 
However , the Israeli attack on I r aq ' s nuclear reactor in June that year put a brake on the 
progress in Iraq-US relations. The Iraqi government alleged that the US knew of the Israeli 
des ign (92). The US government placated Iraqi anguish by condemning Israeli aggression and 
vot ing against Israel on this issue in the Securi ty Council beside suspending delivery of four F-
16 f ighter bombers to Israel as a sign of its d ispleasure . However , before Iranian recoveries in 
late 1981, the US bid for a rapprochement with Iraq was conf ined to improve relat ions at 
d ip lomat ic and economiclevels with an aim to cut into Soviet inf luence in that country. Once 
the war swung back to I ran ' s favor, the US began suppor t ing Iraq and asked its wes tern allies 
to provide Iraq with adequate military equipment . 
A major development in US-Iraq real t ions took place in 1983. US reportedly instiagted 
Iraq to engage Iran in land war so that it could not turn to b lockade the Strait of H u r m u z (93). 
The US support to Iraq became overt by 1984 with President Reagan announcing "that a defeat 
of Iraq would be contrary to the US interests in the reg ion" (94) . The diplomat ic t ies between 
the two countries were restored in 1984. A f t e r that the US suppor t to Iraq came in form of 
mili tary and economic assistance also. On military f ront , Iraq and the US shared intell igence 
repor ts (95) . 
The US also asked its West European allies to pump sophist icated arms in Iraq and 
provide related assistance, such as helping Iraq in its nuclear and indigenous arms production 
programs. Beside, the US also sold arms direct ly to Iraq, though not f requent ly . It suppl ied to 
Iraq over 74 45 Model 214ST Hel icopters in 1985, 30 Model 300c helicopters in 11 83 and 24 
./ lodel 531 MG Hel icopters in 1985. Repor ts also sugges t that the US had p roposed to place 
its t roops under the Iraqi command to revert Iranian aggression of Fao in 1985. 
The US also provided Iraq over $ 10 bill ion in credit each year to meet the cost of its 
huge arms acquisit ion (96). On political plank, the US stopped condemning Iraq for starting the 
war . The Iraqi war was oficiaily described as the one waged by Iraq in se l f -defense . The 
responsibi l i ty for the continuance of the war was squarely blamed on Iran as reflects the 
fo l lowing statement of the US government on the bell igerents Iraq. 
"Unl ike Iraq, Iran is adamant ly opposed to 
negot ia t ions , or mediated end of the conf l i c t " (97) . 
The US did adopt a pro-Iraq s tance but assured itself that it would not in tervene in the 
war . The US choice to intervene in the war always remained capt ive to the Soviet presence in 
Afghan i s t an . Though the US intervened in the war on behalf of Kuwait in 1987, its decision to 
come to Kuwai t ' s help was influenced by the Soviet factor . Kuwai t requested the US to come 
to its rescue in the month of Sept. 1986 and formally in January the fo l lowing year . But the US 
turned a deaf ear to the Kuwaiti request for a period no less than six months . In March 1987 
it decided to rush to Kuwai t ' s help when it learnt about a c landest ine deal be tween Kuwait and 
the Soviet Union according to which the lat ter had agreed to escort Kuwait i oil tankers(98). 
T H E SECURITY OF T H E OIL SUPPLIES: 
' O i l ' was probably the most important factor in shaping the US Iran-Iraq war policy. This 
wa r was being fought between the countr ies adjacent to the w o r l d ' s most busy oil trade sea 
routes and the region which possesses the largest reserves of the world oil. Also, the combatant 
countr ies together were the second largest producer of oil in West Asia . A reduct ion in oil 
exports of the two countr ies would have had shot up the price of oil which had become stable 
recently only. 
The crude oil exports from the Persian Gulf in 1980, the year the wa r began, was 
recorded at 16.9 (99) mbpd which const i tuted as much as one third of the w o r l d ' s demand for 
the crude oil, which was 47.5 mbpd (100). In these c i rcumstances , the US did not want to see 
that the wa r spilled over to other o i l -producing countries of the region also. The US also needed 
that non-combatant countries of the region increase their output so that the decl ine in oil 
p roduct ion and exports from Iran and Iraq could be offse t . Hencefor th , the US prevai led upon 
Saudi Arabia to increase its oil product ion to 10,400 bpd from the mid-Oct . 1980 from 9500 
mbpd in the pre-war period. The oil product ion of Kuwait also increased f rom 1350 mbpd to 
2300 mbpd in the same period. 
Al though due to the decrease in global demand which, in turn was caused by the recession 
in the West , the need of an added supply of oil from the Pers ian Gulf region had abetted, the 
impor tance of the safety of oil trade routes and that of the oil p roducers remained as it was. The 
US, its Western al l ies ' and Japan remained dependent on the Persian Gulf oil , albeit for 
relat ively low quantity. The decreased vo lume of oil the consumer states needed from the 
Persian Gulf could, if denied, have been a heavy burden on the limited and fast-depleting 
reserves in other oil producing regions of the world. 
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The US was equally concerned about the likelihood of a spiral increase in the oil prices. 
However , it did not succeed in arresting the price-hike trend as a result of the war. The oil prices 
went up from $21.67 pb in 1979 to $33.8 at the end of 1980. Af te rwards , the oil prices came 
down or remained static but these never returned to 1979 level (101). It was in 1986 only that 
the oil prices s lumped to $ 14.57 pb, an all time low dur ing that decade. 
The security of oil suppll ies brought about a major change in the US policy. Instead of 
t rying to hammer out a solution to the war, as it tried to do in the beginning, the US counted 
on its increased military presence in the region to ensure that any attempt on the part of either 
of the combatants to s trangulate the oil supply would be petered out (102). The Carter Doctrine, 
which declared that the US would use military option in case the oil supplies from the Gul fwere 
s t i f led by external powers, was a manifestaion of this pol icy. The RDF was deployed in the 
Arabian waters in 1985. Earlier, the US naval task force s tat ioned in the Arabian Sea was put 
on alert, and A W A C s Planes were sent to Saudi Arabia with a v iew to monitor I ran 's preparation 
for a surprise military attack on the US naval force or those of its European allies. Military 
hardware were also despatched to the regional allies to enable them to tackle a possible Iranian 
at tack so long the US forces did not arrive to their de fense (103) . 
Once the war ceased to be a threat to the security of the oil supplies and the 'price 
s tabi l i ty ' (104) , the US found its interests served in the cont inuance of war, although a low-
intensity one and confined to the belligerent states only. The political benetlts the continuance 
of the war brought in to the US happened to divert i tsattention f rom the damages the war posed 
to its economic interests(105). Moreover , the war was an ' s t imulan t ' to the US arms transfers 
in the region. 
Some scholars have misconstrued the relief the US showed after the war did not remain 
a threat to the security of the oil supplies as US disinterest in the war . Even some of them have 
descr ibed this war as a ' forgot ten w a r " , stating that the US evinced interests in this war only 
w h e n it posed a threat to the US oil interests. 
But, on the contrary, the downfall in the US and its allies oil intake from the Persian 
Gulf region, did not reduce their dependence on the West Asian oil. Had the reduced amount 
of oil the West was still buying been interrupted, they could not overcome the loss by exploring 
the same amount of oil from other oil producing regions. This is why when in the later half of 
the 1980s only a meager 6 to 9 million barrel per day was traded through the Strait of Hurmuz 
and the US share in that was merely 0.5 mbpd, the US kept on warn ing Iran that any attempt 
to disrupt the oil suppll ies would not be militarily tolerated by it. 
T H E SECURITY OF T H E ALLIES: 
The security of allies weighed uppermost in the US scheme of thingsduring the war. The 
victory of an anti monarchical Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
and finally the war came one after another in a short span of one and half years to have exposed 
the US regional allies to twin-security threats, internal and external . Though Saudi Arabia had 
favored a war aimed at bruising Iran, the lat ter 's vow to teach a lesson for contributing to Iraq 
war effor ts exacerbated the security vulnerability of the most powerful peninsular country. 
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Of the factors which made the US abandon to its neutrali ty, the cont inuous pressure from 
the allies was a significant one. It was on July 4, 1980 a 'Whi te S ta tement ' formal ly declared 
US total commitment to the securi ty and the integrity of the regional all ies. Carter was 
personal ly in vafour of despatching Saudi Arabia the AWACs, the demand for which was made 
af te r six days of the beginning of the war , despite Secretary of State Musk i e ' s opposi t ion (106) . 
Beside Carter, the National Security Advisor , Brezeinski, was of the view that the US should 
sell the A W A C s to Saudi Arabia and also enter into defense agreements with the regional 
al l ies(107). 
I N C R E A S E D MILITARY P R E S E N C E : 
Another significant step the US took in the interest of the securi ty of the allies was to 
increase its sense of belongingness with them by entering defacto s t ra tegic al l iances. American 
warsh ips escorted the oil tankers of the fr iendly states, its j u m b o jets f lew regularly into the 
airports of allied Persian Gulf states and it shared with them all the intel l igence informations 
gathered by Saudi Arab based A W A C s , wh ich were supervised by Amer ican personnel(108). 
Also, in order to deter both of the combatants (later Iran only) f rom scut t l ing the oil 
suppl ies or spreading the war into the Persian Gulf waters or over to the littoral countries, the 
US started policing the Gulf from the very beginning. Not merely did it increase it own military 
presence, but also prevailed upon its West European allies to fol low the suit . The number of 
allied warshipsof the US, the UK and Aust ra l ia doubled from 30 to 60 by the end of 1981 (109). 
A f t e r the assumption of pres identship o f t h e US by Reagan Amer ican mili tr ization o f t h e 
Persian Gulf in tens i f ied( l lO) . He concluded an agreement to use airforce faci l i t ies at naval 
faci l i t ies at Peshawar with Pakistan, which In the US strategic thinking const i tuted an integral 
part o f t h e security o f t h e Persian Gulf r e g i o n ( l l l ) . The RDF mili tary units became operational 
in 1981 and 1982. And by the t ime the Iran-Iraq war was h a l f w a y through, the US had deployed 
its largest ever naval force in the Arabian Sea waters. 
However , the expansion of the US naval presence was not promted by the Iran-Iraq war 
alone. The Soviet invasion of Afghanis tan was an equally important factor . This is substantiated 
by the fact that the US naval s t rength in the Persian Gulf during the 80s was more than enough 
to tackle a regional challenge. The threats to oil suppllies from Iran were few and far in between 
that did not need to compel the US to stat ion such a large force in the Persian Gulf . As against 
this, the Soviet threat to the oil suppl l ies was imminent and of a permanent nature(112) . 
A N A C T I V E BUT N O N - C O M B A T A N T ROLE: 
The US refrained f rom enter ing the war on behalf of I raq. One of the reasons behind 
do ing so was that the US intervention would have hastened the end of the war . This , in turn, 
would have reduced the dependency of the regional allies on the US, who welcomed the 
Amer ican military presence and extended strategic facilities to it to deter the Iranian threat. 
Otherwise , out of the fear of Soviet Un ion ' s retaliation, the regional states had earl ier given a 
cold-shouldered response to US bid to acquire base facilities in the Persian Gulf . 
Notwithstanding I ran ' s vehement opposit ion to the US, It neve rbecame a regional threat 
to the US interests. Nor was it ever poised to win the war despite maintaining an upperhand. 
Hence, there hardly arose a situation in which US military intervention could have become 
urgent . The US Persian Gulf allies were also not in favor of its direct involvement in the war. 
For, the regional states feared that the US involvement would precipi tate internal resurgence 
(113) . They, therefore, reserved this option as the last resort. The US military intervention 
would have been sought only in the case of an Iranian attack on them. But Iran, anticipating the 
negat ive effects of the internationalizat ion of the war, did not actually mean what it repeatedly 
used to say, that it would take the war to the Arab countr ies . 
However, the US presence in the Persian Gulf can be described as covert military 
intervention. The US naval fleet and an array of strategic bases in the Persian Gulf were virtually 
an insurmountable barrier for Iran in spreading the war. 
To make a bi rd ' s eyeview of the US military presence, an anti aircraft carrier, Kitty 
Hawk, with support ships manned the Gulf of Oman. There were American warships in the 
Indian Ocean just outside the Arabian Sea area. The aero-naval base at Diego Garcia, though 
at a distance of 200 miles f rom the arena of the conflict , stationed 15 large cargo ships and 1500 
sai lors beside B-52 bombers , could be thursted into war zone at short notice. 
A string of strategic facil i t ies from Morocco to Oman enabled the RDF to come into 
act ion swift ly. In Morocco the US had access to the airport at Sidi Salman as wayside station. 
So much so it had access to mili tary airport outside Cairo. In Oman a direct access was available 
at Seib and Thumarai t bases. The Island of Mesirah off the Oman coast was a major US base 
and also a strategic point where from equipment could be transshipped to other bases in the 
region. The Bahrain island had the facilities to accommodate the US weapons and American 
personnel .(114), The Saudi Arabian bases, well equipped , large and deploying the most 
sophist icated American weapons and thousands of US military advisors, could be used in an 
emergency situation. Fearing an internal backlash, the Arab countries of the Peresian Gulf did 
not off icial ly grant base rights to the US, (115) but for all practical purposes the US controlled 
these . 
As mentioned above, the decision to get directly involved in the war by agreeing to 
escort the Kuwaiti oil tankers, which sparked off the US-Iran military hostilities, was an 
expedient move. Having come to know about the Soviet intention to protect the Kuwaiti oil 
tankers , the US was left with no other option except either to deny the Soviet Union the 
opportuni ty or to let it play the role of a regional poIiceman(116). By heeding to the Kuwaiti 
request thr US also tried to project its anti-Iran credentials to regain al l ies ' whose conf idence 
in it had shattered to a considerable extent fol lowing the revelation of US-Iran secret arms deal 
(117) . It may be noted that the security of oil supplies was not the actual reason, as it is generally 
made out to be, behind the US move to escort Kuwaiti tankers. This is because the oil suppllied 
remained by and large unaf fec ted in the wake of the Tanker War as even less than one percent 
of the ships, carrying oil, were h i t ( l lO) . 
T H E A N T I - I R A N I N A I S M : 
The US anti-Iraniansim increased with Reagan taking the charge of the off ice of the 
President. During his election campaign he had expressed an avowedly anti-Iranian stand, 
condemned Car te r ' s arms-for-hostage deal and ruled out the possibili ty of entering into any 
arms deal with the Iranian government in case he became the president (118). 
The US anti-Iranianism stood, as stated above, for preventing Iran from winning instead 
of engineering its defeat . Henceforth,needless to repeat, its did not indulge into an armed 
hostility with Iran except once. Instead, the main feature of the US anti-Iranianism was to deny 
Iran Western arms. For, an increased military prowess to Iran would have in the wake of its 
control of the areas close to Baghdad, abridged the d i f fe rence between Iranian war gains and 
the total victory. This is also stated by the fact the shortage of spare parts and standby aircrafts 
incapacitated Iran air power, which consisted of F-14, F-5 and F-5 warplanes covering I raq ' s 
entire airspace, to break into Iraqi defense and neutralize the Iraqi a rmy ' s strength in ground 
defense. 
'Threa t to use fo rce ' was another characterist ic of the US anti-Iranianism. The US reminded 
Iran of severe reprisals in case it tried to mine strait of Hurmuz, blockade it or attacked its allies 
or even sought direct military help from the USSR (119) . 
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FOR S T A L E M A T E : 
Both, the US limited support to Iraq and its non-mili tant anti-Iranianism also proved that 
Washington was interested in the status quo, the cont inuance of war. 
Since the war had, contrary to apprehensions , not negatively affected the smooth flow 
of oil and its reasonably moderate price, nor did it spread over to the aligned countr ies in the 
region, the US had no stake left in the end of the war . The stalemate, on the other hand, was 
in the national interests. The war had t remendously increased the US clout with the regional 
countr ies , paved the way for the stepping up of its mil i tary presence in the region and taken 
much of the sting out of the oil weapon, enabl ing i t , t he reby , to adopt a bold pro-Israel i stand 
on the Palestine quest ion. 
The US also succeeded to strike a balance of sorts between the two seemingly 
contradictory object ives i.e. to prevent Iran f rom spreading the war to the Arab countr ies of the 
region, and, to let the war continue as wel l . What illustrates this policy most plausibly is its 
mili tary exercises against Iran in 1987. On one hand, these meant to force Iran to s top attacking 
oil tankers in, and mining the Persian Gulf lanes, whereas , on the other , the US contented itself 
wi th launching a low-intensity war so that it did not pave the way for the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war . 
T H E I R A N - C O N T R A DEAL : 
The disclosures on clandestine arms deals, referred to as Iran-Contra deal, between Iran 
and the US were the most embarrassing moments for the US. The revelation of this secret 
arrangement , which facilitated the shiploads of arms and spare parts to Iran in exchange for 
Amer ican hostages in Lebanon, upset, to quote a Soviet scholar, " all preceding declarat ions 
about the US desire to see the war ended and settled by political means" (120). 
More so, the contents and the t iming of the deals reveal to one 's amazement that their 
jud ic ious use would have drawn Iran nearer to victory. The US sent these arms through Israel 
on a Danish ship in September 1985 and September and October 1986. These coincided with 
Iranian victories in ground offensives, with one of them also resulting into the s iezure of Fao 
peninsula (121). 
The Reagan administration had supplied 2008 Tom Hawk anti-tank missiles and 
Sidewinder air Maverick missiles, 235 Flank anti aircraft missiles , spare parts for helicopters 
and f ighter planes worth $ 60 million. This gave enough fire power to the Iranian air force to 
shell Iraqi town falling within the range of these missiles and fighter palnes. However , it is 
diff icul t to speculate as to what was the main intention behind the US arms supplies to Iran when 
a lot more related to the this deal is yet to be revealed (122). 
T H E SOVIET UNION : 
Although in the war involved one of its allies, Iraq (123), the Soviet Union did not tempt 
to take sides. It instead adopted the wait and watch approach. The then Foreign Minis ter of the 
USSR declared his count ry ' s neutrality as soon as the war broke out (124). The Soviet union 
also assured the US that it would not intervene in the war under any commitment to either of 
S5 
the combatant s tates. 
What guided the Soviet Union to maintain neutrality than to help Iraq out was the fear 
that its support to Iraq could result into the defea t of Iran leading to the dismemberment of that 
country or/and the overthrow o f t h e Is lamic government . In addition, the deter iorat ing relations 
wi th Iraq, the pre-occupation with Afghan i s t an and the fear of US backlash also determined the 
Soviet Un ion ' s aloofness. 
The USSR also projected itself as the broker of peace in the region(125).It invited the 
US, both during Car ter ' s and Reagan ' s t imes, for a joint bid to find a solut ion to the 
conf l ic t (126) .Also , the Soviet peace proposals were described as one aiming at "'crisis 
managemen t " than thr "crisis prevent ion". 
With the war having threatened to cause dislocation in the West ' s oil suppl ies from the 
region, its prolongation served Soviet interests also. The Soviet Union also wanted to capitalize 
I r an ' s international isolation for br inging Iran, whose strategic importance had increased by 
leaps and bounds to Moscow after its invasion of Afghanis tan, to its fold. Though Iran had given 
a lukewarm response to Soviet Un ion ' s goodwil l gestures before the outbreak of the war, the 
Soviet policy makers were under an impress ion that under the duress of war the former would 
ul t imately turn to it for help and assistance. 
This is why the Soviet Union showed a slight tilt against Iraq in the beginning. It 
descr ibed Iraq as aggressor(127). It r e fused to supply Iraq arms and ammunit ion in full 
disregard of a provision to this effect in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation it had signed 
wi th the the latter. The Sovoet government jus t i f ied it on the ground that the Soviet-Iraq treaty 
w a s "the treaty of peace, not of w a r " (128) . 
The breakdown in Iraq-Soviet relat ions played a major role in determining the U S S R ' s 
at t i tude towards Iraq in the war. The bilateral relations had started getting s trained after the 
execut ion of 21 leading members of the Iraqi Communist Party by Saddam's government in 
1978. The Iraqi government had also wi thdrawan its military officers receiving training in 
Moscow on the charge that they were be ing indoctrinated by the Soviet Union . The two 
countr ies also had differences over a number of issues concerning bilateral military and 
economic cooperat ion. Also, the Soviet Union did not like I raq ' s openings to the US and the 
West for trade, technology and military equipment (129). 
Iraq lashed out at the USSR for occupying Afghanis tan and worked against the Soviet 
interests in Ethiopia and the PDRY (130). The Soviet Union was sore over not be ing consulted 
by Iraq before its attack on Iran and resented I raq ' s rapprochement with the neighbor ing pro-
US Arab states who were pressurising Iraq to downplay its associ:ition with the communist 
b loc(131) . Iraq did not welcome U S S R ' s policy of getting closer to its enemy Iran(132). 
Reportedly, the Soviet Union had informed Iran in advance about the Iraqi aggressive designs. 
Over the question of Soviet invasion of a fellow Muslim state, Afghanistan, the relations 
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between the USSR and the Persian Gulf countries had turned sour(133). Thus in establishing 
a close rapport with Iran, the Soviet Union was not threatened with the possibil i ty of losing 
Persian Gul f ' s Arab countries ' goodwil l . 
The importance of Iran to the Soviet Union was inherent in the former being the buffer 
zone between it and the US military presence in the Persian Gulf region(134). A strong Iran, 
capable of withstanding US design north of it, was a precursor to consol idat ion of Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. 
Breznev spoke high of the Iranian revolution at the C P S U ' s Congress that held soon after 
the war broke out. The joint communique , issued at the end of the s igning of the Treaty of 
Fr iendship and Cooperation with Syria in 1981, lauded Iranian resistance to Iraqi aggrandize-
ment . It declared that Moscow and Damascus "support the inalienable right of Iran to decide 
its destiny independently, without any interference from outs ide"(135) . The U S S R ' s also 
agreed to give Iran arms through the surrogate-countr ies (136) . 
But by the end of year 1982, the Soviet Union-Iran honeymoon came to an abrupt end. 
The USSR turned back to its ally, Iraq. Iran was not sat isf ied with the U S S R ' s cautious support 
to it. It accused the Soviet Union of maintaining neutrality despite "f lagrant Iraqi aggression 
against Iran"(137), and supplying mili tary hardware to Iraq through proxies (138) . 
I ran 's spiritual leader Ayatol lah Khomeini unequivocally condemned the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanis tan, asking the Iranian government to send its troops to help Muslim fighters 
resis t ing the Soviet forces(139). Against all expectations of the USSR, Iran continued to club 
the former with the US by call ing both of them "aggressor" and "plunderer" and charged it with 
inst igat ing the Tudeh party to br ing down the Islamic government . 
Over and above, Iran arrested 70 Tudeh members in February 1983 on the charge of 
spying for the USSR and expelled 17 members of the Soviet diplomatic staff in Theran, accusing 
them of conniving with the arrested communists . 
Until the end of 1982, the Soviet Union used to overlook Iranian criticism of its 
Afghan i s t an ' s policy and denunciat ion of its communist ideology for the sake of not spoiling 
the opportunities of a close bilateral relations. Even the USSR reacted mildly to the annihilation 
of communist party at the hands of the Islamic government . 
The Soviet union redefined its policy towards Iran when the latter came close to trounce 
Iraq in military invasions inside the Iraqi territory in late 1982. The communist government 
drove home the point that a v ic tor ious Is lamic Iran would be more harmful to its West Asian 
pol icy than what a victorious Iraq could be, that too when it had forfei ted all chances to bring 
Iran in the communist bloc. Besides, the defeat of Iraq would have cost the USSR its only ally 
in the Persian Gulf region. Also, the Soviet policy makers concluded that it would be far more 
dif f icul t to have any leverage with a victorious Iran. Instead, Iran 's victory would make a 
s t imulat ing effect on the Afghan combatants fighting against the Soviet occupation. 
The return to Iraq would have become a strenuous task had the USSR not maintained 
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workable relationship with the same in the years it had tilted to Iran. The arrangement of arms 
suppl ies through proxies was the most important factor in saving the total breakdown in the 
Soviet-Iraq ties (140). 
Yet, the Soviet support to Iraq was not unfl inching. It kept the hope of improving 
relat ions with Iran al ive(141). The soviet Union ' s pro-Iraq policy was restricted to arms 
suppl ies via third parties and directly only af ter 1984 (142). However, the Soviet weapons , most 
apparently the Scud-B missiles, proved a watershed for Iraq in the war. Only after gett ing armed 
with some of the most sophist icated Soviet weapons, Iraq re-asserted itself in early 1988. The 
ser ies of Iraqi victories made a tel l ing impact on the Iranian morale to continue f ight ing, forcing 
it to seek end of the war (143) . 
However , it must not be inferred that the Soviet Union had provided weapons to let Iraq 
f inal ly score the victory. For, the range of the original Scud-B missi les did not cover the crucial 
Iranian target from any given point in Iraq. The Soviet Union had advised Iraq against shelling 
the Iranian cities, using chemical weapons and subjecting the civilian populat ion and targets to 
a t tack. . 
Like the US, the Soviet Union was also not vulnerable to the war. Rather, the end of the 
wa r with Iranian or Iraqi victory was unfavorable to the the Soviet Union for a number of 
reasons. The Iranian victory could have caused the overthrow of the Baathist regime and de-
stabil ized Soviet position in Afghanis tan in the Persian Gulf region and in the Muslim-
dominated republics. 
Similarly, the Iraqi victory would have unseated the Is lamic government and there had 
installed in its place a pro-US one, making Iran once again a US ally. In an eventuality of Iran 
p lunging to the US way in the af termath of an Iraqi victory, some of the analysts of the Soviet 
policy did not rule out Soviet intervention in Iran in the name of the defence of the Islamic 
government (144). 
In a limited sense, compared to the US and its western allies the USSR was more at ease 
wi th the war in view of its non-rel iance on a commodity like ' o i l ' . The war was also used as an 
instrument of arms transfers in the region, particularly to the US allies. Obsessed with their 
securi ty, the US recipient embarked on a policy of mult iple-sources arms supplies. The Soviet 
Union, which was an arms supplier equivalent to US, was automatical ly sourced by these 
countr ies particualrly by Kuwait and Jordan. 
The war also helped the soviet union de-ideologize its foreign policy and as a result 
improve relations with strategically important though ideologically opponent countries like 
Iran(145). At the same time, the Soviet Union also succeeded in not antagonising its tradtional 
client, Iraq. The importance of the Soviet Union as the arms supplier compelled Iraq not to bid 
farewell to its master in its bid to get closer to the US, the West and the pro-US states in the 
region. 
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The war also proved a ready-made instrument to let the US down on the Arab-Israeli 
issue 
The USSR described the war as the part of an Imperial is t -Zionist conspiracy to dividie the 
Muslim World by keeping these countries involved in intra-regional issue. 
Last but not the least , inspite of prominent role o f the U S in protect ing the Gulf countries , 
the S o v i e t U n i o n had a l so got its image enhanced in the e y e s o f these countries as a p o w e r 
sus ta in ing the Iraqi war m a c h i n e ( 1 4 6 ) . 
T H E W A R A N D T H E C O L D WAR: 
The Iran-Iraq made a sobering effect on the supe rpowers ' rivalry. Unlike the Third 
World crises of those days, in this war the interests of the superpowers coincided, leading them 
to back the same side. Both were averse to an Iraqi victory in the beginning and sympathized 
with Iran. Both of them offered to enhance I ran 's defense by giving it new arms and ammunition. 
But once Iran began to dominate the war and looked in a commanding position, both of the 
superpowers swung away from it and helped its adversary. 
In some respects the commonali ty of interests se tmmed f rom mutual confrontation. The 
US saw in the victory of I raq—a Soviet al ly— during the initial years of the war as a major gain 
to the other superpower . It visualised the dismemberment of Iran as a consequence of Iraqi 
victory which would have encouraged the soviet Union to occupy the northern Iran in pursuance 
to its warm water drive To the Soviet Union, the Iraqi victory would have meant the 
replacement of the anti-US Islamic government of Iran by a non revolutionary one, close to the 
US. 
The superpowers ' identical perceptions of an Iranian conquest was also imbedded in 
mutual rivalry. The Soviet Union was wary of it mainly because of the positive influence it would 
have made on the US backed Muslim resurgence in Afghanis tan . Also with the Iranian victory 
and the resultant removal of the Baathist government in Iraq, the Soviet Union would have lost 
a strategic as well as an ideological ally. 
Thus, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war the supe rpower s ' policies towards each other 
was that of 'col laborat ive compet i t ion ' . They understood s takes involved and tried to minimize 
confronta t ion between them. 
Thus despite persuasion and temptation they stayed away from directly intervening in the 
war . The US did fight a protracted war against Iran but did not take it further as it would have 
forced an otherwise passive Soviet Union to protect Iran in defense of its south-east region and 
Afghanis tan. 
On its part, the USSR did not interpret the US-Iran mili tary confrontat ion as a precursor 
to the American policy of expanding its sphere of action to its peripheries. Both of them 
unwittingly collaborated in supplying arms and ammunition to Iraq, sharing intelligence data 
with it and furnishing high-tech assistance to its nuclear program. They literally collaborated 
in the UN while ensuring the adopting of the UN securi ty Council Resolution 598 (148). 
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The ' compe t i t i on ' part of their relationship got ref lected in their will to optimize the war 
for increasing inf luence in the region at the cost of each other . They charged each other with 
instigating the war , susta ining it and blocking the peace process . 
The Iran-Iran war was not a proxy war. The superpowers only partially influenced the 
course of the war . Al though both of the superpowers had prior information of Iraq aggression, 
they did not prompt it to do so. In fact, they failed in prevent ing the outbreak of the war despite 
the fact this was not in their interests. 
Frequent hal ts and cease-fires during the war were not arranged by the superpowers . 
They were also not instrumental in ending the war. The argument that the US-Iran military 
entanglements in 1987 reversed Iranian supremacy in the war is a weak one. Even after being 
bashed up by the US, Iran launched the last Human Wave mili tary thrust. The US offensive was 
limited in terms of the area it covered. It was a low-intensi ty war and was short-l ived. This, 
therefore, did not dampen the Iranian morale. 
Hardly likely did the war come to an end in effect of superpowers- sponsored Security 
Council Resolut ion 598. For many months after its being adopted, the resolution 598 remained 
operationally inef fec t ive due to its outright rejection by Iran. The resolution did not accompany 
the threat of the imposit ion of the economic embargo or military action in case of an 
incompliance with it by any of the two belligerents .So it hardly carried enough punch and force 
to compel the f ight ing countries to end the war . The resolut ion was accepted by Iran as a face-
saving device. It w a s never accepted by Iran as a blueprint of a just solution to the war. 
At best the superpowers played the role of crisis manager , but in a limited sense only. 
They ensured that the war did not spread.The US saw that the oil exports from the Persian Gulf 
remained unaf fec ted by the war. Apart from these, the supe rpowers ' role as the 'crisis manager ' 
w a s non-existent . They could not manage to de-escalate the war , to shorten it and to end it. 
Iran-Iraq War contributed to the making of ' N e w De ten te ' between the superpowers . 
This might have driven home the point that there were areas and issues where there interests 
coincided and a col laborat ive than collision course served their interests better. However, if 
the war contr ibuted in the easing of tension between the superpowers , it did so to a limited 
extent only. The evolut ion of 'New Detente ' between the superpowers was the culmination of 
a host of factors and developments in the regions other than the Persisn Gulf. If Europe was the 
region where the Detente began, the West Asia is also said to be the region where the process 
began very late (149) . 
T H E ATTITUDE OF A R A B S T A T E S 
On the face of it, the regional countries declared neutrali ty. However, their neutrality 
was , at best, mil i tary than political. They assured Saddam of their support before he invaded 
Iran and then we lcomed the Iraqi at tack(150). King Khalid, in particular, had reportedly blessed 
Saddam the success when the latter visited Saudi Arabia a month before attacking Iran. 
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Other littoral countries were approached by Saddam a few days before the commence 
ment of the war. He is supposed to have sought their support and not the advices as in the caseof 
Saudi Arabia . The disclosure of the decision to attack Iran by Saddam would have been a matter 
of concern to smaller states. But, at the same time, they had to contend with the inevitabili ty 
of the war and their inability to prevail upon Saddam Hussein to desist him from it in the interest 
of their security. 
They had also realised that in one respect the war tended to benefit them. They hoped 
that the Is lamic Government of Iran would collapse under the pressure of Iraqi onslaught, 
ending, thereby, the threat of 'export of a revolut ion ' which was appealing to masses in these 
countr ies(151) . 
T H E ' E X P O R T OF REVOLUTION' T H R E A T : 
The 'exportabil i ty of Islamic revolut ion ' threatened the ' r eg ime ' s securi ty ' than the 
'nat ional securi ty ' of the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf . Ayatollah Khomeini ' s call, through 
all means of communication, for the over throw the imperialist and un-Islamic regimes had 
begun appealing the rebel elements. The Shei resurgence had raised its head in Saudi 
Arab ia (152) , the UAE, Oman and Bahrain. In Kuwait the pro-Iran Sheite party "A1 Dawa" 
s tepped up terrorist activities. Politically deprived and socio-economically discriminated, the 
Shia populace was the 
potential target of the appeal from across the Persian Gulf. The anti-imperialist, anti-monarchi-
cal nature of the Iranian exhortations also aroused the sent iments of other distressed and 
dispossessed sections of society as well as those of the immigrants from South Asian and 
Eastern 
Medi terranian countries, particularly the Palest inians (153). 
The Saudi government was ant icipat ing a mass-based anti-monarchical revolt as a 
consequences of Khomeini ' s call than Shia resurgence as Shias constituted merely 2 percent of 
the total populat ion. So were the countr ies like Kuwait and Qatar where Shias made up of 
roughly 17 percent of the total population. Bahrain, where Shias numbered half of count ry ' s 
popula t ion, was most vulnerable to a Shei backlash. 
The 'national securi ty ' of these countr ies was also slightly endangered. The countries 
who have already settled their boundary d isputes with the Shah feared that the new government 
would in its antipathy to the former regime abrogate previous treaties and agreements. They 
also did not rule out the possibility of the disputes being used as a plea by Iran to attack their 
vital 
economic facilities and the oil shipment in the Persian Gulf waterways. 
Kuwait can be singled out as the country whose 'national securi ty ' than the reg ime ' s was 
more under the clouds of Iranian threat. It wfis geographically closest to Iran and was within 
the range of Iranian missiles and aircrafts it fired and operated from the places close to Iran-
Iraq border . The Shei resentment, on the other hand, lacked popular support and was not, 
therefore , a potential threat to the Al-Sabah rule as such (154). 
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Though in the beginning the Persian Gulf countries expected a quick victory by Iraq, 
they, as the war began showing clear signs of gett ing escalated, also adjusted their policies to 
its changing fortunes. In I ran 's engaement in a war with they found that their securi ty was 
inherent . The Iranian Government ' commitment to export revolution had got relegated to 
secondary 
impor tance due to the trivialities of the war . 
T H E E A S T E R N MEDITERRANEAN C O U N T R I E S : 
In the Eastern Mediterranean sector, Egypt and Jordan took I raq ' s side. Egyp t ' s support 
to Iraq is more start l ing a case in point. Irked over Iraq-led move for Egypt ' s ouster f rom the 
Arab bloc. President Sadat described the Iraqi attack as " recklessness of a blood thirsty boy 
like Saddam Hussein". But, very soon Egypt realized that the war had come as a good omen for 
the end its isolation. Supporting Arabs against Iran Egypt could prove its Arab credentials to 
the fel low countries. Relying on its huge inventory, Egypt presented itself to Iraq as the supplier 
of mil i tary wherewithal . In order to tide over the Soviet arms embargo Iraq was looking for a 
source which could supply it the Soviet made weapons ( l55 ) . 
Unlike Egypt, Jordan supported Iraq right from the day first .King Hussein of Jordan 
toured Baghdad during October 4-5, 1980. This was only the first of his countless visi ts to Iraq 
dur ing the war years. Each of his visits culminated into the s igning of agreements with Iraq, 
aimed at strengthening of Iraq-Jordan military cooperation. Jordan also broke off diplomatic 
re la t ions with Iran. It provided Iraq access to port of Aqba to receive outside mili tary supplies . 
It proposed to Iraq to form a joint battle force , named 'Ymahuk ' (156 ) , against I ran. 
Iraq received "enemy ' s enemy is f r e ind" type of support from Jordan. The principal aim 
of King Hussein was to help Iraq win the race for the regional power role over its adversary, 
Syria, a common enemy. Also, the war was a solitary chance for King Hussein to establish, for 
the first t ime, relations with Iraq at equal level . In the past, being dependent on Iraq for aid and 
polit ical support on its Palestine policy, Jordan had interacted with Iraq from the posit ion of 
weakness . 
I R A Q - N E I G H B O U R I N G AR.AB C O U N T R I E S R A P P R O C H M E N T : 
The war brought Arab states and Iraq closer. Earlier, Arab states were inter locked in an 
ideological rivalry with the Baathist Iraq and considered Iraq as an expansionist power and a 
backer of internal discontentments. 
The process of rapprochement was mooted by the neighboring Arab states. They rushed 
to revive diplomatic relations with Iraq and elevated it to the posit ion of the protector of 
territorial integrity of the Arab land (157). They left the task of defending their securi ty with 
Iraq 
for two reasons. In the first Place, they knew that Iraq was the only power among them who 
could take on the Iranian threat. In the second place, they had found that Iraq had taken it upon 
itself to trounce Iran at a time when they wanted Iran to be battered but were not prepared and 
ready 
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for doing this themselves. 
However , the improvement of relations was an expedient move rather than a sincere 
at tempt towards establ ishing confl ict-free relations for the fu ture . No effort was made to settle 
the issues pertaining to frontier delimitations, the neutral zone, tribal migration and cross 
border smuggling. The one with Kuwait over two islands, Bubiyan and Warbah, was also not 
addressed to despite an all the time great relat ions between the two countries(158). 
Thus, I raq-neighboring Arabs relations were limited to security and financial matters 
whi le the age old content ious issues were al together ignored. To a limited extent, Iraq took 
some diplomatic initiatives, giving an impression that it had shed its aggressivenesson the 
boundary issues. But more than this, Iraq highlighted to the hilt the Arab-Iranian divide to 
coalesce it and the Arab countries into a single political and ethnic unit (159). 
A R A B C O U N T R I E S ' SUPPORT TO IRAN: 
Iran was not left unfriendly in the war either. Among the Arab countries of the Middle 
East , notably Syria, South Yemen and Libya extended the i r suppor t to Iran. The Baathist Syr ia ' s 
support to Iran was an interesting case. Ideologically, the Is lamic Iran was as much at variance 
with the Syrian Baathism as it was with the Iraqi one. More interesting is the fact that Syria 
associated itself with Iran in the war solely because of the intra-ideological rivalry with the co-
Baathist Iraq. 
Syria was the leading supplier of arms, notably anti-aircraft guns, anti tank missi les and 
rocket propelled guards, to Iran. It also sent t roops at Iranian forces ' disposal. It weakened 
economic mainstay of Iraq by cutting Iraq 's main oil pipeline to the Mediterranean(160). It also 
overt ly aided and abated Kurd movements and other internal rebellions inside Iraq (161).The 
Syrian support to Iran had strategic dimension also. Siding wi th Iran it managed to counter-
balance the " hostility ring, made up of Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanese phalanghists, sur rounding 
i t" (162). 
The degradation in Syria-Iran relations was witnessed around 1987. Compel led by oil-
pr ice s lump coupled with Syria ' s failure to pay over $ 2 billion for imports of oil to it, Iran in 
1987 reduced oil shipment to Syria. In addition to this, Iran cont inued supporting the Hizubllahs 
of Lebanon and did not use its influence to persuade them them to support Syr ia ' s Lebanese 
policy. 
Libya was the first Arab country which declared its suppor t to Iran. It did so in order to 
give vent to its avowed hatred of the US. It also called upon o ther Arab states to s top backing 
Saddam. Col. Qaddafi decried purchase of A W A C s by Saudi Arabia and condemend the Persian 
Gulf countries for aiding US in the altter 's e f for t s to militrize the region. Libya was one of the 
main arms suppliers to Iran. 
The PLO played a low-profile role in the war. Dependent on the Arab assistance and not 
wan t ing to lose I ran ' s first-ever support to the Palestinian cause, the PLO maintained 
' equ ids tance ' . In this bid of it, the PLO was also helped by the combatant countries w h o wanted 
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to maintain friendly relations with it to establish their anti-Israeli credentials. Beside, the 
combatants did not stand to gain anything substantial, both militarily and economically, in trying 
to wean the PLO away from each other. 
Worried over the degradation of the Palestinian issue, the PLO was most sincere among 
all regional powers for an early end to the. war. But, it lacked leverage with either of the 
bell igerents to play any meaningful role in ending the war. 
Alger ia ' s support to Iran was mainly vocal . It s temmed from Alger ia ' s annoyance with 
Iraq over the la t ter ' s support to Morocco on the Polisaric Issue(163). Alger ia held Iraq 
responsible for the degradation of the Palestinian issue and shif t ing of internat ionalfocus from 
the Mediterranean region to the Persian Gulf, the region far from Alger ia ' s sphere of action. 
Israel looked at the Iran-Iraq war f rom the angle of its national security. Apprehensive 
of the emergence of Iraq as the fountain-head of the Arab military prowess if it happened to 
t rounce Iran, Israel envied Iraqi victory most. As a result, it implicitly supported Iran brushing 
aside the la t ter ' s rejection of Israel as a sovereign state(164). The Iranian rhetoric were not a 
securi ty threat as were the prospects of Iraqi victory. Also, the ouster of fr iendly regime of the 
Shah and its replacement by hard-line Islamic government did not undermine Israel ' s security 
as these tumultuous events had taken place in a country farthest from it among the Muslim 
countr ies of the region. 
Thus, fully obsessed with its territorial security, Israel viewed the growing anti-
Khomeinism among the Arab countries as the formation of a political and strategic Arab alliance 
including the erstwhile Arab leader and the principal enemy, Egypt. 
The 'Arab fear ' would have, among other things, prompted Israel to send clandestine 
arms supplies to Iran. In connivance with the US Israel supplied Iran spare parts it badly needed 
to sustain its American armory. Reports also claim that Israel was supplying arms to Iran 
through out during the outbreak of the war and the revelation of the secret deals . 
In contrast to the US, the Arab states and the Soviet Union, Israel was poised to reaping 
maximum benefits in the eventuality of I ran ' s victory, the Iranian victory, viewed the Israeli 
policy makers, would break up the emerging military demon, Iraq, into a Sheite, Kurdish and 
Sunni states with Turkey "taking upper northern provinces, Iran taking Sheite south and Syria 
Wes t I raq" (165). 
The continuing standoff between Iran and Iraq was also in the interests of Israel. It, as 
said above, degraded the Palestinian issue, gave Israel more freedom to crush Palestinian 
upris ing and take on the Lebanon ' s Hazebollahs. Thus, when the whole ofWest Asia was 
directly or indirectly involved in the war, Israel invaded Lebanon after gett ing assured that its 
move will not escalate into an Arab-Israeli war as the two most militarily powerful states of the 
region were embroiled in a war being fought between themselves. 
It was a matter of relief for Israel that the teo most powerful of the regional countr ies— 
Iraq and Iran — were exhaust ing their military strength against each other. The Iran-Iraq war , 
which re-established West As ia ' s prestige as an unstable and strife-torn region, reinforced 
Israel ' s importance as the most reliable and stable s tate to the US in the region (166) . 
The war came as a 'blessing in disguise ' for Israel as it militarily exhausted and 
economical ly weakened Iran which, as a matter of fact , must have for the first time part icipated 
in any Arab war against Israel(167). The war also minimized the chances of Iran and Iraq 
ganging against Israel in the foreseeable future. 
The war also helped Israel to convince the US that the dangers to the securi ty of oil 
s temmed not f rom Arab-Israel i issue but from intra-Muslim countries rivalries. Hence, the US, 
the Israeli leadership used to point out, needed not to snub Israel for its repression of 
Palestinians and placate the oil producing countries of the region at the cost of fr iendly and 
durable relations with Israel. 
PERSIAN G U L F S T A T E S ' POLICIES T O W A R D S T H E W A R : 
Back to the Persian Gulf states ' policies towards the war , none of these conformed to 
'genuine neut ra l i ty ' . For, being the pricipal aid giver to Iraq they were passive part icipants in 
the war. It seemed that as if there was some sort of unders tanding between Iraq and the rest of 
the Persian Gulf countr ies on their respective roles. The Persian Gulf countries pumped into 
Iraq as much as $ 50 billion during the war to enable it to meet the cost of defense preparedness 
and pay back the debts it owed to the Western count r ies (168) . They began cut t ing down 
economic assis tance to Iraq after 1985. But, this development did not mean any lack in Arab 
commitment to Iraq. The austerity on the part of the Arabs was the result of a perceptible decline 
in their national incomes and the compulsion for providing monetary assistance to other 
aspirants , such as Egypt and the Palestinians. 
Al though the Arab assistance to Iraq began decl in ing after 1985, its usefu lness in-
creased. The Arab assistance.after 1984 came when the economy of Iraq was in shambles and 
its defense expendi ture had skyrocketed (169). The wi thhold ing of assistance at this stage, 
when the war f rom the viewpoint of Iraq was in most cubical stage, could have crippled I raq ' s 
military might and economic strength. The Persian Gulf states shipped Iraqi oil through their 
tankers after the 
closure of the Shat t -a l -Arab, I raq 's only access to the sea, and that of Iraqi oil pipel ines passing 
through Syria and Turkey . 
If the suppor t to Iraq from the Persian Gulf countr ies came mainly in fo rm-of the 
economic assis tance, Egypt and Jordan contributed to Iraqi war efforts through furnishing 
military hardware. Moreover , these countries also helped Iraq by sending contingents of their 
armed forces to it. Eypt ian pilots flew Iraq 's Soviet made aircraf ts . Jordan ' s armed contingent 
participated in the war under the command of the Iraqi forces (170). 
Yet, the Arab countries of the Persian gulf countr ies viewed the possibility of an Iraqi 
victory with anxiety and suspicion. The fear that after its victory Iraq might become bold enough 
to settle issues wi th Persian Gulf countries on its own terms or the victory would have given 
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fil l ip to its regional ambitions was haunting these countries. Hence, the Persian gulf countries 
became interested in an unending war as this would have meant Iraq 's dependence on the 
constant inf low of economic assistance from them. They knew that their assistance to Iraq 
would at the stage when the latter was not doing well , only help it to hold Iran out than to 
overrun it. 
A few scholars even hold the view that the Persian Gulf countries wanted an unending 
ear right f rom the beginning. But this argument carries little weight . First, the neighbors had 
given pr ior approval to Saddam on the account of their percept ion that the war would be a few 
days affair , leading to the collapse of the Is lamic government of Iran. Second, the financial and 
logistical support the Persian Gulf countries extended to Iraq at least until in the first one and 
a half years of the war, when Iraq was dominat ing the scene, would have meant to contribute 
towards an early end of the war in I raq ' s favour than a s ta lemate. 
There also came a moment when these countr ies realized that Iran could not be defeated 
in this war and, therefore, it would always remain an important actor in the Persian Gulf polit ics 
as a radical Is lamic state. At this juncture, these countr ies tried to improve their relations with 
Iran at d iplomat ic and economic levels (171). Also, whenever a spil l-over of the war threatned 
the Persian Gulf countr ies they resorted to a two-pronged strategy. They increased military and 
economic assistance to Iraq and intensified the effort to find a peacefu l solution to the problem. 
On such occasion came in 1983. They discussed prospects of peace at the GCC summits and 
even once came up with a proposal which among other things envisaged Saddam stepping down 
f rom the power and taking a aback seat in Baghdad to accommodate Ayatollah Khomein i ' s 
condi t ion for the end of the war(172) . 
On a similar occasion in 1986, when in the wake Iranian seizure of Fao peninsula the 
Iranian army had reached very close to Kuwaiti territory and the oil facilities of Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait were under the danger of an Iranian attack, both of these states pleaded with Iran 
not to take the wa r across Iraq (173). 
T h e prolongat ion of war came as a blessing in disguise as it kept two most powerful 
regional powers interlocked with each other. Peace would have come into force as a result of 
the victory of either of the belligerents, emboldening it to fulfil l its other regional ambit ions at 
one go and that too agaisnt the relatively weaker enemies . 
The cont inuance of the war served the interests of the regional powers in another respect 
also. Due to the prevai l ing security scenario, the regional countries were offered sophist icated 
weapons the suppl ier needed to deploy in the vicinity of the war-zone. 
For economic reasons, the continuation of war , which reduced the bel l igerents ' oil 
expons by 25 to 40 percent, helped Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to maintain their huge quota of 
oil product ion and supply irrespective of the s luggishness in the world oil demand (174). 
A m o n g all, the prevention o f w i d e n i n g o f t h e war assumed top priority in the Persian Gulf 
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countr ies ' agenda. To this effect , they, firstly and foremost ly, decided to refrain from 
part icipat ing in the war from the Iraqi side. The logistical and financial support to Iraq s temmed 
f rom this pol icy-object ive. It was used as an al ternative. The Arab countries overlooked Iraqi 
call to jo in the war with it. They opposed Saddam's proposal for a military coalition of anti-Iran 
powers (175) and even criticized the Iraqi attacks on Iranian ships in the Strait of Hurmuz as 
it would have invoked Iranian retaliation on the oil ships of the Persian Gulf countries in the 
absence of those f rom Iraq(176). 
The Persian Gul f ' s Arab countries gave financial and logistical support to Iraq with 
assurance that it would not invite anything more than some protest from Iran. For, fear ing 
internationalizat ion of the war with the US entering the fray from its Arab allies' side, Iran could 
i l l -afford to react violently to the Arab countries non-mili tary support tio Iraq. The proximityof 
the whole of Kuwait and oil facilities of Saudi Arabia to the war zone and that of the UAE, Qatar 
and Bahrain to Iran was the geo-strategic reason behind the Perasian Gul ' s Arab countr ies 
polocy of non-involvement (177). 
The military options theses countries resorted to were absolutely non-combatant , may 
it be the s t rengthening of their defense, the evolution of common defence system and their 
clandest ine military cooperation with the US. The main object ive behind these move was to 
deter Iran from widening the war(178). The shooting down of the Iranian F-14s f ighter planes 
by Saudi F-15s was the solitary instance of any of the Arab Persian Gulf countr ies ' direcrt 
involvment in the war . Also, this particular development , as says R. K. Ramazani, "did not show 
Saudi political resolve and a willingness to use military force to defend its terr i tory"(179). 
The Persian G u l f ' s Arab countries ' gave a mixed response to I ran 's repeated threat to 
s t rangulate the Strait of Hurmuz. During the del iberat ions at the GCC summits and on some 
other occasions a major i ty of them preferred to use d ip lomat ic e f for t s to persuade Iran from 
blocking the strait. They regarded joint military action under the GCC umbrella as the least 
likely option. It is noteworthy in this connection that the G C C countries were capable of 
protect ing 
the Kuwaiti oil tanker. Even the Saudi forces with A W A C s and F-15s at thier disposal were not 
lagging technically in protecting the Gulf oil lanes f rom a possible Iranian attack. But despite 
all these, Kuwait turned to the USSR and the US and Saudi Arabia never came forward to ensure 
protect ion to its ships. 
The war put the regional countries in the state of di lemma over the issue of the Us military 
presence in the region. They could not ward off an Iranian attack unless the US forces came to 
their rescue at an early stage of the crisis. This could have been possible only if the US 
maintained a suff icient force in the region with full facili ty at the nearby bases. At the same time, 
a slight miscalculat ion about the US presence in the region might have provoked Iran to attack 
these countr ies . The littoral states ' tackling of this issue was, however , cautious and remark-
able. They did not invite US to maintain a physical presence in the region. They also told the 
US to refrain from intervening in the war unless requested to do so(180).They denied base and 
landing rights to the RDF and the US aircrafts and did not enter into any defense agreements 
with the 
167 
lat ter(181). Another reason behind their policy to avoid military cooperation with the US was 
not to let Iran exploit Arab people ' s ant i -American and anti-Israeli sentiments and, as a result, 
engineer popular revolt. 
Otherwise, the Persian Gulf allies of the US banked totally on its over- the horizon 
presence in the region(182). They sought the sane weapon system from the US which was with 
the RDF and the CENTCOM to form a coherent defense system. The RDF was linked to the 
C-3 system and the AWACs Saudi Arabia possessed. 
Alwaiys in doubts about their capabili ty to deal with war-experienced, relatively heavily 
populated and big-sized Iran, the smaller and geographically vulnerable Arab countries of the 
Persian Gulf, such as Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, did not, of course, enter into open mili tary 
coopera t ion with the US in order not to antagonize Iran, but they were also pre-decided to move 
in f o r t h e US help instead of invoking GCC-led joint military action in an eventuality of Iranian 
invasion. This is borne out by the fact that none of the GCC countries opposed the US over-
the-horizon presence in the region. Kuwait , which had persistently advocated for pursuing a 
non- aligned course in the war for the Arab countries, went in quickly for US and also Soviet 
help for the protection of its oil tankers f rom Iranian attacks in 1987 (183). 
Al though no permanent base rights were extended to the US, but it wasg iven right to 
access so as to deploy equipment and ammuni t ion essential to sustain the US forces for a 90-
day intensive war with a regional power. Oman, in fact, granted base facil i t ies to the US 
atMisirah, Sib Thumari t and at strategically important Kasab which overlooks the Strait of 
Hurmuz. The Sib was a shelter for the US fighter planes and Misirah accommodated US 
personnel . 
The whole of Bahrain was virtually a US base, despite the denial of this by both the 
countr ies . Saudi Arabia , unlike the smaller countries of the Arabian peninsula, was least 
integrated to the US regional defense system, yet its bases were modernized by the US in a way 
that they looked more appropriate for US military requirements than those of Saudi Arabia . 
A W A C s , which were central to the RDF mili tary strategy, were provided to Saudi Arabia only 
when the latter conceded joint handling of the same. 
The Iran-Iraq War heightened the need and importance of maintaining a war-or iented 
national security system. To this effect , the regional countries viewed modernizat ion of their 
respect ive armories an essential task. Arms acquisi t ions by them doubled. Quali tat ively, one of 
the most sophist icated weapons were purchased, such as AWACs and the F-15s. The supplier 
were allured to be provided oil at lower price in exchange for sophisticated weapons . Beside 
procur ing advanced arms, the regional countr ies also took interest in modernizing their military 
bases and imparting rigorous training to their armed forces particularly in handling and 
operat ing modern weapon system. 
Creation of a military bloc against external threat might have not been one of the reasons 
behind the inception of the GCC.But with a war being fought next door, the member-s ta tes 
could 
m 
not overlook the need to form a common defense system. The idea, mooted by Saudi Arabia in 
mid-November 1980, a imed at creation of Gulf -RDF joint striice force, holding of regular 
military exercises, creation of unified air defense system, a common military weapon and 
standardization program and a GCC arms industry (184). 
Truly speaking, no progress could virtually be achieved on this front. The idea received 
a setback as Kuwait at the very outset refused to be the part of any such system. The GCC 
defense system proved out to be an exercise in formality, limited to holding of joint exercises 
and maintaining a 7 ,000-s t rong armed force, unmatched in all aspects to the military strength 
of both Iran and Iraq. The failure to come up with a vialbe defecne network can be attributed 
to the division among the member states on the efficacy and implicat ions of common defense 
sys tem, with Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar maintaining that this would only antagonize Iran. 
The common defense system was suffered the member s ta tes ' lack of faith in it. Even in 
the wake of Iranian at tacks they did not take courage to invoke it. It eventually proved out to 
be a symbol of Saudi leadership of the GCC as smaller neighbors were dependent upon Saudi 
A W A C s for their air defense system(185). 
It is difficult to specual te that how long was the idea of the formation of a regional 
organizat ion in air, but it is undoubtedly clear that the GCC came into existence (186) as a direct 
consequence of two regional developments , the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. 
These developments realized the peninsular countries of their common identity, particularly to 
the outside world, that is said to be the most pressing reason behind the formation of a regional 
grouping(187) . 
The GCC was a Saudi Arabian brain-child. The war provided a f ine opportunity to Saudi 
Arabia to form a group of the Persian Gulf countries which excluded both Iraq and Iran. 
Otherwise , in a move to establish a regional organization, Saudi Arabia could not afford to drop 
Iraq because not only was it the part of the same geographical region i. e Persian Gulf, but an 
A r a b state also. Vulnerable to the spreading of war and aggravation of anti-monarchical internal 
discontent , thesmal ler Gulf countries favored a greater level of cooperat ion among the regional 
s ta tes . Thus, they seconded the Saudi idea of regional grouping(188) . In relation to the Iran -
Iraq war, the GCC was posed as an Arab non-aligned grouping, a power bloc not in alliance with 
ei ther of the combatants but a platform to jointly work for the set t lement of the Iran-Iraq 
dispute . 
The war, at the very outset, was the result of Iraqi r eg ime ' s miscalculat ions; First, 
Saddam Hussein exaggerated the weakening of Iranian military strength following the large-
scale purging in the Iranian army and taking over of the responsibil i ty of the national defense 
by the untrained Revolut ionary Guards after the revolution. Thinking in these terms, Saddani 
over looked the factors, like the numerical superiority of the Iranian forces and Iran 's geo-
s t ra tegic depth, with Tehran and other political and economic centers being far off for ag round 
invasion. 
Second, Saddam Hussein looked at the negative and purely military aspects of the 
repercussion of the revolut ion on tiie Iranian armed forces. He failed to comprehend that the 
revolution had instilled a new sense of confidence, sacrif ice and commitment among the Iranian 
armed forces personnel to the national integrity of the country. The Iranian army did consist of 
untrained Revolutionary Guards but they were instrumental in the success o f t h e revolution and 
would have labored doubly hard to protect the country in order to protect the revolut ion ' s 
success . 
Third, Saddam Hussein misunderstood administrative, economic and political problems 
a country undergoes dur ing the transition of power as internal chaos. He did not gauge the 
amount of public support behind the new regime and the strength of internal discontent in Iran. 
Instead of stirring up internal instability, which was of administrat ive and procedural in nature, 
the war at this moment was bound to weaken the exist ing opposi t ion, consolidate the new 
government ' s s t ronghold over the people, prepare the people to bear hardships for the sake of 
war and most importantly unite people of different factions, religious sects and regions in the 
name of a national crisis affect ing all and s u n d a r j . 
T H E C O M B A T A N T S W E R E EQUALLY POISED: 
One of the most start l ing characterist ics of the war was that both of the bell igerents 
were equally balanced but, interestingly, not in same depar tment . In other words o n e ' s strength 
w a s the other one ' s weakness . Iraq enjoyed logistical superior i ty . It had access to sophist icated 
weapons of as many as 32 countries including both the superpowers (189). In 1984 Iraq 
possessed 2.5 to 1 superiori ty in tanks and 4 to 1 in aircrafts , APC, infantry and artillery. In 
1988, 
the Iraqi superiority fur ther widened to 4 to 1 in tanks and 10 to 1 in aircraf ts(190) . However , 
in artillery it reversed to 3 to 1 in I ran ' s favor . Iraq 's defense expenditure was almost double 
to that of Iran during the war years(191) Over-fed with arms an ammunition, I r aq ' s logistical 
capabil i ty was much more than the need and requirements of its armed forces. 
On the contrary, from being the reg ion ' s most adequately furnished one, the Irnaian 
armory began shr inking with the outbreak of the war as the weapons Iran lost could not be 
replenished due to an all round arms embargo against it. Iran secured its defense related needs 
f rom the Third World countr ies and black markets. But the arms from these sources fell short 
of world standard and were costl ier. 
If in logistical capabili ty Iraq excelled it lagged behind in the number game. Heavily 
populated, Iran mainta ined a 4 to 1 edge over Iraq as far as the numerical strength of the armed 
forces was concerned. T h e Iranian government was also able to mobil ize hundreds of thousands 
of people to join the war and. The compratively smaller populat ion of the coun t ry 'was a 
s tumbling block before the Iraqi government to mobilize people to join the war as this would 
have caused manpower shortage in civilian and economic sectors . 
In the spheres of ' t ra in ing ' , the Iraqi army had distinct advantage over that of Iran. The 
Iraqi army was exper ienced and trained by the Soviet personnel , based on typical hierarchical 
set up and discipline. Consist ing of young Pasdaran ( REvolut ionay Guards) and villagers from 
the war-prone areas, the Iranian army was by and large untrained but in the handling of small 
weapons. This is why the Iranian army was found lacking in military acumen, str ike capability. 
the laying of siege and foraying into the opponent ' s defense. 
Religious dedication and high moral was the kernel stone of the Iranian armed forces ' 
s t rength. They were told by their government that they were not merely defending the territorial 
integrity of the country but fighting a ' J ihad ' to save revolution and Islam from the infi-
dels(192). The religious duty to struggle and sacrif ice imbued the Iranian army with determi-
nation to fight and suf fer unto victory (193) . 
I R A Q A D E Q U A T E L Y A R M E D BUT W E E K IN S T R A T E G I E S : 
The Iran-Iraq war would go down in history as the one in which the militarily s t ronger 
s ide was at the receiving end most of the time, except between September 1980 to mid-81 and 
then again during the the last six months of the war. I raq ' s ruling reg ime 's military and political 
shor t -s ightedness underl ines this. Iraq erred in not trying to occupy the Iranian mainland in 
order to achieve its main war objective, i.e. the toppling of the Is lamic government, when it was 
mainta ing an upperhand. It made a half-hearted offensives , confined to theperipheries of Iran 
and withiut the needed air support . Massive air raids were the only way out to break into the 
Iranian defense lineas the Iraqi ground forces into Iran had already been outnumbered. 
The number handicap always failed the Iraqi military thrusts. For instance, not in a 
posi t ion to bear heavy human losses, the Iraqiforces could not make an all out assault against 
the Iranian army, essential to break the stalemate the ground batt les had generally resulted into 
(194) . 
Then there were internal constraints. Iraq was more prone to political destabilization and 
economic dislocations. It could not automatically mobil ize Iraqi people, who in majori ty were 
Shias, against a Shei country. Even, there was a threat inherent in recruiting local people in the 
war . This would have swelled the number of Shias in the army, turning it into a potential threat 
to the Sunni regime (195). 
Military analysts have pointed out that Iraqi military thrusts were poorly conceived and 
badly coordinated(196) . The Soviet training of the Iraqi forces was found inadequate. The Iraqi 
aircraf ts f lew at a very high altitude affect ing the accurate targeting. 
The Iraqi forces were well-trained and experienced enough in comparison to those of 
Iran but not so by the world standard. Its per formances in the 1973 war and against Kurdish 
rebell ion were poor. Against Iran these weaknesses came to fore again. Senior army off icers 
were found hesitant to widen the area of operation. Too much emphasis was laid on the object ive 
of destroying I ran 's economic targets, while the Iranian military installations were spared. Even 
the Iranian economic targets were repeatedly attacked unnecessar i ly(197) . 
T H E IRANIAN A R M E D FORCES' STRENGTH A N D W E A K N E S S E S : 
The Iran-Iraq War derives home the point to a student of Military Science that ' human 
factor" is as important as the ' technology factor" in a 20th centliry war, particularly the one 
between the two Third World countries. Despite lagging behind the Iraqi force.? in tactical 
capabil i ty, it were the Iranian forces which held the sway most of the time. With comparat ively 
larger armed forces rces and the availability of the manpower together made it possible for Iran 
to launch "grand of fens ives" into Iraq repeatedly, unmindful of human losses. This, in turn, 
enabled Iran to lay siege around the Iraqi defense, which lessened the chances of Iraqi intrusions 
into its own terri tory. 
Iran soon overcame the lean period its armed forces underwent fol lowing the sacking of 
a large number of regular military personnel. Except creating some problems in initial stages 
the step largely hleped Iran. The new army was more dedicated to the revolution and, therefore , 
to the government . There was smooth coordination between the government and the army. The 
Revolut ionary Guards and the regular army were closely knit. 
I raq ' s geo-strategic disadvantages offset the Iranian armed forces ' tactical inferiori ty. 
With most of the Iraqi targets being at short-distances, the Iranian aircrafts reached the targets 
within 5 to 10 minutes and could fly low so as to attack with precision and accuracy(198). This 
is why the Iranian government used its air powerqui te effect ively in driving the Iraqis out of its 
terri tory in 1982(199) . 
However , I ran ' s diminishing armory cost it dearly. It made a realdifference between the 
Iranian forces ' success in occupying Iraqi border towns and its fai lure to capture central towns 
of Baghdad and Basra. Iran, which had in the first few years of the war made most of the use 
of its air-power, could not utilize it to disrupt the Iraqi defense in the later years as with the 
passage of t imes its air prowess declined sharply due to the lack of spare parts supply. As its 
weapon system was West-oriented, I ran 's resort to the non-Western arms suppliers in the wake 
of the snapping of relations with the erstwhile suppliers after the revolution did not help Iran 
much. Not merely the weapons it procured f rom the Soviet Union ' s clients and the black market 
were quali tat ively inferior but the Iranian army was not trained in operating these arms. Nor 
could Iranhire the services of the military personnel of the supplier countries. 
The Iranian army personnel constituting the ' human waves ' happened to be armed with 
Soviet made Ak-47s , RPG-7s and anti tank weapons , which were unmatched to the Iraqi 
f i repower . On top of this, I ran 's 3 to 1 advantage in manpower also declined at the eve of the 
end of the war. Heavy casualties in grand offensives dampened not only the moral of the Iranian 
army but that of the civilians also, enthusiastically part iciapting in the war earlier. In the last 
year of the war , the Iranian armed forces strength got reduced to 100,000, equal to that of 
I r aq ' s . 
IRAQ N O T IRAN W A N T E D T O R E G I O N A L I S E T H E W A R : 
Contrary to the common perception, it was Iraq, instead Iran, which wanted to spread 
the war to the Arabian peninsula. The primary Iraqi object ive behind attacks on the Iranian oil 
ships in the Persian Gulf waters was to provoke Iran to hit, in the absence of of Iraqi ships, the 
oil tankers of the Iraq-fr iendly states. The importance of regionalisation/internationalization of 
the war grew to Iraq when it found itself incapable of defeat ing Iran on its own. Iraq also thought 
that the direct involvement of the US and the Arab states would be the most effect ive means 
to divert I r an ' s attention from :he Iraqi land, into the Gulf waters or force Iran to seek peace 
wi th Iraq. 
Iran did crearte specter of the spill over o f t h e war among the Persian Gulf countries. But, 
it was a deterrence only, aiming at preventing Arab countries f rom joining the war and entering 
into defense pacts and security agreements with the US. Otherwise, the widening of war was 
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suicidal for Iran as this would have brought in the US a far superior enemy than Iraq, direclty 
agaisnt it. In addition, Iranian onslaught was bound to dub Iran as an "aggressor" which would 
have had far-reaching implications, from withdrawal of support from some of the Arab and non-
aligned countries to imposition of UN economic and military* sanctions.Economic reasons alone 
did not warrant the expansion of the war. An Iran-Arab war had to be fought in the Persian Gulf 
waters, leading to the closure of the Strait of Ilurmuz and, therefore, the stoppage of oil supplies. 
Such a situation would have amounted to a self-imposed oil-embargo at a time when Iran was 
exporting oil beyond its OPEC-fixed quota to meet the expanses of war. 
THE LONGEST WAR OF THE 20TII CEiNTURY: 
It was the longest war of this century. None of other wars have been fought over a period 
which is even half of the Iran-Iraq war's dxiration. The two other wars which occupy second and 
third place in the list of the longest wars of this centur>' were no ordinary wars.These were World 
War I and World War II. Unlike the two world wars, the Iran-Iraq war was fought in an era o f 
technological revolution in warfare, that is said to have increased the chances of an early end 
o f a war. 
This makes one ponder that as to what were the main factors whichdelayed its end for 
no less than eight years. First, the war continued stretching as both the belligerents were evently 
balanced in the sense that both were incapable of defeating each other(200). Second, there did 
not come a stage in the war when both of the combatants would have desired peace together. 
The balance of war kept on tilting from one side to the another and therefore when the losing 
side tried for peace the other side put forward humiliating and unacceptable terms and conditions 
for peace. 
For instance, Iran considered relinquishment of power by Saddam as the precondition for 
any peace talks with Iraq. \^Tule Saddam Hussein stuck to the transfer of its sovereignt)- over 
Shatt-.^-Arab and Khuzestan province by Iran to Iraq. Third, Both of the states possessed an 
inbuilt economic capability to sustain the war. Iraqi war efforts were funded by the Arab powers. 
Although, financial assistance to Iraq came largely in form of debt, but their regular supply 
lessened the burden o f war on Iraq's domestic budget. As regards Iran, its expenses on the war 
were comparatively low while its economy was in a better state of condition. It is not intended 
to prove here that the war did not weaken the two countries' economies, but it weakened their 
economy from flourishing ones into a stagnant one. Fourth, there were numerous de-escalationand 
stalemates during the war. Generally each bout followed a long spell of peace. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 
The Iran-Iraq War was one of its own kind as far as its implications on the combatants, 
the regional powers and outside actors are concerned. Succinctly speaking, each of them 
benefited from it and suffered equally. 
I R A N 
That the war ravaged Iranian economy is a misconception. For, the graph of the Iranian 
economy shows an upward trend with the progress of the war, instead the contrary. The Iranian 
economy was undergoing a lean period on economic front in the early years of the war. But, it 
was the after-effect of the overthrow of the Shah and the resultant snapping of economic 
relat ions with the US, I ran ' s largest t rading partner. Had the war been a factor in the 1980-82 
I r an ' s economic deteriorat ion, it would have aggravated fur ther instead of improving after the 
outbreak of the war . For example, Iranian oil exports declined to 1.1 bpd in 1980 and 0.8 in 1981 
f rom 4.5 in 1978, but f rom then onwards these started picking up, reaching 1.6 bpd in 1982 to 
2.2 in 1983 (201). Since 1983 till the end of the war Iran produced oil and exported above its 
O P E C -quota. 
The Iraqi attacks on its oil tankers and installations, it is said,brought considerable 
damages to the Iranian economy. But, on the contrary, despi te Iraqi attacks Iran kept 
onproducing and export ing oil in the earmarked quantity each year . From Kharag, I ran 's main 
island terminal and the target of intensive Iraqi air and missile raids, Iran succeeded in taking 
oil consignment to the mouth of the Persian Gulf by charting 20 to 25 tankers with each tanker 
carrying 3. 7 million barrel oil(202). 
The decline in the Iranian exports and sagging national income was caused by the decline 
in the global demand of oil. This is why the percentage of the reduct ion in Iranian oil exports 
in the 80s corresponds to the percentage-decl ine in oil exports f rom other principal suppliers 
and the decline in the global oil demand. The worldwide recession and Islamic government ' s 
stress on the development of small scale and artisan industries and not the war were the factors 
behind the stagnation the heavy-industries, particularly steel and petrochemicals , suffered 
dur ing the war. 
Despite the war the Iranian government pursued a self-rel iant industrial development 
and achieved considerable success. This helped the growth of Iranian economy in the second 
half of the war. The trade relations with the West also picked up dur ing the war. Iranian imports 
f rom the US in monetry terms increased from $ 0.02m in 1980 to $ 0.30m in 1981 to $ 2 b in 
1983. And in comparison to 1983 the US-Iran trade relations in 1988 had increased six-fold. 
The war-t ime military expenditure also did not eat much into the civilian expenditure. Iranian 
military expenditure during war happened to be much lower than those whopping ones in Shah ' s 
t ime. 
Purchasing of arms from the black markets, the Third Wor ld and East Europe did not 
incur any additional expenditure. Since the arms procured f rom the black market were of low 
quali ty the purchase value of these was many times less that the high cost qualitative we.apons. 
T h e arms Iran acquired from rest of the sources mentioned above were also cheaper than the 
West -made weapons of similar category. 
The war, as a matter of fact, indirectly contributed the growth of the Iranian economy. 
For example, to reduce its mili tary-expenditure the Iranian government established arms 
exports substitution industries for the manufacturing of small arms and ammunition, tanks and 
spare parts. Although, these did not generate additional income but proved cost-effect ive(203) . 
An array of agriculture based and small scale industries mushroomed in Iran which gave 
employment to a large section of people, arrested the trend of urbanization and created new 
sources of 
national income. 
The Iranian government tried to evolve a 'mechan i sm ' to withstand the economic 
pressure of the war . The government launched an ambit ious five year development program in 
1983 with a targeted growth of 7 percent. Throughout the war the GDP remained consis tent ly 
at 5 percent, a remarkable growth rate for a country beset with a war. The development of non-
oil economy pa id-of f . The non-oil sector contr ibuted as much as 70 percent to the total GNP 
of Iran. 
I ran ' s trade relations with the Soviet bloc and the Third World increased many-fold 
during the war and in comparison to the 7os. The Iranian oil was being bought by Japan, India, 
North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore in Asia , all of the East European countr ies , and 
Tansierre Leone, Madagaskar , Burundi and Nicaragua in Latin America . 
I r an ' s agriculture sector, which contributed 30 percent of the GDP and employed 
thousands of people , remained unaffected by the war . Even the recruitment of people to army 
did not create manpower shortage in the agriculture sector . 
One of the most discerning losses Iran suffered in the war was human casual t ies (204). 
Around 5 ,00,000 Iranians were killed, one million wounded and nearly 3 mil l ion displaced. 
b y l 9 8 4 , the death toll on the Iranian side had already crossed 2,00,000 mark. In addit ion, 
around 
6,00,000 people were injured and 8,000 taken as pr isoners .Casual t ies shot up in Iraqi missile 
and chemical weapons attacks before the end of the war . In February-March 1988 alone 1,000 
Iranians were killed in Iraqi missile f ir ings(205). About 5,000 people, who included Kursds and 
I ran ' s Revolut ionary Guards ' , were killed when Iraq aprayed chemical weapons on Halabja 
(206) . 
The human fatalit ies Iran suferred represent a cal luous loss in terms of number only. Its 
ef fects were not fatal both on the morale of civilians and the army. Islamic fervor coupled with 
the glorif icat ion of martyrdom in the She' i sect of Islam prevented a sense of de tachment from 
the war among the people out of the fear of death. The Iranian government also g lor i f ied those 
killed as martyrs describing them as the companions of Imam Hassan, one of the most revered 
figures in She ' i Islam who, according to the tradit ion, martyred along with his 72 companions 
in the War of Karbala . The families of the deceased, in jured and prisoners were g iven generous 
payment, provided jobs and other facilities, such as houses. 
A few wri t ings on the Iran-Iraq war misconst rue the contribution of the success of the 
Islamic Revolut ion towards social cohesion in Iran. They describe this as a result of the Iran-
Iraq war. It was actually the ' Is lamic ' dimension of the Anti-Shah revolution which blurred the 
Shia-Sunni , e thnic and class divide in Iran. It was the achievement of the Islamic revolution that 
an " o v e r w h e l m i n g majority of Iranians without any regard to ethnic identity, clear of sectarian 
orientat ion, appeared to have coalesced in what is an essence of national effor t to defend the 
1 1 5 
hoiTieland"(207). Similarly, much of the groundwork for the political stability was provided by 
the revolut ion and not the war . 
The Irnaian clergy had come to power with full backing from the people. The opposition 
movements were weak and lacked political legitimacy even before the outbreak of the war. And 
there was no squabble for power between various political fact ions in true sense of the term. 
Rather , there was total eradication of political opponents by the new government, accomplished 
f inal ly by spring 1981 with the ouster of the then President Bani Sadar(208). 
The war gave political stability to Iran not by establishing clergy rule in the country but by 
increasing its credentials as a strong and the best government , successful in foiling the 
Iraqiinvasion and what they called the US imperialist onslaught. 
The war did not hinder the democrat izat ion of Iran. When the war had broken out, it was 
specula ted that taking the advantage of emergency situation the new government would renege 
on its promise to set up an Islamic system based on Westmins ter model. However, it was amid 
war tha t the Iranian constitution was adopted, the post of president and prime minister 
insti tutionalized and parliament was elected, which kept on funct ioning without fail from then 
onwards , and the bureaucrat ic set up was reorganized. 
The war played the role of the cement ing force between the Iranian army, the people and 
the government . Af te r the revolution, both people and the new government has developed a 
distaste for the army for its oppressive activit ies during Shah ' s rule. This distaste was reflected 
in the grooming of 'Pasdaran ' as the al ternative army. However , the war not only increased in 
the eyes of the government the importance of a regular armed force but gave a chance to the 
lat ter to re-establish its commitment to the nation and the new government . 
As far as the negative impacts of war are concerned, it accentuated Iran 's international 
isolation. The revolution followed by the seizure of Amer ican Embassy by the Iranians had 
deter iorated the Iran-US relations only. But, at the same time, it had improved the chances of 
normalizat ion of Soviet Union-Iran relations. 
But, I ran ' s w a r w i t h one of its allies forced the Soviet Union not to go great guns despite 
immense strategic importance of an anti-US Iran to it. In the initial stages the ' w a r ' resulted 
in a change of heart as far as the US was concerned, but Iran did not reciprocal. Once, the 
chances of Iranian victory began looking a destabil izing factor to the US regional interests, the 
I ran-US relat ions reached the flash point of distrust. 
But, it is sheer exaggeration to describe Iran's isolation as international. Iran maintained 
diplomat ic relations with one of the superpowers , namely the Soviet Union. Iran found a number 
of takers of its stand against Iraq in the Third World countr ies , particularly the Middle Eastern 
ones. The relations with Iraqi supporters were by and large sour. However, there never 
prevai leda state of war between these countr ies and Iran. Diplomat ic ties were maintained, and 
both the parties took additional precaution in not provoking each other. 
The war indeed brought a few countr ies closer to Iran, Syria and Libya being the 
example . I ran 's isolation was not permanent either. The relations with the Soviet Union 
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f luctuated between normal to worse. When the war was in its last phase, the relations between 
the two countries improved, resulting into exchange of emissaries, who, among others included 
Sheverdandze , the then Soviet Foreign Minister. 
Iran was indeed absolutely isolated by the US but if the clandest ine deals between the 
two countries are treated as the part of bilateral relationship, then Iran and the US, who 
exchanged arms for hostages in Lebanon deal (disclosed in 1986), were in good terms for an 
unknown period of time. 
I R A Q 
Unlike Iran, the war directly impinged on I raq 's economy. Due to the closure of the 
Shat t -Al-Arab, Iraqi oil exports fell drastically from 2.4 bpd in 1980 to 0.7 mbpd in 1981. With 
this, 
Iraqi oil revenues fell down to $ 10.4 billion in 1981 from $ 26.2 in 1980. The problem 
accentuated when Syria closed down the Iraqi oil pipeline passing through its territory in April 
1982. The Iraqi exports declined to mere 650,000 bd in 1982 and the oil revenue slashed to S 
9.5 billion the same year(209). 
T h e war cost a slur on Iraqi foreign exchange. It began drying up at a fast pace. For 
instance, within a span of four years i.e. 1979-83 period, I raq ' s foreign exchange reserves 
s lumped to $ 3 to 4 billion from $ 35 to 40 bi l l ion(210).Iraq 's external debt rose, by the time 
the war came to an end, to US $ 50 billion (211), mostly owed to oil-rich countries of the Arabian 
peninsula. 
With the defense sector being developed to the hilt, the burnt of war were borne heavily 
by the civilian sector of Iraq. Resort ing to a strict 'gun and but ter ' policy, Iraq took several 
austeri ty steps which affected the civilian sector. Imports were slashed by half, development 
projec ts , particularly those related to irrigation, reclamation, rai lways, automobiles, were 
pared down and the salaries of the government off icials were reduced. 
The war charged heavily f rom the Iraqi manpower. Pitted against a country with a 
populat ion five t imes over than that of its own, Iraq drew a major chunk of newly recruited 
armed forces personnel f rom the civilian sector. Around 65 percent of the people employed in 
the civilian sector were asked to jo in the armed forces. The workfo rce in factories, state and 
non-government organizat ions got reduced to half, as a result. The f i l l ing in gap strategy of 
employ ing foreign labors (212) proved a poor substi tut ion.The foreign workers could be 
employed in construction and service sectors only. The manpower shortage in the agriculture 
sector remained unchanged. The agricultural production declined. A country which used to 
export food items turned a net importer of them. This can be gauged f rom the statistics that at 
the end of the first year of the war I raq ' s food import bill was around $ 13 million and this 
amount almost doubled at the end of the next fiscal year. 
Maintenance of foreign workers was an additional burden. The depletion of foreign 
exchange fastened. Any attempt to cutback the amount of remit tances resulted into reverse 
migrat ion by the foreign workforce .With their lives and security in danger, the foreign workers 
could be allured to slay by being offered an attractive salary and remittance facilities only. 
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The war did v/eaken the Iraqi economy but the state of economic condit ion did not 
weaken the Saddam reg ime ' s resolve to carry on the war . Iraq, like Iran, also succeeded to 
manage its economy in a manner that the conduct of the war could have been suff icient ly funded. 
The foreign aid and assistance played a crucial role in sustaining the economic cost of 
the war. In the second half of the war the Iraqi economy improved a bit, enabling it to increase 
its defense expendi ture . The marginal economic progress was attributed to an a cont inuous 
increase in Iraqi oil exports and growing trade with the West(213). The increased trade with 
the West was the fal lout of the war only. It was the war which brought West closer to a country 
—Iraq—, which being a Soviet ally could in peaceful si tuation, and that too during the cold war 
years, not imagine of gett ing so much politically and economically closer to the former. This 
holds true for the close economic relations between Iraq and its Arab neighbors too. 
The war constraints made Iraq pursue a more reasonable economic policy.It s topped 
wast ing resources on lavish and prestigious projects . The postponement of the the Non-Aligned 
summit in Bhagdad due to the War should have certainly been a political loss to the country and 
a personal one to ambit ious Saddam Hussein, but it saved a lot more money from being 
squandered on a project which had already consumed US $ 7 biUion(214). 
The Iraqi government concentrated on projects helpful to expand Iraqi exports . For 
example, ref iner ies were overhauled, the export of ref ined products increased, the construction 
of a major refinery and petro-chemical complex was taken up and completedsoon. The economy 
was liberalized to attract private companies and individuals ' participation, particularly in the 
service sector . 
The war consolidated Saddam's rule. Iraqi people did not try to de-stabi l ize his 
government but supported his political moves out of the fear that in effect of a political change 
the country will fall to the Iranian army, which most of the time laid siege around the main 
political and administrat ive centers of the country. Though not as popular and char ismat ic as 
the his counterpart , Imam Khomeini, Saddam had the backing of its people to keep on f ighting. 
The 
undercurrent of Iraqi peop le ' s attitude to Iraqi government during war years is adequately 
summed up by The Washingtom Post as; 
" the people do not want a wa r to go on, and some 
even b lame Saddam for it, but they do not 
want revolut ion of Iran to happen here" (215) 
A war being fought between a Sunni regime ruling over Shias constituting 55 percetn of 
the count ry ' s total populat ion against a Shei country, must have instigaed Iraqi Shias to revolt . 
The chances of a revolt in the army were even greater as the Shia personnel could have not liked 
the idea of kill ing the brethren of their sect at the behest of a Sunni regime. But nothing of that 
sort happened. The most important factor behind this was the fact that as per the long Arab 
tradition the Iraqi people gave ethnic-cum-nationalist ic fervor precedence over their religious 
identity (216). Beside, Saddam very 'shrewdly kept the Shia population loyal to the country and 
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the government by offer ing various incent ives to them, directing the army to protect the Shia 
rel igious pilgrimages in the country and entering into political deals with the prominent Shia 
leaders . 
It was not by the people as a whole or the Shei among them was Saddam's government 
threatened during the war . The regime security threats came mainly from within the ruling elite. 
A number of aborted coups took place and at tempts to assassinate Saddam were made . The most 
ser ious v/as the one in Oct. 1983 when the government foiled a coup attempt by Saddam's 
brother- in- law and 11 other senior mili tary off icers . 
However , the above-mentioned rebell ions were ruthlessly suppressed, with the main 
activists being executed and others involved jailed and stripped off their services. The sporadic 
coup and assassination attempts did not point to political instability in Iraq during the war days 
as these had come from above, with the genera] public being aloof from the these developments. 
Interestingly, the war subsided the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq(217). Like Shia people, the 
Kurdish people too were placated. Realizing the necassity of normalization of si tuation in Kurd 
domianted areas so that the Iranian army could concentrate in south-east, Saddam Hussein 
o f fe red to to Kurd leaders peace packages, accepting a majori ty of the Kurdish demands. Thus 
in 1984, Saddam Hussein signed an agreement with the Kurd representatives. The treaty 
provided for free and democrat ic elect ions in the Kurdistan, leading to the consti tuting of a 
legislat ive assembly and economic council for Kurds, and a pldege by the Iraqi govewrnment 
to protect Kurdistan from foreign invasion by the Iraqi government(218) . The agreement also 
included a commitment on the part of the Kurdish leaders, particularly Jalal-Al Talbani and 
those belonging to Patriotic Union Of Kurdistan, to cease hostili ty and join instead the Iraqi 
force against Iran. 
The deal did not work for long as the Democrat ic Party of Kurdistan, which had a large 
fo l lowing among the Kurds , opposed it. Later relations between Saddam and Jalal-Al-Talbani 
also cooled off . Between 1985 and 1988, Kurds rose their heads again, but their def iance of Iraqi 
authority was feeble, disorganized and beset with internal factionalism while the Iraqi govern-
ment unleashed state terrorism, manifested most discernibly in chemical weapons attack on 
civil ian people of Halabja town, to suppress the Kurds. 
The Iran-Iraq war took away 6,5000 Iraqi lives and left 3,00,000 wounded . Beside, 
60,000 Iraqi soldiers were taken as pr isoners of war, the Heaviest toll Iraq suferred in any of 
the wars it fought in its history. Lacking rel igious motivation and revolutionary zeal, as was the 
case with the Iranian people, Iraqis reflected anguish (but did not express it publicly) over the 
deaths of their relatives and friends. The Iraqi government tried to minimize peop le ' s passive 
resentment by giving facilities to the families of armymen killed in the war. The widow of those 
kil led were given land, attractive house, a grant of US $ 7,000 and loans repayable over 25 years 
and pension(219). 
The Iraqi foreign policy underwent a significant t ransformation.I ts atti tude towards the 
Arab monarchies moderated. The territorial claims over these countries were dropped at least 
temporari ly , and suppor t to rebels were withdrawn. It modestly expressed its opposit ion to the 
Formation of the G C C and its exclusion from it. The d i f fe rences over the low-profi le Arab 
support to it was also expressed with utmost care and caution. 
Most revolut ionary change in Iraqi foreign policy was the atti tude towards Egypt, whose 
ouster f rom the Arab wor ld was earlier orchestrated by Iraq. Later Egypt became the largest 
supplier of arms and spare parts to Iraq among the Arab countr ies . Iraq inexchange promised 
to campaign for its re-entry to the Arab fold. In 1984 Iraqi Vice Prime Minister Taha Ramadan 
stated publically, " I r aq—governmen t and pa r ty—cons ide r s Egyp t ' s return to Arab nations as 
I raq ' a primary Pan-Arab objective and regard its relationship with Israeli as its internal affa i rs ," 
(220). 
Surprisingly, Iraqi attitude towards Israel also pacif ied. In Arab league Conference in 
Sept . 1982, Saddam Hussein was reported as saying the securi ty of the Israel was a pre-
condition to the solut ion to the Arab-Israeli conflict . The Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz 
went to the extent of saying that "Iraq was not opposed to a pevceful l set t lement of the problem 
and therefore negotiat ions with Israel"(221). This volte face in Iraqi policy towards Israel was 
an amazing development because it had all along described the war as Zionist-Imperialist 
conspiracy and accused Iran playing in the hands of the these forces. However , it be noted, the 
fr iendly attitude towards Israel was the West and the US oriented so as to project Iraq as a 
regional country not opposed to the la t ter ' s interests in the region, part icularly the one 
pertaining to the integrity and the security of Israel. 
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C H A P T E R IV 
T H E G U L F C O O P E R A T I O N C O U N C I L 
Though a misnomer in the strict sense of the term, the Gulf Coopera t ion Counci l — 
consis t ing of Bahrain, Kuwait , Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U A E —is the largest, the 
most comprehens ive and relatively the most successful at tempt towards mult i lateral coopera-
tion in the history of the Persian Gulf region. 
Yet, the G C C has, so far, not evolved into a regional g rouping worth the name, 
part icular ly in terms of its object ives laid down in its charter and other blueprints . Nor is it 
wor thy of being equated with other exis t ing major regional organiza t ions such as the N A T O 
andthe A S E A N which are known for their achievements , s t rengths and w o r k i n g ( l ) . 
The level of cooperat ion among the GCC member-s ta tes has been of medium intensity 
and the pace a little above slow. Character is t ical ly, it isnot a grouping planted by, and formally 
aligned to, a major global power . Yet, either on its own or due to the interplay of regional and 
extra-regional developments it has heavily banked on the West , par t icular ly the US for support 
and survival. 
It is in this f ramework that a detailed study of the G C C has been at tempted here. 
I N T R A - G U L F C O O P E R A T I O N IN 1970s A N D E A R L I E R : 
Historically, the urge for cooperat ion, in an inst i tut ional ized form, among the Persian 
Gulf countr ies has emanated from a ' common threa t 'posed by a country from amongst 
themselves .Before tiie advent of Is lam, these were not the commonal ty of languages , cultures 
and political systems but the Sassanid incursions which were the chief s t imulant in dr iv ing the 
then tribal Sheikdoms to form a common defense system. Otherwise , they were always 
embroiled in perpetual and bloody inter-tribal confl ic ts . 
Af t e r the birth of Islam in the Hejaz region of t o d a y ' s Saudi Arabia and its subsequent 
territorial ans spiritual expansion, that spread over the whole of the Persian Gulf region, 
including the Persian empire, the new religion, which the entire Arab populat ion embraced, 
turned out to be the major un i fy ing force. 
But, W i l l i the gradual weaken ing of Khiiafat inst i tut ion, the central force that roped Arab 
tr ibes into a sort of federat ion, the t r ibe-state system re-emerged . ' I s l a m ' , common language 
and ethnicity were factors denoted to Arab tribal states cohesion into a dist inct geographical 
unit. 
From inside, perennial feuds among royal famil ies coupled wi th an urge for territorial 
expansion denied the evolut ion of regional coopera t ionfor centuries together . Or the levels of 
off icial cooperat ion, in the words of Christ ie John ," were so sl ight as to be of little e f fec t and 
without last ing impor tance"(2) . 
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Under almost 150 years of British control , there hardly existed a ra t ionale and oppor-
tunity for regional cooperat ion as Britain itself supervised all the larger and wider issues 
concerning the region as a whole . British control over the rest of the Arab ian peninsu la did 
not leave for Saudi Arabia , which became independent in 1921, any room to d r a w i n g t h e smaller 
nat ions towards it till the date the British power announced to wi thdraw in 1969. 
During this period, only a few at tempts in regional cooperat ion were made by Saudi 
Arabia. The most notable of these were the s igning of agreements on economic exchanges in 
1953, on economic unity in 1957 and Arab Common Market in 1964(3). 
However , it was Britain which laid the foundat ion s tone of intra-Gulf cooperat ion, but 
only on the eve of its depar ture from the region. The British power encouraged seven trucial 
Sheikdoms of Abu Dhabi Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman , Ras-a l -Khaima and Umm Al-Qwain to merge 
into a single state. It orchestrated the 1971 Dubai agreement , where in the nine She ikdoms, the 
rest two being Qatar and Bahrain, agreed to consider the fo rmat ion of a 
federat ion or union. 
In 1972, the Emirs and Sheiks of these states moved a step ahead and decided to form 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However , only af ter three years of this the UAE could come 
into existence. Not only this, Bahrain and Qatar later opted out. Historical animosi ty led them 
to disagree over power shar ing in the proposed federat ion, p rompt ing both of them to declare 
themselves as sovereign states. 
Thus in the format ion of the UAE in 1975 there ref lected a lack of poli t ical unity among 
the regional states. The lack of unity was also exhibited exhibit on the securi ty issue. In 1976 
both Oman and Kuwait separately proposed the es tabl ishment of a common defense system but 
the move did not evoke enough enthusiasm (4). 
In the same year, the Arab Gulf states rejected an Iranian p roposa l fo r mutual defense 
all iance, mooted at the first confcrcnce of the Gulf foreign minis ters at Muscat . Iraq also did 
not find any taker of its proposal , which was presented in 1979, for an ' A r a b Gulf Security 
fo rce ' , loosely linked to the Arab League Joint Defense Pac t ' (5 ) . 
Even the Soviet invasion of Afghanis tan , which created a sort of securi ty chaos in the 
region, did not act ivate the Arab Gulf states to coordinate their de fense policies by put t ing up 
a common defense system, albeit a loose one. Instead, each of them individual ly started to shore 
up its defense preparedness . 
Saudi Arabia , which was most vocal against the Soviet invasion and probably the most 
vulnerable to the U S S R ' s expansionist ambit ions Persian Gulf , t r ied to evolve a common voice 
of the Arab Gulf states in condemning the invasion. But this, at best, was a poli t ical and 
diplomat ic move and could have been translated into a demonst ra t ion of regional unity had it 
been preceded or fol lowed by a common stand on security issues at s take . 
The Saudi policy s tatements on the invasion, part icularly in regional and international 
II 
fora, were conspicuous by the absence of a reference to the need of forming a network of Arab 
( including the Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean sector) or a Muslim front against the 
Soviet invasion of a next door neighbor of their region and more importantly a Muslim 
country(6) . 
As against a broad-based regional cooperation, endeavors on a l imited scale were indeed 
made with some success during the 1975-80period . The United Arab Shipping Company was 
established in 1975 by the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Iraq and Qatar. In the same 
year, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain Kuwait and Saudi Arabia established Gulf Ports 
Author i ty . In 1979, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia , Qatar, Kuwait , and Iraq agreed to incorporate the 
Gulf Petrochemical Industr ies in order to establish petroleum by-products industries. The Arab 
Gulf University was established in 1980 to impart training for students in dif ferent scientif ic and 
professional fields, by the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq. 
In 1977 the Gulf Arab trade ministers resolved to establish a common market and in 1980 
the Gulf Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry was founded. Also came into 
existence the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard, the Gulf Air, The Gulf News Agency, the Gulf 
Organizat ion for Industrial Consult ing, The Gulf Joint Production Institute, the Gulf States 
Informat ion Documentat ion Center, The Gulf Radio and Television Training Center, The Gulf 
Televis ion Corporation, The Regional Project for the Survey and Development of Fisheries 
Weal th , The Joint Gulf Organization for Marine Meteorology and the Gulf Postal Union (7). 
T h e l a u n c h i n g of s u c h a l a r g e n u m b e r of j o i n t v e n t u r e s in e c o n o m i c , 
communicat ions ,massmedia spheres was a distinct departure from the past. This is illustrated 
in the statistics that in the 1970s inter-Arab institutions grew one and a half t imes more than 
the number of those established in preceding two decades. • , 
That same year the present Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber A1 Ahmad, discussed the issue 
of regional security at bilateral level with the heads of the states of the region barring Iraq. 
C O O P E R A T I O N ON OIL R E L A T E D ISSUES: 
The Persian Gulf states demonstrated a greater sense of unity in the 1970s. As a result, 
there appeared some sort of simialrityin their approaches and object ives. 
They were instrumental in strengthening, the OPEC cartel. They backed Libya i n . 
chal lenging the Western Oil Companies ' monopoly overpr ic ing and production of oil. They also 
played a central role in Tehran-Tripoli agreements (February and April 1971) for an increase 
in oil p r i ces .OPEC's oil prices increased from $ 3.0 pb to $ 5.1 pb during the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War . In similar refrain, they masterminded the 1973 Oil Embargo on the US and Netherlands 
and the three-fold price hike, taking the new posted price to $ 11.65 pb (9). 
The Persian Gulf countries also formed a cartel within the OPEC to counterbalance the 
radical Arab oi l -producers pn the one hand and Iran,on the other. In the later half of the 70s, 
these states turned pr ice-moderates , opposing Price Hawks, such as Iran, within the OPEC. As 
a matter of fact, on all issues pertaining to oil the Arabian peninsula countr ies towed a line of 
action designed and dictated by Saudi Arabia, then the producer of the bulk of the OPEC and 
the Persian Gulf oil. Therefore the oil policy of one country looked an " image mirror" of o thers ' . 
C O O P E R A T I O N ON P O L I T I C A L ISSUES: 
The oil embargo also set the pace of cooperation on political issues among the Arab 
countries of the Persian Gulf . This was their f irst-ever act ion-oriented response to, and the most 
vivid demonstrat ion of, unity of stand on the Palestine issue. The Persian Gulf Arab countr ies ' 
policy reflected unanaimity earlier too, but then these countries operated in the larger 
f ramework of Pan-Arabism, and when it smacked of Nasseri te radicalism, which the Arab 
monarchies opposed, they resorted to Ant i -Zionism. 
But the qualitative di f ference this time was that af ter originally moot ing and carrying out 
the oil embargo against Is rael ' s allies and sympathizers, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf 
looked at the Palestine issue as one demanding a joint strategy on action and policies among 
themselves as much as in concert with the Arab countries outside. 
More so, the oil embargo was the first major concerted ef for t by the Arab conservatives 
to assert in the Arab polit ics on the strength of oil power, neutral izing their American 
connection and the relative remoteness from the Arab-Israeli War Zone. Fol lowing Egypt ' s 
success in escaping from another defeat due to Arab monarchies action, P L O ' s subsequent shift 
f rom radical states to Gulf monarchies in its bid to come out of fo rmer ' s shadow and its yearning 
for f inances the Palestine initiative slipped from the hands of "old guards" in favor of the new 
saviors. 
In another sense, it was a unique case of regional (political) cooperat ion. Target ing the 
US, the Persian Gulf countries later evenly balanced their ties with the former. This, together 
with their immensely increased oil prowess, changed the region from hitherto a sub servient 
system of international polit ics to one of its sub-systems, capable of extricating itself from 
extraneous dependence or turning it into interdependence if the c i rcumstances demanded and 
suppor ted . 
Though for a short while only, by imposing the oil embargo the US the Arab states of 
the Persian Gulf also de-emphasized their national interests for a larger cause. This was true of 
both 
a big nation like Saudi Arabia and a small country like Qatar. Doing this, Saudi Arabia also 
invited the chances of being attacked. Though the probabil i ty of such attack was remote due 
to a number of constraints yet it was communicated to Saudi Arabia by a person no less than 
Henery 
Kissinger and a s t rong group of 'At tack Protagonists[ , who had gathered around the then US 
president . 
In view of this the chances of Saudi Arabia being stripped off the regional policeman 
status by the US were far less remote and denial of arms largesse and the scrapping of security 
commitments seemed the most probable l ikelihood(9). 
Then, far more threatened would have been the smaller countries. Although their oil 
instal lat ions were not targeted, they feared that they might get involved due to the escalation 
of war or the eruption of superpowers confl ict . More imminent and real was the danger of 
loosing 
in the US a guarantor of their security which had used its leverage over Iran to restrain it from 
territorial expansion into the Persian Gulf. 
But, the regional states failed to maintain the momentum of cooperat ion.An important 
factor behind this was the short duration of the oil embargo. It did not present the Gulf states 
with enough time to consolidate, and properly rationalize the gains of oil embargo in the context 
of regional cooperat ion. 
It took another five and a half years before the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf could 
show some glimpses of their solidarity on the Palestine issue. This occasion was the signing of 
Camp David Accord in 1978. It was vehemently condemned by the Persian Gulf countries who, 
both before and after the s igning of the accord, did nto give in to the US persuasion to follow 
the suit. But a marked di f ference is noticed in these Arab countr ies ' united resolve in 1973 Arab-
Israeli War and on Camp David Accord. 
First, one of them i.e. Oman, did not severe diplomatic relations with Egypt(lO). Second, 
anti-Egypt move was embroiled in Pan-Arabism, encompassing a vast landmass, spread over 
two continents and a score of countries. Thus in view of these s ta tes ' distinct location, size,arid 
geographical proximity with the country concerned and its internal and external political 
orientation and economic state of condition each pursued an anti-Egypt policy varying from the 
o thers ' . 
In fact, only Saudi Arabia, given its size, its involvement in intra-Arab affairs and its 
s ignif icance as the guardian of the holiest of Islamic shrines, and Iraq, given its newly found urge 
to seize the Egyptian opportunity, played an active role in ensuring Egyp t ' s ' ous t e r f rom the 
Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Organizat ion of Afr ican Unity. 
Smaller countries backed the move but they certainly lacked that enthusiasm. 
C O O P E R A T I O N IN P E R S I A N G U L F IN T H E 70s : N O N - S U B S T A N T I V E , F U T I L E : 
The regional cooperat ion during 70s can be marked out for its low-key nature. Scores 
of regional level institutions were established but none paved the way for, or culminated in, the 
format ion of a broad and close-knit organizat ion. In terms of number, their at tempts represent 
a s ignif icant development in regional cooperation but qualitatively speaking these were a 
failure. 
It was as early as 1976, that Kuwait had putforward the proposal of a Gulf Union, but 
it took a span of another five years before such an organization could come into existence. 
Be it noted that the formation of the GCC was not a logical extension of Kuwaiti 
proposal . For, it was never in pipeline. Even its chief propounder Kuwait , fai l ing to receive an 
encouraging response, dropped the idea and instead sh ihed its focus on improving relations 
with the regional countries at bilateral level (11). 
A host of other regional institutions could not take o f f . T h o s e which could be established 
worked but worked barely in the desired manner in a region of geographical ly close-knit 
countries, economically inter-dependent, possessing identical socio-polit ical and economic 
structure and linguistically, ethnically the same and with a common religion to fol low. 
In the 70s the Persian Gulf countries did not look inward. Saudi Arabia, which is the 
biggest power among the Arab peninsular countries, should have made some dexterous efforts 
to carve out a niche for itself across the Persian Gulf into the Eastern Medi terranean sector by 
cashing in on the Palestine issue and underplaying its relations with the US (12). 
The Arab countries did show up as a sub-system in some of the intra-Arab affairs at the 
Arab and Islamic forums, such as the Arab League and the OIC. Mutual cynicism mainly 
prevented the formation of such a regional union. To Saudi Arabia the smaller countries 
acquiesced, but they were not prepared to embracre Saudi hegemony, which they found laying 
inherent in forming a regional grouping. 
But if Saudi Arabia was feared to turn clloses, Kuwait , whichf i rs t presented the Gulf 
Union proposal , too was left alone for the fear of it assuming the leadership by vir tue of being 
the wealthiest and the most developed. 
However , more dis turbing was the failure of the endeavor to form a sovereign state of 
nine shikhdoms. Firstly, it was the Iranian claim on the whole of Bahrain that led the rest of the 
nine to delay the process of reaching at a final agreement. However , once Iran withdrew its claim 
the urge to usher as a soverign state prevailed upon the Bahraini ruler to desert the move. The 
traditional feud between the ruling families of Bahrain and Qatar marred the deliberations and 
negotiat ions on the formation of a single state of these states. In these c i rcumstances it was in 
all respects preferable for both Bahrain and Qatar to emerge as sovereign states than to 
negotiate power sharing between them and or other seven Sheikhdoms. 
Last but not the least, what really robbed them of establishing a regional organization 
was lack of a common threat of such an imminent nature that it could overshadow the factors 
obstruct ing the cooperat ion. The US threat to seize oil f ields in case the Arab governments 
s trangulated oil supply for long was such a threat, sut it was short- l ived. Also,it remained a 
matter of academic discussion in the US, and the idea did not accompany any US effort or 
intention to amass troops and forces in the vicinity of the region. Over and above, the criticism 
to this idea was vehement inside the US and this reduced the possibil i ty of the execution of this 
plan to the minimum. Even, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf did not panic. 
Iran was the only threat at that time to reckon with. But as it had happily accepted the 
role of the "Gulf Pol iceman" jointly with Saudi Arabia the threats f rom it had proportionally 
receded. The Arab countries of Persian Gulf countries did not relish Iran amassing huge arms 
and ammunit ion from the US and its western allies in exchange for its role in the Gulf but were 
consoled by the fact that these were at least not directed against them. 
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Iraq too was not a potential threat, al though it had not rel inquished its claim over Kuwait 
and parts of Saudi terri tory. But, at a same time, these disputes did not f igure high on th'i 
I raq ' s fo re ign policy agenda, due to its entanglement with Khurdish resurgence and pre-
occupat ion with the Iranian threat on eastern border. At that t ime Iraq also needed to take a 
radical shif t from its typical hostile approach towards these countries to capitalize on the Arab 
conf idence, it had gained after masterminding Egypt ' s withdrawal , for the purpose of fi l l ing the 
post Camp David leadership slot in the Arab world. To minimize the Arab suspicion on its Soviet 
connect ion, Iraq was bound to demonstrate a greater level of good neighborl iness vis-a-vis the 
regional Arab powers . 
F A C T O R S BEHIND GCC's F O R M A T I O N : 
Thus, little and restrained cooperation among the Persian Gulf countries,at least till 
1978, did not have paved the way for the formation of the GCC. In fact , to locate the genesis 
of the G C C prior to 1978 tends one to over look the catalyst years (1978-1981) of the G C C ' S 
format ion. 
The Camp David Accord, the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanis tan and 
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War were major developments during 1978-1981 period which led 
to the formation of the GCC (13). 
T H E C A M P DAVID A C C O R D : 
From the viewpoint of regional cooperation, the Camp David Accord was not significant 
as this did not galvanize the Persian Gulf states into togetherness(14) . But being the most vocal 
reject ionists of the accord and instrumental in ex-communicat ing Egypt f rom the Arab fold, the 
Persian Gulf countries shot into prominence once again in the Middle East politics. 
This, in turn, re-established the Persian Gulf as a distinct geographical and geo-political 
ent i ty—the rationale behind the formation of the GCC despite the presence of the Arab League 
and close lingual, religious and historical aff ini ty with the rest of the Arab world. 
By rejecting the Camp David accord brokered by the US, its Persian Gulf allies showed 
a wil l ingness to undermine their association with the US on an issue of regional importance of 
major domest ic implications. This exemplif ied the assertion of the Persian Gulf countries into 
an independent international sub-system than a superpower ' s exclusive area of action. 
Protest against the Camp David accord helped Saudi Arabia graduate to the role of 
leadership in the Persian Gulf region. In adtion, with none of the issues concerning the Persian 
Gulf region after 1973, succeeding in unit ing the regional countries together, the Palestine issue 
after the Camp David at least worked as a binding force before the events like the Islamic 
revolut ion and the Iran-Iraq war came to overshadow it as far as the inception of the GCC is 
concerned. 
T H E S O V I E T I N V A S I O N I N A F G H A N I S T A N : 
On 27th December 1979 Soviet troops occupied Afghanis tan . Taken aback, the Persian 
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Gulf countries interpreted it as a part of a grand Soviet design to encircle the oil-rich Gulf . The 
uncertaint ies in Post-revolution Iran and Bluchistan reinforced their fear. This fear found 
expression in Persian Gulf s ta tes ' criticism of the Soviet invasion. Without exception the Arab 
countries adopted a united stand against Soviet invasion. All condemned the USSR in the UN 
General Assembly at the QIC conference. Yet, it is very unlikely that this development would 
have necessitated an increased cooperat ion among the regional states. 
In fact, within one and a half months of the Soviet invasion, the Arab monarchies vetoed 
Iraqi proposal of An Arab National Charter which provided for prohibi t ion of foreign power 
intervention in the Persian Gulf region. By accepting the Iraqi proposal the Arabian peninsular 
countr ies might have put at rest the fear of a combined Iraqi-Soviet invasion. But the 
disapproval of the same shows that the specter of the Soviet invasion and that of an increased 
level of intransigence from the Soviet allies in the region were not grave enough to the regional 
securi ty. 
Around the same time, Saudi foreign minister visited Kuwait and Pakistan and proposed 
a collect ive security plan to them as well as other regional countries. However , the plan did not 
seem to have been mooted in the backdrop of the Soviet invasion. Rather the plan accidentally 
coincided with it. For, it envisaged cooperat ion in internal security matters and not to deter 
external threats (16). 
Af te r initial outrage, the Gulf Arabs toned down their criticism of the Soviet Union. 
Saudi Arabia offered to establish diplomatic ties with the USSR provided the latter withdrew 
from Afghanis tan . Kuwait publicly told that the USSR did not pose threat to the Gulf security 
despite 
the fact that the Soviet force were barely 350 miles away from the Strait of Harmuz and had by 
then demonstrated their capabil i ty to lift troops and equipment on short notice into Afghanis tan 
and over to longer distances in the Gulf(17) . Stephen Page holds the view that this very security 
threat had actually prompted the Gulf Arabs to seek accommodat ion with the USSR(18) . 
Oman was the only exception. It signed an agreement with the US al lowing the lat ter 's 
forces access to the Masirah island airfield and other Omani military facili t ies. But, much to the 
sat isfact ion of the USSR, other Gulf states disapproved this dea l .Kuwai t ' s foreign minister 
Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad A1 JAbar A1 Sabah visited Moscow at the end of the April 1981. His 
visit jnarked the lack of unanimity in the Arab monarchies ' opposit ion to the Soviet moves in 
Afghanis tan and a rejection of the then US Secretary of State Alexender Ha ig ' s proposal of an 
anti-Soviet "Strategic Consensus" , including the US and its Gulf Arab allies. 
The l ikelihood of the formation of an anti-Soviet regional grouping diminished due to 
the U S S R ' s assurance to the Gulf countries that it had no intention to step into the region. "The 
USSR did not need oil and had never sought to dominate the Peisian Gulf" , said a spokesman 
of theSoviet Union. The USSR also called, even if only for the matter of denying the US the 
advantage of gaining influence in the region by capitalizing the Soviet invasion, for "security 
of oil communicat ions and equal commercial access to oil sources of the Persian Gulf 
region".The USSR removed Gulf s tates ' doubt when Breznev in his off icial visit to India 
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proposed an international agreement on December 10.1980 st ipulated: 
1) Not to create foreign military bases in the Arabian Gulf or on adjacent Island; not to deploy 
nuclear weapons of mass destruction there. 
2) Not to sue force or threaten the use of force against Arabian Gulf countries, and not to 
interfere in their internal affairs . 
3) To respect the non aligned status chosen by the Arabian Gulf states, Not to draw them into 
military grouping to which the nuclear powers are party. 
5) To respect the sovereign rights of the states of this region to their natural resources and: 
6) Not to create any obstacle or threats to normal trade and the use of sea-lanes l inking the 
countries of this region with other countries of the world(19) . 
T H E IRANIAN R E V O L U T I O N : 
The overthrow of the Shah in January 1979 and subsequent seizure of power by the 
Islamic regime under the headship of Imam Khomeini beset the Arab Gulf with twin problems 
concerning their securi ty. First, It exposed them to a kind of double-edged threat. First; it came 
f roma regime (in control of reg ion ' s most advanced military machine), that had from the day 
first declared hostility towards the Arab monarchies and called upon its people to export the 
Is lamic revolution across the Persian Gulf and urged the people of the Arab countries to 
cooperate. Second; it created 'securi ty vacuum' in the region. This is i l lustrated as under : 
1) The dimension of the threat the Iranian revolution posed can be gauged from the fact that 
it activated both the radical (anti-monarchy) Sunnis, and the Shia minority. Even the expatri-
ates—the labor force—ident i f ied themselves with the Islamic regime or its struggle against 
Shah ' s exploitat ion. It is reported that even during the days of revolution its representat ive were 
trying to proselyt ize the peoples of Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia . If reports 
are to be believed then soon after coming to power the Khomeini regime had started supplying 
arms and giving training to the dissident Shias in the Persian Gulf countrt ies. 
Both in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia Shias staged demonstrat ions.They were said to have 
done so at Khomein i ' s instigation. In Kuwait and the UAE the signs resentment amiong Shias 
were also noticed. 
These developments , a few and far in between, were successful ly crushed though they 
often erupted at local level. Their repeated occurrence perturbed the governments of these 
states to a great extent . They rushed to find a mechanism to cooperate on internal securi ty. The 
exchange of intell igence was stepped up, I raq 's help was acquired to feed intell igence and 
security data and the regional governments began taking pre-empet ive action against opposi-
tion groups and " radical activists" before they could stir an agitation. 
This experiment was probably the first case of l iving cooperation among the Persian Gulf 
states, making them discover the practicability of such a cooperat ion and vitality of practicing 
it in insti tutionalized manner and at a wider level. The Iran-Iraq war did the rest. And there the 
GCC was founded (20). 
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2) The Shah ' s departure created a security vacuum. Al though unwil l ingly, the Arab 
countries had acquiesced to the Shah ' s domination of the Gulf .They had reconciled with Iranian 
occupation of three disputed is lands—Abu Musa and two T u n b s — in 1971 when the latter 
began playing the role of a bulwark against the radical Iraq and the Soviet Union. Their military 
and 
manpower strength beingno match to that of Iran further convinced them to remain fr iendly with 
the latter. While their membership to the US power-bloc brought them together on external 
security issues in the region. 
The removal of the Shah shattered the exist ing Gulf security structure aggravating 
among the Gulf Arabs the need of evolving a new security system from among themselves. 
T H E US F A C T O R : 
That this runs as a major theme in the gulf s ta tes ' scheme of things on the security plank 
must be seen in the light of the fact that they were not wil l ing to fall back upon the US as a 
substi tute of Iran. The USwanted control over the Gulf military bases and other strategic rights 
in exchange for guaranteeing security of the regional states.The Gulf states were , at that point 
of time, not wil l ing to concede to the US terms and condit ions. For the condit ions of the US 
tended to give credence to the doubt that it was more interested in the seizure of oil fields than 
the defense of the Gulf. 
Very recently in the shape of events in Iran they had experienced the extent of the adverse 
consequences of maintaining close association with the US. Fol lowing the Iran-US model of 
relationship they would have only given new source of strength to the internal (radical-Islamist) 
opposit ion, which emboldened by the success of the Iranian revolution had come to the fore very 
powerful ly(21) . Nor could it be a wise step if the Persian Gulf countries wanted to neutralize 
the Soviet threat and, more importantly, to avoid the superpowers confronta t ion in the Gulf 
theater(22). All was not well in respect of the relations between the US and the Arab countries 
of the Persian Gulf. The near denial of F-15s and F-5s to Saudi Arabia and the di f ferences over 
Camp David accord and the price of oil were the major irritants to a relat ionship conducive for 
forming a military bloc. 
T H E I R A N - I R A Q W A R : 
The GCC was founded six months after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war . This was the 
time when Iran, after being put back on the wal l for the first six months of the war , began to 
bounce back. This coincidence makes one specify as to whether the Iran-Iraq war or Iranian 
recoveries were catalyst to the formation of the GCC. 
The war was started with a hope that a politically unsettled and militarily disarrayed Iran 
would soon be overrun by Iraq. At least this was the impression the Gulf States gathered from 
Saddam who visited some of the Arab capitals in the Persian Gulf, reportedly to secure lat ter 's 
s support and approval of his decision to wage a war against Iran. Though expressed neutrality 
and urged the two countries to end their war, the Gulf states had unoff ic ia l ly assured Saddam 
to help and support him, to an extent that King Khalid personally wished Iraq success against 
the "enemy of the Arab nation"(23). 
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But, the Iraqi reverses forced the Gulf leaders to review their policies.Iranian retaliation 
threatened free flow of their oil exports. Sudia Arabia and Kuwait have their major refineries 
and ports within the striking range of the Iranian air force. But it was the oil shiping which was 
more endangered than the oil Installations. Of the Persian Gulf countries, only Saudi Arabia 
could divert its oil exports , through its pipeline, to the Read Sea. The rest of them needed a free 
passage through the Gulf waters and the Strait of Harmuz. The foreign minis ters ' meet ing of 
the 
Arab Gulf states in Taif in February 1981, in which the decision to form the Gulf Cooperation 
Council was taken, was called in the background of this threat only. 
Avoiding to indulge into a direct confrontat ion with Iran, the foreign ministers decided 
to evolve the G C C not as a regional security grouping, as opined by the Omani representative. 
Rather, the Kuwaiti version of the 1980 Saudi plan for the military cooperat ion was adopted. 
This meant to establish the GCC as a platform for providing f inancial help to Iraq and 
cooperat ing on internal security among themselves. Thus a sjiape off icial ly neutral, indirectly 
pro-Iraq and non-confrontat ionis t with Iran the GCC took at the t ime of its bir th. This test if ies 
that it was a logical corollary of the Iran-Iraq war . 
Some expoerts on the subject matter say that the Iran-Iraq war was a catalyst in the 
format ion of the G C C in an altogether dif ferent sense; that it was the f i rs t -ever opportunity to 
Arab Gulf states to put Iran and Iraq "out of play as partners to any joint Gulf enterprise"(24) . 
True to a large extent, but an exaggerat ion of this viewpoint tends todownplay the importance 
of security threats emanat ing f rom the war in the formation of the GCC. For, had the war not 
impinged upon the territorial security and internal stability of the Arab nations these countries 
would have not come to form this organization merely on the ground that they had a chance to 
isolate both Iran and Iraq. Also, the aforementioned logic suggests that as if Iran and Iraq were 
the only obstacles in the Formation of a regional grouping. Had this been so,the Arab 
monarchies would have established a GCC like organization long before . But, when one looks 
back at the ef for ts towards regional cooperation in the 70s, two distinct t rends belie this. First, 
the set t ing 
up of an exclusive regional organization remained elusive most importantly because of the 
unwil l ingness on the part of, and division of opinion over the nature and scope of the 
cooperat ion among, the conservat ive Arab states. Second, few of the p re -GCC effor t s at 
cooperat ion included Iraq and excluded a few conservative states which now enjoy member-
state staus in the GCC. 
Non-inclusion of Iraq in the GCC despite the la t ter ' s solidarity with the former in its war 
against Iran has led some analysts to wrongly conclude that the ' Iraqi threa t ' also loomed large 
in the minds of the Gulf rulers during the negotiations to set up a regional organizat ion. They 
go on arguing that experiences with Iraq in the past, its territorial designs in the Persian Gulf 
and exist ing ideological antagonism between them was too much to be over looked in the favor 
of recently-established and largely untested re-alignment. These analysts, however, fail to 
envision the indispensabili ty of the Iraq-Arab Gulf re-apporoachment . The Iranian threat was 
immir.cnt and grave to such an extent that they could not afford to feel mutually threatened. 
Right from 1978, when Egypt signed Camp David Accord, there had begun a full-scale 
real ignment between Iraq and Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, In 
subsequent Bhagdad conferences, called to reject the accords and admonish Egypt, they 
discovered areas of common interests and were led in close cooperat ion to build up a strong 
anti-Sadaat power bloc. Af te r Imam Khomeini came to power and he threatened to export his 
revolution across the border the two decided to work closely to contain Khomein i ' s Islamic 
revolution. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanis tan did not mar the improvement of ties between Iraq and 
its Persian Gulf neighbors. Iraq decided to downplay the event and Saudi Arabia worked hard 
to align Saddam in condemning Soviet invasion. This policy met an exemplary success. Saudi 
Arabia managed to secure Iraqi participation in QIC ' s foreign minis ters ' meet ing on January 27 
called to condemn the Soviet invasion. The conference adopted Iraqi resolution which along 
side the USSR flayed the US and western powers for tampering with Afghan i s t an ' s situation. 
This newly found love was extended to an extent of the Gulf countries gave prior approval to 
S a d d a m ' s decision to attack Iran. Thus by the time of G C C ' s format ion, Iraq had ceased to exist 
as a threat at least for the near future. What would have indeed persuaded the Gulf rulers to 
refrain f rom including in the GCC Iraq was the fear of I raq ' s inevitable domination of the GCC 
given its military and economic supremacy. 
A B S E N C E OF R E G I O N A L TENSION: 
It would be too simplist ic to attribute the formation of the GCC only to political 
developments f rom 1978 to 1981 in the Persian Gulf region.The limited contribution of the 
decade-long, though low-key, tradition of regional cooperat ion should also be also recognized. 
The agreements and understanding on everything from civil aviation to standardization 
of educational curricula: the exchange of information, the establ ishment of joint economic 
ventures , harmonizat ion of development program so f o r t h ' a n d so on contr ibuted to the 
evolution 
of the GCC in the sense that the Arab countries discovered some common grounds among 
themselves. But more important than this, t jhe cooperation in the 70s helped smaller states 
remove distrust towards richer and bigger states, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia respectively, 
reduced to a considerable extent, enabl ing both the sides to overlook the dichotomy of wealth 
and size and jo in the GCC (25). 
Though it was primarily an outcome of the growing threats to their external and internal 
stabil i ty, the G C C was not merely a security grouping. In order to stay away f rom the Iran-Iraq 
war, so as not to provide Iran an excuse to launch an attack, the member-s ta tes projected the 
GCC more as an economic union than a military bloc. The agreement on economic cooperation 
had drawn subs tance f rom, if it was not an outgrowth of, thepre -GCC economic cooperat ion. 
It is not entirely true that the common threat in the form of Israel, Soviet invasion of 
Afghanis tan , the Iranian revolution and then the Iran-Iraq war led the regional states to subside 
intra-regio.<aI disputes and apprehensions for the cause of the much-needed solidari ty. As a 
148 
matter of fact, during the 1976-1981 the Gul fs ta tes had achieved a measure of regional stabili ty 
in isolation to these developments . Most significantly, Saudi Arabia had at least abandoned its 
territorial ambitions agaisnt the smaller Gulf states and had resolved by then most of its 
territorial 
d isputes(26) . The boundary disputes among other states existed as ever but these did not 
endanger regional stability because none of these states were capable of sett l ing them through 
military means and were unwill ing to reach at political solution to them for the fear of the 
possibil i ty of conceding them or a portion of them to the other states and invite in return the 
ire of their people. 
T H E OIL FACTOR: 
G C C ' s formation was also induced by the world energy balance and the resultant division 
along the line of surplus oil producers and deficit oil producing countries.(27) The declining oil 
demands, the reducing share of the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf in w o r l d ' s total supply and 
sagging prices accentuated the need of developing non-oil sector of respective economies . To 
avoid duplicat ion and increase cost effect iveness , the concerned oil export ing states needed to 
cooperate in their developmental effor ts . 
The decline in the global oil demand coupled with the emergence of non-OPEC oil 
suppl iers-mainly the UK and Mexico — had reduced the O P E C ' s share in total global supply 
of oil f rom 70 percent to 40 percent. This phenomenon forced the defici t oil states to gain 
maximum mileage outoil prices before it declined further. Whereas the surplus oil states had 
stake in "oil retaining the central position in the world energy balance"(28) . 
The latter, represented by the Arab states of the Persian Gulf , jo ined each other to 
establish a cartel within the OPEC. The decline in oil expoerts underscored the importance of 
coordinat ing their oil policies outside the O P E C ' s purview. Over and above, with OPEC having 
not remained a reliable forum, as it was in the past, the importance of establ ishing an exclusive 
bloc of the surplus oil producing countries also increased. And this was materialiased by 
forming the GCC. 
SECURITY C O O R D I N A T I O N 
T H E E V O L U T I O N : 
The evolut ion of security coordination among the G C C countr ies took place between 
May 1981 and May 1983. During this period the Chiefs of Staff of the member states met, under 
the chairmanship of Brig Yusuf Al-Madani , four times. In the first meet ing on September 
21 ,1981 only organizational matters were covered (29). Coordination of defense ef for t s was the 
main agenda of the summit conference in November 1981. However , till then the GCC-states 
were reluctant to discuss it elaborately to pacify Iranian concerns. 
But the aborted coup in Bahrain in December the same year, which was allegedly 
supported by Iran(30), prompted the need of entering into some kind of defense agreements in 
the January 1982 meeting of the defense ministers. On March 15, 1982 the chiefs of Military 
Staff had their second meeting in Saudi capital, Riyadh. In this meeting a decision to set up a 
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joint military force was taicen. It was also decided to invest $1.8 billion in military purchases 
for Oman and Bahrain, and to acquire advanced aircrafts f rom Washington(31) . 
In November 1982, the defense ministers met for the second time. By this time Iran had 
started launching counter offensives against Iraq.In the light of this development the necessity 
and urgency of art iculating a common defense policy increased. Iran was described as a common 
and primary threat and it was underlined that the projection of combined military strength was 
essential to deter hostile forces and to tackle them in the eventuali ty of a war . 
At the third GCC summit , whuch was held In Bahrain in Nov. 1982, the heads of the state failed 
to reach at an agreement on a Common Defence Pact as recommended by the defense ministers. 
However , they issued a communique, in which they resolved to coordinate their defense 
policies. These countries avoided adopting the defense pact due to the Iranian opposit ion, 
conveyed to the U A E ' s president Sheikh Ziyad in response to his o f fe r to mediate between Iran 
and Iraq. The Iran categorically told that it would not brook any security arrangement in the 
Gulf which excluded it(32). 
In the fourth Summit the heads of the member-s tates concentrated on evolving a 
cohesive system of communication techniques unison. Other issues which figured in the summit 
included the formation of Joint Military Academy and.compulsory military training (33). 
The undercurrents of the GCC security policies as evolved during 
the above-ment ioned and subsequent meetings were: 
1) Preservation of sovereignty and independence. 
2) Enhancement of naval and air defense systems. 
3) Security of oil facilities, from external, particularly Iranian, 
at tack, 
4)Defense against amphibious armored raids 
5) Maintenance of internal security; and 
6) development of capability to support the over-the-horizon 
reinforcement by the United states(34). 
E X T E R N A L T H R E A T S TO T H E GCC: 
The GCC is threatened by a host of external threats, regional as well as extra-regional . 
Of the extra-regional threats the one emanat ing from a possible East-West confronta t ion has 
f inally receded with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But their eruption in, at least, early 
80s was not entirely ruled out by the Gulf Arabs as in the wake of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanis tan the US threatened to use force, if necessary,if the Soviet Union moved further 
south onto the Arab Gulf region to hinder the supply of oil to it and its western allies. However , 
how far the specter of East-West confrontat ion contributed to the evolution of the GCC security 
is any body ' s guess. For they would have realized that even in case of pooling all resources under 
joint command, the East-West confronta t ion could neither be prevented, nor controlled nor 
deterred. In such a scenario, the Gulf Arabs would have ended up taki ng US side or at best could 
' Hibilize diplomatic means to forestall the confrontat ion. 
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Next to the Soviet Union, the US itself consti tuted the most potential threat to the Gulf 
Arabs . The long-cherished strategic, economic and political relationship between them is, in 
fact, vulnerable to a single issue i.e. disruption of oil supply to the West . Of many options in 
the US scheme of things to meet such an eventuality, one is a forcible take over of the oil 
installations, either by the US alone or under a collective security action involving, beside the 
Western allies, Israel also. 
To the West of the region, the potential threat was Ethiopia and South Yemen, the latter 
a close ally of the Soviet Union and a constant source of abett ing internal dissension in Oman, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Yet, PDRY could not be counted among potential threats to 
the external security of the GCC whose strategic targets were out of the reach of the P D R Y ' s 
air power . 
The threat form north is represented by Israel. Its a i rpower interdiction capabili ty covers 
all the s t ra tegic-economic targets of the Gulf, a proof of which was provided when Israeli 
aircraft f lew over Saudi airspace during its raid on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1982.However , 
the GCC-countr ies have by intimidating the US of the use of oi l-weapon in an eventuality of 
Israeli attack, neutralized the Israeli-threat. The ability to compel the US and its allies , West 
European countries and Japan as well , to harden their atti tude towards Israel, as it happened 
during the the 1973 war because of oil embargo, has strengthened their faith in the oil diplomacy 
as a means of restraining Israel. Beside this, by extending thei rsuppor t to the recently concluded 
accord between Israel and the PLO, these countries seem to have embarked on a policy of 
peaceful co-existence with Israel. 
The threats to the GCC states, thus, comes from the east, Iran and Iraq. Both the 
countr ies are and have been militarily the most powerful regional states and pose radical threats 
of different variety to the conservative monarchies . Beside, Iraq and some G C C countries are 
entangled in boundary disputes. This is why at the expense of the exclusion of Iran and Iraq, 
a Gulf security arrangement is unlikely to succed, unless the responsibili ty for the same is taken 
by the US. The strategic location of the region falls within the striking capabili ty of these 
countr ies . Iraq has, moreover, made overland attacks against Kuwait and just refrained from 
doing the same against Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf crisis. Coming close to trounce 
Iraq, Iran in the 80s threatened to become an overland threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (35). 
Iraq, is now no more a shield of the peninsula against the Iranian or any other threat from the 
east*. To Gulf Arabs, Iraq, given its historical territorial disputes with some GCC states and 
Saddam Husse in ' s penchant for war, is in many ways a greater and perpetual threat. 
C O O P E R A T I O N ON E X T E R N A L SECURITY: 
The security cooperation among the GCC countries eludes an intensive and well-
integrated multilateral arrangement. In fact, there has been a sort of unwil l ingness on the part 
of the member-states to evolve such an arrangement. Suspicious of the regional security 
sys t em ' s practicabili ty and success, the smaller states do not want to invite the ire of their 
s t ronger and bigger neighbours, like Iran or Iraq, for the sake of a token presence in the name 
of regional security. As a part of the over all hostile security system, these smaller states can 
be 
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taken at par with the 'latent enemies' by the adversary power. Moreover, given their relatively 
weaker militaiy position only these smaller states would be singled out for revenge by an 
adversary. An attempt by Iran to escalate its war with Iraq in the 80s would e.xposed the UAE, 
Qatar and Bahrian to an intensive air and naval attack due to their closer proximity with Iran 
than, say, Saudi Arabia. That is why the multilateral security setup, which was envisaged as early 
as in 1981, could come into effect by 1986. In addition, for their national security against a 
formidable enemy like Iran the smaller states preferred to bank on a major global power, like the 
US.Both the bigger and the smaller members of the GCC have not put to practice their high-
prof i le security doctrine based on centralized military structure, c o m m o n armed 
forces,weaponsstandardization, unified training system and common arms procurement. 
Their different weapon systems, particularly in case of aircrafts, hindered the evolution 
of C-3 system. For instance, the French aircraft Kuwait possesses are incompatible to the 
American C-3 system. The Saudi AWACS are relevant more to the security structure of Qatar 
and Bahrain and less in the case of Oman or the UAE. These ah-crafts do not cover the entire 
airspace of Saudi Arabia and a majority of the GCC countries. Obviously, then, the non-
beneficial slates are less inclined to integrate their national security to the AWACS-based 
regional security. 
The common defense forces proposal incurred the contribution of a large chunk of their 
armed forces by the Smaller states, which would have weakened their national defense, 
particularly against an internal threat. 
The unilied training system proposal (36) was eventually left aside as this was bound to 
amount to the abandoning of security contracts with the West, which is engaged in military 
training through its personnel in each country separately. Under this system the training to the 
requirements o f the national defense system would have also suffered. 
The Idea of weapons standardization could not realise as it required dependence on a 
single and common source o f supply. On the other hand,the Weapons procurement policy o f the 
each slate in the region is directly linked with the interests pertaining to bilateral relations with 
the supplier, which, in turn, makes the replacing of more than one supplier with a single or a new 
one, or a group of suppliers with the other group, far difficult. 
The common security system as it stands today is confined to a theoretical premise that 
attack on one member state would be regarded as an attack against all. This has served the 
purpose of political cohesiveness more than that of the security. This is why they exhibited 
political solidarity against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ver>' quick!}' but failed to militarily 
retaliate with equal swiftness. They showed up with only symbolic presence during the collective 
security operation against Iraq. This testifies their unwillingness to use force against an enemy, 
to deter or tackle a regional enemy through collective military actions. 
The GCC is not like the NATO. The cooperation in enhancing the national defense of 
each country separately has turned to be one o f the major objectives of the GCC. Oman and 
Bahrain have been financed by the rest of the GCC states in improving their military strength 
(37). On this basis, a few analysts advance the argument that the member states' pre-occupation 
with the national defense is not an outcome of a disillusionment with the regional security 
rationale. That is why the frantic individual-level attempt to increase the defense prowess has 
not given birth to arms race, mutual suspicion and antagonism as it generally turns out to be. Not 
only 1: is, but also under the GCC's aegis counties like Bahrain and Oman have been funded in 
their defense enhancement programs (38). 
Thus, in reality, what has emerged over the years and in the failures and successes of 
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numerous experiments with a common security is a symbol ic regional security system. An 
example of which is the conducting of joint military exercises, code-named "Peninsula Shield", 
each year(39) and the creation of Riyadh based C-3 system. These are neither apt to, nor are 
intend to be so, to deter a threat although most of these exercises were held during the Iran-
Iraq War. They are aimed at giving a demonstrat ion of convergence of security interests, 
commonalty 
of threats and a slight spanking to the enemy that if it tries to muddle with one of the GCC 
consti tuents, it may have to confront all of them. 
C O O P E R A T I O N ON INTERNAL SECURITY : 
Internal security threats to the GCC come mainly from the minority tribal groups(40), 
the minority religious sects, mainly Shias scattered in all the GCC countries in significant 
numbers (ranging from 75 percent in Bahrain to 7 percent in Saudi Arabia) , expatriate 
workers(41) , and various social . Islamic and professional groups who include Beduins, Urban 
populace, technocrats , enterpreanures, armed forces and educated elites. 
The forms of the threats range from protests, riots, terrorist at tacks —which are carried 
out by tribals Shias and Islamic activists —, covert grievances of the expatriates against the host 
country and political dissent from the professional groups. 
As regards the threats from the local populace, expatriates and professional groups, the 
regional regimes have handled these on individual level through adopting various positive 
measures, which include political concessions, such as formation of representative bodies at 
local and national levels, facili tating greater participation in public affairs to professional 
groups, invoking Arab traditions of kinship and tribalism, and giving Islamic credence to their 
rule to preclude any demand for political change and modernization, channalis ing the oil wealth 
down to the lowest strata of people, though not necessarily on equitable basis, and providing 
a welfare state facili t ies. 
At regional level, only the acts of militancy by the Islamic fundamental is ts , tribal and 
sectarian minority groups and expatriate workers matter. To meet threats from these groups, 
the GCC countries have evolved an Internal Security Arrangement ' (ISA) which includes 
exchange of data, surveil lance information (currently stored in a data bank in Saudi Arabia) on 
the activities of political opponents. There is also a political understanding among the member-
states not to extend any form of support to rebel e lements .The ISA is a lose and vague regional 
mechanism being restricted to only exchange of data and other information and having been 
negotiated only bilaterally with each other. The pledge to refrain from assisting rebels is not a 
legally binding regional agreement. Rather, it has evolved and is strictly adhered to because any 
such activities in a part icular are apprehended of having cross border repercussions. 
In fact, any attempt to give regional dimension to ISA has met with fai lure. Saudi Arabia 
also mooted this idea in 1980. But, it could not material ize due to Kuwai t ' s opposi t ion to 
exceptional and extra-territorial powers it tended to give to Saudi Arabia, particularly the right 
to make cross border hot pursui ts(42). 
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GCC's S E C U R I T Y SYSTEM A N D T H E US : 
The G C C ' s security system is intricately linlced with the United States policy to preserve 
the status quo in the region, to retain its clout on and credibility with the peninsular states and 
to use its military might to protect its interests in the region. That the GCC was an outcome of 
the regional s tates ' resolve to marginalise their dependence on the US on security issues lest 
it become counter-productive by instigating an Iran-like si tuation, is an hastily conceived 
proposi t ion. Indeed, the prevention of the eruption of an Iran-l ike revolution was one of the 
main object ives behind the formation of the GCC, but not at the expense of exclusion of the US 
f rom the regional security. The G C C ' s inception was actually to avoid an overt and direct 
security links with the US. In other spheres, such as arms supply, the "Over- the-Hor izon" 
security of the region, particularly from the Soviet Union and the formidable regional enemies, 
like Iran, the GCC has exclusively relied on the US. 
This is why the G C C welcomed the Carter Doct r ine and the creat ion of the 
RapidDeployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), which was later expanded into US Central 
Command (USCENCOM)—"the most visible military step taken by the united states (in the 
region) since the signing of the Bhagdad pact in 1955"(43). 
The US was offered base facilities in Oman and reportedly in Bahrain.The rest of the 
GCC countries did not press Oman and Bahrain hard to abandon their security ties with a foreign 
power . Kuwait directly approached the US, instead of t rying to activate regional security 
mechanism, to.protect its tankers from Iranian attacks in 1987. This move too was not opposed 
by other members of the GCC. 
American arms are central to the regional security system and essential to achieve the 
task of weapon standardizat ion, an important feature of the common securi ty. Needless to 
mention, that the most effect ive symbol of the G C C ' s common security have been A W A C S 
which cover a large portion of the combined strategic airspace and establish the C-3 system. 
The G C C ' s invitation to the US forces on its soil during the Persian Gulf crisis creates 
an impression that seeking of direct help from the US would have always been on the cards 
earlier too had a similar situation arisen. The ease and urgency with which American help was 
sought to eject Iraq out of Kuwait is a more interesting case of the G C C ' s total reliance on the 
US. On August 9,1990, that is barely a week af ter Iraqi attack, Saudi Arabia off ic ia l ly invited 
American forces. According to some reports, the US forces had begun arr iving in Saudi Arabia 
even two days before this(44). Sonn the other GCC members fol lowed the suit . On August 19, 
the UAE became the second state to permit the Arab and " f r iendly" states to deploy their forces 
and to utilize other military facilities. So did Qatar on August 27. While Oman and Bahrain, 
wherein the multinational forces were not deployed, allowed the allied forces to use their 
military facilities(45). 
C O N S T R A I N T S OF T H E GCC SECURITY SYSTEM 
A) H E PENINSULA SHIELD : 
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Joint land exercises by the member states of the GCC in 1983 in the UAE gave birth to 
the GCC Rapid Deployment Force. This was later code named as "Peninsula Shie ld" af ter much 
debate and di f ferences over its name and mission. At present the force is stationed at King 
Khalid Military City (at Hafar-al-Batin near the Saudi-Kuwait Border) in Saudi Arabia. The 
Saudi Forces constitute the major part of this force fol lowed by Kuwait . While the presence of 
armed contingent from other member-countr ies is mainly token(46). 
The idea of having a common land force to repel any outside land aggression struck the 
Gulf leaders after the at tempted Coup in Bahrain in December 1981 (47). But it could not take 
practical shapedue the dif ferences over its nature, mission and composi t ion.The main objection 
was to the Saudi idea of dividing it into two nuclei—one at north-eastern border and the other 
at south-eastern border as they did not want to be engaged on the front (Saud i ' s southern 
eastern border) which lies much beyond their territories. 
Even after inception the GCC-RDF has been marked for unenthusiast icpart icipation by 
the member states. The UAE and Oman have had reservations about the idea of its expansion 
and the s trengthening of its capabili t ies. For they feared that it would send a wrong signal to 
Iran, a preemptive air and land strike from whom the two countries could not repel. 
The common land force does not even make up half of the strength of the land forces of 
the regional adversaries, Iran and Iraq. For instance, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran could thrust 
into G C C terri tories a troop in tens of thousands in an attack from Southern Iraq which its force 
were then occupying. In such a scenario, the Persian Gulf region could not raise the required 
number of armed contingents even with the help of Egypt and Jordan(48) . Both Egypt and 
Jordan have some diff icul t ies f ielding a force of a large size to such a distance from home. The 
limited numerical strength of the land forces of each country runs againstthe idea of contributing 
a large chunk of their armed forces to the Peninsula Shield so that the latter can look 
formidable .The matter is further complicated by the fact that about one-sixth of each armed 
force is made up of the foreign personnel, who might not like being the part of the common 
armed force which is weaker than that of the adversaries. 
Also huge presence of foreigners in a joint task poses the problem of dependabil i ty. 
While , entrust ing the task to protect the national security on foreigners and divert ing the 
indigenous personnel to common land forceposes the same problem. In fact, the only factor that 
neutralizes the ineff iciency of the Peninsula Shield is the geographic advantage the Gulf 
countries have vis-a-vis a land aggression from the countries on the other side of the Persian 
Gulf. Sustained overland attacks from Iran or Iraq can be channeled only along the narrow 
access at the northern edges of the peninsula. 
Beside this geographic equalizer, the PeninsulaShield is no match to armies of the hostile 
powers. At best, they are good in giving the armed forces common experience in inter-
operabil i ty and to develop a sense of cohesion among them. The Peninsula Shield looks to be 
a deterrent in so far as it demonstrate a political will of the countries who consti tuted it to jointly 
confront an outside threat. 
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B) J O I N T AIR D E F E N S E SYSTEM: 
The idea of joint air defense system was mooted in November 1981.It could materialize 
in the last quarter of 1986 when in GCC summit conference in November the member-states 
agreed to establish the joint air force(^9) . The air defense system centers around the Airborne 
Warning a Control System aircrafts, stationed on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, and the land 
based anti-aircraft and marine missile network(50). 
Yet, the A W A C aircrafts cover the entire air space of Saudi Arabia and that of others ' 
partially only. The development of C-3I(control Command, Communicat ion and Intelligence), 
which is understood to have been the rationale behind the integrated air defense system under 
AWACS, has been obstructed by the the acquisition of different aircraf ts (predominantly French 
in three states, American in two and British in one) by the regional countries. This militates 
against the inter-operabili ty of the air forces. Particularly, the acquisit ion of French system by 
Kuwait is incompatible with that of the American system which Saudi Arabia possesses. 
Even the AWACS-borne system does not give the regional countries air-superiority over 
Iran or Iraq. Here, geography puts the Arab Gulf countries in a disadvantageous posit ion even 
if their air-defense system is relatively stronger than their naval and land defense systems. 
Situated along the western periphery of Persian Gulf the key strategic locations of the Arab 
countries fall well within the reach of Iranian and Iraqi warplanes. 
Though highly sophisticated on paper, in practice the air defense system has not been 
worthy of it. Israeli aircrafts flew undetected and unchallenged across the Arabian Peninsula 
to destroy Iraqi Nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1982. Similarly, in 1983 a dissident Iranian pilot 
landed his Phantom Jet at Dhahran Airport without early detection (51). 
The operation of AWACS in an armed conflict is subject to wil l ingness of the country 
of its origin to cooperate. Al though local air crews can fly these aircrafts , their operation 
requires a maintenance team, comprising technical personnel, of 450 men from the aircraft 
makers and technical assistance from a contingent of 21 uniformed men from the US air Force 
(52). Therefore , in an unexpected situation of terminat ion of US-GCC securi ty ties or the US 
tilt towards power against whom the GCC can use A W A C S or domest ic pressure on US 
administrat ion to keep away from getting involved in regional dispute, the G C C countries 
would not be able to use the AWACS. Such a situation the GCC states would indeed face in a 
war against Israel. 
Q W E A P O N C O N S T R A I N T S ; 
For a number of times the GCC countries have principally agreed to s tandardize their 
weapon system, embark on a unified training and to procure arms f rom single or a particular set 
of sources(53) . Yet, owing to s trong unilateral approach to arms procurement , what exists in 
the region is a disintegrated weapon system which further reduces the scope of weapon 
standardization and restricts inter-operability of combined forces. 
As early as at a ministerial meeting in Jnauary 1982 the idea of coordinated arms 
procurement polir • "as floated. But, Saudi Arabia expressed its reservations, point ing out that 
this would make all the regional countries dependent on a single source of supply. This could 
also integrate the Gulf security to that of an external power in an explicit manner exacerbating 
internal dissension, accentuating the external power ' s dominance. 
The diversif icat ion in GCC countries ' arms procurements is seen most exposed in the 
field of f ighter aircraft despite the fact that these countries are integrated under a common air 
defense system. In 1984, at least four countr ies—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait , UAE and B a h r a i n -
decided to make F-16 as their common aircraft . But this plan could not material ize due to 
restrictions imposed by the US fighter export policy. Then it seemed that the regional countries 
would opt European Tornado or French Mirage 2000. However, finally, Saudi Arabia and Oman 
favored Tornado, Bahrain went for F-14, the UAE placed orders for 38 Mirage 2000 and Qatar 
and Kuwait chose Mirage F - l s . 
As regards the unified training system, it is hampered by training to armed forces by 
foreign experts f rom one country in one member-s ta te to the another country in an another 
member-s ta te(There are about 20,000 foreign military personnel training some 200,000 
indigenous armed forces in all six states). Obviously , as says Kechichian Joseph A. "since the 
background of these advisors is diverse their training reflects a def in i te ' cache t ' which will 
accentuate different approaches" (54). Besides, the placing of the unified training in the hands 
of foreign experts itself counters the building up of an independent combined armed forces, 
the very objective of the unified training. 
Common arms production policy seems an ideal far f rom the reality. In the 70s the Arab 
monarchies had embarked on an ambitious indigenous arms production program with coopera-
tion from Egypt . But it met with an immature death after Egypt signed peace treaty with Israel 
in 1978 as it led to severance of its diplomatic ties with Arab countries. The G C C countries have 
since then moved to Pakistan which is in no way a suitable alternative.Even, the development 
of an industrial base in the GCC countries for arms production is still in its infancy (55). The 
slow progress on this front casts doubts on the sincerity of these countries to achieve their stated 
goal. In addit ion, the arms production is in no way going to reduce the dependence on the 
foreign supplier . For the weapons the GCC countries would be able to produce would in all 
l ikelihood be far inferior in technology and other aspects to those of the West which they 
reallyneed, aspire for and are capable of buying. 
T H E V U L N E R A B I L I T Y OF T H E GCC's SECURITY S Y S T E M : 
On the one hand, the evolution of the G C C ' s security system has not been adequate, 
while, on the other, its fragility has been further exposed by the presence of militarily stronger 
powers —Iran and I raq— in the region. They are confronted with the possibili t ies of naval, air 
and land attacks, closure of the Strait of Harmuz, and political subversion backed by the two 
countr ies . To thwart these dangers the GCC countries have a combined strength of 100,000 
insuff icient ly trained personnel against about 600,000 men in Iran and Iraq each (56). This 
makes them to rely exclusively on the US each time these threats become ' r ea l ' . 
If Iran refrained from blocking the Strait of Hurmuz or declaring a ful l - f ledged war 
against the GCC-countr ies , it was because it visualized a direct confronta t ion with the US in 
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such a scenario. On their own, the GCC overlooked numerous short of war military intrusions 
by the 
Iranian air force during its war with Iraq. Iranian aircrafts attacked Kuwaiti towns of Al-Abdali 
at Iraqi-Kuwait borders twice in November 1980. It damaged a Kuwaiti oil facility center in 
October 1981. In February 1986, Iranian troops penetrated as far as the Khawr Abdullah 
channel. Iranian silkworm missiles were launched against Kuwait in September 1987 and since 
spring 1984 Iranian aricrafts regularly retaliated the Iraqi attacks of Khrag Island by hitting 
merchant vessels bound for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. But on each occasion, the GCC decided 
not to respond. Only Saudi Arabia once gunned down one F-4 Phantom of the Iranian air force 
on June 5, 1984. Combined strategy against Iran was limited to Saudi Arabia providing Kuwaiti 
air defenses along with the intelligence information gathered by the AWACS, despatching the 
GCC-RDF from Hafr-al-Bat in to Kuwait on March 3 , 1 9 8 6 after I ran ' s successful of fens ive on 
Faw Peninsula, and logistic support extended to US for ref lagging the Kuwaiti tankers in 1987. 
The Kuwaiti decision to seek the Soviet as well as the US help in ref lagging its ships was 
a kind of recognit ion among the GCC member-states that even a combined GCC effort to 
accomplish the same would have been inadequate. On this occasion the GCC played the role of 
second-f iddle to Saudi Arabia by agreeing to enlarge Saudi A W A C S survei l lance to the south 
in order to cover the entire route of the escorted convoys, provide basic facili t ies (medical 
service, water and fuel), extend landing rights in case of emergency to the US forces and help 
the US in the mine-sweeping operations in the G C C ' s territorial waters . 
The varying perceptions of a regional threat and their military capabili ty make these 
states to give combined strategy a low priority. Saudi Arabia is relatively less threatened 
because of 
its large size, and possession of a sizable fleet of modern F-15 fighters supported by AWACS 
radar aircrafts . This makes it more enthusiastic about the formation of a s trong security system 
under its doniinance(57). 
But the countries, such as Kuwait and the UAE (58) —more exposed to threats from 
across the Persian G u l f — do not subscribe to a high-profi le common defense system on the 
pretext that this would provoke the adversaries. Any all iance with Saudi Arabia , the govern-
ments of these countries think, would associate them to threats targeted ,otherwise, against 
Saudi Arabia only. The UAE is far away to be covered by A W A C S based Saudi air defense 
system and lacks early warning or tactical air capability to repell an attack by Iran or Iraq(59). 
This underlines its unwill ingness to involve the GCC in its row over Abu Musa and Tunbs 
Islands with Iran in the past as well as recently. A UAE Gulf Official told the press on April 15, 
1992 
that his country did not want to regional ise the issue adding "the UAE has told other Gulf states 
that it is a very serious situation but no one will take action unless it is requested by the 
UAE"(60) . Qatar and Bahrain are in the same category and Oman, despite or because of being 
tied to the US in close strategic cooperat ion, has not very actively contributed to the making 
of the Gulf security system. 
Notwiths tanding that the Omani armed forces are one of the most professional and battle 
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experienced ones in the Persian Gulf region, tliey are, however, t oo small in numerical strength 
and under-equipped to tackle a threa t f rom Iran o r l r a q . Manpowershor tages , coupled with lack 
of funds for defense expenditure, impose limitations on any Omani effor t to increase its defense 
build up. Its involvement in military action against the afore-mentioned countries is bound to 
blockade the Strait of Hurmuz, while the Omani naval forces, too, are capable of carrying out 
only ' run and hit ' attacks, using speedboats. Even in case of laying mines or clearing mines, 
Oman would have to call for outside assistance(61). 
All these factors have turned the GCC security system docile and meek as borne out by 
its remaining quiet on several occasions, a few of them pertaining to Iranian incursions having 
already been mentioned above. When the Persian Gulf Crisis got ensued their response Initially 
lacked collectivism with only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait adopting strong postures and the rest 
of them favoring a peaceful solution. Their collectivism got restored only when the US forces 
landed on Saudi soil, giving them the confidence that any Iraqi attack against them could now 
be repelled. They did not even once harped on the idea of tackling the situation on their own 
and their participation in the war that followed was symbolic, eclipsed by even Egyptian and 
Syrian 
part icipat ion not to mention that of the US and its European allies. 
E C O N O M I C C O O P E R A T I O N WITHIN T H E G C C 
On economic issues the Arab countries, sans Yamen, of the Persian Gulf bear more 
comonal i ty than any other issue of common concern.the economic cooperat ion has gradually 
taken a back seat in favour of a more pressing issue— the securi ty—,it preceded the inception 
of the G C C and the limited success on this front implictly or explicitly encouraged theformation 
of this organisat ion. 
The identical weaknesses—shor tage of human resources, lack of industrial base, 
problems relating to assets in the foreign countries, uneven social and economic development 
— and the identical s t rengths—posession of nearly two thirs of the wor ld ' s proven oil reserves 
and being major actors in world trade and international f inance— of the G C C countries 
underl ined the importance of coordination and integration of economic policies. A blueprint of 
ecomnomic cooperat ion titled "Unif ied Economic Agreement" was signed on June 8, 1981. 
It called for; 
- f reedom for travel for the nationals of each member state, 
- fe reedom of commerce between member states, 
- the construct ion of common economic infrastructure, 
-e l iminat ion of custom duties between the G C C states provided 
the goods satisfy a criterion of a mnimimum local value 
added content (set at four percent but open to go up as high 
as 20 percent) , 
-coordinat iopn of import and export policies and regulation, 
-creat ion of collective negotiat ing force to strengthen 
the G C C ' s position vis-a-vis foreign suppliers, 
- f ree movement of labour and capital. 
-coordinat ion of oil prices, 
-coordinat ion of industrial activities and standardization of 
industrial law, 
-coordination of policies for technology, training and labour, 
-col lect iove approach to air t ransportat ion polcies, and 
-establishemtn of a unified investement strategy and coordination 
of financial monetry and banking policies including possible 
adoption of common currency. 
Some other measures agreed upon by the GCC states in fol lowing 
agreements include; 
-creation of communicat ion network between all Gulf states, 
-effect ive manpower utilisation, 
-establishemnt og gulf infromation bank, 
-exchange of expertise in all fields, 
-unif ied media strategy, 
-at traction of foreign investment,and 
-establ ishement of a special fund for the the Gulf securi ty(62). 
A number of provisions was put into practice since 1982. The Gulf Investment 
Cooperation was establ ished. It earmarked $ 2.1 b for economic development and industrialisation 
in the area and to facili tate joint economic projects in agriculture, commerce, minnig and 
general 
investment. The Gulf Standards Organisation was formed, which set a uniform standard of 
weights and measeures for the community. The GCC countries agreed to help Oman expand its 
market ing capabilit ies by building an industrial park in Oman. An agreement was reached to this 
effect with the member states decideing to promote among themselves the use of products from 
the G C C ' s basic industries so as to st imulate the local demand. Demonstra t ing this the member-
states decided to to set up a tyre factory im Oman to fulf i l each one ' s needs.In a meeting of 
finance ministers in March 1982, the GCC decided not to abolish the tariff totally by imposing 
a custom duty of four percent(63) . 
In 1983, the G C C embarked on a study to explore the possibil ty of construct ing a 
distribution supply netwrok for l iquified natural gas to support its electricity production, 
desalination plants and basic industries. On Nov. 9, 1983, i.e.at the conclusion of the Doha 
Summit , it was agreed that Gulf citizens would be allowed to practise pharmacy, work in hotel 
and resteurants and trade in all six states. 
By early 1984, the GCC brought out a list describing each member s ta te ' s accomplish-
ments in implemeting Economic Agreement provisions. For Instance, the UAE was credited 
with having lifted duties on agricultural and farm products originating in other member-states , 
accpeted the transit regulation of the GCC, allowed the GCC cit izens to practise medicine, law, 
accounting and engineering. Bahrain was reported having allowed the G C C citizens to invest ' 
in the country and permitted the practising of law and medicine by the GCC countries nationals. 
not indicate that the G C C countries in the near or distant fur tue would be able to meet the target. 
The diversif icat ion activities are beset with lack of physical and human resources, institutional 
bott lenecks, overcharging by foreign supliers or contractors and expansionary domestic, 
monetry and fiscal policies. 
The industrial development can, of course, that too in a limited way, reduce the GCC 
countr ies ' imports but can not enhance exports . But, what they need is to f ind out an export 
oriented item equivalent of oil to maintain the economic growth rate under the oil economy. 
Says Anthony John Duke, "there is no way to avoid the fact that the expansion of non-oil sector 
wil hinge largely on exports"(66) . The memeber-s ta tes have not mooted any joint effor t to 
become 
self-suff ic ient in the commodit ies they import heavily. 
I N V E S T M E N T : 
The 'Gulf Investment Corporat ion ' was set up in 1982 in Bahrain with the establishment 
of the 'Gulf Investment Fund ' (GIF).It aims and object ives have been to contribute to the 
economic development ,promote the development of financial resources, assist the diversifica-
tion of the sources of income, and provide a commercial ly accaptabe return to the share-holders 
among the member states(67). 
It opened for business in May 1984 with a staff of three. Its treaseaure is active in money 
market and foreign exchange. The marketing Securities division has started trading in fixed 
income and trading in floating rate notes. It is committed to a number of projects , involving a 
sum of $ 750 m (68). 
T R A D E : 
The G C C ' s policy of trade is two-pronged i.e. promotion of intra-regional trade and 
representat ion as a group in trading with extra-regional countries and organisat ions.As a result, 
the member-s ta tes have made joint purchases of rice and other foodstuffs , imposed GCC-wide 
tax on several products , such as iron, steel, cement and food staples, to protect the local 
insdutries and negotiated as single unit with multilateral insti tutions such as Arabsat , Amarsat , 
International Civil Aviat ion Organisation, GATT, SWIFT and other regional and international 
organisat ions, like EEC and other countries(69). 
On the In t ra-GCC trade front, the GCC states have moved towards duty-f ree trade and 
expansion of trade particularly in goods and services which can be acquired from amongst 
themselves. 
The coordination of trade policies has met some successes. At least the GCC export has 
reached the " take o f f " point. More importantly, in their dialouges with the EEC and he USA— 
their largest trading par teners— the G C C has utilised its togetherness in negotiat ing with the 
la t ter in favourable terms. They are noted for the i r joint criticism o f U S maintaining the position 
of dominant partner and it charging too high a price for supply of goods and services. 
The in t ra-GCC trade has no doubt increased but not to the extent of diminishing their 
aepenaence on extra-regionai countries tney are trading with. Constrained alike by a weak 
industrial base, the GCC countries can not trade in more than a few items, and can not do so 
at all in technology and services. Even the little trade among the member-s ta tes involves mostly 
the re-export of goods imported from aborad. In 1986 the G C C imported 12 percent of the total 
world exports . From 1975 onwards 75 percent of its requirement of goods, services and 
technology has been met by Indutrialised countries appropriat ing as much as $66 b in 1982 and 
$ 56 b in 1986(70) .According to trade figures for 1985, the GCC imports comprised 42 percent 
capital goods , 34 percent industrial products and 12 percent foods tuf fs . Europe provided 37 
percent of the G C C ' s requirement , Japan 17 percent and the United States 11 percent . Add to 
these f igures the trade with the former Communist bloc and developing countries, the volume 
of trade within GCC becomes negligible. 
The only benefit the GCC states could gain from negotiat ing as a collect ive united force 
is to threaten to diversify their sourcesof supply .Thus they acheived a degree of indpendecne 
on the matter of choice. Yet this freedom does not cover all the i tems the GCC imports from 
a part icular country. Some of them can be provided by a single suplier or by a part icualr set of 
supliers . Their exports do not seem to have carved out a niche in the world market . They are 
not only qualitatively inferior but include the items which are in surplus globally. 
In addition, trade inflows within the countries of the GCC consti tute only roughly 10 
percent of the total exports from the region, even though this f igure represents about 200 
percent growth over the past 10 years(71) .Thus more than being an independent economic unit 
in the world trade the GCC is integrated, in the capicity of a weaker partner, to the global 
economy. 
S T A N D A R D I Z A T I O N : 
A breakthrough in the standardization of prices, weight and measures was made by 
establishing Weights and Measures Organisation. It calls for establishing a uniform syatem of 
industrial s tandards that would apply to the GCC member states as a whole . As far as the price 
s tandardizat ion, the GCC countries have once, at least, demonstrated it by collectively 
purchasing bulk of rice in 1983. Electricity and telecommunicat ion companies have also 
mitigated large gap between their prices. But these acheivements are symbolic only in the sense 
that the prices of the two most important commodit ies Oil and Natural Gas have yet not been 
hormonised, mainly due to fluctuations in international prices of these resources. 
E C O N O M I C CITIZENSHIP: 
In 1983 the member-states implemented article 8 of the Unified Economic Agreement 
provisiosn en jo in ig each state to accord one another ' s citizens the same rights and treatment 
which are granted to its own citizens. These rights include f reedom of movement , work and 
resident right of ownership, freedpm of excercising economic activities and free movement of 
capital in any of these states. From 1983 onwards a number of steps have been taken to broaden 
the sphere of article 8, including "equal treatment of any GCC ci t izen 's investments in industry, 
agricuture, f isheries, natural resources, animal husbandry, contracting, hotel, restaurants, 
maintenance, commerce and real estate for personal use"(72) . Equali ty is also awarded to 
profess ionals f rom other states, including accountants, physcians, pharamacisi ts , engineers. 
economis ts etc. 
A S S E T S : 
This is a neglected area. They have not tried to expand the geographical base of their 
assets as most of them are in US and West European banks. They have also not been able to find 
out an alternative to t ransferr ing their surplus in foregn country despite the fact that the nominal 
value of the surplus has not increased in correspondence with the price increases in import 
bi l ls ,Rather the purchasing power of these surplus has decreased owing to inflat ion and 
currency 
depriciat ions(73). 
T H E L I M I T A T I O N S O F E C O N O M I C C O O P E R A T I O N : AN O V E R V I E W : 
The economic cooperation in the region is limited by many constraints which also also 
seem unlikely to be overcome. These constraints are over-dependence on the export of crude 
oil, scarcity of human resources, which would become more acute with the expansion of 
industrial base in the region(74), scarcity of mineral resources other than the oil and hydrocar-
bon, lack of an indigenous technological base(75), and the slow progress of industrial 
development . 
The GCC states exhibited a measure of cooperation only on the issues their national 
interests meet. The Issues on which they fail to agree are overlooked, the example being in point 
is their differences over the price of oil, petrochemicals, l iquefied gas, ferti l izers and aluminum 
products . 
The dependence on the West has not reduced. Consumpt ion of goods technology and 
services has increased in the areas in which the GCC states have not made any stride. Moreover, 
the high level of consumption in the GCC region is unmatched to the limited production. The 
products of Gulf industries are export-oriented even though the outside market is f looded with 
these products . Coupled with this is the fact that inexperience in market ing industrial products 
militates against the member-s ta tes ' ability to make their presence felt in the international 
market(76) . The reduction of the dependence on the West is s lower than the reduction of Wes t ' s 
dependence on the Gulf oil. 
Though both in its Charter and the Unified Economic Agreement the GCC appears to be 
a mirror- image of the EEC, it, however , is far behind and far inferior in every aspect to it despite 
ten years of its existence.The joint measures in the fields of trade, industry, investment and other 
aspects of economic interaction reflect economic cooperat ionamong a few sovereign member 
states only in areas of common interests,while the regional integration of economies demands 
much more. The GCC mechanism does not have supra-national power as does the EEC, nor 
is it capable of practicing "protect ionism", because of having yet not reached a stage self-
suff ic iency as the EEC has. 
The dichotomy in geographical sizes has also marred the economic integration. The 
smaller and less developed countries fear that they may be overwhelmed by the larger and more 
advanced economies like that of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait . For instance, Qatar does not see 
economic integration process as very beneficial as its economy lacks the base for an aggressive 
and sophisticated industrial development. A small country with suff icient reservoir of oil and 
gas, Qatar is not in need of much industrial development and, therefore, needs little or no 
investment of capital from its neighbors. In cost-benefit analysis dominance by neighboring 
powers is more dangerous to it than the slow industrial growth. 
Oman also wants to go slow on integration for a d i f ferent reason. Removal of tar i ffs and 
common production of some items threatens to weaken national industries. Also, Oman does 
notwant to give up its control of such industries like fisheries, which may have a good prospect 
in the near future. Bahrain is, however, an exception. It has actively participated in regional 
economic integration and has in the process benefi ted from it. Most of the crude oil for 
i tsrefinery comes from Saudi Arabia. Almost half of its oi l-revenue comes from a field shared 
with the Saudis. It banking industry thrives on support f rom the regional financial powers — 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Its aluminum industry survives on Saudi and Kuwaiti participation 
in it. The island is the center for many intra-regional activities. It is the service center for the 
region, headquarters of the Gulf Air, and houses the Gulf Universi ty(77). 
The G C C ' s f iasco in economic integration lies not in the very rationale behind its 
formation but its slow progress. The member states need to intensify the existing level of 
cooperat ion, increase their sphere of activities in areas hitherto left uncovered, particularly 
those where their interests do not clash. The smaller countries, on their part, should shed 
perceived threat of domination. The institution can still give them a chance to participate 
beyond the region which they are incapable of doing by acting alone. Rationalization and 
coordination of industrial development can give them an opportunity to launch viable under-
takings within their territories. 
Given the limitations of a viable and intra-GCC cooperat ion, the organizat ion can 
integrate its economies with the rest of the Arab states, Iran and Third World countr ies as a part 
of its strategy to lessen dependence on the West . Egypt and Syria can play an important role 
in providing the Arab Gulf states the manpower, both skilled and unskilled, services, goods and 
technology. So is true with the developing countries like India, China and those of the ASEAN. 
Their dependence for financial help on oil-rich GCC countries would bring about an interde-
pendent relationship removing doubts about fo rmer ' s dominance(78) . Also such a cooperation 
would help the GCC countries create a large market for the goods produced within the region 
(79) . 
C O O P E R A T I O N IN OIL POLICY 
Despite sharing the same goal of revenue maximizat ion, the Arab Gulf countries sans 
Iraq did not coordinate their oil policies prior to 1981. However , during the course of the 
formation of the GCC, these countries included solidarity on oil issues as one of their political 
and economic objectives. Article 11 of the Unified Economic Agreement enjoins the member 
states "to endeavor to coordinate their policies with regard to all aspects of oil industry"(80), 
which includes exploration refining, marketing , industrialization , pricing, transport, utiliza-
tion of gas and development of energy sources. Here fol lows a detailed study of how far and 
to what extent the G C C countries have stuck to their commitment . 
D E C L I N E IN W O R L D OIL D E M A N D A N D T H E G C C S T R A T E G Y : 
G C C ' s formation and years that followed coincided with the sharp decline in the world 
oil demand, causing a massive erosion in the G C C ' s share in a shrinking market. In 1980 it was 
providing 23.61 percent of the world oil which decreased to mere 10.34 percent in June 1985. 
The situation remained more or less the same through out the 80s as not only the decl ining global 
demand of oil but the increase in Non-OPEC oil production and supply, demanded f rom them 
an uphill task to join hands to achieve stability in price (81) and increase their share in 
product ion and sales. 
The GCC countries have not responded to the se tuation judic iously . Their approach to 
the crisis has shif ted from contracting their production and exports to stabil ize the price to 
acting as a swing producer to lower down the prices to cause reduct ion, in Non-OPEC oil 
supplies. 
For instance, Saudi Arabia reduced production to 2.4 million bpd in 1985 from 8.3 in 1978 
which increased to 5.90 in July 1986 and came down to 3.70 in January 1987 (82). 
Shi f t ing of s tances from one extreme to the other has cost the GCC,part icular ly Saudi 
Arabia, dearly. During the phase of expansion in production the prices have come down and the 
gains in terms of revenue have been disproport ionate. On the other hand , acting as the swing 
producer they have also lost more revenue than non-Arab OPEC countries dur ing the phase of 
production contract ion(83). Their policy of lowering down the price, as in 1986 when by 
increasing the OPEC production by 4 million bpd from 16 million bpd the prices fell from around 
$30 to $8.75 per barrel, did increase their market share but not the revenues in the same 
propor t ion . 
In fact, the GCC states are faced with a di lemma. They do not stand to extract much 
income from maintaining a constant output and allowing the prices to rise. Even to rise the world 
price in an era of declining oil demand by 10 percent would require a massive cut back by Saudi 
Arabia and others. Such a drastic cutback would cause a marked downfal l in earnings due to 
the shrinking their share in the world oil market.It is said that even if Saudi Arabia reduces its 
product ion to zero level the price would not jump by even 50 percent . 
C O O P E R A T I O N BUT FLAWED: 
The problem, therefore, lies in the inconsistent policies and in the lack of cooperat ion. 
Saudi Arabia has alone determined both the policy of increasing the product ion and contracting 
it. Others have extended their support to it. Statistics show that Kuwait , Qatar and U A E ' s oil 
product ions and exports have come down and increased with those of Saudi Arabia . The 
d i f ferences over the excess production by Saudi Arabia has, of course, been resented by other 
G C C states, but ultimately these states have given in and fol lowed the Saudi example(84) . 
C O O P E R A T I O N WITHIN OPEC : 
Their cooperation within OPEC has been an undeniable factor . Possessing the largest 
and more-last ing reserves, sharing about 44 percent of O P E C ' s total product ion and given their 
low absorptive capacity in comparison to otlier OPEC member countr ies , the GCC carries the 
most 
important weight within the OPEC. Their combined strength has enabled them to act as cartel 
within the OPEC. They, in many respects, have played this role both in and against the interests 
of other OPEC members . Saudi Arabia has always counted on the support of Kuwait , the UAE 
and Bahrain in trying to act as swing producer within the OPEC. 
The GCC-states have held meetings prior to each OPEC summit to work as a unit on the 
issues to come up. They worked against Iran and I raq ' s at tempts to get their quota increased 
by the OPEC during the war. Af te r the war when the erstwhile bell igerent supported price-
increase and cutback in product ion, the G C C , on the contrary, showed reluctance, compromis-
ing finally on $ 21 pb than $ 25 advocated by Iraq and Iran in the OPEC Summit immediately 
before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis. 
They have acted as a "conservat ive force" inside the OPEC (85) concernedwith "health of the 
western economies" more than the well-being of the OPEC. This is reflected in their policy of 
awashing the West with oil, even when it ran contrary to the object ives of other OPEC members . 
The G C C ' s economic policy in non-oil sector has compelled the member-s ta tes to adopt a pro-
consumer stance on oil in OPEC deliberations. Given their weak technological base they heavily 
rely on collaboration with the multinationals from the West for industrial development. 
Meanwhile , their requirements of goods and services and arms and ammunit ion(86) are 
continue to be met by the West unless they achieve the targeted industrial development , which 
by all optimistic account is long long away. Then it is in the Western countries wherein lies a 
potential market for financial investment(87). These compulsions together make them to 
maintain stability in world oil market so as to bargain the Western help(88). 
From time to time there have appeared chinks and fissures in GCC solidarity. In the mid-
80s the UAE refused to adhere to quota system. Kuwait has since the end of the Persian Gulf 
War demanded freedom from quota system. While Saudi Arabia, as also the other GCC states, 
oppose Kuwai t ' s request on the ground that this would lead to a s lump in price, a f fec t ing the 
income of all oil-exporting countries including Kuwait. 
Though Kuwait has refrained from expressing its grudge in an extreme manner the issue 
has brought Saudi Arabia on the side of Iran who opposeas the Kuwaiti proposal . Thus any 
disarray within the GCC ranks can bring about dangerous correlation of forces. Given this 
possibil i ty the GCC cooperat ion within and outside OPEC can not be taken for granted. The 
cooperat ion is vulnerable to ever-changing political and economic landscape of the region. 
The G C C ' s cooperation within OPEC has caused the near-exclusion of Oman and 
Bahrain as they are not the member of this organization. This has harmed the GCC in two ways. 
First, the GCC looks to be a cartel of " four" only and it is commonly called so too. Second, 
being a non OPEC member, Oman holds scant respect for O P E C ' s arrangements , largely 
determined by the fellow GCC states. During 1980-85 when the other OPEC members of the 
G C C had completed their major infrastructure projects , Oman, where oil was discovered in 
1970, was making a beginning towards it. It, therefore, needed added revenue and turned down 
the GCC s ta tes 'o f fe r to coordinate with them in their policy of reducing production and 
maintained a constant rise in its production (89). 
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Oman could be compelled to comply with the GCC ' s oil policy in 1986 only, but only 
after the fellow states duly recognized Oman ' s need to maintain a high product ion rate. It agreed 
in September 1986 to cut its production by 10 percent reducing its oil product ion to 550,000 
bpd. In 1987 Oman announced further cuts that brought the its product ion down to 530,000 
bpd. Oman ' s importance to other G C C ' s states increased with the need of laying a pipeline 
which could bring the oil to Indian Ocean directly, bypassing the danger zone of Strait of 
Hurmuz(90) . 
T H E PERSIAN G U L F WAR AND A F T E R : 
In 1990s, the Persian Gulf crisis set the tone of the G C C ' s mutual cooperat ion. 
Compensat ing the loss of Kiwaiti\Iraqi oil from the market and maintaining their production 
level high at reasonable price, the GCC states did not only assure to keep the "International oil 
market away from any violent f luctuat ions"(91) but also tried to prevent the oi l -consuming 
states from a frantic search for alternative source of energy as they did af ter the 1973 crisis. 
The GCC states have launched campaign at international forums that the economic 
embargo against Bhagdad remains in force so that neither can it resume its oil exports nor can 
it acquire estimated $ 10 b to rebuild its oil infrastructure(92) . This way they want that the oil 
prices do not crash unless the period of rise in world oil demand, particularly f rom the Persian 
Gulf region, ensues. In continuation of their policy in the Persian Gulf crisis/war, the Gulf states 
in near future would not like to disrupt Western access to their oil so as t o ^ e a n them away from 
resort ing to non-Arab sources, development of al ternative source of energy and conservation 
methods when the period of high demand returns. 
Then capital izing on the Wes t ' s dependence on their oil, they might move to the policy 
of gradual reduction in oil production and increase of prices. This is why Saudi Arabia has all 
along been trying to subvert the Iranian campaign for reduction in O P E C ' s product ion to allow 
the basket price reach $ 21 pb. It seems satisfied with the current price $ 18.50 pb.It seems that 
when the oil market tightens, probably from the mid-1990s, they would not repeat the mistake, 
of early 1970s, to let the price increasing so sharply that recession fol lows in the oil consuming 
states and as a result of this demands also rduce. Interest ingly, the mistake of the 1970s resulted 
into counter mistake by the oil consuming states as they resorted to over-product ion from the 
sources with short-span reserves in the North Sea and Alaska. So, it is expected that when the 
GCC would let the price increase, the oil consuming states would be left with fewer options, 
falling, thereby, in the G C C trap. 
T H E C U R R E N T D I L E M M A : 
However at present, the GCC ' s di lemma continues. The increased output not only brings 
them disproport ionate revenue but thedeplet ing nature of oil reserves also means that each 
barrel of oil extracted today is reducing the number of barrels to be produced in future by an 
equivalent amount , result ing into reduction of the aggregate national capital s tock for fu ture 
flow of income. Even the expected rise in their current level of exports and their share in the 
global supply of oil is not all that rosy. It would fur ther accentuate the deplet ion, probably at 
a s c a l e faster than human and phys ica l capital is created to replace them ( 9 3 ) . But at the s a m e 
t ime, the reduct ion in output shall cause corresponding dec l ine in national i n c o m e and w o u l d 
therefore retard the e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in non-o i l sector . 
S imi lar ly , the s l u m p in o i l -pr ice has eroded the G C C countr ies ' assets w h i c h is be ing 
drawn to maintain current-account surp luses . But they need to do s o to generate a l ternat ive 
source o f i n c o m e through fore ign inves tment and ul t imate ly through d o m e s t i c e c o n o m i c 
b a s e . T h e uti l i ty o f this m o v e is tied to how fast and to what extent d o e s it he lp these countr ies 
m o v e away from an oil based e c o n o m y . 
C O N S T R A I N T S WITH GCC's OIL POLICY : 
T h e G C C ' s e m e r g e n c e as a cartel w i th in the O P E C is counter -product ive to the latter. 
Th i s s e e m s to have d iv ided the O P E C into t w o groups . T h e o n e wi th e x c e s s capac i ty and the 
other wi th little or n o - e x c e s s capaci ty . T h e former one , main ly c o n s i s t i n g o f the G C C count i e s , 
e v e n if it a m o u n t s to l o w e r pr ices wants to increase its output to preserve a future market for 
its o i l . T h e latter group wants the pr ice-hike . G i v e n its l imited reserves and their dep le t ion it 
d o e s not have a long-run market o u t l o o k l ike the GCC. Iran and Iraq a lso have substantial oil 
reserves but at present they s ide wi th the non G C C - g r o u p as the r i s ing cos t o f their e c o n o m i e s 
and ambi t ious d e v e l o p m e n t a l projects undertaken by them in non-oi l s ec tor force them to favor 
price-r ise . 
T h e coordinat ion in oil p o l i c i e s a m o n g the G C C states on var ious i s s u e s and on various, 
o c c a s i o n s has been found m i s s i n g too . Th i s is b e c a u s e each country has a national po l i cy o f oil 
product ion and exports w h i c h is not a l w a y s in l ine w i th their dec lared integrated approach. For 
e x a m p l e , c o m p u l s i o n s l ike the need of e x c e s s i n c o m e at a g i v e n point o f t ime has forced a few 
countr ie s to se l l their crude oil b e l o w the posted price s o that their export may rise. A s a result, 
the oil import ing countr ies have l i f ted their needs from that very country reducing the v o l u m e 
of oil s u p p l i e s from other countr ies of the reg ion .This w a s the s i tuat ion faced by the U A E in 
the m i d - 8 0 s . It w a s unable to sell its oil as Oman suppl ied the s imi lar qual i ty o f oil at a l ower 
p r i c e ( 9 4 ) . 
T h e l ink b e t w e e n a G C C country ' s oil po l i cy and its national in teres t sa l so b lock the 
e v o l u t i o n o f a uni form oil po l i cy . Saudi Arabia has l inked its product ion-export s p o l i c y to its 
secur i ty . There fore , Saudi Arabia is for a po l i cy of prov id ing oil to its guarantor o f its securi ty , 
the US , and its a l l i es in abundance and at a l o w e r price. A n d s ince it is the s w i n g producer the 
G C C m e m b e r state fo l l ow the suit w i l l i n g l y or unwi l l ing ly . 
A n ideal s i tuat ion to o v e r c o m e the negat ive e f f e c t o f ind iv idua l i sm to integrat ion o f oil 
p o l i c i e s w o u l d be that the G C C establ i sh a c o m b i n e d quota (o f course each m e m b e r hav ing a 
separate share) , w i th in the OPEC. This is the h ighes t and the most ideal s tage o f c o m m o n oil 
p o l i c y . A s this w o u l d prevent an increase G C C ' s output and a lso unilateral product ion increase 
by one or t w o m e m b e r s result ing into an over-a l l decrease in oi l price and in turn the reduced 
oil i n c o m e to all the m e m b e r states. But Saudi Arabia might not favor this s trategy as this w o u l d 
imply a great deal reduct ion in its oil output and a l itt le or n e g l i g i b l e cut in the outputs o f the 
smal ler states . 
T h e y a lso can not prevent indiv idual i sm unless the G C C c a m p a i g n s for O m a n ' s inc lus ion 
in the O P E C . Af ter this Oman can be e x p e c t e d to harmonize its oil p o l i c y w i th that o f the G C C 
and the O P E C (95 
POLITICAL C O O P E R A T I O N 
A s a forum for pol i t ical cooperat ion the G C C ' s areas of act iv i t i es are main ly c o n f i n e d 
to h a m m e r i n g out c o n s e n s u s on regional and extra-regional i s sues and r e s o l v i n g inter state 
d i sputes ( in case such a so lu t ion is not p o s s i b l e the G C C tries to m i n i m i s e the sp i l l over e f f e c t s 
o f these ) ( 9 6 ) , and sa feguard ing their pol i t ical s y s t e m from internal threats. 
C O N S E N S U S ON R E G I O N A L A N D A R A B ISSUES: 
A s regards the regional i s sues , the Iran-Iraq war and later on the Pers ian Gul f Crisis have 
been the major event s w h i c h direct ly or indirect ly i n v o l v e d the G C C countr ies . In both the 
e v e n t s the member- s ta te s saw to it that their p o l i c i e s re f lec ted a s e m b l a n c e o f un i formi ty . T h e s e 
s ta tes , 
therefore , ut i l ized the G C C forum in dea l ing wi th such s i tuat ions . Particularly, w i t h regard to 
their p o l i c y on Iran-Iraq war they projected the G C C as mediator and each m e m b e r avo ided to 
o f f e r its g o o d o f f i c e s in individual capaci ty . 
Bes ide , the G C C also b e c a m e an institution for channe l i s ing the member-s ta tes ' f inancial 
he lp to Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war, during G C C s u m m i t s the m e m b e r s tates exhib i ted 
unanimity o f approach in taking an anti-Iran s ide , a l though indiv idual ly each of them, in 
particular the smal ler states , did not adopt the s a m e overt ant i -Iraniansim. 
D u r i n g the Persian Gulf cris is , the G C C s h o w e d a greater s e n s e o f unity after the smal l er 
s tates and Saudi Arabia and the Kuwait i government in e x i l e o v e r c a m e initial d i f f e r e n c e s on the 
nature o f their react ion to the Iraqi invas ion . U n l i k e the Iran-Iraq War, the smal l er s tates s o o n 
toned d o w n their re luctance in cooperat ing wi th Saudi p o l i c y o f inv i t ing f o r e i g n f o r c e s t o w a g e 
a war against Iraq on their beha l f . T h e y later on dec ided to take part in it a l so . A l l their major 
d e c i s i o n s and act ions during the Gul f cris is were taken from the G C C plat form, a l though these 
w e r e largely dec ided by Saudi Arabia and the Kuwaiti government in ex i l e . 
On the Pales t ine i ssue , the member-s ta tes e v o l v e d a c o m m o n p o l i c y o f prov id ing aid and 
ass i s tance to PLO and the Palest inian organizat ions w a g e i n g the Int i fadeh. F o l l o w i n g the 
format ion o f the GCC, the member- s ta te s renewed their o p p o s i t i o n to the C a m p D a v i d A c c o r d 
and Egypt-Israe l peace treaty of 1979 . They took anaddit ional s tep by v e t t i n g the Fahad Plan 
on the se t t l ement of Pa les t ine i ssue , w h i c h b e c a m e Arab pos i t i on on the M i d d l e East p e a c e at 
Fez 
s u m m i t ( 9 7 ) . B e f o r e e x t e n d i n g tl]eir support to the A u g u s t 1 9 9 1 PLO-Israe l A u t o n o m y Plan 
their stand on Pales t ine i s sue w a s unan imous i . e . l iberation o f Pa les t ine . T h e G C C states acted 
as a unit in the Uni ted Nat ions on the ques t ion of Pales t in ians rights and coord inated on f reez ing 
d e p o s i t s for the World Bank projects they saw as as host i le to the Pa les t in ian c a u s e ( 9 8 ) . 
C O O P E R A T I O N ON C O N T A I N I N G I N T E R N A L T H R E A T A N D R E T A I N I N G MO-
170 
N A R C H I C A L S Y S T E M 
T h e intra-GCC cooperat ion to contain and repulse interna! threats, c o m i n g mainly from 
the Shia peop le , tribal groups and radical I s lamic m o v e m e n t s , has been securi ty oriented such 
as sharing o f data and c o m m i t m e n t to non- inter ference in each other ' s internal affairs . 
On pol i t ical front, these states have not e v o l v e d any m e c h a n i s m . Their identical 
approach to handle internal threats can roughly be descr ibed as cooperat ion . T h e GCC-s ta te s 
have ut i l ized traditional peninsular inst i tut ions such as Maj l i s , w h i c h is made up of p e o p l e ' s 
representat ives , to g i v e p e o p l e an opportunity to participate in publ i c affairs and to remain in 
c l o s e contact wi th them. Through this strategy the ruling reg imes have a lso a imed at m i n i m i z i n g 
the rebel e l e m e n t s ' i n f l u e n c e on local populace , w h o (rebels ) are s e e k i n g to c h a n g e the pol i t ical 
inst i tut ions and g o v e r n m e n t s ( 9 9 ) . H o w e v e r , the extent to w h i c h these rul ing reg imes have 
a l l o w e d p e o p l e ' s participation in publ ic affairs varies . In Kuwait , for e x a m p l e , the representa-
t ive inst i tut ions have been fairly large in c o m p o s i t i o n , and v e s t e d w i t h s o m e l eg i s la t ive p o w e r s . 
T h e y are further enti t led to c o m m e n t and cr i t ic ize the g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c i e s . A s against this, 
in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman the l i k e w i s e d e v e l o p m e n t o f such an inst i tut ion is yet to be 
real ized. 
Al l these states in s imi lar refrain reject a f u l l - f l e d g e d democrat i za t ion o f their pol i t ical 
s y s t e m s . T h e y s e e per iodic e l ec t ions , ex i s t ence o f p o l i t i c a l parties and consu l ta t ive and national 
c o u n c i l s ' e x e r c i s i n g l eg i s la t ive and e x e c u t i v e powers as disruptive . In c o n f i n i n g these institu-
t ions to the status o f "advisory bod ie s ' the rul ing reg imes have taken recourse to Is lam. They 
have managed to h o o d w i n k their p e o p l e s by s a y i n g that the Quran and Sharia are their 
const i tut ion and the legal basis and the jus t i f i ca t ion o f their rule; T h e y proc la im that the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah( lOO) of the prophet do not prov ide for d e m o c r a c y as it is unders tood in 
today. Is lam, accord ing to them, stands for a s table and b e n e v o l e n t rule based on the principle 
o f consu l ta t ion wi th the p e o p l e . So long a rul ing g o v e r n m e n t carry out its func t ions in the 
interests o f p e o p l e it need not be changed or undergo the per iod ic e l e c t i o n s etc , they 
m a i n t a i n ( l O l ) . 
T h e rul ing reg imes have provided a w e l f a r e state to the p e o p l e ( 1 0 2 ) a n d expanded the 
base o f oil wea l th d o w n to the c o m m o n peop le . A s a result, a major chunk o f populat ion in each 
country c o n s i s t s o f the middle and upper middle c lass p e o p l e c o m p r i s i n g b u s i n e s s fami l i e s , 
t echnocrats and bureaucrats . The monarchica l g o v e r n m e n t s have de l ega ted to the above 
m e n t i o n e d c l a s s e s s o m e of their administrat ive powers ( 1 0 3 ) . T h e y , in turn, have b e c o m e the 
s y m p a t h i z e r o f the e x i s t i n g rule as their e c o n o m i c w e l l - b e i n g and their urge to take part in the 
state administrat ion is met by the present pol i t ical and e c o n o m i c s y s t e m in the G C C region. 
In fact, unl ike the pre-oil era, the e c n o m i c a l l y w e l l o f f e l i t e s s e e m to have renounced their 
right to part ic ipate in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process in favor of part ic ipat ing in the s ta te ' s adminis -
tration. T h e oil g a v e the rul ing g o v e r n m e n t direct a c c e s s to the state revenues w h i c h they 
ut i l ized 
to increase their popularity a m o n g the p e o p l e . Earlier revenue had to be s q u e e z e d from the 
p e o p l e through the merchants , w h o , in turn, exac ted a pol i t ica l price or reward. 
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T h e ruling reg imes have also adopted the po l i cy o f dis tr ibut ing their p o w e r s a m o n g the 
rul ing fami l i e s by incorporat ing almost all the members , w h o run into thousands , into d i f ferent 
s e c t o r s o f the state m a n a g e m e n t , particularly in the bureaucracy (104) . Th i s has served to sa t i s fy 
the rul ing f a m i l y ' s s e n s e of ent i t lement to power , prevent the total transfer o f adminis trat ive 
p o w e r in the hand of bureaucrats and technocrats b e l o n g i n g to non-ru l ing f a m i l i e s w h o are 
v i e w e d as relat ively less re l iab le (105) . 
H o w e v e r , the G C C g o v e r n m e n t s have not paid due attention to the need o f a concer ted 
e f for t to ensure that pol i t ical d e v e l o p m e n t in each state m o v e s in harmony w i t h that o f the other. 
Pol i t ica l / inst i tut ional d e v e l o p m e n t is in d i f ferent s tages in each state( 106) . T h e leve l o f pol i t ical 
l iberal izat ion in Kuwait after its l iberation is far aheadof pol i t ica l - inst i tut ional d e v e l o p m e n t s in 
Saudi Arabia , Qatar, Oman, the U A E and Bahrain. Saudi const i tut ion is yet to mater ia l ize . S o 
is Omani g o v e r n m e n t ' s promise to g i v e p e o p l e a consu l ta t ive a s s e m b l y . D e v e l o p m e n t in Kuwait 
can generate s imi lar d e m a n d s a m o n g the p e o p l e in other countr ies , w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t s o f 
t h e s e s tates are yet not ready to c o n c e d e . In fact , these s tates have e x p r e s s e d their resentment 
to Kuwai t in this regard. 
T h e internal threats have not been ful ly e l iminated . Nor can the poss ib i l i ty o f expans ion 
o f m a s s base o f pol i t ical opponent s be ruled out. T h e oil w e a l t h and the resul t ing w e l f a r e state 
w i t h its fac i l i t i e s to the p e o p l e has by and large integrated them to the traditional pol i t ical 
s y s t e m . But this can not be taken for granted . In Jill Crysta l ' s w o r d s "as w e l f a r e functionis 
b e c o m e the norm and s e r v i c e s b e c o m e l eg i t imate c la ims on state and rights that the indiv iduals 
as c i t i zen can c la im from the s ta te"(107) . T h e s e trends can transform p e o p l e ' s no t ions o f rights 
o b l i g a t i o n s towards the state and the reg ime. D e c l i n i n g state revenues resul t ing into shrinking 
o f w e l f a r e rights and u n e m p l o y m e n t may b e c o m e a source o f instabil i ty in future. 
P e o p l e in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s w o u l d turn to the anti -status quo i s t s as has been w i t n e s s e d 
in A l g e r i a and Egypt over the past f i v e years or so . Radical I s lamic m o v e m e n t s are gradually 
e s tab l i sh ing their footho ld in the G C C countr ies . They have ques t ioned the I s lamic credent ia ls 
o f the Monarchy-ru le , the very bas is w h i c h kept p e o p l e t ied to the n o n - d e m o c r a t i c pol i t ical 
s y s t e m in the region. T h e I s lamic forces arepromis ing an alternative pol i t ical s y s t e m advocat ing 
that Is lam m a k e s it ob l igatory upon a g o v e r n m e n t to s e e k p e o p l e ' s mandate . There fore , these 
f o r c e s maintain, p e o p l e ' s part ic ipation in the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g proces s through democrat ic 
inst i tut ions and per iodic a s s e s s m e n t o f the government is in c o n s o n a n c e wi th the H o l y Quran 
and the Sunnah. 
T h e grudge a m o n g p e o p l e against A m e r i c a n intervent ion, as a l w a y s , still pers is ts as a 
potential source o f internal instabi l i ty in the region. A f t e r the Pers ian Gul f War, p e o p l e ' s 
resentment against the A m e r i c a n intervent ionhas constant ly been on the rise. T h e Gul f states, 
therefore , need to recons ider their s trategy for tackl ing internal threats. Not o n l y this , but they 
a l so must work together to s e e that a particular s ta te ' s approach on this i s s u e d o e s not vary from 
that o f the other. Otherwise , the p o l i c y o f pol i t ica l a c c o m m o d a t i o n by o n e state and that o f 
h e a v y - h a n d e d n e s s by the other one w o u l d g i v e birth to a new source o f Intra-GCC tens ion , 
a l l o w a n c e s . 
n 
GCC AS P E A C E B R O K E R 
T h e G C C ' s has taken the role o f a peacebroker in s o m e major c o n f l i c t s w h e t h e r a m o n g 
its m e m b e r s or b e t w e e n a m e m e b r state or s o m e other country, s u c h as the Persian Gul f Crisis , 
South Y e m e n - O m a n conf l i c t . It has a lso tried to media te in c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n the regional 
countr ie s such as the Iran-Iraq War. 
T H E IRAN-IRAQ W A R : 
T h o u g h large ly under the impact o f this war, the G C C w a s c o n s p i c u o u s by its absence 
from making any mediat ion e f forts in the first year of the war. T h e member- s ta te s in individual 
capac i ty made verbal requests to warr ing countr ies to s top the war and s u b s e q u e n t l y se t t le their 
d i sputes through negot ia t ion . They a l so threw their w e i g h t behind the e f for t s o f the Organiza-
t ion o f I s lamic C o n f e r e n c e to bring an end to the w a r ( 1 0 8 ) . Ret ir ing in favor o f the OIC, the 
member -countr i e s , it s e e m s , w e r e not w i l l i n g to i n v o k e the G C C as an arbiter in the war. 
T h e G C C ' s media t ion e f forts in the war began from 1982 , w h e n in its annual s u m m i t that 
year they supported Iraq's June 10, 1 9 8 2 proposal for a c e a s e - f i r e , t roops wi thdrawal to the 
internat ional ly r e c o g n i z e d borders and a negot iated se t t l ement of the d i spute on the Shatt . T h e y 
a l so urged Iran to c e a s e hos t i l i t i e s and accept the arbitration o f the OIC, the N A M or the U N . 
In 1983 the member-s ta tes held a specia l mee t ing in A b u Dhabi in w h i c h they urged Iran 
and Iraq to s top the war as it w a s threatening the regional secur i ty . T h e y a l so appealed to neutral 
countr ies to s e e k an end to the war by d e v i s i n g s o m e formula acceptab le to the be l l igerents . 
That s a m e year fore ign ministers o f Kuwait and the U A E v i s i t ed Tehran and Baghdad to 
persuade the t w o countr ies to l imit their war a c t i v i t i e s . A p e a c e plan, p r o p o s e d after the end of 
the v i s i t , ca l led upon the t w o countr ies not to attack merchant sh ips o f the Pers ian Gulf 
countr ie s 
p a s s i n g through the Strait of Hurmuz and s top attacking each o ther ' s c i t i e s and c iv i l ian 
p o p u l a t i o n s and t a r g e t s ( 1 0 9 ) . 
At the D o h a s u m m i t during N o v e m b e r 7 - 9 1 9 8 3 , the G C C countr i e s supported the 
Un i t ed Nat ions Secur i ty Counc i l R e s o l u t i o n 5 4 0 , w h i c h w a s adopted the s a m e year, a sk ing the 
warr ing countr ies to s top at tacking against each other, particularly t o w n s , e c o n o m i c targets and 
ports . 
In September 1984 , the G C C ' s fore ign minis ters met in Saudi Arabia . In that mee t ing 
minis ters reiterated that the Counci l w o u l d carry forward its e f for t s to s e e k a peace fu l so lut ion 
to the Iran-Iraq War. 
During the Kuwait Summit j n N o v e m b e r 1984 the member-states requested the bel l igerents 
to end the war in the interests o f M u s l i m p e o p l e s o f the t w o countr ies and for the sake o f stabi l i ty 
and securi ty o f the reg ion w h i c h w a s b e c o m i n g e x p o s e d to s u p e r p o w e r s intervent ion. In May 
1 9 8 5 , Saudi fore ign minister. Prince Saud-Al -Fa i sa l , v i s i t ed Tehran to o f f e r media t ion b e t w e e n 
Iran and Iraq. 
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T h e cont inuat ion o f the war for e ight years d o e s not o f course point to the G C C ' s 
inabi l i ty to f ind a peace fu l so lut ion to i t . For, the be l l igerents were adroit in not end ing i t ( l l O ) . 
T h e y did not took a ser ious note of the G C C ' s p e a c e p r o p o s a l s and, for that matter, those from 
the U n i t e d Nat ions , the N A M the OIC and Alger ia . Yet , this d o e s not shroud the fact that the 
G C C ' s e f for t s w e r e largely non-ser ious , inact ive , and partisan on var ious o c c a s i o n s . 
. T h e s e r i o u s e n e s s o f the G C C to bring an end to the war can be doubted on t w o counts . 
First, the G C C ' s role as a honest peace-broker w a s di luted by its cons i s t en t l o g i s t i c and f inancial 
support to Iraq during the war. This g i v e s credence to doubt that the main a im of the G C C 
countr ies to project i t se l f as peace broker was , in fact , a imed at o f f s e t t i n g their support to Iraq. 
S e c o n d , they abstained from making any act ive d i p l o m a t i c e f fort to end the war w h e n Iraq had 
the upper hand in the war. This , if a s soc ia ted wi th a c o m b i n a t i o n o f other f a c t o r s — the Gul f 
s tates ' approval to Iraqi attack on Iran and their interests in the defeat o f Iran w h i c h had after 
revo lu t ion b e c o m e a major threat to the securi ty o f the reg ion , makes one to infer that the G C C 
countr ie s favored a war that could result into the defeat o f Iran than the p e a c e w h i c h w o u l d have 
kept Iran military intact and the I s lamic government f irmly seated in p o w e r . 
T h e G C C s h o w e d act ive interests in peace on ly w h e n Iran b o u n c e d back wi th its armed 
forces enter ing Iraqi territory, a f e w hundred mi l e s away from Kuwai t . T h e y adopted a 
conc i l i a tory approach towards Iran, their 
support to Iraq c o o l e d d o w n a bit and they c a m e up wi th s o l u t i o n s that c o u l d have made an 
honorable retreat o f Iranian army from Iraqi territory. 
G C C fore ign minis ters ' 3 0 - 3 1 May 1 9 8 2 peace proposal for bilateral wi thdrawal o f the 
t w o forces to the internat ional ly r e c o g n i z e d border c a m e w h e n Iranian forces had entered Iraqi 
territories . It is reported that in the month of June that year , the G C C o f f e r e d $ 10 to 2 5 b as 
reparations to Iran if it observed c e a s e - f i r e a long the front. T h e reports w e r e den ied by the G C C 
sources . Rather, it w a s o f f i c i a l l y stated that the G C C had proposed an 'International R e c o n -
struct ion and D e v e l o p m e n t Fund for the t w o countr ies if they c e a s e d hos t i l i t i e s . Iranian sources 
a l so c o n f i r m e d that such an o f f er w a s made and thay had rejected as their country needed a sum 
not l e s s than $ 150 b and that too if it w a s made through I r a q ( l l l ) . 
T h e Saudi Fore ign minis ter ' s v is i t to Tehran to o f f e r his country ' s g o o d o f f i c e s for the 
se t t l ement o f Iran-Iraq dispute c a m e in the w a k e o f Iranian search of merchant sh ips o f the Arab 
Gul f countr ie s p l y i n g the Strait o f Harmuz. In other w o r d s , the G C C p e a c e e f for t s w e r e more 
for the prevent ion of spread ing over of the war than its end. There were certain p e a c e proposa l s 
w h i c h were s p e c i f i c a l l y l imited to this end. 
But as s o o n as the poss ib i l i ty o f the war spread ing o v e r to the w h o l e reg ion subs ided , 
the n o n - c o m b a t a n t Persian Gulf cpuntries began get t ing interested that the war l ingered on as 
it detracted the t w o major regional powers away from the Arabian Pen insu la and a l so g a v e Saudi 
Arabia an opportuni ty to advance its bid for regional l eadership ( 1 1 2 ) . It is, therefore , very 
unl ike ly that their repeated cal l s to the be l l igerents to c e a s e host i l i t i e s w o u l d have really 
intended what these l iterally meant. 
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A s a matter o f fact, the G C C did not c o m e up wi th a f u l l - f l e d g e d p e a c e plan, w h i c h , 
bes ide urging the be l l igerents to end the war, w o u l d have a l so prov ided a blueprint o f so lut ion 
to their dispute . Thus these were l imited to proposa ls l ike wi thdrawal o f the armed forces to 
internat ional ly r e c o g n i z e d borders and negot ia ted se t t l ement o f the Shatt d ispute on ly . 
Lack of G C C countr ies ' pol i t ical e c o n o m i c and military c lout on e i ther o f the be l l igerents 
made them unable to i n f l u e n c e the attitude o f Iran and Iraq towards p e a c e ( 1 1 3 ) . Iraq did not 
heed to their requests to refrain from attacking neutral sh ips in the Gul f waters . 
Iran adopted an unfr iendly posture towards the non combatant Pers ian Gul f countr ies 
str ict ly on ideo log i ca l grounds . S o it w a s bound to reject their p e a c e e f for t s . A l s o , Iran's 
i n d e p e n d e n c e from these countr ies for e c o n o m i c military ass i s tance or pol i t ical support meant 
that noth ing could compe l l Iran to d e - i d e o l o g i s e its re lat ions w i th the G C C countr ies . 
I R A Q - K U W A I T DISPUTE: 
During the per iod b e t w e e n the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi o c c u p a t i o n o f 
Kuwai t , the G C C countr ies were taken aback by raking up of the boundary and oil d i sputes by 
Iraq with them. H a v i n g spent b i l l ions o f dol lars on Iraqi war e f for t s and endured Iranian 
retribution for support ing Iraq, Kuwai t had thought to have bought o f f Iraq's territorial c l a ims 
on it. T h e GCC, therefore , during this per iod, did little to set t le the v e x e d border i s sues b e t w e e n 
Iraq and Kuwait in the favor o f the latter by c a s h i n g in on their ass i s tance to Iraq during the war. 
But a m a z i n g l y , the G C C also s h o w e d r e c k l e s s n e s s w h e n the i s sue b l e w out. Kuwait , it is 
unders tood , expressed anguish over the m e m b e r states' inabi l i ty to use the G C C as an inst i tution 
to persuade Iraq from rais ing the i s s u e ( 1 1 4 ) . 
S o o n after the invas ion all the G C C states expres sed sol idari ty w i th Kuwai t but they w e r e 
s l o w in e x e r c i s i n g pressure on Iraq to w i thdraw.The first G C C statement against the Iraqi 
i n v a s i o n w a s i s sued after 36 hours of the b e g i n n i n g o f the cris is during a m e e t i n g of the G C C 
f o r e i g n minis ters at the Arab L e a g u e and QIC mee t ings . From 3rd to 7th A u g u s t 1 9 9 0 there w a s 
no attempt to set t le the i s sue . Th i s w a s probably b e c a u s e o f the G C C ' s d e c i s i o n not to set t le 
the i s sue p e a c e f u l l y and on its o w n but to invi te Arab and U S forces to expe l Iraq from Kuwait . 
On G C C ' s e f for t s to reso lve the cr is i s one can only bank on s o m e reports carried out by Arab 
media during those days that the matter w a s b e i n g negot ia ted by Kuwai t and Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia had 
a l so tried to normal ize relat ions b e t w e e n Iraq and Kuwait . 
H o w e v e r , s ince the tabl ing o f the first draft reso lut ion at the U N Secur i ty Counc i l w h i c h 
w a s adopted as the U N S C resolut ion no. 6 6 0 , ca l l ing upon Iraq to w i thdraw i m m e d i a t e l y and 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y from Kuwait and restore its l eg i t imacy , it s e e m e d that the G C C countr ies were 
not interested in s e e k i n g a negot ia t ion w i t h Iraq on the Issue . T h e y t o o k a back seat in favor 
o f U N ' s reso lut ions on the cr is i s . At the G C C summit in D o h a (Qatar) during D e c e m b e r 2 2 - 2 4 
1 9 9 0 , it w a s u n a n i m o u s l y reso lved that the G C C w o u l d not negot ia te w i t h Iraq till it w i thdrew 
its troops from Kuwait . 
The G C C later o f f i c i a l l y maintained that it wou ld o n l y play an indirect role in reverting 
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the cr i s i s . It re fused to take part in US-Iraq d i a l o g u e o v e r Kuwai t . Ti ie pos i t i on it mainta ined 
then w a s that it w o u l d remain constant ly in touch wi th the U S and the U N w h i c h w e r e e n g a g e d 
in f i n d i n g out a se t t lement of the crisis . 
O M A N - S O U T H YEMEN DISPUTE: 
T h e l o n g s tanding c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n O m a n - S o u t h Y e m e n sur faced again during 1 9 8 0 -
1982 . This w a s marked by South Y e m e n i s o l d i e r s ' c r o s s i n g the frontier into D o h f a r region, 
d i sputed b e t w e e n the t w o countr ies . A d e n a l l eged that Omani mil i tary he l i copters o f having 
v io la ted its a irspace and Oman a c c u s e d P D R Y of pursuing an a g g r e s s i v e fore ign p o l i c y towards 
its ne ighbors . By the spring o f 1982 Oman began to construct a ser ies of for t i f i ed p o s i t i o n s a long 
its south wes tern border and d e p l o y e d its best trained and best e q u i p p e d troops behind the 
for t i f i ca t ions . A s a result, t ens ion b e t w e e n the t w o countr ies he igh tened . On beha l f o f the G C C 
Kuwait mediated b e t w e e n the t w o g o v e r n m e n t s in the first w e e k o f M a y and s u c c e e d e d in 
ge t t ing a jo int c o m m i t m e n t s igned by the hos t i l e countr ies to refrain from launch ing attack 
against each other. 
H o w e v e r , the d e c i s i o n to f o l l o w up the negot ia t ion fel l through w h e n A d e n re fused to 
take pert in it. T h e s a m e month an Iranian de l ega t ion v i s i t ed A d e n . This g a v e rise to specu la t ions 
that A d e n wi l l a l ign i tself w i th Iran, Syria and Libya against the G C C and the U S al l ies in the 
region. Th i s act ivated the G C C again. Saudi Arab ia ' s interior minister , N a y i f Ibn A b d e l A z i z , 
travel led to A d e n and conferred with the its deputy prime minister . In that m e e t i n g N a y i f o f f ered 
a major amount o f aid to P D R Y if it negot ia ted a p e a c e deal w i th Oman. P D R Y responded 
favourably by dec lara ing that it w o u l d particiapte in the proposed m e e t i n g wi th Omani 
representat ive in Kuwait in early July. 
On July 8, the t w o g o v e r n m e n t s s i g n e d a general agreement on out l ines o f a p e a c e treaty 
w h i c h w a s eventua l ly s igned on October 10. There , c o n s e q u e n t l y , f o l l o w e d the es tabl i shment 
o f not on ly d i p l o m a t i c relat ions b e t w e e n the P D R Y and O m a n but the c h a n c e s o f the creation 
o f an ant i -GCC polit ical and military a l l iance in the Arab region a lso d imin i shed . Th i s in all 
respect s w a s the most out s tand ing s u c c e s s o f the G C C as a p e a c e broker. 
A R A B - I S R A E L I CRISIS: 
H a v i n g b e c o m e pre -occup ied wi th the Iran-Iraq War s o o n after its incept ion , the G C C ' s 
did not pay e n o u g h attention to f ind a so lu t ion to the Arab-Israel i prob lem. T h e sol i tary 
e x c e p t i o n to this po l i cy w a s that the Counc i l s erved as a forum for de l iberat ion on the Fahad 
Plan, w h i c h wi th m o d i f i c a t i o n s b e c a m e the agreed Arab pos i t i on on the M i d d l e East Peace at 
1 9 8 2 F e z S u m m i t . 
T h e c h a n c e s of their p lay ing any meaningfu l role in se t t l ing the Arab-Israel i Issue w a s 
a l so d i m i n i s h e d by the Superpowers , more prec i se ly by the U S d e s i g n to e x c l u d e any other 
country from the M i d d l e East Peace proces s . The role the U S g a v e to the Oi l -r ich countr ies in 
its M i d d l e East Peace d i p l o m a c y w a s to act as "moderate Arab". H a v i n g eng ineered E g y p t ' s 
ous ter from the A r a b - f o l d for p l a y i n g this very role, the G C C states did not agree to cooperate 
w i th U S in the sa id role. But at the s a m e t ime, in order not to undermine their d e p e n d e n c e on 
the U S during the Iran -Iraq war, the G C C countr ies preferred to mainta in a l o w - p r o f i l e . 
T H E I N T R A - G C C DISPUTES: 
On this front, the G C C has b en re la t ive ly s u c c e s s f u l . A f t e r its format ion , there has 
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been s o m e progress in re so lv ing s o m e of the manyintra-state d i sputes w h i c h e luded se t t l ement 
for quite a long t i m e . T h e s e inc lude the S a u d i - O m a n agreement after the 1 9 9 0 G C C mee t ing to 
put the d ispute over Burami Island to rest. 
On a number o f o c c a s i o n the G C C just s t o p p e d a f e w d i sputes from get t ing translated 
into direct confrontat ion , such as the one b e t w e e n Qatar and Bahrain o v e r Hawar is land in 1986 . 
T i m e l y media t ion by Saudi Arabia eased the tens ion . A f t e r the format ion o f the GCC, the 
m e m b e r - c o u n t r i e s have a lso e x e r c i s e d restraint in not raking up the border d isputes in the 
interest o f the unity and integrity o f the organiusat ion . 
H o w e v e r , T h e number o f c o n f l i c t s the G C C has been able to r e s o l v e are f e w e r than what 
have yet not been addressed to. The G C C is found lack ing in taking up o n e i s sue after other 
u n l e s s these flare up. Its approach has been l imited to reduc ing the t ens ion b e t w e e n the 
c o n f r o n t i n g states and not e f f e c t i n g a permanent se t t l ement . Thus these d i sputes remain a 
s e r i o u s threat to the coopera t ion a m o n g the counc i l m e m b e r s . 
G C C A N D T H E O U T S I D E W O R L D 
G C C A N D T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S 
1) P O L I T I C A L A N D S E C U R I T Y C O O P E R A T I O N 
T h e G C C has only o f f i c i a l l y not been an integral part o f the U S Persian Gul f security and 
e c o n o m i c po l i c i e s . Otherwise , its d e p e n d e n c e on the U S for both e v o l v i n g a se l f -re l iant security 
s y s t e m and by banking on its intervent ion to thwart a c h a l l e n g e they are inapt to meet , point to 
the contrary. For this reason the G C C " can be descr ibed as an e x t e n s i o n o f the U S military 
i n v o l v e m e n t in the region rather than as an independent regional securi ty arrangement"(115) . 
E v e n the a b s e n c e of formal securi ty t ies b e t w e e n the t w o actors is the part and parcel o f their 
c o o p e r a t i o n . Both the U S and the G C C do not want to push their mi l i tary re la t ionsh ip to an 
extent w h i c h fue ls the very pol i t ical instabil i ty , w h i c h they both want to prevent at all cos t s . 
In the 8 0 s , both the U S and the G C C countr ies did not e s tab l i sh direct secur i ty l ink in 
order not to p r o v o k e Iran to attack the Arab countr ies o f the Pers ian Gul f or to e x p l o i t this in 
abet t ing internal d i s s e n s i o n there (116) . A n d if this arrangement did not work out the G C C 
leaders knew w e l l that f ighters and aircrafts aboard just one U S carrier in the Gul f waters w o u l d 
neutral ize any Iranian attack. 
Over the years the Un i t ed States and the G C C countr ies h a v e d e v e l o p e d a s y s t e m of 
secur i ty cooperat ion , accord ing to w h i c h the former w o u l d e n h a n c e the latter's abi l i ty to de fend 
t h e m s e l v e s , by arming them with sophis t icated w e a p o n s , by d e p l o y i n g a large naval force in the 
v i c in i ty o f these countr ies and bui ld ing air bases and other support fac i l i t i e s wi th a v i e w to 
d e p l o y i n g its forces quick ly . 
Reg iona l and extra regional threats necess i ta ted the G C C countr ie s to stay a w a y from 
es tab l i sh ing direct securi ty t ies wi th the U S and mainta in ing a covert a l l iance instead. During 
m u c h of the 80s , danger o f Iranian attack in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s pers i s ted . T h e threats from the 
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Soviet Union heightened due to its presence in Afghanistan and the renewal of the Cold War 
with West Asia being its main theater. Rusdsia's political and strategic clout over PDRY and 
the Countries of Horns of Africa was also percieved by the GCC states as potential threats. 
Increasing strategic and political importance of the Persian Gulf Arab countries coupled 
with the US' increasing capability to move the required troops and logistics to the region in the 
80s also facilitated a close GCC-US cooperation(117). Following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan the probability of Soviet expansion southward became an apparent threat because 
of which the region's oil assumed strategic importance despite its reduced share in the global 
supply. Consequently, the region became important for the US on two counts. First, for its 
(region's) protection from a Soviet advancement. Second, as the landmass to facilitate the 
logistic and other facilities to US naval maneuverings in the Arabian Sea. 
The Iranian revolution threatened the internal instability of the region which had 
becomeof vital interest for the US. In effect, the US did not conceal its concern for the security 
and stability of the countries, thereby clearly stating that it would militarily intervene in an 
inevitable situation. This commitment can best be ascertained from then American President 
Ronald Reagan's statement, "USA would not allow Saudi Arabia to become another Iran"( 118). 
So said American President, George Bush, after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To quote him "Saudi 
Arabia's independence is of vital Interest to the US"(119). So the US interests in the security 
and stability in the region had to be receprocated. In fact, the GCC-states capitalized this for 
building up their defense and clinching an informal deal that the US would come to their rescue 
when asked for. 
The only semblance of independence from the US the GCC states enjoy is, however, their 
ability to keep away the foreign forces from getting directly involved in the regional crisis unless 
approached. But this right coincides with the US policy to defer intervention so long its vital 
interests in the region are not directly threatened. 
During the Persian Gulf crisis, the GCC and the US practiced what they had unofficially 
agreed with during the 80s. The US intervention to liberate Kuwait and forestall Iraq from 
attacking Saudi Arabia resembled its committment to the NATO, which enjoys a formal security 
alliance with the US. It started in Saudi Arabia the largest military-build up since its involvement 
in Vietnam and went whole-hog in battering Iraq. During the crisis both the US and the GCC, 
particularly the former, mooted the idea of casting the GCC into NATO mould. On September 
4 , 1 9 9 0 , the then US Secretary of state, James Baker, indicated this in a testimony to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee while stating " we need to work together with governments in the 
Gulf... to build a more durable order. "A global alliance", he said, " long term security and 
stability in the Persian Gulf in a way that builds on the unprecedented international consensus 
that has already been formed" (120). 
The idea, however, later did not find much favor with both the GCC and the US, largely 
because the GCC feared that it would disrupt their newly established cordial relations with Iran. 
The US toorealised that a formal allaince would ignite political turbulence in the region. And 
yet there are bilateral security agreements between the US and Saudi Arabia and the US and 
Kuwait, which in a way amount to a formal security ties between them. 
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The two countries, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are becoming surrogate states of the US. 
The new elements added to the US-GCC security cooperation in the 1990s are an increased US 
naval presence, improvement in US ability to reinforce its armed forces contingents in the region 
quickly by propositioning heavy equipment and strengthening of the military prowess of the 
regional countries through arms supplies and training of the local armed forces. Thus the US 
is contemplating the emergence of a GCCsecurity system, with or without other Middle Eastern 
powers, Like Syria an3 Egypt, which improves the regional states' capability to take on a 
regional threat but also enhances the dependence of the GCC states for arms, spare parts and 
its naval forces on it. 
2) E C O N O M I C TIES: 
The 1980s witnessed a major decline in the GCC countries' oil exports to the West. But, 
the Oil exporting countries were more reliable sources to keep the US awashed with oil (121). 
Courting only them, particularly Saudi Arabia, the US could influence the oil policy of the whole 
OPEC, the biggest cartel of the oil supplier. Whatever little amount of oil was imported from 
the region it remained vital. For, the termination of the supplies would have increased the 
burden on the sources available with the non-GCC OPEC countries and those outside it, leading 
to an intense competition among the oil consuming states and increase in oil prices (122). 
The GCC countries' industrial development program served the US interests. The US is 
the largest investor in the region (123). Thedevelopment of the GCC common market boosted 
the US trade with the smaller states. 
However, the industrialization has introduced an element of unprecedented competitive-
ness in US-GCC economic relations. Exports of petrochemicals as well as other products from 
these countries have met with competitive pressure from EEC's, US' and Japanese petrochemi-
cal and other commodities producers. In the mid-1980s, the US, like Japan and the EEC, 
introduced several measures to protect its domestic market from unexpectedinflux of refined 
products from rthe Persian Gulf. The US pressurized the Congress to introduce projectionists 
legislation. Since for the production of petrochemicals the GCC countries have been dependent 
on their collaborators—the multinationals from the US and other West European countries — 
the US has used this helplessness of the Persian Gulf countries as an instrument to prevent the 
autonomous growth of the this industry in the region. 
As mentioned elsewhere in his chapter, the GCC countries "have publicly complained that 
the US has not given up its old policy of treating them as an unequal trade partner even in the 
changed circumstance. Another complaint against the US trade behavior is that its firms charge 
too high a price for their goods and services and that the US technology transfer is not according 
to their expectations and it smacks of a US design to slow down their economic progress in non-
oil sectors so as to prevent them from competing with the US in global market. 
The di •"'"erences over trade issues can take serious proportions after the GCC re-emerges 
as potential oil supplier to the US and its Western allies. The US then would need to increase 
its imports to the region to maintain favorable balance of trade. 
The compulsion to retain its imports to the region intact would also heighten in view of 
the US foreign exchange crunch. In a few years from now, it is estimated, it would require a 
foreign exchange of Over 100 b a year to finance its oil imports. 
However, the perceived US dependence on the Gulf oil shall give the GCC countries 
bargaining power. To the US they may offer to bring the oil prices down in exchange for 
technology transfer from it for their industrial development. 
3) C O O P E R A T I O N ON A R A B - I S R A E L I ISSUE: 
The GCC's and the US perceptions on the Arab-Israeli differ.However, after the Persian 
Gulf war they both extended support to the PLO-Israel accord on Palestinian autonomy. Unlike 
many other countries, like Iraq, Iran and Syria, who advocate an aggressive policy towards 
Israel, the GCC-states have favored a peaceful solution to the Palestinianproblem, leading to 
the establishment of an independent state of Palestine and existence of Israel within the borders 
as outlined in 1948 UN Partition Resolution. 
Yet, the GCC countries have been slightly less than the "moderate Arabs" which the US 
wanted them to be on the Middle East Peace issue. For they have out rightly rejected US wish 
to enter into diplomatic relations with Israel. Nor have they "constructively", from the US point 
of view, cooperated with the US in finding but a solution to this problem. So much so that these 
countries have complained to the US that it has been too soft on Israel. 
But, the divergent perceptions on the Palestine issue were not an irritant to their 
otherwise trouble-free realations. It seems that there existed an agreement between the two. 
The US refrained from using its clout on the GCC in pressurizing it to cooperate with or follow 
the American line of action. On their part, the GCC reciprocated by not bringing the differences 
to the center-stage of their relations with the US. 
They did not launch a tirade against America for its allegedly Pro-Israeli policy. Rather 
these countries have given a sympathetic hearing to American viewpoint at diplomatic levels 
even if as a matter of courtesy. They also, of course in order not to worsen their ties with the 
US on an extra regional issue, have virtually abdicated themselves from playing a high profile 
role in Arab-Israelidispute and instead pursued the policy of quiet diplomacy. They also seemed 
content with Washington cooperating closely with them on security political and economic 
issues despite maintaining special strategic relationship with Israel. They also feel that the US 
maintains close relations with Israel, which is their enemy only because of being a non-Arab and 
non-Islamic entity, and not with the GCC's real enemies.Also, they take solace in the fact that 
Israel happens to be situated not in the Persian Gulf region but rather on the Mediterranean side. 
The US has the last say. For more than the GCC influencing the US policy of Arab-Israeli 
issue it has been the other way round. The USA's leverage with the GCC countries after the 
Persian Gulf war would have influenced the latter's decision to welcome the August Accord 
when similar ones were in the past vehemently criticized by them. 
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Also, signed by the Chairman of the PLO, YAsser Arafat, and the leader of a community 
which supported their arch enemy Iraq in the Persian Gulf war, the GCC countries, it was very 
likely, could have out of enmity opposed the Autonomy plan and castigated Yasser Arafat as 
the traitor of the Arab cause. Only a greater interest than to defile the Palestinians , PLO and 
Yasser Arafat seems to have prompted them to fall back upon the US line on the Arab-Israeli 
Accord. 
It is premature to predict whether the US would now exercise its influence to normalize 
GCC-Israel relations so as to enhance its image of peace-maker in the region as well as the 
world. That the Arab people have not welcomed the accord is the major constraint before the 
US. It all depends upon whether the US considers its image-building a preferable choice over 
the perceived threat of the Arab people's backlash against their governments or not. Nothing 
at this moment can be predicted with authority as neither the US nor the GCC countries have 
spelled out their policies in this regard. 
G C C AND T H E SOVIET UNION : 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was an added 'irritant' in the relations between 
the Arab countries of Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union. The GCC countries were not merely 
bitter over the Soviet invasion of an Islamic country, as they officially pronounced, but also took 
it is as a threat to their own security. The Soviet Union alsodid not welcome the formation of 
the GCC dubbing it as a military alliance between the member-states and the US (124).TheSoviet 
Union also rejected the Gulf security project, which did not envisage a role for the US, placed 
by Kuwait on GCC's agenda to allay the Soviet fear. Meanwhile, The USSR continued 
publically supporting the national liberation movements in the Arab Peninsular region. 
But very soon they both realized the benefits of establishing cordial bilateral relations. 
Moscow's diplomatic efforts to reassure the governments in the Gulf that it had no intention 
to move forward or interfere in their internal affairs gradually minimised the spectre of the 
Soviet threat. The improvement of contacts in the 80s with the Soviet Union, which eventually 
led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the GCC countries and Moscow, was 
viewed 
by the GCC countries a better option that fitted well in their over all security scheme. 
Such a policy, opined the GCC governments, was poised to serve many of their interests. 
It could have lessened their dependence on the US, improved their chances to play one 
superpower against the other and in the process a greater maneuverability vis-a-vis the US, 
demonstrated a non-aligned position more pronounceably, and contained popular opposition to, 
the GCC-US link. 
The USSR's strategy was also moderated by increasing its influence among the GCC 
countries in order to counter the western influence and presence in the region. Threatened with 
the prospects that in an eventuality of direct confrontation with the US the airfields and the 
territorial waters of the GCC countries would be used as launching platform for an attack on 
it, the USSR realized the friendly relations with the former (GCC states) would restrained them 
from collaborating with the US in such situation. 
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Positive steps taken by the Soviet Union in first few years after the formation of the GCC 
were seen in slackening support to the PFLO after Oman and South Yemen signed a peace treaty 
in 1982 even though Oman was moving closer to the US by conducting military exercises with 
the latter. Moreover, Moscow embarked on a diplomatic campaign to convince Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf that it would be advantageous for them to establish 
relations with it. It continued modest commercial initiatives in the region, resumed sales of 
weapons to Iraq shortly after the war began, showed a disinterest in a clear cut Iranian victory, 
and refrained from voicing opposition on a high-profile scale to the US arms sales to the 
region(125). 
The Soviet Union also tried to make the most of US-GCC differences over the Arab-
Israeli dispute. The US commitment of marines to Beirut from September 1982 until February 
1984, which was criticised by the Persian Gulf countries as US support to Israeli aggression, 
provided such an opportunity. The USSR backed Arab countries of the Persian Gulf for 
assailing the US-backed agreement between Israel and Lebanon(126). Before Mikhail Gorbachev 
came to power in March 1985, the Soviet Union, despite quick successions at the apex of its 
body politicfollowing Breznev' Andropove's and Chernenko' death, did make some noticeable 
moves towards rapprochement with the GCC countries.These, beside taking advantage of the 
US-GCC differences over the solution to the Lebanon Crisis, included support to the GCC-
sponsored resolutions in the UN Security Council against Iranian attacks on the Persian Gulf 
ships and theoffer of arms, such as anti-air missiles to Kuwait. But America frustrated The 
USSR by promising to meet the Kuwaiti requirements. 
The GCC countries' response to the Soviet initiatives was reciprocal. Kuwait supported 
USSR's policy on Lebanon and its Iran-Iraq policy. It bought arms from it. Oman, UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia also, toned down their criticism of the Soviet Union's Persian Gulf policy. In the 
fall of 1984, contacts between Saudi and the UAE officials with their counterpart in the Moscow 
were reported. Surprisingly, by the end of 1984 the Gulf antagonism towards the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan also became muted. At the December 1984 OIC meeting Afghanistan 
was barely 
mentioned and the USSR's connection to it was not at all referred to. 
Oman in September 1985 and the UAE two months later established diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union. The Omani decision came as a surprise. It along with Saudi Arabia was 
the most vocal anti-Soviet state within the GCC. The same year official contacts between 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the USSR increased, with Bahrain even advocating the GCC 
members to reconsider their poor relations with the USSR. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided an impetus to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the USSR and Saudi Arabia and the USSR and Bahrain. It ought to be noted 
that both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia had hitherto evaded the issue of entering into diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union despite having normalized relations long ago and approved 
Oman's, the UAE's and Qatar's diplomatic ties with it in the mid 80s(127). 
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Cooling off of the Cold War, which until now prevented Saudi Arabia, mainly under 
American pressure, from establishingdiplomaticrelations with the USSR, along with the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and finally and most importantly Soviet opposition to its own 
ally's occupation of Kuwait(128) paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the USSR and Bahrain and USSR. 
Also, the Saudi decision to this effect, taken soon after Saud A1 Faisal's visit to Moscow 
in September 1990, aimed at isolating Iraq and driving a wedge between the two countries. 
Bahrain's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR was announced on Septem-
ber 28 in Washington during a meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers. The 
underlying factor behind Bahrain's decision was to balance its heavy reliance on the western 
powers in the Persian Gulf crisis(129). 
Undoubtedly, the Soviet-GCC relations kept on improving throughout the 80s and 
onward till the disintegration of the USSR. But they both failed to capitalise on congenial 
relations between them in realizing and accomplishing their respective objectives. The USSR 
could not do harm to any of the US interests in the region. It is hard to believe that the friendly 
ties with the USSR would have really mattered in denying the US strategic facilities in the 
eventuality of a US-USSR confrontation. Given their vulnerability to such a pressure from the 
US, the GCC countries would not have been been able to do so even if they wanted to. 
As regards the GCC countries, what they could gain from ending their political hostility 
towards the USSR was an ability to play one superpower against the other when annoyed with 
one of the two. Otherwise, the nature of relationship with the USSR in security political and 
economic matters hardly matched that with the US. In other words, this means that the 
GCC states failed to minimise their heavy dependecne on the US. 
GCC-IRAN RELATIONS: 
The Iranian revolution —particularly the attempt to export by urging the Sh'ie popula-
tion in the GCC countries to rise against their Sunni overlords—, and the Iran-Iraq war—which 
in the GCC countries' perception had the potential to spread over the entire region— 
determined the GCC-Iran relations in the 80s. 
From Iran's point of view the GCC states' unstinted support to Iraq in the war and their ^ 
role in bringing the US military forces in the region mainly to contain Teharan, impeded the 
chances of the establishment of normal relationship between the two. 
However, their mutual relationship was not always all that hostile.Behind the veneer of 
an apparent and extremely antagonistic relations,there existed an understanding not to worsen 
the relations to the point of military confrontation. To offset their logistic and financial support 
to Iraq and to see that it did not provoke Iran to regard them as a party to the war, the member-
states of the GCC made conciliatory moves towards Tehran. 
Though limited in scope this move often included the holding of official level contacts 
with Iran, maintaining a modest economic relation with that country and refraining from 
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resorting to military means to deter Iranian attack on the Gulf ships (130). Moreover, the Iraqi 
reverses on the war front, increased their fear of an Iranian backlash, which compeleld them to 
adopt a policy that neither of the two belligerents should win the war. 
Iran's threat to declare war against the Arab Gulf countries during the Iran-Iraq war was 
conditional to the latter's direct particiaption in the war from the Iraqi side. The Iranian 
government also balanced its policy of deterrence by reassuring the Arab states through official 
statements that it had no designs against the GCC states. Instead, it was eager to establish a 
realtionship with these countris based on "friendship cooperation and co-existence". 
The Smaller Gulf states were inclined toward normalizing relations with Iran, for they 
found themselves in a disadvantageous posotion in case the war spread over. Qatar resented 
Saudi and Iraqi pressure to severe its contacts with Iran and maintained a semblance of good 
relations before and after the attempted September -October 1982 Coup, allegedly as an Iran-
backed plot to destablize Al-Thani rule. 
Bahrain's relations v/ith Iran strained after the abortive Coup which the pro-Iran forces 
attempted in December 1981. But in August 1982, after about eight months of that event, 
Bahrain reestablished diplomatic relations with Iran. 
The UAE maintained a very good relations with Tehran all through the Iran-Iraq war 
period. It adopted a "true neutrality" and urged the other members of the GCC to be soft on 
Iran. 
After the Iran-Iraq war, the biggest impediment to the normalization of Iran-GCC 
relations was removed. Iranian foreign minister All Akber vilayet was instructed to attract 
friends for Iran in the Persian Gulf region and avoid any policy that will isolate the country. 
The death of Imam Khomeini and Rafsanjani's ascendance to power brought about a 
notable change in Iran's foreign policy which aimed at ending Iran's international Isolation. The 
new government finally abandoned Iran's policy of exporting its revolution to the Arab nations 
and took the end of the war as an opportunity to shun previous hostility towards Persian Gulf 
neighbours. The Arab countries welcomed Iran's acceptance of resolution 598 and conveyed 
to Iran that the event had thrown up an opportunity to usher in a new era of cooperation. 
The Persian Gulf crisis established a thaw in Iran-GCC relations. Improvement of 
relations with Iran was most crucial objective in the Arab Gulf countries' bid to isolate Iraq 
internationally as then Iraq was making unprecedented moves to court Iran by capitalizing on 
Iran's enmity with the US and its opposiiton to the presence of foreign forces in the region. Iraq 
went to the extent of conceding the Shatt eastuary to Iran for which it ostensibly had fought an 
eight Year war. The GCC tried to match this with by inviting Iranian foreign minister Vilayet! 
to Qatar just before the start of Doha summit in December 1990. And the Iranian Ambassador 
to Qatar, Syed Mirzai, was invited to attend a session of the summit. Indications were given 
that Iran would be included in a comprehensive Gulf security system along with Egypt, Pakistan 
and 
Syria. 
Iran expressed its disappointment to invitation to foreign forces by the Gulf Emirates but 
neither did it criticize them nor did it refuse to cooperate with them in the Gulf crisis. Iranian 
assurance to the GCC countries that it would not defy UN sanctions against Iraq came as a 
greater relief even though they regretted Iran's refusal to take part in multi-forces operation 
against Iraq. While opposing the presence of Foreign forces in the region Iran agreed to be the 
part of any Persian Gulf politico-military -security system which excluded the US. 
However, the goodwill created in Iran-GCC relations during the Persian Gulf crisis has, 
as expected even during those days, did not resulted in the establishment of perfect ties between 
these sides. Desperate to see that Iran remained neutral in the war, the GCC countries went all 
out to accommodate it. But after the end of the crisis they weighed the pros and cons of Iranian 
inclusion in the Gulf security arrangement and found that a direct Iranian role in any Gulf 
security system would be disadvantageous. The fear that the US would not allow this to happen 
and might severe the security ties with them if this really takes place is the single most important 
factor behind this. Then there is an added fear that any such security system would be dominated 
by Iran. Saudi Arabia would not like this prospect and the smaller states do not relish the idea 
of being placed under dual-domination, of Iran as well as of Saudi Arabia. Thus in Damascus 
summit the question of including Iran in the proposed security system was indeed discussed but 
it met with strong opposition from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar(131). 
For Iran, the Gulf crisis ended its diplomatic isolation in the regioneven though it failed 
to earn a place for itself in the new security arrangernent. This meant that Iran failed to make 
a major breakthrough in the region in connection with its grand objective to outmaneuver the 
United States in the region and to emerge as a regional power after the Iraqi defeat and in the 
wake of Saudi Arabia's inability to become an independent and strong military force in the 
region. 
G C C A N D IRAQ: 
Iraq was excluded by fellow Arabs when the latter formed he GCC although its rationale 
lies in Pan-Arabism. The relations between Iraq and Arab Peninsula states at the eve of the 
GCC's formation were by all accounts 'friendly', as reflected in their cooperation in ousting 
Egypt from the Arab-fold, common concern at the threats from Iranian revolution and Saddam 
Hussein's consultation with Gulf Emirates on his plan to attack Iran. 
But good relations with Iraq caused the GCC fear that the inclusion of Iraq would expose 
the council as a military alliance against Iran. Whereas, Iran had already warned to launch air 
strikes against Arab Gulf states if they helped Iraq in the war. Beside, despite the existing 
goodwill the would be member states were apprehensive of regional ambitions of Iraq. Hence 
Iraq's inclusion in the council would have prepared a ground for Iraq for fulfilling such 
ambitions. 
However, Iraqi exclusion from the organization did not hamper its existing friendly 
relations with the GCC states. Instead, the war gradually gave an impetus to, and strengthened, 
such ties. So long a swift and single-handed Iraqi victory seemed in the sight and the threat form 
Iranian revolution remained imminent the Arab countries of the Gulf supported Iraq in the war. 
185 
Following Iraqi reverses during March-May 1982 in the war, the GCC states became 
more outright in their support to Iraq by providing it logistic and financial support. In adopting 
this policy they knew that they would become more exposed to an Iranian attack but they also 
knew that an Iranian victory in the war would render them more vulnerable either to an Iranian 
attack or to an internal rebellion backed by Teharan. To meet this paradoxical situation the Gulf 
states resorted to a policy of continuing support to Iraq and at the same time balancing it by 
projecting themselves as arbiter of peace in the Iran-Iraq war. 
Both before and after its reverses in the war Iraq moved closer to the GCC by making 
the Arab affinity as its basis so that the Gulf assistance kept on coming. The most noticeable 
change in Iraqi behavior towards the GCC countries was the abandonment of its radicalism 
against these states. The long-heard Bathist polemics calling for the overthrow of reactionary 
Arab governments, describing the Arab states as stooges of Imperialism and aspiring for the 
unification of the Arab World under Baathist banner seemed to have become a forgotten history. 
However, Iraqi government lacked an understanding of the GCC's predicament for 
adopting 'neutrality' and refraining from expressing their solidarity with Iraq publicly. Saddam 
Hussein expressed anguish over these countries' ambivalent approach towards Iraq even 
though "Iraq had thrown up a barrier before Iranian expansion in the Arab world in general and 
the Gulf in particular"(132). Otherwise, Iran would haveoccupied the whole Peninsula, Saddam 
Hussein warned the fellow Arab countries. 
The 10 year-old honeymoon between Iraq and the GCC countries came to an abrupt end 
with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Though relations had begun worsening two months before 
the Iraqi demand that Kuwait and SaudiArabia should waive off Iraqi debt in recognition of its 
services in defending them from Iran, Saudis appeared to be willing to meet this demand after 
intial hesitations. Kuwait, however, was adament and refused to oblige Baghdad. 
At a later stage, Kuwait agreed only to forego a paltry sum from the total amount due 
on Iraq. Following this Iraq accused Kuwait and the UAE for illegally extracting oil from Iraqi 
oilfields and deliberately over-producing oil to keep the OPEC oil-prices low which resulted in 
Iraq's inability to generate the required for recovering from economic losses it suffered during 
a war fought to defend the Arabian peninsula. The GCC countries simply failed to foresee the 
serious proportions the controversy could assume. They regarded it as a tactical pressure on 
them to hike the prices. They, therefore, tried to settle the issue at OPEC forum by closely 
conceding to Iraqi demand for posting the oil prices to $ 25 per barrel. At the end of the OPEC 
summit, wherein the agreed price was determined as $ 21 per barrel, at Geneva the GCC states 
had thought that the crisis was over (133) with the UAE president going to an extent of saying 
that the OPEC summit was a great success. 
Still counting on their support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, they did not expect 
anything untoward from the latter. The GCC countries failed to take note of the Iraqi leader's 
grievances that their support was not in proportion to the services Iraq had rendered in shielding 
the Arab peninsular countries from Iran by shedding " rivers of blood". 
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However, the GCC, unlike its approacli during the previous months, reacted against 
Iraqi invasion sharply; by not only denouncing Iraq but also adopting a tough posture on 
peaceful solution to the crisis. They refused to negotiate with Iraq unless it withdrew from 
Kuwait unconditionally. They also stepped aside the regional organizations —Arab league and 
the GCC— in seeking a pacific solution to end the crisis. They instead saw to it that such 
organizations, regional or international, support the UN's recommendations for ending the 
crisis. 
Their approach was virtually militant. In part due to US pressureand in part due to fear 
of a follow-up action by Iraq against Saudi Arabia and other smaller countries they hurried in 
inviting US forces on their soil to pressurize Iraq to retreat and if this failed then wage a war. 
This reflects in the following text of the speech given by King Fahad at Doha Summit (December 
22-24) 
"Brothers we have not made decision regarding a peace 
or war, but we have made a decision regarding the 
return of Kuwait if peace is possible or by war if 
there is no option but war.... we have not 
been afraid, hesitant, cowardly or languid (134)". 
There has appeared no moderation in the GCC's tough stance after about three years of 
the end of the Gulf crisis. Concerned more than the US with remaining military might of Iraq 
as it is still more than a match for them, the GCC countries have wholeheartedly supported the 
Post Gulf war UN resolutions for the destruction of Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons, the 
continuing of embargo, the US military actions in Iraq and its policies first to remove Saddam 
and then to limit his rule by creating 'No War Zones', south and north of Iraq. 
Iraq's approach to the GCC was no less militant. It renewed Bathist slogans of the 70s, 
now disguised in Islamic ideology, by calling Arab people touproot the monarchies, declining 
to withdraw from Kuwait and respondingto the GCC's move to force its withdrawal from 
Kuwait by taking such actions as annexing Kuwait and declaring it the 17th province of the 
country.During the war its army captured a Saudi port Al-Khafzi and launched Scud missile 
attacks on Dehran. 
After the end of the war Iraqi Defiance continues. Kuwait is still shown as Iraqi territory 
in that country's map. Iraq has rejected UN demarcation of its borders with Kuwait by virtue 
of which the Port of Umm-E-Qasar has been transferred to the former. And it has frequently 
made incursions into Kuwaiti territory. 
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CHAPTER V 
T H E PERSIAN G U L F CRISIS 
No other conflict between the two Third World countries in the recent history proved a catalyst 
for wide-ranging changes on international politics as did the Persian Gulf crisis, caused by Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. So much so, that it eclipsed the political and economic 
implications of two other contemporary historical events— the end of the cold war and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Interestingly, in its nature, the crisis mirrored one of the numerous cases of invasions 
which have occurred from time to time in the post-Second World War era. However, the region 
of its origin, the countries involved in it, the countries it affected, turned it into an international 
war, fought between Iraq and the US-led global coalition of some 32 countries of the world. 
\ 
A detailed and analytical account of the events that unfolded between August 2, 1990 
and February 25, 1991, will be in order here. 
EVENTS PRECEDING T H E IjRAQI INVASION 
The stage for the Iraqi invasion was set on July 17 ,1990 , when in a public speech on the 
anniversary of 1958 and 1968 Baathist revolutions, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein accused 
some of the Persian Gulf regimes of being involved in an "imperialist -Zionist" conspiracy to 
cut off Iraq's livelihood by not keeping the oil prices abysmally low through over production, 
without any economic justification and against the interest of the OPEC as well as the Arab 
nations. He also complained that the Arab nations were working against the interests of Iraq 
instead of rewarding it for having protected them from Iran by fighting an eight-year war with 
it. He warned the Arab nations of Iraq's retaliation to remedy the situation. To quote from his 
speech: 
"If words can not provide its people with protection then, 
actions will have to be taken to restore matters to their 
normal course and regain the rights which have been 
usurped". 
Saddam's speech had three distinct components, which marked a deviation in Iraq's 
policy towards the Arab neighbors. First, the US was involved in a conspiracy against Iraq. 
Second, the neighboring Arab rulers had launched an economic war against Iraq. Third, Iraq 
could resort to the use of force to discipline the Arab regimes gulity of over-production. 
The next day, Iraq called the accused countries by the names. In a formal letter to the 
Arab League on July 18, 1990, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, accused Kuwait and the 
UAE of causing a crash in oil prices. Kuwait was described as the main culprit. "As far as the 
Kuwaiti government is concerned, its attack on Iraq is double one. On the one hand, Kuwait 
is attacking Iraq and encroaching 
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upon our territory, oil fields and stealing our national wealth, such an action is tantamount to 
military aggression. On the other hand the government of Kuwait is determined to cause the 
collapse of Iraqi economy during this period when it is confronting the vicious imperialist-
Zionist threat, which is an aggression no less serious than the military aggression", the letter 
read. 
The letter also complained that Kuwait had erected oil installations on the southern part 
of Iraq's Rumailah oil field and had produced oil from it to the tune of $ 2.4 billion. The letter 
demanded that Iraq be paid by the Kuwaiti government an amount equal to the oil stolen by it 
and compensation for the damages the Iraqi economy had suffered due to the downfall in the 
.oil prices. 
The Kuwaiti government responded by mobilizing regional support against Iraq. It sent 
a troika of ministers to the Gulf Cooperation Council on the same day. The next day i.e. July 
19, 1990, in a letter to the Arab League Secretary General, the Kuwaiti government denied as 
"falsification of facts" the Iraqi accusation of having encroached on the Iraqi lands. The letter 
also asserted that Kuwait had all the rights to pump oil from the southern Rumailah field as it 
constituted the part of Kuwaiti territory. "Hence Kuwait has produced oil from the wells within 
its territory, south of the Arab League liner and far away from the international borders to 
conform with international standards", read the Kuwaiti letter. 
In another letter sent to the UN Secretary General, Perez De Culler, on July 19, 1990, 
the Kuwaiti government accused Iraq of threatening it. The Kuwaiti move infuriated the Iraqi 
government which subsequently sharpened its diatribe against Kuwait, criticizing it for 
internationalizing a bilateral issue on the US dictates. Kuwait denied this charge, asking Iraq 
to settle this disputes through Arab League's mediation. 
On July 23, 1990, the US satellite Intelligence reported that Iraq had moved about 
30,000 troops to Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. Around this time, the US clarified its stand on the 
controversy with the State Department spokeswoman stating that " the US was determined to 
defend the principle of freedom of navigation and to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait 
of Hurmuz". The US also made it clear that it would defend its interests in the Persian Gulf 
region and use force if needed. The US also held a hastily arranged military exercises with the 
UAE's armed forces. 
The Arab League at this stage was inactive. However, the Egyptian President, Hosni 
Mubarak, visited Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia on July 24, 1990 to defuse the tension and 
succeeded in arranging a meeting between Iraq and Kuwait on July 28-29 in Jeddah. Then 
followed the two-day (July 26-27) OPEC ministerial meeting in Geneva. The decisions taken 
at the meeting redressed many of Iraqi grievances. It decided inter alai that : 
- The minimum reference price for the OPEC crude basket is set 
at $ 21 per barrel. 
- The ceiling for OPEC crude oil production for the second half 
of the 1990 is set at 22.49 million barrels daily. This 
compares with the previous 22.086 million barrel per day. 
- The production quotas for all the 12 members remain 
unchanged the only adjustment being the UAE whose quota 
is raised from 1.095 million barrel per day to 1.5 million 
barrel per day. It is also specified that production form the 
neutral zone is included in the ceiling and quotas of Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 
- The monitoring committee consisted of the Heads of the Delegation 
of all member countries who will monitor production and supply of 
oil by all member countries(l). 
Iraq which had advocated for fixing the price at $ 25 pb in the OPEC summit, however, 
accepted the decision of the price being at $ 21 pb. The Iraqi Oil Minister, Islam-Al-Chalabi, 
said in an interview with the Middle East Economic Survey, "We never said that the price of 
$ 25 pb can be achieved today—to make a jump from $ 14 pb. Of course, it can not be achieved. 
This ( $ 21) represents a very good and positive start towards attaining a price of $ 25pb and 
may be more (2)". 
Meanwhile, the Iraq-Kuwait meeting which was scheduled to be held on July 28-29 was 
postponed to July 31. It is said that the period saved was utilized by the two sides to come to 
some broad understanding before the summit. Saudi Arabia, the PLO and Jordan mediated to 
settle the issue. 
The meeting was held on the rescheduled date. But, it could not prove fruitful as Iraq 
refused to agree to Kuwait's partial acceptance of its demands made at the Summit. Iraq 
demanded the ceding of the southern part of the Rumailah oil field. This was rejected by Kuwait. 
In response to Iraqi demand for $ 2.4 billion as compensation for the oil extracted by it from 
the Rumailha oil field, Kuwait reportedly agreed to pay about half of that amount, 1 billion. 
Kuwait also agreed to write off Iraqi debts and pay additional financial compensation for oil 
market losses during Iraq's war with Iran, provided Iraq agreed to sign a favorable border 
treaty. 
Pre-war developments point to the fact that these did not lead to war(3). Rather, these 
precipitated the matter to creating a ground for Iraq to invade Kuwait. First, Iraqi relations with 
Kuwait and other Arab countries of the region were not strained to have warranted all of a 
sudden a hard-hitting speech from Saddam Hussein on July 17, 1990. Second, Iraq threatened 
to use force from as early as it raised the controversy. The issues like alleged extraction of oil 
by Kuwait from Iraqi sites and Arab countries' designs to stall Iraq's economic progress could, 
in normal circumstances, have created strains in the relations at political and diplomatic levels 
than warranting an invasion. This is further substantiated by the fact that in the July 27-28 OPEC 
summit most of the Iraqi demands were met yet it invaded Kuwait within five days of the 
concluding of the summit. Last but not the least, the reported conversations between Saddam 
Hussein and the US ambassador to Iraq, during which the latter assured Iraq that the US did 
not want to intervene in a regional affair, must have emboldened Iraq to attack Kuwait(5). 
CAUSES OF T H E CRISIS 
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The alleged Kuwaiti encroachment, the petroleum quota question and the debt issue 
did not figure among Iraq's alibis of invading Kuwait. Instead, Iraq Justified this act by 
describing it as a response to an appeal by Kuwaiti revolutionaries to assist them after they had 
ousted the Al-Sabah family and installed an interim government (6). But this excuse can not be 
taken seriously by any stretch of imagination(7). This was only a ploy to attract the support of 
anti-monarchical elements in the Persian Gulf region and a bid to shroud its violations of 
Kuwaiti 
sovereignty by Iraq. 
The objectives that actually prompted Iraq to invade Kuwait were, of course, the need 
of revitalizing its economy, establishing control over the strategic islands of Bubiyan and 
Warbah and turning itself into the strongest regional power. 
IRAQ'S D E T E R I O R A T I N G E C O N O M Y : 
The most plausible reason behind Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the uncontrolled and 
deteriorating economy of Iraq. However one must not tend to believe that the invasion of 
Kuwait was the last option to Iraq to overcome its economic problems. Iraq could have ward 
off the economic pressures by trimming its costly military program and by tightening its belt. 
In addition, the Kuwaiti government's offer to pay $ 1 billion in compensation to Iraq the raising 
of oil prices to $ 21 pb by the OPEC could have put the Iraqi economy back on track (8). 
But, this way the revitalization of Iraqi economy was bound to be a long drawn out affair. 
Annexation of Kuwait, on the other hand, was seen as quicker-fix for the all economic ills. Sharp 
increase in oil prices, resulting from the chaos accompanying the annexation, and the huge 
wealth of Kuwait, including its 100 billion foreign assets, could have reversed the downslide 
in Iraqi economy in one stroke (9). After annexing Kuwait, Iraq was destined to become the 
swing producer, replacing Saudi Arabia. With an additional quota of 4.6 million barrels per day, 
Iraq could have cleared its financial obligations as well as used the new oil wealth to maintain 
a huge standing army of one million and devoted a large amount from it to the chemical and 
nuclear weaponsdevelopment program. 
At the end of its war with Iran, Iraq was faced with serious economic crisis. Its external 
debt stood at $ 60 to 80 billion ( 10). The neighboring Arab powers, who had provided Iraq 
financial aid to the tune of the $ 500 million a month during the war, had no interests left in 
helping Iraq out during the peace time. 
The eight-year war with Iran had created an acute resource-crunch. The reconstruction 
and the rehabilitation program had come to a standstill. Due to the neglect of non-oil sectors 
during the war, the Iraqi economy was heavily dependent on income from oil which constituted 
90 percent of the governmental,revenue. As a result, there began appearing a yawning gap 
between the government's earnings, which was estimated $ 17.12 billion annually with Iraq 
exporting 2. 7 to 2.8 million barrel oil per day at the price of $ 18 pb, and its expenditure, which 
was estimated $ 56. 1 billion in 1990. This is what prompted Iraq to lobby for the opting of oil 
price near the $ 25 pb mark. Iraqi official sources estimated that the decline of single dolor in 
oil price meant a loss of $ 1 billion annually to the country. During 1981-90, according to Iraqi 
sources, the country had lost $ 89 billion on account of the decline in the oil prices. 
The agriculture sector suffered badly during the war. In consequence, Iraq turned into 
a net importer of food at a time when its purchasing power had declined steeply. The policy of 
encouraging private sector did not make any significant breakthrough. Instead, it led to about 
25 percent rise in prices of goods due to the declining imports. Political compulsions also added 
to Iraq's economic woes, as says Pant Grijesh "Political imperatives of peace not only forced 
the Iraqiregime to mobilize finance but also undertake the task of rehabilitation and the 
reconstruction" (11). With politcal liberalization being a dangerous proposition to garner 
political legitimacy, the Iraqi government did not have any other alternative to acquire the same 
except keeping the people economically satisfied. The invasion of Kuwait was both the only 
political instrument to win popular solidarity and a short-cut to bring Iraq back to the economic 
prosperity. 
T H E L E A D E R S H I P URGE: 
Since the exit of Egypt from the Arab camp, Iraq had put forward itself as the candidate 
for the leadership of the Arab world. Because of a number of political reasons, mainly the Syrian 
resistance and the Saudi Arabia's reluctance, Iraqi move went largely unwelcome. The Iran-Iraq 
war hindered this process further. But, at the same time, the war turned Iraq into the region's 
most militarily powerful country blessed with a huge arsenal and a large, battle hardened, well-
trained and well-equipped armed forces. Learning from the past experience, both before and 
during the Iran-Iraq war, that the Arab countries would not invite it to take the mantle of the 
leadership, Iraq, decided to impose it on them. This explains the sudden and unexpected change 
in Iraq's attitude towards the oil-rich countries, which had stood by it during the Iran-Iraq 
war(12). The strategy of Saddam Hussein was that if he could add to Iraqi military prowess the 
control over the greater part of the petroleum wealth of the Arab world he would be able to 
become the arbiter in one of the most important Geo-strategic regions of the world. 
It can not be ruled out that Saddam would have dreamt of emerging as a sort of 
superpower. With the Soviet Union on the course of decline and the Eastern bloc having already 
collapsed, the Muslim bloc could on the basis of its numerical strength and its petroleum wealth 
qualify as the potential rival to the mighty US and the country leading it would have 
automatically become the USSR's successor. Taking all these factors into account, it is easier 
to understand Saddam's obliviousness from the possible reaction to his action, his arrogance, 
his self-confidence, his faith in his messianic role and his opposition to a peaceful end to the 
crisis (13). 
« * > 
A few more factors influenced Saddam's decision to use force to realize his leadership 
urge. Saddam's regime calculated that Arabpeople would, by and large, not regret the removal 
of Sabah family from the power. The Iraqi government thought that its move would be 
considered at home and elsewhere in the Arab world, as aright step towards rectifying a 
historical injustice done to Iraq by the British colonialists. 
The international environment was undergoing a change. Moscow had almost neglected 
the Persian Gulf region as its attention was diverted to the pressing ethnic and economic 
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problems back home. Washington was involved in the restructuring of the East Europe and the 
Soviet Union. With the end of the superpowers confrontation, the field was left for indigenous 
nationalist leaders, like Saddam Hussein, to pursue their parochial interests(14). Thus Saddam 
assumed that in the changing international scenario the US would accept his move as a fait 
accompli. 
Iran's humiliation in its war with Iraq and the gradual withdrawal of European and 
American naval forces from the Persian Gulf in 1988-89 had created a vacuum in the Persian 
Gulf region. Saddam Hussein's public warning to Israel and the neighboring Arab countries 
were downplayed as rhetoric. The Arab leaders sided with Iraq when it threatened that if Israel 
attacked Iraq it would "incinerate half of Israer'( 15) The Arabs were of the view that the Iraqi 
threat was provoked by fears that Israel might attack sites in Iraq where nuclear facilities were 
presumed to be in the process of construction. 
Iraq did not fear retaliation from Arab countries. Egypt, the only country which matched 
Iraq's military strength, was considered a friendly power as it was the co-member of Arab 
Cooperation Council.There were over one million Egyptians employed in Iraq who sent 
remittances home. In addition, Egypt had not sent unit size military forces abroad since its 
involvement in the disastrous Yemeni civil war during 1962-67. 
Syria was bogged down in the Lebanon. Saudi Arabia looked docile as despite being 
disturbed by the formation of the ACC, it signed the pact of non-aggression with Iraq and 
Kuwait and had offered Iraq to sign a similar pact. No Persian Gulf country could single 
handedly take on Iraq and the combined defense of the GCC was a 'non-entity' in comparision 
to the Iraqi military prowess. Given the popular Arab mood against the US intervention in the 
regional affairs the Arab Gulf countries would, Sadaam Hussien calculated, not ask for foreign 
help in case he invaded Kuwait. Over and above, the Saddam regime could also count on total 
support from its people who had backed Iraq on the question of its claim on Kuwait from the 
days of 
the Hashmite monarchy. 
T E R R I T O R I A L EXPANSION: 
To Iraq, Kuwait has been a strategic prize. The Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan are 
crucial for Iraq to widen its 15-mile long narrow access to the Persian Gulf waters. And the 
whole Kuwaiti territoryprovides connection to Iraq and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf 
through land, in the absence of which Iraq has been clubbed with either the Fertile Crescent 
countries or with Iran that is on the other side of the Persian Gulf. 
Iraq's historical claims over the Kuwait are unjustified. The Turkish empire of which Iraq 
is said to be the successor state recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty in Anglo-Ottoman Draft 
convention on the Persian Gulf Area in 1913. According to this convention, the islands, Bubiyan 
Warbah and Falaka, were described as the part of Kuwaiti territory. On July 21, 1961, Kuwait 
was admitted as a sovereign country to the Arab League of which Iraq was also the member. 
On October 4, 1963, the Iraqi government formally announced its recognition of Kuwait (16). 
Even Saddam Hussein's claim that the British power had forcibly carved Kuwait out of the 
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territory of Basra 'Vilayet' of Ottoman empire does not sound logical in view of the facts that 
as his government as well as the preceding ones recognized Kuwait as sovereign state and 
entered into diplomatic relations with that country(17). 
Beside this, the historical claims in the Persian Gulf can not be regarded genuine due to 
overlapping territorial changes there. Saddam Hussein's claims are not different in nature to 
Jewish claims over Palestine. Moreover, going by Saddam Hussein's logic Iraq itself becomes 
the part of Turkey, which claims itself to be the successor state of Ottoman empire. Both Syria 
and Lebanon can legitimately claim Palestine as it was also the part of the vilayet of Damascus 
and Beirut under Ottoman empire. And Saddam could have extended Iraq"s historical claim 
over entire Arabian peninsula as it constituted the part of 'Hasa'region, which was used to be 
administrated from Basra by the Ottomans(18). 
RESPONSES TO T H E G U L F CRISIS /WAR 
T H E A R A B G U L F COUNTRIES' RESPONSE: 
The Arab Gulf countries were shocked and dismayed at the turn of the events. The 
invasion of Kuwait looked to them a prelude to similar exercises against the rest of them. Their 
response to the crisis was, therefore, that of total solidarity with Kuwait and unanimous 
condemnation of Iraq. In the beginning, these countries sought a peaceful solution to the crisis 
leading to the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwaiti territory. But, faced with the specter of expansion 
of Iraqi invasion, which, they knew, they could not revert even jointly(19), the GCC countries, 
in a total volte face to their previous policy, invited the American troops to intervene. 
Interestingly, the six-point statement which was adopted on Aug. 3 at the Ministerial 
Council meeting of the Arab League in Cairo after 36 hours of discussion, rejected any foreign 
intervention in Arab affairs. But the GCC's Ministerial Council meeting, which was held the 
same day and at the same venue, was an exception to the Arab League's resolution. The 
communique issued at the end of the GCC Ministerial Council summit emphasized that any 
collective UN action would not amount to foreign intervention. It was an indication that 
eventually foreign help would be sought. 
At this time Saudi Arabia, along with the US, tried to impress that Iraq was planning to 
attack it (20). The US Secretary of Defense, Richard E. Chenny, visited Saudi Arabia on August 
3. It is also reported that Saudi Arabia on August 6 invited "friendly countries" to help other 
regional countries in protecting their sovereignty. At the Arab Summit meeting, which was also 
held at Cairo, on August 10, the invitation to foreign forces was recommended. 
Though initially an impression was given that the US forces were in Saudi Arabia to 
defend that country and not to take any military action against Iraq, on November 5, when King 
Fahad and James Baker met, Saudi Arabia conceded to the US pressure to give it the permission 
to launch an attack against Iraq when and if the need arose. Saudi Arabia, in return, secured the 
right to jointly command an attack inside Iraq. The veto power on allied attack against Iraq also 
rested with Saudi Arabia. It is reported that Saudi Arabia had invited the American forces within 
a few hours after the Iraqi invasion. 
The Arab Gulf countries' decision could spell dangers for the ruling regimes, more so 
for Saudi Arabia (which houses the holiest of Islamic shrines), as the presence of "unbelievers" 
on 
Saudi soil was always held as a mark of disrespect. The Islamic fundamentalists and the royal 
puritan family did not at first approve the move. The Saudi government tried to assuage people's 
resentment and that of the religious elements by stating that the foreign forces were not gathered 
to carry out any military operation and would be leaving as soon as the Iraqi danger disappeared. 
Even when war between an Arab power—Iraq— and the US became imminent the Arab 
governments proclaimed in order to pacify Arab peoples' irethat their participation in the force 
was to liberate Kuwait and not to attack Iraq (21). As the war approached nearer, more than 
the Iraqi invasion Saddam's resistance to the US became important for the general Arab public. 
As a rsult, they began supporting Saddam Hussein.Their was also a proportionate increase in 
Arabs'disliking of the US as they perceived its resolve to destroy Iraq as the part of its post-
cold war strategy to establish its hegemony in the entire Arab 
world (22). 
On the foreign policy front, another perceptible change in the policy of the Arab 
countries of the Persian Gulf was the placating of .Iran. Common perception of Iraqi threat 
brought the two sides to express similar concerns. Both viewed that after annexing Kuwait, Iraq 
will have a long coastline and would become a naval power. They also thought that Iraqi control 
of a large oil reserves would greatly disturb the regional balance of power. Thus both the sides 
condemned Iraqi invasion. Iran criticized the US presence in the region and was apprehensive 
of the shift of the balance of power in the region in favor of Saudi Arabia, yet instead of Saudi 
Arabia it criticized Iraq for being responsible for US presence in the region (23). In fact, the 
Iranian opposition to the foreign presence was toned down . The Iranian president, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, said, at a Friday sermon in Tehran, " we have no objection to them obstructing 
aggression. However, it would have been better if the regional countries would have done not 
so" (24). The Kuwaiti foreign Minister paid a visit to Tehran where he expressed regrets over 
the "past mistakes" of his countrytowards Iran. A host of dignitaries from the GCC visited Iran. 
On September 29, the GCC foreign ministers met the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ail Akbar 
Vilayti, at the Iranian off ice at the UN headquarters in New York, 
At the December 24-25 GCC Summit at Doha, Iranian ambassador to Qatar was invited 
as observer. The Joint Communique, issued after the meet read "the Council w e l c o m e s the 
Islamic Republic of Iran's desire to enhance and develop its relations with the GCC countries. 
It reaffirmsthe importance of working seriously and realistically to solve differences between 
Iran and the member-states so that the area is able to invest its resources in an over all economic 
development. The council conHrms its desire to establish relations with Iran based on good 
neighborliness, non-interference in internal affairs and respect of sovereignty and peaceful co-
existence." At a press conference in Doha, the Qatari foreign minister indicated that Iran could 
be involved in a regional security system. Similar indications came from the Secretary General 
of the GCC, Abdulla Bishara, who said that there were some countries interested in cooperating 
with the GCC in regional security and stability and they by virtue of their geographical position 
would have an important role to play in any such system. 
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The GCC countries' gestures overwhelmed Iran. Its foreign minister,Ali Akbar Vilayeti, 
proposed seven-member GCC sessions( 25). However, the GCC states were not prepared to go 
to that extent as they did not want to annoy the US. Also Iranian induction into the GCC carried 
the fear that this body would be dominated by Iran given its geo-political and geo-strategic 
preponderance in the region(26). 
Once it became clear that Iraq would not withdraw from Kuwait through persuasion, the 
GCC countries came all out in favor of the use of force agaisnt it. They had the genuine fear 
that if Iraq was not severely punished the rest of them would also fall prey to its ambitions(27). 
Saudi Arabia feared the undermining of its predominance in the region. A conspiracy theory was 
also in the air. According to thistheory, which was given credence by the Saudi government 
itself, the annexation of Kuwait was the part of a larger plan of Iraq, Yemen and Jordan to 
occupy Saudi Arabia with Iraq retaining Kuwait, Jordan the Hejaz area and Yemen parting away 
with territory over which it had dispute with Saudi Arabia(28). 
All indications suggest that the GCC countries were strictly for a war against Iraq. The 
US troops invited by them in an overwhelming number were more than enough if the purpose 
was merely to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.The GCC countries were adamant 
on Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait as the pre-condition for a negotiation-based solution to the 
crisis. Their unyielding stand, and also those of Iraq and the US, caused a stalemate,(29) the 
war 
ultimately became inevitable. 
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf were, however, also in a sort of dilemma. They felt 
that Iraq's complete destruction would, on one hand, remove the Iraqi threat for ever, but, thay 
on the other hand, feared that since Iraq was adequately prepared for such a war it would not 
be a cake walk for the multinational forces. Instead, it would turn out to be a prolonged war 
and spill over to Saudi Arabia, causing enormous loss of human lives and Arab wealth. There 
wasan 
added fear that Iraq's defeat would create a vacuum in the region tempting Israel and Iran to 
fill it (30). 
They also had some doubts on US ability to fight a long drawn out war with Iraq at the 
cost of loss of hundreds of its soldiers. And what if Iraq dragged Israel into war, would, then, 
they continue to side with the US-Israeli-allied forces risking the chances of popular revolts all 
around. These were the questions which haunted the Arab 
governments. 
This was one of the reasons behind the limited contribution, such as wherewithal and 
military personnel by the GCC countries to the Multinational Forces and their negligible 
participation in the war. An unofficial understanding had been reached between the US and the 
GCC countries that the latter would share the entire cost incurring to the allied forces in 
exchange for their token involvement in the military operation. For Instance, Saudi Arabia bore 
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the entire expenditure of the maintaining of the US forces and construction of the infrastructure 
facilities. Beside this, Saudi Arabia and the UAE increased their oil output to compensate the 
absence of Iraqi oil (31). The increase in the oil production at the time when there was no oil 
glut in the market was supposed to increase the Saudi revenue by, it was estimated, $ 15 billion 
per annum. This could enable Saudi Arabia to meet the additional cost of maintaining foreign 
troops. 
IRANIAN RESPONSE: 
For Iran, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was its diplomatic victory over the US and the Arab 
countries who supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. For, it vindicated the Iranian claim that 
Iraq was an expansionist and aggressive county and had attacked Iran in 1980 for territorial 
gains and toppling the Islamic government. The invasion upheld Iran's warning, during the late 
80s, that Iraq would not spare the Persian Gulf countries either, using its added military prowess 
against the very countries whom it was indebted to for this. 
Iran opposed the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait even though by that time the relations 
between the two countries had begun to improve. The Iraqi president had exchanged concilia-
tory letters with his Iranian counterpart and both the countries held common views on the 
question of oil prices and production during the emergency OPEC summit in July. 
On August 2, the Iranian Foreign Minister .issued a statement which read "Islamic 
Republic of Iran rejects any form of resort to force as a solution to regional problems. It 
considers. Iraq's military action against Kuwait contrary to the stability and security in the 
sensitive Persian Gulf region, and condemns it... Iran considers respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of other countries and non-interference in their internal affairsas absolute 
principle of international relations. Since Iraq's military action contravenes the above principles 
and such actions would have serious effects on regional and national security and global peace 
and would pave the way for increased presence of a global military powers in the region, Iran 
calls for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops to recognized international borders and a 
peaceful solution to the dispute"(32). 
Thus, Iranian stand on the Kuwaiti crisis automatically brought it closer to the GCC 
countries.Iran declared that it would take unilateral military action if the two islands ( Bubiyan 
and Warbah) were ceded by the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf to Iraq. However, the 
honeymoon between Iran and the GCC countries did not culminate into what Iran actually 
wanted, the membership of the GCC and a solution to the Kuwaiti crisis brokered by The GCC-
Iran combine, denying, thereby, the US a chance to establish its foothold in the region. The 
GCC's tilt towards the US, whom Iran could not side with, prevented Iran from playing a major 
role in the crisis. Even Saudi Arabia did not like the smaller Persian Gulf countries gestures to 
Iran. It prevailed upon the rest of the GCC members to defer the issue of Iranian admission until 
the Kuwaiti issue was resolved.. 
Iraq, like the GCC countries, was also trying to appease Iran. Iran's apathy towards the 
US, whom Iraq had challenged, came to help Iraq mend its ties with Iran. The Iran-GCC 
repproachment was also the cause of concern for Iraq. For these reasons Iraq made an 
unexpected move (33). on August 14, it unilaterally accepted the Iranian terms for a peace 
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the UNSCRs and used the good off ices of Syrian President, Hafez-al Asad, a close friend of Iran. 
Hafez-al-Asad visited Iran during September 22-24 to assure it that the foreign troops would 
pull out of the region as soon as the liberation of Kuwait was achieved and there would come 
up,instead, an Arab-Islamic security system including Iran as its constituent. 
Y E M E N ' S RESPONSE: 
Yemen sided with Iraq and had a distinction of being all alone beside Cuba in opposing 
the Security Council's moves against Iraq(37). Strong Bathist influence in North Yemen and 
South Yemen's avowed anti-imperialist postures along with popular mood in favor of Iraq 
prevented Yemen from wilting under Saudi and American pressures. 
Angry over Yemen's close association with Iraq, the Saudi government called upon the 
Yemen's northern tribes to revolt against the Sana government. It also expelled 8,00,000 
Yemeni workers. While the US cancelled aid arrangements with Yemen . Iraqi oil delivery to 
Aden refinery was cut off. Saudi Arabia also tried to undermine the three-month old unity 
between the North and South Yemens. 
M E D I T E R R A N E A N COUNTRIES' RESPONSE: 
Unlike the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean countries were divided 
over the issue of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent evnts. Egypt, Syria and Morocco 
arrayed against Iraq, while Jordan, PLO, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia stood with it. 
E G Y P T ' S RESPONSE: 
When the Iraq-Kuwait crisis was brewing, Egypt tried to mediate between the two 
countries to resolve the issue. Saddam Hussein spoke to Egyptian President, Hosseni Mubarak, 
and later sent his foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, to Cairo. Hossseni Mubarak himself 
paradedbetween Kuwaiti and Iraqi capitals to arrange a meeting between the two countries. On 
his part, Saddam is said to have assured Mubarak that he would not attack Kuwait. Thus, the 
Iraqi invasion made Mubarak bitter as it had meant the failure of his diplomacy. Egypt, 
therefore, adopted an anti-Iraqi stand. It supported all the UNSCRs, voted for the Arab Summit 
resolution on the sending of an Arab force in Saudi Arabia, despatched its forces to join the 
allied forces and allowed US warships to use the Suez Canal. 
The Egyptian government's decision to join the multinational forces was taken against 
the public mood. However, In Egypt the popular spport to Saddam Hussein was not as strong 
as in other countries. There was resentment among people also against Iraq over the plight 
Egyptian workers were facing in Kuwait and Iraq after the invasion. There were reports of 
beatings and even murders of Egyptian workers in Iraq. Mubarak's government also took 
stringent actions against protesters of Egyptian stand in the crisis. 
The Ikhwanul Muslimeen, the Egyptian government's main political opponent, did not 
put up any strong challenge to Mubarak on his government's stand in the crisis. The Ikhwans 
were only mildly opposed to the US war against Iraq so as not to lose the financial assistance 
being provided to them by Saudi Arabia (38). 
Despite being critical of the Iraqi invasion, Egypt in the initial stages was seeking an Arab 
solution to the crisis, a move which the US must have not appreciated, Egyptian government's 
position changed during August 7-8, when the Bush administration threatened to stop US 
military and economic aid to Egypt if it did not support the US policy towards the crisis. 
Later, Egypt was obliged to support the US as the latter waived off its military sales to 
Egypt worth $ 7 billion by converting it into grants-in-aid ( 39). The Arab foreign ministers in 
a meeting in Cairo on September 10 also decided to shift the headquarters of Arab League back 
to Cairo. Egypt solicited these generosities from the US and the Arab countries by increasing 
the level of its forces stationed in Saudi Arabia from 3,000 to 30,000. 
SYRIA'S RESPONSE: 
The condemnation of the Iraqi invasion by Syria, did not came as surpirse.What, 
however, deserves special mention is Syria's active role in the drama that unfolded after August 
2. This activism was dictated by benefits that Syria could garner in the form of economic reward 
and political recognition from the oil-rich Gulf states as well as the US (40). Thus Syria 
supported international action against Iraq, conveyed to the US that would not change side in 
an eventuality of Israeli involvement in the war and agreed, to quote the Syrian foreign minister, 
Farooq Al-Shara, "israeli-Palestinian peace process should not be linked to the issue of Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait" (41). Syria also sent troops to Saudi Arabia but decided that the mission 
of its forces in the wake of the war would be defensive only (42). Syria also lobbied for a vital 
place for itself in the post Gulf crisis regional security system. 
Syrian people's response was overwhelmingly pro-Iraq. Syrians, of course, did not 
approve the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait but they, at the same time, held that it was invited by the 
arrogant Kuwaiti government. Syrians were, by and large, stunned when their government 
decided to send its forces to help the multinational forces. There were widespread protests 
throughout Syria, particularly in the eastern part of the country around Deir-ez-Zor. 
The Persian Gulf crisis provided an opportune monument for Syria to join ranks with the 
US. It saw no point in continuing its anti-US policy when the Soviet Union, Syrian guarantor 
against US-Israeli brinkmanship, was on the verge of forfieting its superpower status and as a 
result the regional allies had become of little interests to it(43). The deterioration of relations 
with the USSR, with which Syria had signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1980, 
also paved the way for the Syria-US reconciliation. The USSR had raised the issue of Syrian 
debts, which were about $ 25 billion. It had begun improving ties with Israel by allowing the 
Soviet Jews to migrate to that country and was showing hesitations to help Syria out in attaining 
strategic parity with Israel. 
Syria was presented with a good chance to enter into a rapprochment with the US in a 
respectable manner as the latter was in need of an assurance from former that it would not enter 
the war from Iraq's side if its arch rival somehow dragged Israel into the war. Syria was lured 
by the US to join the allied camp. It was promised to be given a free hand in Lebanese affairs. 
American patronage was withdrawn from Christian militias in Lebanon. The USA also 
establisheddiplomatic relations with Syria. EEC de-released loans worth $ 193 million, earlier 
held back on the ground that Syria was a terrorist state. 
J O R D A N ' S RESPONSE: 
Jordan, a staunch ally of the US in the region, mildly criticized Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Officially, Jordan opposed the occupation and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, recognized Sabahs 
as the legitimate ruler of Kuwait and supported the sending of the Arab forces to secure Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait. It also decided to comply with the UNSCRs adding, however, that it 
alone would decide how to do it(44). On the other hand, Jordan also opposed the presence of 
foreign troops in Arab land and the US led military actions against Iraq. King Hussein also 
supported the linking of the Kuwaiti issue with Arab-Israeli issueby Saddam Hussein. 
To avoid a breakdown in its relations with the US, the West and the Arab countries of 
the Persian Gulf, Jordan assumed for itself the role of a peace broker. King Hussein went 
(August 14) to Washington, reportedly, to hand over a letter from Saddam Hussein to Bush. 
All of Jordanian peace plans fizzled out as the US refused to agree on any thing less than Iraq's 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Jordan kept its peace mission alive even then as King 
Hussein went to Morocco and Algeria and met (September 20) their respective heads of the 
state. After meetings these leaders. King Hussein proposed a compromise peace plan which 
envisaged Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and that of the Foreign forces from the region, a 
referendum in Kuwait within six months of that, deployment of the UN peace keeping forces 
in Kuwait and an Arab force in Saudi Arabia and an international conference on the Palestine 
issue. This move was also rejected. 
Gradually, Jordan began supporting Iraq overtly. This was, among other things, caused 
by growing Saudi hostility towards it. When Jordan had adopted more or less a balanced stand— 
supporting Iraqi withdrawal and opposing the foreign presence—Saudi Arabia cut off its oil 
supply of 30,000 barrel per day to it (45). Jordanian people, including Palestinians(46), who 
overwhelmingly supported Iraq, influnced King Hussein's decision oppose an international 
coalitionagainst Iraq. 
There were huge public demonstrations in Amman against the US, Over 80,000 
Jordanians had volunteered to fight along side the Iraqis(47). The rejection of popular mood 
in order to satisfy the US, could have been exploited by the Islamic fundamentalists who had 
already consolidated their position as the most significant bloc in Jordanian parliament( 48). 
Iraq's importance to Jordan also dissuaded it from siding with the US. The economic 
crisis had increased Jordan's dependence on Iraq which was providing Jordan oil at a 
considerable discount. Iraq was also a market for Jordan's agricultural exports. Transit trade 
from Iraq to the Read Sea port of Aqaba had become crucial to the port's rapid growth during 
the 1980s. Thousands of Jord.anian workers were employed in Iraq. Jordan viewed Iraq as its 
strategic ally against Israel. 
PLO'S A N D PALESTINIANS' RESPONSE: 
Like Jordan, the PLO and the Palestinians supported Iraq and were more outspoken in 
doing this. Thus Palestinians everywhere in the region—occupied territories, Jordan and 
Persian Gulf countries—, were unanimous in tlieir support for Iraq. 
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Tiie PLO, unlike the Palestinian masses, initially tried to obfuscate its position. It 
declared that it wanted Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait. The PLO had also disapproved Iraqi 
invasion at the Arab League Summit.But, at the same time, it advocated an Arab solution to the 
crisis 
and condemned the "reckless US Intervention" and regretted that "some of the Arab countries 
had accepted it". The PLO also tried to play the role of mediator. However, fol lowing the 
rejection of its peace plans by the US and its allies in West Asia and as the crisis escalated, the 
PLO came to identify itself with Iraq. 
The PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, visited Baghdad on August 19 and conferred with 
Saddam Hussein. In that meeting PLO's support to Iraq might have been pledged. However, 
on official records Arafat proposed a peace plan to Iraq which envisaged withdrawal of the Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait, restoration of Sabah rule, subsequent establishment of firm border between 
Iraq and Kuwait and Kuwaiti compensation to Iraq for the revenues the latter had lost due to 
Kuwaiti oil policies. 
PLO, frustrated by the failure of Intefadeh and continuing Jewish settlement in the 
occupied territories, and skeptical of US intention to resolve the Palestinian issue, saw in Iraq 
a savior which by annihilating Israel would pave the way for the establishment of a Palestinian 
state. It saw in Saddam a force to unite the Arab masses and take on Israel and America. PLO 
was sore with the Persian Gulf countries' failure to fulfill their financial commitment towards 
the Palestinian cause. 
The Palestinians whole-heartedly supported the linkage of the Kuwaiti and the Palestine 
issues and refused to regard it as Iraqi design to justify its occupation and annexation of Kuwait. 
They were rejoiced over Iraqi missile attacks on Israel which to them was the demonstration 
of a linkage between the Persian Gulf crisis and the Palestinian problem (49). Israeli discrimi-
nation to Palestinians in not providing them chemical war equipment during the war and an 
increase in Israeli forces atrocities those days further fanned Palestinians' pro-Iraqi sentiments. 
Saddam's offer to Palestinians to settle down in Kuwait also strengthened Palestinians-
Iraq bond. The Palestinians in Kuwait lent activesupport tolraq in informationgatheringwhich 
facilitated Iraqi invasion and swift occupation of Kuwait. 
LIBYAN R E S P O N S E : 
The Qaddafi regime overlooked the Iraqi invasion and concentrated its tirade against the 
presence of US and British forces in Arab lands. At a news conference in mid-August, Qaddafi 
demanded thatthe USA be placed under international legal sanctions as Iraq had been, warning 
that failing this, Libya might leave the United Nations. Libya also called for the removal of naval 
blockade againstlraq and stated that it would not abide by the economic sanctions against Iraq 
as far as the supply of food and medicine to the latter was concerned. It together with PLO 
floated a peace plan which called for the mutual withdrawal of Iraqi and the Western forces and 
their replacement by an Arab-Islamic force in Saudi Arabia and by the UN forces in Kuwait, 
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ceding of Warbah and Bubiyan islands to Iraq and a referendum in Kuwait allowing its people 
to decide about the nature of tlie political system of their country. The Libyan plan also 
proposed that there be adopted a common Arab oil policy. Following the rejection of this plan, 
Libya came out with another plan this time in conjunction with PLO, Jordan and Sudan. The 
second plan was also rejected. 
However, by mid-September, the Libyan policy changed from an extremely anti-US to 
cautiously pro-Western. This change was brought about by Iraqi rejection of Libyan offer of 
material assistance. During his visit to Libya, the Egyptian president advised Qaddafithat his 
overt support to Saddam Hussein would invite US hostility once the Kuwaiti crisis was over. 
Libya, as a result, modified its policy. It even offered to send its troops to join allied forces. 
However, the Libyan offer was rejected by the US. It is said that the US did it in order not to 
be bound by any moral obligation when raising later the issue of Libyan involvement in the 
bombing of a Pan Am flight over the Scottish town of Lockerbie. 
T U N I S I A ' S RESPONSES: 
Tunisia opposed both the Iraqi annexation and US intervention in the crisis. At the Arab 
League Summit it expressed pessimism at the majority decision to invite the US forces in Arab 
land. The Tunisian president, Zine-i- Abdine ben Ali, described this as "lending an imaginary 
legitimacy to the Western presence in Saudi Arabia. The Tunisians government reluctantly 
accepted the UN sanctions against Iraq. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf took punitive action 
against the Tunisian government by withdrawing all financial support to it. US aid to Tunisia 
was cut back as well. 
M O R O C C O ' S RESPONSE: 
Morocco supported the US position in the Persian Gulf crisis(50). Dependent on the 
western economic aid for its survival, it had no other option. However, Morocco could not make 
any significant contribution to the multinational forces because it was bogged down in western 
Sahara. No reinforcement or heavy equipments were sent. The small sized force Morocco sent 
to Saudi Arabia did not participate in the Operation Desert Storm. There was a little change of 
heart when the war against Iraq started. Moroccan king told 'Le Monde', a French magazine, 
that Iraq's complaints against Kuwait had some substances. This change was caused by Pro-Iraq 
demonstrations in Morocco. 
A L G E R I A ' S RESPONSE: 
The Algerian government tried to stay away from the crisis by opting to play the role of 
a peace broker. It distanced itself from directly opposing Iraq by abstaining from voting at the 
August 10 Arab League Summit. The Foreign Minister of Algeria, Ahmad Ghizali criticized the 
West's decision to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets abroad. 
Public protests, led by the Islamic fundamentalists, against US aggression played a 
significant role in Algerian government adopting a neutral stand. FIS (Islamic Salavation Front) 
leaders, despite Iraqi regime's hostility to Islamic fundamentalism, visited Iraq to express their 
solidarity with that country. The FIS also warned that "any aggression against Iraq will be 
confronted by Muslims every where". 
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T U R K E Y ' S RESPONSE: 
Turkey was not an active participant in tiie anti-Iraq coalition in the beginning. Thougii 
Turlcey supported all the US led actions against Iraq, it did not relish the prospect of suffering 
the loss of $ 300 million annually to be caused by closure of Iraqi pipelines carrying Iraqi oil 
to the Mediterranean sea. 
Turkey was little embarrassed when Bush asked it to clarify its position and cut off Iraqi 
oil pipelines. Iraq helped Turkey to come out of its dilemma when it itself shut down one of the 
pipelines and reduced the flow of anotherby 30 percent (August 6) s incebecause of the embargo 
none was lifting oil from Turkish terminal. Two days later, Turkey banned Exports of Iraqi oil 
from its territory and froze all Iraqi assets. Later, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, 
visited Turkey offering it financial compensation for the loss of revenue, and military protec-
tion. In return, the US got an assurance from Turkey that in case of a war with Iraq it would 
provide its northern base for military operations to the US forces. 
Initial reluctance was given up soon and by the time the war broke out, Turkey was not 
only an active participant in Anti-Iraq coalition but it also permitted the US to make sorties from 
its Lcrlik base. 
The decision of the Turkish government invited strong criticism from the leftists and the 
Islamic fundamentalists alike. Even part of the military establishment opposed the move, fearing 
that it would lead to Iraqi retaliation. Certain elements in the Turkish government also flayed 
the move, expressing their resentment through tendering resignation. 
Turkish president Ozal's decision was prompted by the prospects of Turkish admission 
into the European Community as the Turkish participation in the war against Iraq would have 
demonstrated the country's importance as a strategic location in the West's war with an Asian 
power. The Turkish government's move was also likely to establish its sensitiveness to issues 
concerning Europe, resulting into an enhanced level of economic and military assistance from 
that region and the US(51). Turkey was also seeking an entry into the Persian Gulf politics, 
mainly interested in taking part in Persian Gulf security system and improving economic 
relations with the oil-rich states. 
ISRAELI RESPONSE: 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait if, on the one hand, turned the Iraqi sabre-rattling against Israel 
into an imminent threat (52), it was also a welcome development being a pleasing diversion of 
the international attention from its suppression of the Intifadeh and the question of peaceful 
settlement of the Palestine issue. Saddam Hussein's invasion, accompanied by the threat to 
engage Israel into a war, was used as a pretext for avoiding a cut off in defense expenditure and 
securing military and economic aid from the West(53). 
Yet, Iraq's move in Kuwait had all the elements to make Israel apprehensive.Iraq had 
already issued a warning to Israel that any other attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities would be 
answered by burning half of Israel. Israel did not dismiss this threat as a mere rhetoric. The 
binary and chemical weapons Iraq possessed could accomplish this task. Instead, Iraqi 
clarification that such an option would be resorted to only in retaliation to an Israeli attack was, 
of course, dismissed by Israeli government as a ploy to divert Israeli attention from its security 
concerns. 
At the same time, the Iraqi Invasion had in a way steered Iraqi attention from Israel, It 
relieved Israel that in case of such an attack the Arab countries, whom Iraq had alienated after 
occupying Kuwait, might not join Iraq. The US response to the Iraqi invasion also served the 
Israeli interests. That after its misadventure in Kuwait, collective security action against Iraq 
was inevitable came as a sigh of relief to Israel. Otherwise, Iraq's credibility to launch a war 
against Israel in future would have enhanced if Iraq was allowed to retain control over Kuwait, 
its oil reserves and its financial assets. Israel also feared that if Iraq came unscathed from its 
invasion of Kuwait then it would have to confront Iraq alone. 
The Israeli government did not rule out an Iraqi-Israeli showdown during the war. The 
full support Saddam Hussein had been receiving from Palestinians In Jordan and Occupied 
territories convinced Israel that Iraq had both means and Arab (masses) backing to launch a full-
fledged war against her. 
Israel, however, shared the US concern that it should not get involved into a war even 
if provoked. The Israeli government knew that once the war would break out Iraq would not 
spare any effort to drag Israel into the war, leading a few Arab countries to breakaway from the 
Coalition. 
Israel also visualized that the magnitude of Iraqi attack on it during the war could, 
however, scale down if Iraq were engaged in a fierce battle with the coalition forces. Israel also 
found the peaceful solution to Kuwaiti issue, as a result of which Iraq could have retained its 
military strength intact, unfavorable to it. Moreover,a peaceful solution, leading to Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait, could have increased pressure on Israel to agree to a similar kind of 
solution on its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, 
Israel prepared itself to deal with the inevitable. The armed forces beefed up their 
capability to counter an Iraqi attack. Among other security measures taken by the Israeli 
government was the distribution of gas masks among people for protection from chemical 
attacks. The US and Israel exchanged information on the Iraqi threat. Israel agreed to provide 
logistical and other support to the US led forces. Infrastructure was laid to secure communi-
cation between Israeli and the American defense authorities. Arrangement were made for 
provision to Israel of early warning on Iraqi missile attacks against Israel. 
When the war started, the Israeli forces were stated to be well-prepared and alert to react 
to any Iraqi attack. As early as January 18, first Iraqi missile landed on Israeli cities. Two 
'Patriot' surface-to-air missile batteries, ordered by Israel for delivery in Spring,1992, were 
immediately sent to Israel. Another package of the US Patriot batteries was airlifted to Israel 
with their American crews. Shortly before the end of the War, an additional Dutch Patriot 
BaUery 
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was also transported to Israel. 
The Patriot batteries were deployed in Tel Aviv and Haifa, and became operational 
within hours of their arrival on site to intercept incoming ' Al-Hussein missiles, Their unimpres-
sive track record in intercepting the Iraqi missile notwithstanding, Patriots proved extremely 
valuable in alleviating the population anxiety and in demonstrating the US commitment to the 
Israeli defense. 
T H E US AND T H E PERSIAN G U L F 
The US in many ways helped Iraq acquire the awesomemilitary capability by the end of 
the Iran-Iraq war as a result of which it had become a bullying state prepared to challenge even 
the might of the US. 
From intelligence sharing Agreement with Iraq in 1982 to the resumption of diplomatic 
relations with it in 1984 and the loans and credits to it to the tune of $ 4.2 billion, which were 
mainly used by Iraq for nuclear and missile development programs and acquisition of the 
weapons from the western countries, the US pampered Iraq all along. Some political analysts 
even feel that in view of Saudi Arabia's inherent weakness to outdo Iranian challenge. The US 
was developing Iraq as the policeman of the region to safefguard its interests. 
This hypothesis is reinforced by some sort of undercover and clandestine US assistance 
to the Iraqi nuclear program. The US helped Iraq boost its missile capability. The Saad 16— 
Iraq's premier hi-tech complex for aircraft construction— missile design programs and also 
nuclear research received financial assistance from the US. Massive amount of sensitive 
equipment and technology were sold to Iraq by US firms.There were 6,000 licenses for $ 1.5 
billion worth computers, machine tools, electronic equipment with military potential. There was 
no monitoring of their ultimate use. 
Other American equipment which Saddam Hussein acquired from The US included $ 200 
million worth of Bell helicopters, a machine tool plant capable of making weapons and a powder 
press suitable for the compaction of nuclear fuels. Beside this, two US computer firms 
built a giant petrochemicals plant near Bhagdad and a $ 4 billion ethylene facility(54). 
The change in US attitude began appearing from the 1990 only when it realized that after 
battering a formidable enemy like Iran, Iraq was emboldened to assert itself in the Persian Gulf 
politics by hook or by crook. Then, the US became critical of Iraqi actions, expressed concern 
over Iraq's defense-build up and alleged it of stealing American technology. This allegation was 
a good excuse to shroud its own involvement in and contribution to Iraq's ambitious programs. 
It is in this background of a little bit strained US-Iraqi relationsthat Iraq in July 1990 
began threatening Kuwait and the UAE. Saddam Hussein had also taken up the cudgels against 
the US, accusing it of supporting Kuwait and the UAE in their " economic war against Iraq". 
Weigh against Iraq's anti-US tirade, the US reaction to Iraqi moves was mild by all accounts. 
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This persuades one to infer that the USwanted that Iraq invaded Kuwait so that it could 
intervene on behalf of the aggreived country to take on Iraq (55). 
In a meeting with the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, on July 25, Saddam Hussein 
had made his intention clear. He said to Glaspie "If we do not get what we want from Kuwait 
...., we shall use force"(56). The Ambassador's reply was " the US did not want to take sides 
in Intra-Arab disputes, like your border disagreement with Kuwait". She even showed some 
sympathy for Iraq ( 57) while saying "I know you need funds. We understand that and our 
opinion is that you should have an opportunity to rebuild your country. She further stated that 
her country's State Secretary had directed the US embassy officials in Bhagdad to emphasize 
this instruction. 
The content of Saddam-Glaspie discussion apart, the US did not forewarn its Arab and 
West European allies of Iraqi move. 'Aviation Week and Space Technology' reported that the 
US satellite intelligence had detected Iraqi tanks movingtowards the Kuwaiti border on August 
1. Though there was sufficient time to inform Kuwait about the move and to warn Iraq against 
attacking Kuwait, the US chose to remain silent. The CIA had also informed the administration 
about the possibility of Iraq invading Kuwait. Thus when the intelligence, the CIA, and media 
had reported about the developments that were likely to lead to Iraqi invasion( 58), the US 
Administration's contention that it failed to pre-empt Iraqi action because it relied on Arab 
allies' —Egypt, Saudi Arabia— reports that no such thing was going to take place sounds 
illogical. 
On the day of invasion, when Bush was asked that whether he was taken by surprise, he 
replied " not totally by surprise, because we have good Intelligence and our intelligence had 
informed me about what action might be taken" (59). On August 1st, Iraqi Ambassador to the 
US, Sadiq A1 Mashat, was summoned by the State Department and told that Iraq must solve its 
dispute with Kuwait peacefully. But this too points to the mild nature of the US reaction to the 
situation preceding the invasion. By August 1st, Iraq had already made its intention clear and 
had moved a large portion of troops to Kuwaiti border, which was also detected by the US 
intelligence satellite. The US reaction to this situation, particularly when one of its allies was 
the targeted state, could have come in form of a warning, threatening Saddam of a reprisal. The 
summoning of Iraqi ambassador on the other hand looked like the part of routine diplomatic 
ritual. 
As soon as Iraqis invaded Kuwait, the US administration's statements and reactions 
turned, in stark contrast to the past week or month, harsh and unflinching. The US did not then 
try to mediate to settle the issue peacefully. Bush said that if Iraq withdrew "unconditionally" 
from Kuwait and the " legitimate" government of Kuwait was restored, the issue of settling the 
crisis peacefully would be taken up. Saddam Hussein's invasion was linked to the actions of 
Adolf Hitler. And the US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, was immediately sent to Saudi 
Arabia, following whose meeting with King Fahad, Saudi Arabia formally invited the US troops. 
This indicates that not only would have the US been requested to send its troops, but Cheny 
might have gone to Saudi Arabia to persuade it to seek the US military intervention. The 
Secretary of State would have been a better choice if the US wanted to confine its dialogue with 
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Saudi Arabia to political issues related to the crisis. 
The US, which despite all evidences suggesting to an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, had 
pretended not to take the threat seriously, raised a new issue, with a measure of authority, that 
Saudi Arabia might be attacked BY Iraq, though Saddam Hussein, unlike what he used to say 
before attacking Kuwait, categorically denied it. This was used as a pretext to send its troops 
in Saudi Arabia and take punitive actions against Iraq; "economic and otherwise", as said Bush. 
President Bush sent on 7 August troops, air power— utilizing an operational plan 
devised several years ago for possible use against the Soviet or Iranian military actions in the 
Persian Gulf 
region—, protect Saudi Arabian oil fields from possible Iraqi incursions on August 7 ,1990 . By 
November, the US forces numbered more than 2,30,000 army personnel and marines and more 
than 1,500 combat aircrafts of all types. US naval forces in the Persian Gulf were also 
augmented, additional air forces units were sent to Turkey and some were positioned in the UAE 
and Qatar. 
A Central Command forward headquarter, under General Norman Schwarzkopf, was 
established in Saudi Arabia. On November 8th, Bush announced plan to deploy upto 200,000 
additional troops to achieve what he termed as "an adequate offensive option". At that time it 
was also agreed that the approval of Bush and King Fahad was required for any offensive action 
against Iraq. However, according to this agreement once the military action against Iraq was' 
authorized by Saudi Arabia, the US forces would be free to operate exclusively under their own 
military commanders. 
The logical conclusion of the US actions before and in the aftermath of Iraqi invasion can 
only be the fact that the US was pre-determined to wage a war against Iraq. The this took place 
only after about five and a half months of the arrival of the first batch of US forces irl Arabian 
peninsula does not suggest that the US had opted war as the last resort, only if the economic 
embargo failed to achieve the stated goals. The economic embargo, in fact, was not used for 
this 
purpose(60). First, it at best could have secured Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, which , it is 
stated, was not the primary objective of the US. Instead, the US wanted to smash Iraq militarily 
and remove Saddam Hussein from power. Second, it had become clear within a few months that 
the embargo had not worked out, but the US waited for another few months to attack Iraq so 
that the numerical strength of the US forces turned out half a million ( 61). Thus, the embargo 
was used for buyingthe time for military preparedness. A war and not the embargo could serve 
all of the US interests; destruction of the military might of Iraq, removal of Iraqi threat to Saudi 
Arabia's and Israel's security, liberation of Kuwait and the emergence of a new international 
order with the US at its apex ( 62). 
Beside attaining the required military strength several other reasons can be attributed to 
the US delaying the war. The US policy to give its military action a collective security sheen 
for the purpose of legitimizing it, was bound to take a considerable period of time. There was 
also tremendous public pressure in the begining not to go for war. A section of US military 
analysts were against the war as they maintained that the US would incur heavy manpower loss 
and it did not have the required superiority to defeat a regional power on its (Iraq) home ground. 
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Instead, carrying out its war in tlie name of a collective security action gave its actions 
a semblance of 'legality'. It also helped the US to prevent the war being Americanized since its 
unilateral military adventures in the past against Libya or in Panama had invited sharp 
international criticism. The US forging a coalition with scores of other countries could also help 
to offset growing anti-war sentiments back home. 
The other countries' involvement did not, as would apparently seem, signified the US 
weakness in accomplishing the task of the peace-keeping single-handedly. Instead, it estab-
lished the US control over the UN and also pointed to the fact that "America leads the world 
in attempts to solve the conflict and others follow it as unequal partners" ( 63). Unlike the case 
of true multilateralism, as was the World War Big Three coalition, the US drama was " pseudo 
multilateralism: "A dominant great power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea 
and still worshipping at the shrine of collective security, recruits a ship there , a brigade there 
, and blessing all around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen" ( 64). 
Of course, this time the US wanted, at least for placating the Public opinion, that the 
burnt of a war must be borne out by all the concerned countries; Arab Gulf states, Japan, 
Germany and other West European countries. 
American people were dead against the waging of the war as Americans soldiers began 
to arrive in Saudi Arabia. The question that whether, it was morally permissible to sacrifice a 
single human life for the pursuance of an interest, even if legitimate one boggled the American 
public most. 
They were haunted by the specter of thousands of dead bodies returning home after 
fighting "somebody else's " war. Americans, as stated above, were also perplexed as to why 
American soldiers be singularly made scapegoat when the interests of other countries around 
the world wwere also at stake. They were equally concerned at the effects of war on nation's 
treasury as it was estimated and made public that it would cost one billion everyday to the US. 
Opinion surveys indicated that the majority of Americans did not favor war. Anti-war 
demonstrations by thousands of people became a routine affair for months. The Vietnam phobia 
and the fear of an spurt in "Islamic terrorism" were other aspects which contributed to the anti-
war attitude of the people( 65). 
When the Operation Desert Storm was launched, public protests increased. However, 
with the stunning successes against Iraq at the cost of unexpectedly low casualties the national 
pride and jubilation overshadowed the initial dismay. Electronic media played the most 
significant role in transforming people's attitude towards the war as it beamed the US victory 
live. 
Thus, Bush finally managed to win popular support. However it did not last long. As soon 
as the euphoria of the victory died down, the negative effects of the war began to be felt by 
ordinary American. He held the war was by and large futile for common man. He reflected this 
disillusionment by defeating Bush, who, it was being unanimously said, would be elected 
unopposed for the second term. 
As regards the US objectives behind unleashing a war against Iraq, the most important 
was to usher in the post cold war era as the undisputed monarch of the world. This emanated 
from both the opportunity the end of the cold war had provided and the danger the possibility 
of the emergence of multilateral world order posed. The US decline as the superpower was 
inherent in the vanishing of the Soviet Union(66). The West European countries did not need 
to rely on the awesome military might of the US to be protected against the Soviet power. They, 
mainly Germany, started asserting themselves as economic and technological superpower. China 
and Third World countries, with weapons of mass destruction, pretended to challenge the US military 
might in their respective regions if not worldwide. 
The Gulf crisis came as an opportunity to the US to check its diminishing power status. 
It provided a chance to reinforce the centrality of military strength in the international politics. 
The US could demonstrate that the West had to fall in line with it to tackle a regional issue of 
immense importance to their security and economies. The US could emphasize that the 
economic well-being of West Europe would rest with the country which could assure an 
uninterrupted supply of oil from Persian Gulf to them. Most importantly, it could bring home 
the point to the Western European powers that they alone could not take up a Third World 
challenge to their economic interests. 
For the Third World countries the tackling of the Persian Gulf crisis by the US was a 
reminder, that they were no match to the US military prowess. For a Third World country 
aspiring for a regional power status independent of the US it implied that the countries from 
their own regions preferred the US unilateralism over their regional supremacy (67). 
The end of the cold war came as an opportunity to the US to impose unilateralism. The 
US could target the weaker Third World states without the fear of its move being deterred by 
the Soviet Union. It was far easier for the US to establish a master-client relations with West 
Europe as well as the allies in the Third World as their clout to play one superpower against 
other diminished. 
All other important US objectives of war flowed from it. For instance, the oil was a 
central issue in this crisis not because its supply was endangered and the prices had begun 
shooting, for oil continued flowing from the region and the price hike that followed the Iraqi 
invasion was the result of panic ( 68). Some analysts have even gone to the extent of arguing 
that this panic was created by the US. The US had three months of reserves —nearly 600 million 
barrels—to avoid the panic. The inflated price justified increased exploration and exploitation 
in Alaska offshore and elsewhere. The additional revenue essentially was utilized in the 
conducting of the Operation Desert Storm. 
What, therefore, was at the heart of the issue was the question as to who owned the oil, 
the users or the producers. In USA's view a Third World power could not sit over the largest 
reserves of oil in the world to deny the consumers the oil and influence the world oil price (69 ) . 
In fact, Iraqi effort to increase oil prices to a reasonable level was not all that threatening to the 
US. What was unacceptable to US was the absence of the US influence in decision making 
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p r o c e s s p e r l a i n i n g to the price and product ion o f oi l ( 7 0 ). A l s o , the U S did not want that an 
oil 
rich country with an investment over 100 billion abroad was occupied by Iraq, who would deny 
it a regular flow of Arab wealth in form of investment, assets and recycled petrodollars. 
The oil was important in a few other aspects also. Once the war led to the liberation of 
Kuwait it along with other US friendly oil producing countries would step up the production 
to deluge the market. Thus the oil would remain cheaper in the 90s despite an increase in the 
global demand of oil. This proves that the war was fought against Iraq not to set the turbulence 
in oil market, resulting from Iraqi invasion, in order but in the interests of a long-term oil policy. 
As stated above a strong Iraq had become a liability to the US after the end of Iran-Iraq 
war and the cold war. With Iran still smarting from its defeat, Iraq had turned from a friend ( 
being enemy's enemy) into a potential threat to the US and its allies in the region. It was too 
aggressive, too ruthless, too unpredictable, too untrustworthy and above all too independent 
and ambitious. Therefore, it needed to be destroyed if their came a golden opportunity to realize 
this goal. 
This explains the US stubborn rejection of moves to find out a peaceful solution to the crisis. 
Though apparently the US was right in maintaining that no peace without the aggressor country's 
withdrawal was morally justifiable, but its insistence on peace before withdrawal in the case of Israeli 
occupation of Palestine underlines that the US is principally against such a peace formula. This 
strengthens the doubt that the US wanted the settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait issue not before It 
settled its scores with Iraq. The centrality of Iraqi military destruction in the US war objectives 
got proved retrospectively. While Iraqi military destruction was only partly achieved during the 
45-day war, the US did not relent as it activated the UN to complete the unfinished task. Thus 
a host of resolutions were adopted at the Security Council which envisaged total dismantling 
of Iraqi missile force and the weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council resolutions 
also called for an international arms embargo on transfer of arms and military related technology 
to Iraq. 
Aware of Saddam's ambitions, the US knew that mere destruction of Iraq would not do. 
Removal of Saddam was equally necessary. Bush, it is reported, directed the CIA to destabilize 
Iraq politically and get rid of Saddam by any possible means( 71). The economic embargo, 
among other things, aimed at starving Iraq, leading to a popular upsurge against Saddam's 
regime. 
Bush did not rule out an anti-Saddam coup during the war. He had also urged the Iraqi 
military and the people to force Saddam to "step aside". A large section of media persons, 
particularly those belonging to Israeli lobby, held the view that the Kuwaiti crisis could not be 
solved unless Saddam was removed. Les Aspin, the chairman of the powerful House Service 
Committee wished that destruction of Iraqi military capability and the removal of Saddam went 
hand-in -and. This Congressman was willing to tolerate a million men army without Saddam 
Hussein than the vice versa"(72). 
Security, both internal and external, of Arab allies as well as Israel also prompted the US 
to destroy Iraq. Once The US had already risked popular backlash in the Arab countries by 
deploying its forces there, it had become incumbent upon it to decimate Iraq so that Arab 
people's morale could dim and the governments proved vindicated. It was also imperative upon 
the US to destroy Iraq to the extent that it ceased to be a threat to Saudi Arabia. 
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Another US consideration was to "clip the wings" of Saddam Hussein before he 
brandished both chemical weapons and missiles against Israel. The disadvantages of leaving 
Iraq 
scot-free were numerous. Had Saddam Hussein's military machine been left intact, Saudi Arabia 
would have become a long term security pre-occupation for the US, an obligation that would 
have been expensive and embarrassing. The added revenues provided by the utilization of 
production from Kuwait were destined to augment Saddam's financial capability to develop of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The US interests vis-a-vis the GCC allies could have 
become a hostage to Iraq's growing influence in the region. The US wanted to resuscitate the 
NATO and retain it under its suzerainty. Both the desires could be met by activating the NATO 
against Iraq. The US was perturbed over the NATO being called as redundant after the end of 
the cold war to an extent that the USSR had agreed that the united Germany could belong to 
the NATO. The West European members also developed it into a new entity wherein defence 
considerations would be secondary. The NATO's participation in the war, on the other hand, 
promised to reinforce its importance as principally a military organisation. 
T H E SOVIET UNION A N D T H E PERSIAN GULF CRISIS 
Soviet Union's involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis was a self-recognition of its 
reducing clout as a power of international stature. Thus it did not differ from the US on basic 
issues involved in the crisis. 
At the same time, the crisis was seen by the Soviet policy makers as an opportunity to 
salvage its image. Thus the Soviet Union tried in vain to carve out for itself the role of peace 
broker. By refusing to participate in collective security actions, the decision to which effect had 
emanated from its inability to bear its cost in the prevailing economic condition, the Soviet 
Union made a last ditch effort to give an impression that it could still act independently. 
As soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait, the USSR condemned the Iraqi Aggression, demanding 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This followed the US Secretary of 
State's visit to Moscow to confer with his Soviet counterpart, Eduarde Shverdandze. After that, 
the two countries issued a joint statement which condemned the Iraqi aggression and included 
an assurance from the Soviet Union to stop arms supplies to Iraq. The joint statement set the 
tone of Soviet policy towards the Persian Gulf crisis. It indicated that the Soviet Union was not 
looking at the crisis from the traditional master-allies relations angle. Rather, the USSR showed 
willingness to cooperate with the US in seeking an end to the crisis. Subsequent developments 
pertaining to the crisis brought some changes in Soviet attitude, but its policy remained more 
or less the same. 
Soviet Union was expected to play the role of a moderator in the UN Security Council 
to soften the US-led international aggressiveness towards Iraq. However, the USSR did not 
only facilitate a smooth passage of the UNSCRs but also agreed to comply with them 
faithfully(73). 
During the debate on UINSCR 660 ( 1990), envisaging economic embargo against Iraq 
the Soviet representative at the UN bserved"We do not advocate hasty decisions, but we must 
face the fact that the pace of the events taking place—the events which started with the sudden 
invasion of Iraqi forces of Kuwait—dictates that we take the necessary steps in accordance with 
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direct requirements of tiie United Nations Charter" ( 74). 
In tlie case of the resolutions permitted military action against Iraq, the Soviet Union 
adopted a little different line of action.The Soviet government maintained that it preferred a 
political solution and insisted that the war must be carried out under the auspices of the UN ( 
75). 
The USSR did not have any other option than voting in favor of the resolution 
authorizing the war. The Soviet veto could not stop the US from taking an action outside the 
scope of the UN. While, the consequence of such a drastic step by the Soviet Union meant its 
international isolation politically as well as economically . In fact, the war was not in the 
interests of the Soviet Union as it meant a red signal to Soviet peace efforts, the only instrument 
in the hand of that country to make its presence felt in the Persian Gulf crisis. The war was also 
not in the economic 
interests of the USSR. 
The USSR adopted a three-pronged strategy. It did stay away from multilateral military 
build up in the Persian Gulf, dissuaded the US from attacking Iraq unless all peace efforts 
exhausted and expressed its objection to the war not being conducted under UN umbrella( 
77).Gen. Mikhail Moideyev, the Soviet chief of staff, went on warning that any military action 
in the Persian Gulf would leadto the Third World War. Gorbachev desperately tried to see that 
a peaceful solution to the crisis was found before the deadline finally ended. He sent 
Academician Primakvo to Bhgadad as special envoy to persuade Iraq to withdraw at the last 
moment. 
Soviet Union categorically refused to participate, even symbolically, in the war on 
January 17, the day the war started. Its opposition to the war sharpened as it openly criticized 
the Allied Forces bombing on civilians. On January 29, the USSR issued a joint statement with 
the US which said bombing would end if Iraq promised an unconditional withdrawal. The USSR 
also joined Iran and a few other countries in opposing the US wanton destruction of Iraqi 
military 
and civilian targets during the air raids(78). 
W E S T EUROPE'S , JAPAN'S R E S P O N S E TO T H E G U L F C R I S / S 
West European countries and Japan sided with the US. France can be figured out asthe 
country which maintained a littje distance from the US. So did Germany, albeit to alimited 
extent, by restricting its support to the US to financially contributions. 
Commonalty of interests with the US brought the allied powers together. Free flow of 
oil was more essential to West European countries, even more so for Japan, than the US. The 
answer can only be found in the unique concentration around the oil of the Persian Gulf. 
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Petroleum explains why international consensus and action have been achieved in this case— 
but not, for example, in the case of Palestinians. 
Saddam also contributed to the US- West Europe-Japan solidarity by remaining 
obdurate on the question of withdrawal from Kuwait. Otherwise, France's search for a 
honorable settlement of the issue and Japan's preference for the avoidance of war could have 
caused chinks and fissures between them and the US which also determined to resolve the issue 
by the use of force against Iraq. After all the allies were more concerned with the issue of the 
uninterrupted 
supply of oil than the total destruction of Iraq or the removal of Saddam, the latter was the US's 
principal goal. 
Saddam was also responsible for enraging France, a US ally not blindly toeing the its line 
of action like the UK. France was looking for a peaceful solution to the issue. On September 
14, Iraqi soldiers forcibly entered the French embassy in Kuwait. France condemned this as 
aggression and demanded the prosecution of the persons responsible for attacking its embassy. 
The French demands were rejected by Iraq. By then France had not decided to send its troops 
in the region to join those of the US and other countries. However, soon after the aforemen 
tioned incident, France changed its mind (79). 
France also acknowledged a linkage between Kuwaiti crisis and Palestinian issue and 
urged the US to take up the latter one as soon as the Kuwaiti crisis was resolved. France also' 
tried to convince Iraq on this count. 
West Europe and Japan condemned the Iraqi aggression and froze the assets of Iraq and 
Kuwait. They also hailed the US-Saudi Arabia decision regarding the deployment of friendly 
states' forces In Saudi Arabia. These countries soon began sending their troops in the 
region.France, however, made only verbal commitment in this regard with the Mittrand 
government announcing that it would positively respond to a Saudi and Kuwaiti request for 
military and technical aid. It also decided to strengthen its naval and air presence in the Persian 
Gulf. 
Later, France also sent its troops and announced that It would join an attack against Iraq 
if that was carried within the framework of collective Security action as envisaged in the UN 
Charter. Otherwise, the French government decided, it would take part in a military operation 
against Iraq only if that country attacked a third country, say Saudi Arabia or Israel(80). 
France and the UK deployed modest-sized ground and air forces in Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. France sent a troop of 9,000 men. It also deployed six destroyers and frigates, three 
support ships, one command ship. Mirage Jaguar fighter bombers and transport planes in the 
region ( 81). 
Other European states despatched token forces. Japan decided to provide $ 6 billion aid 
to war efforts and Germany $ 1 billion. British and French naval forces also enforced the UN 
economic sanctions on Iraq by interdicting Petroleum and other shipments coming from Iraq 
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and Kuwait. w 
The European countries confirmed their participation in the war on January 14, by 
deciding unanimously to abandon their peace initiatives. 
All ies' participation was not as forthcoming as that of the US. The US also expressed 
resentment on the lack of support from them, resenting that this was despite the fact that their 
dependence upon the Gulf oil was far more acute than that of it. The total troops strength of 
the allied powers in the Persian Gulf was merely 50,000 as against the USA's 4,30, 000, 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS 
The United Nations, which till the eve of the Iraqi invasion was beset with the problem 
of failing to respond to a crisis in time, lost no time to discuss the situation that followed the 
August 2 developments. During the debate, the Iraqi invasion was unanimously described as 
unacceptable and unbelievable. The Security Council passed a resolution which determined that 
breach of peace was committed by Iraq and asked it to withdraw unconditionally to the position 
as located before the invasion (82). This resolution was followed by many more which, taken 
together, called for restoration of Kuwait, imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq and the use 
of minimum force for the enforcement of such sanctions. 
The Security Council Resolution 661 ( 1990) imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, "one 
of the broadest set of sanction ever put in place". The resolution called upon all the states to 
prevent import, export and transshipment of all commodities and produce (including oil) to or 
from Iraq and Kuwait and stop the transfer of funds, military equipment and weapons to Iraq. 
The resolution, however, exempted foodstuff, medical goods under " humanitarian circum-
stances" from the items banned under the embargo. The international community was also 
requested to provide all possible assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait and protect 
its assets. The said resolution also asked not to recognize any regime planted by Iraq in Kuwait. 
The resolution also constituted a committee of all the members of council to supervise the 
progress of the implementation of the sanctions. 
The Security Council Resolution 665 (1990), which was voted in favor by all the 
members present with Cuba and Yemen abstaining, virtually allowed the naval blockade of 
Iraq(83). It called upon the maritime powers in the region "to use such measures that 
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the 
Security Council" to interdict all maritime shipping from and to Kuwait to inspect and verify 
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation relating to economic 
sanctions against Iraq. 
The UNSC adopted resolution 666 on September 14 ( 1990) which tried to resolve the 
intricate question of supply of food and medical items to Iraq and Kuwait under "humanitarian 
circumstances". The strategy it evolved was to prevent uninterrupted flow of food items and 
medical goods (84) and deny the Iraqi government control over the supplies made under the 
humanitarian circumstances. The text, adopted by all the members with Cuba and Yemen voting 
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against it, directed the Security Council Committee to keep the situation regarding the supply 
of foodstuffs to Iraq under constant review. It requested the Secretary General to collect 
information from United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies on the availabil-
ity of food in Iraq and Kuwait. As and when the committee felt that the supply offoodstuffs be 
restored to it was required to report to the SC for appropriate action and authorization. After 
the authorization the foodstuffs were permitted to be distributed through UN agencies in 
cooperation with the humanitarian agencies in order to ensure that they reached the intended 
beneficiaries. 
Passing 12 resolutions in a row the UN did not, as it has been advocated, get 
reinvigorated. Instead, it was a test-case of the US abduction of the same. For, its limited 
involvement in and clumsy reaction to other conflicts, which preceded and followed the Persian 
Gulf crisis, pointto the fact that the UN's collective security action over Iraq did not emanate 
from its conscience. Instead, it fell victim to the wishes and whims of a single power. 
The hijacking of the UN by the US exposed the very irrationality of an undemocratic 
provision in the Charter, the establishment of the Security Council authorized to take executive 
actions with each of its member vested with a 'veto power'. This, in effect, means that the UN 
can become captive to the wishes and whims of a single power. The Persian Gulf crisis exposed 
this to its hilt. 
Also, the crisis questioned the efficacy of the "veto power". The exercising of the veto,' 
as was demonstrated time and again, is related by the veto bearing country to its national 
interests than the interests of the world community as a whole. If previously the over use of the 
veto prevented the UN to resolve any crisis. The absence of veto bearing voice in the Persian 
Gulf crisis led to the adopting of one resolution after another, not allowing the diplomatic 
efforts the required time to succeed in ending the crisis non-violently. 
In other words, when a major global power is ruling the roost in international arena no 
power can prevent it from utilizing UN's services in pursuit of its goals and objectives. This way 
the Persian Gulf crisis established that the US dominated this world body after the end of the 
cold war. The US behaved in such a dictatorial manner in the UN that it did not even consult 
the Secretary General and never took the matter to the General Assembly. 
The US domination indicates the decline of this world body. This is because the UN might 
not be brought into scene in those crises whose solution does not serve the US interests ( 
Bosnian crisis, for example), where the US does not need to invoke the UN to legitimize its 
involvement or where the US wants to take the credit all alone (Palestine accord). 
In addition, in order to take punitive action the UN would always look to the US, for only 
it can make such a large contribution to the UN's peace-keeping operations and influence other 
member countries to do the same. The problems such as the composition of UN forces, 
command and control of the UN-sponsored operations and, most importantly, the financing of 
such operations will be a grave obstacle to a UN collective security action not supported by the 
US. 
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The UN's authorization of war against Iraq raises a moot point. That is whether the UN's 
military actions under its international obligation to establish and protect peace and security are 
morally justified. The sufferings Iraqis have undergone due to economic embargo, the number 
of civilian Iraqi casualties during the allied forces'carpet bombings and damage done to the 
properties for civilian use suggest that they are not. The blame the UN must shoulder for the 
sufferings the Iraqi civilians are exposed to can not be transferred to Saddam Hussein accusing 
him of being responsible for all this. People of an undemocratic poltical system should not be 
made to suffer from a punitive action taken against their governmentas they do not influence 
its decisions. 
The cruelty inherent in the undertaking of UN's moral obligation by another state on 
behalf of it can only be mitigated if the UN instead of authorizing a concerned states to carry 
out military operation under the collective security action itself takes the charge and in the 
course of the proceedings sees that laws of the war particularly those pertaining to the 
protection of civilian (and their properties) of the targeted country are strictly adhered to. 
The UN can't be said to have rejuvenated due to its role in a crisis in which its charter 
was blatantly violated (85). First, The collective security action was not undertaken under the 
UN command. 
Second, the UNSCRs called for liberation of Kuwait and not the attack on Iraq. Actions 
inside the country targeted to be punished can be taken under extraordinary circumstances, For 
example the one in which without destroying the occupying power, the withdrawal can not be 
secured. But in case of the task of liberating Kuwait could be accomplished by the allied forces 
by landing their troops in Kuwait with adequate air cover to throw the Iraqi forces out from 
there (86). 
EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE 
The Persian Gulf crisis can be marked for the mooting of numerous peace plans in its 
short duration of four months, yet none yielding the desired results. 
The first of these proposals came from Iraq itself only on August 2 ,1990 . The three-point 
Iraqi peace proposal demanded the resolution of all the West Asian problems simultaneously 
and on the same principle and basis as set by the UN Security Council, immediate withdrawal 
of the US forces and its replacement by an Arab force with its size and area of deployment as 
decided 
by the UN Secretary General and the constituents of the force by Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 
consultation with each other, and the exclusion of Egyptian force as they "are in the US plot 
against Iraq". 
On August 25, the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, announced a three-stage peace plan 
which stipulated the freezing of military build up in the Persian Gulf, withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait and the international forces from Saudi Arabia and its replacement by both UN and 
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Arab Peace Keeping forces, and setting up of a committee chosen by the Arab League to discuss 
the territorial aspect of the conflict. 
The PLO plan was presented in a modified version as the PLO-Jordan Plan on August 
28. Beside envisaging the Iraqi and Foreign forces' withdrawal, the plan proposed an agreement 
between the Kuwaiti government and that of Iraq on the latter having administrative control 
over some parts of Kuwait followed by plebiscite in Kuwait. 
PLO came out with another Peace Plan on September 4. This plan was disclosed by 
Arafat's deputy in the Al-Fatah organization of the PLO in an interview with French newspaper 
"Liberation". A four-point plan, it called for a guarantee from the US that it would not attack 
Iraq's chemical plants and nuclear facilities, Iraqi withdrawal from all of Kuwait except Bubiyan 
so that Iraq could have an access to sea, establishment of Iraqi-Kuwait border with Iraq 
possessing the Al-Rumeilah oil field, and plebiscite in Kuwait.This plan also maintained that 
Emir of Kuwait be bared from returning to Kuwait, unless the Plebiscite was held. 
On August 31, the Arab League Proposed a five-point Peace Plan. This envisaged 
immediate release of hostages by Iraq, a guarantee from Iraq on the safety of Arab laborers in 
Kuwait, return of royal family to Kuwait and a guarantee from Iraqi government that it would 
not mishandle the Kuwaiti assets. The Proposal also condemned Iraqi invasion and refused to 
recognize its annexation of Kuwait. 
In the month of September, Libya mooted a peace plan whose provisions included 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and its replacement by a UN force, withdrawal of US 
troops and its replacement by an Arab or Muslim force, lifting of economic embargo on Iraq, 
Kuwaiti surrender of two islands and the Rumeilah field to Iraq, political self-determination for 
Kuwait people, a unified Arab oil Policy, and immediate negotiations on debt repayment by and 
compensation to Iraq. 
ON January 14, 1991, the Organization of Islamic Conference ( OIC) appealed to Iraq 
to withdraw from Kuwait and thus avoid war in the interests of Muslims of his country and those 
of the other Persian Gulf countries. 
Outside the Arab world, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also tried to seek a political 
solution to the crisis. In a meeting of NAM foreign ministers on October 4, 1990, the federal 
secretary of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, the then chairman of the NAM, was authorized to 
evolve NAM'S position on the crisis and use his good off ices to resolve it. The minister 
thereafter visited a host of countries including Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. During his 
visit to Saudi Arabia the minister also met the dethroned ruler of Kuwait. 
Beside the Arab countries, he visited France, Soviet Union, the US and the EEC 
headquarters. He also met the UN Secretary General during his world tour. NAM sought 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as the pre-condition for any peace 
talks.However, it also maintained that after the Iraqi withdrawal the foreign troops must also 
pull out from the Persian Gulf region followed by an Iraqi-Kuwaiti negotiation on border 
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dispute issues. The NAM was also for a guarantee to Iraq that it would not be attacked. It was 
for the establishment of a regional security set up in the Persian Gulf sans any link with the 
outside military powers. It contended that immediately after the Iraqi withdrawal the whole 
complex of Middle Eastern Question be addressed, possibly by convening an international 
conference (87). 
France was the only country from West Europe active in peace efforts. In an address to 
the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1990 the French president said that if Iraq agreed 
to withdraw, all the Middle East problems could be negotiated. It was a four-phase plan which 
envisaged in first place the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait 
and determining " the democratic will of the people of Kuwait" in the second stage, convening 
of an international conference on issues like presence of foreign troops in Lebanon, Palestin-
ians' rights for self-determination and the right of Israel to live in security in the third stage, 
and formulation of an Arab agenda on arms control and intra-regional cooperation in the last 
stage. 
The Soviet Union was also engaged in finding out a diplomatic solution to the crisis. 
Soviet President sent his special advisor, Yevgene Primakov, to Bhagdad and Washington. 
After his meeting with Saddam Hussein, Primakov declared that the latter had wished to 
withdraw provided he was allowed to retain the Bubiyan island and the Rumeilah oil field. 
Though the Soviet Union did not make any comment on Iraqi offer, Primakov's statement that 
he was not 
pessimistic about the prospect of a political solution to the crisis, indicated Soviet 
Union's implicit support to the afore-mentioned Iraqi position(88). 
Primakov went to Bhagdad again during the war (February 12 ,1991) and declared in his 
subsequent visit to Iran,that he saw "rays of light" in Iraqi position. Gorbachev presented a 
peace proposal on February 19, which called for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and negotiation 
of the Palestine problem. On February 21, the Soviet Union also announced that Iraq had agreed 
to withdraw unconditionally. On February 22, Moscow said that Iraq accepted the Gorbachev 
proposal. 
The US, which maintained that no peace was possible unless Iraq withdrew immediately, 
unconditionally and completely from Kuwait(89), also resorted to diplomatic means in the end 
of November. On 30th of that month, the US President made a dramatic announcement that he 
was sending the Secretary of State, James Baker, to Geneva to confer with Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, Tariq Aziz, and invited Tariq Aziz to Washington for direct negotiations. Iraq agreed 
to send Tariq Aziz for Geneva negotiations scheduled to be held on January 9. On January 5, 
Bush said in a message to nation that in the meeting Baker would reiterate the US position that 
Iraq should withdraw immediately unconditionally and completely from Kuwait. On January 9, 
the two officials met for seven hours. The talks failed. Baker said that during the meeting he 
did not find Iraq willing to withdraw from Kuwait. 
Before the war broke out, the UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar,visited Bhagdad 
in his last ditch effort to see that the issue was settled without the war being made. During his 
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meeting with Saddam Hussies, Cuellar tried to convince him that incase Iraq withdrew, it would 
not be attacked. There will be subsequent lifting of the embargo followed by the withdrawal of 
foreign forces and the convening of an international conference on the Palestine issue. 
All of the above-mentioned peace plans proved futile. Much of the explanation behind 
this lies in the biased character of the plans. These were clearly tilted in favor of either of the 
sides. The PLO Plan or the one it proposed in union with Jordan was totally biased in Iraq's 
favor. In fact, one can gauge the growing liaison between PLO and Iraq in the latter's peace 
plans. The one it proposed on August 25 was quite impartial as it asked for the simultaneous 
withdrawal of both the Iraqi and foreign forces. But within two days of it, the PLO along with 
Jordan came out with a new plan which called for holding of plebiscite in Kuwait also. The one 
PLO proposed on September 4, went a step ahead by proposing that Kuwaiti Emir be not 
allowed to return before the holding of the plebiscite. 
Qaddafi' insincerity in trying to find out a peaceful solution to the crisis reflected in his 
peace plans as these were more or less an endorsement of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. For, these 
advocated that Iraq be permitted to retain two Kuwaiti islands and people be accorded the right 
of political self-determination, meaning thereby Iraq could retain Kuwait if its people wished 
so. 
The Arab League plan did not even ask for a simultaneous or post-Iraqi evacuation 
withdrawal of the foreign forces. It was accordingly rejected by Iraq's sympathizers in the 
League and, therefore, turned out to be a non-starter (90). 
The OIC, where Saudi Arabia wielded much influence cashed in on Islam to call for a 
unilateral withdrawal of Iraq, evading all other related questions such as the Palestine issue and 
the withdrawal of foreign troops. 
The NAM set the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait as pre-condition for the settlement of 
any other West Asian problem. France's proposal was more or less the same. But the reference 
to the restoration of "democratic will of the people" drew much interests. It could mean either 
of the two; to grant people the right to determine their future political system and Sabah's family 
's return to power. 
The USSR claimed to have broken the ice twice i.e. persuading Iraq to accept the 
Security Council resolution which firstly and formostly demanded Iraq's unconditional with-
drawal from Kuwait; However, no sooner than the USSR made these claims Iraq denied it. The 
US alsorejected Soviet peace proposals. Thus the shuttling between Bhagdad and Washington 
by Primakov by and large proved a futile exercise. 
Even the US proposal to hold negotiations with Iraq was a political move. A number of 
factors suggest that it aimed at buying time. The situations before January 15 i.e the pre-
mansoon session in Arabia, were not ideal for war as heavy rains were expected which were 
poised to turn a good portion of land on Iraq-Kuwait border into marshland, restricting the 
movement of tanks and APC's. Till then public opinion was not mobilized in favor of war. The 
West European allies, barring the UK, were skeptical of the utility of military action. So were 
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the Arab nations, with Syria , Egypt and even Saudi Arabia having yet not been able to decide 
that whether they would take part in any assault on Iraq. 
However, once the pre-mansoon period came to an end, the US-Arab countries-Western 
allies evolved a consensus on the question of war, the US began harping on that it would not 
agree for anything less than an Iraqi withdrawal during Baker-Aziz meeting at Geneva, No such 
statement was made by Bush when he offered Saddam Hussein 
the olive branch. 
The possibility of peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis became a casualty to US 
and Iraq's uncompromising and confrontatlonist positions. The US stood for an immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal and Iraqi insisted on linking his withdrawal to that of Israel from the 
occupied territories. 
In view of the fact the US was more interested in destroying Iraq and the linking of two 
West Asian issues by the latter was a political ploy, it was hardly likely that the US could agree 
to simultaneous resolution of both the issues on Iraq to the solution of the two crisis one by one, 
though both the options were well-meaning and attainable. 
In the initial stages, Saddam's tough posture eluded peace. In response to French 
Proposal of September 4, Saddam put withdrawal of western forces and the lifting of economic 
embargo as pre-conditions. He also declared that he had no intention to withdraw from Kuwait 
(91). While at the eve of and during the war the same rigid attitude was exhibited by the US. 
Bush 
ensured himself that January 9 Baker-Aziz meeting did not succeed by stating that the talks 
would be used to ask Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally. 
Despite the Soviet contention on February 23 that Iraq was ready to withdraw, which 
was also not denied by Iraq, Bush said that it did not go far enough and went ahead launching 
land war on February 24. Since Iraq had partially accepted the US conditions, diplomacy should 
have been given one more chance by deferring the land war for a few days. 
In fact, as the January 15 deadline approached nearer the US toughened its stand on 
peace. At the begining of the crisis Bush was reported as saying that a mere statement of intent 
on the part of Saddam to withdraw would be enough, but when the war started with US nearly 
getting closer to its main.objective of destroying Iraq, it rejected to announce cease-fire even 
though Iraqi President ordered a pull out from Kuwait (92). 
US was also against an "Arab Solution" to the Kuwaiti issue which reflected in its 
cajoling Saudi Arabia into inviting American forces. US reportedly persuaded King Fahad not 
to attend Algerian president Shadli Ben Jedid who was to visit Saudi Arabia to arrange a meeting 
between Saddam Hussein and the King on their border. 
THE COURSE OF WAR 
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It does not sound logical to say that the military action against Iraq was launched as a 
last resort before which the United states waited for economic sanctions to make desired effect 
on Iraq or diplomatic means to succeed. It had become clear much before January 17 that the 
economic sanctions had failed to dampen Iraqi resoluteness. Various diplomatic initiatives also 
failed in the face US as well Iraq's uncompromising stands. 
This may lead one to believe that the war was inevitable. To launch it on January 17 was 
a strategic decision. The deployment of around 400,000 troops by the US could be completed 
only towards the end or the beginning of December, 1990. The allied forces camping in Saudi 
Arabia also needed two to three months to get acalamatise with the geo-climatic conditions of 
the Arabian desert. 
The US military strategists had warned their government that a Panama-like surgical 
strike was not possible against Iraq. It was,therefore, advised to enter the war after full 
preparation. Back home, during the first few weeks following the Iraqi invasion the public mood 
was also not in favor of the war. Americans and Europeans were of the view that o i l—the main 
concern of the U S — w a s coming from the Persian Gulf region without interruption. In view of 
this, the American public opinion held, it would be unreasonable to start a war which was going 
to cause about 50,000 deaths on the side of the allied forces alone. 
Since the cost of the maintenance of the presence of the US-led Allied Forces was being 
borne by Saudi Arabia, there was no economic compulsion to return soon. Uncertainties 
regarding the participation of the Arab forces in an attack against Iraq, the Arab response if 
somehow Israel entered the war, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and human casualties also 
persuaded US to defer the launching of an attack for an appropriate time. 
During the debate before adopting the UNSC resolution which was meant to authorize 
collective security action against Iraq, January 15 was set as the deadline. This was also a 
strategic decision. For the period between January 1 and 15 happens to be the beginning of 
Mansoon session, therefore one or two heavy rains were not ruled out. In such a scenario, the 
US could not have been able launch at least the ground battle as the movement of heavy 
weapons 
like tanks, APCs would not have been possible in the marshy land on Iraq-Kuwait border. 
When the war started the US led multinational forces ( MNF) were about 550, 000 in 
number. 250,000 of them were brought in the months of December and January alone. The MNF 
was armed with the laser guided smart bombs, heat-seeking missiles, electronic w a r f a r e 
measures to suffocate all communication of the enemy and an array of front-line aircrafts 
capable of dropping conventional as well as nuclear explosives. The attack was launched on a 
completely dark night of 17th January optimizing the effectiveness of precision bombs. The 
bombing began with the air force flying 2,000 tO 3,000 sorties per day and cruise missile striking 
strategic targets including command and control centers and facilities producing chemical and 
biological weapons of Iraq. 
The air strike tried to gain mastery over Iraqi skies by attacking air defense suite air strips 
and Iraqi aircrafts. The US also bombed refineries, power stations, political targets like 
Presidential Palace and Ministry of Defense. 
Tiiat how long the US would continue to bomb Iraq was kept close. Bush assured that 
it would be a six-day affair. This led many an analyst to believe that the US was for a quick 
victory. For, it wanted to avoid Israel being sucked into war and Iraq destroying oil wells in 
Saudi Arabia. However, a few other military analysts disagreed with this proposition. For, Iraq 
could be destroyed totally only in a long drawn out war. And if to kill Saddam was also one of 
the objectives of the MNF then the end of the war depended entirely upon the accomplishing 
of this task for which no time limit could be stipulated. Also, knowing the Iraqi strength at 
ground, the US did not want to start it before the morale of the Iraqi government and the army 
was destroyed(93). 
Within a few days of the aerial attacks allies' air strikes spread over civilian targets as 
well . This was partially the result of the allied forces' failure to destroy Iraqi military 
infrastructure in full. Iraq managed to safe its military strength from total destruction displaying 
the art of surprise and deception. Iraq strewed countryside with plywood Scud missile launchers 
with artificial fire emitting heat from energy decoys. In addition, Iraq deployed full-sized plaistic 
inflatable tanks purchased from the West. Use of these dummies enabled Iraqis to achieve 
tactical surprise, especially during the air campaign. They also dug themselves deep Inside the 
ground, with the Republican Guard in concrete underground shelter to prevent casualties in 
enemy's air attack (94). 
Iraq attacked Israel with Scud missiles as soon as the war started. The Iraqi action was 
to provoke Israel to jump into the war so that the Arab forces particularly the one from Syria 
could withdraw thesmselves from the war.It was politically motivated more than military-
oriented. 
Firstly, the missile attacks were not regular. When Israel with the help o Patriots started 
neutralizing Iraqi missiles in mid-air Iraq had an option to increase the frequency of attacks and 
hurl not one but 25 missiles or so in a single attack. Israel did not posses required number of 
Patriots to counter Iraqi missiles attacks on such a large scale. 
Fear of a nuclear attack from Israel, which would have been a logical option for Israel 
had it been exposed to the threat of total destruction from Iraq, served as deterrence to Iraq. 
Although Iraqi move against Israel was welcomed by Arab people, it failed to drive a wedge 
between the Arab and the rest of the allied forces. The USA dealt with the situation quite 
reasonably as it literally bribed Israel, in form of giving it financial assistance, to keep it away 
from the war. Saddam Hussein also erred in attacking Saudi Arabia simultaneously. This act of 
him gave the Arab governments an excuse to say that they would not part with the coalition 
forces even if Israel entered the war. They pointed out that Iraqi attacks did not look to be an 
extension of Arab-Israeli conflict as they themselves were being meted out same treatment from 
Iraq as was Israel. 
The US scored a major success by completely jamming Iraqi air surveillance capability 
enabling it moving huge quantities of weapons, equipment and other support materials over 
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sparse lines of communications. This in turn helped the US to outmaneuver Iraqi force 
deployment. 100,000 sorties dropping 88,500 tons of bombs in 40 days destroyed Iraqi 
command and control facilities and restricted the flow of maintenance commodities to Kuwait 
to 2,000 tones a day from the requirement of 20,000 tones per day. 
On February 24, President Bush ordered the Gulf command to eject Iraqi out of Kuwait. 
Allied forces struck into Kuwait and Iraq beforedawn on that day. There was light resistance 
from Iraq as a large number of troops surrendered. 
Iraq had deployed nearly 170,000 troops consisting of four armored and six infantry 
divisions inside Kuwait and 2,50,000 in southern part of the country which adjoins Kuwait on 
border with Saudi Arabia(95). 1,05,000 Republican Guards were held as reserves, some around 
Bhagdad but mostly (100, 000) in southern part of the country in general area of Basra in two 
groups; one immediately north of Kuwait city and other Around Basra (96). Iraqis had 
constructed well fortified defecnes all along the front, relying on a network of deep minefields 
and earth beams razor wires. Trenches had been dugged and filled with oil, to be ignited at the 
time of allied forces' attack. Tanks and other support weapons were hidden inside strong points 
from where firing position could be taken on beams to engage attacking troops. A total number 
of, 50,000 mines had been laid all along the front line. The weapons Iraqi army was equipped 
with were not only of the most sophisticated quality, but were used in the eight-year long war 
with Iran, meaning that Iraqi army was quite efficient in employing them under desert 
conditions. Iraqi anti-aircraft defense was very formidable, it included hundreds of Soviet-built 
surface-to-air missiles and around 4,000 modern anti-aircraft guns. The Iraqi army was also 
aclamatized to the desert warfare. 
According to some accounts, both the US and Iraq were not contemplating a land war. 
The US perception was that Iraq will not be able to survive its military machine after massive 
air offensive. Whereas, Saddam Hussein was under impression that aware of his country's edge 
in land warfare with the specter of loosening thousands of lives and resultant domestic and 
international criticism in addition. Bush would like to avoid it. 
But, when Saddam showed no sign to give up despite being bruised in about the month 
long aerial attack, the US planned a perfect air-land battle. It adopted an air-land battle strategy 
which implied air attacks on the rear areas to cut off supplying lines, destroy command and 
control centers and strike Republican Guard units toisolate it from the battle front. Air attacks 
was to be followed by rapid forays through enemy defecnes by ground troops with the help 
of artillery, close air support and armored attacks, throwing the enemy off balance spreading 
fear, confusion and dismay in opposite's camp. 
General Schwarzkopf planned to move the allied forces swiftly to surround the Iraqis and 
pound them. The air power was to be used to break the will of the enemy to fight. The date for 
the ground offensive was fixed on 21 February (97). However, due to USSR's efforts to 
negotiate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, it was postponed for February 24. 
A day before the commencement of the ground offensive, the focus of the allied forces 
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shifted to the front, attacking tanks, troops minefields and artillery emplacements. The allied 
forces' used 15,00 pound bombs known as Daisey Cutters. These destroyed every thing in 300 
foot diameter. The allied forces' decided not to concentrate on bombing the Republican Guards 
inside concrete bunkers and other units dug inside the ground. Instead, the strategy was to 
damage about 30 percent of the artillery of the enemy. 
On February 24, the US 18th Corps comprising 82nd Airborne Assault and 24th 
Mechanised Infantry divisions along with the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment launched the 
extreme western hook with heavy French armored brigade of the French Dagnet Division 
protecting its western flank. The 101st Airborne Western division leaping from 400 helicopters 
established a logistic base. 
On the morning of February 25, about the same time as 101st was cutting highway 8 
further west, the 24th Infantry Division established itself on the Euphrates river near Al-
Nasirriyah, achieving complete tactical surprise and taking the Iraqis aback. As a result 
thousand of Iraqisoldiers surrendered. The US forces also destroyed bunkers full of munitions, 
weapons and other stocks between Talil and Jalibaah airfield. 
When 18th Corps offensive neared Basra, The Hmammurabi Armored Division of Iraq 
was forced 30 km west of Basra to give the battle ground to the arriving troops. The US forces 
were able to destroy at least six Hammuravbi battalions with artillery and ground support 
helicopters. At 3.30 a.m. on February 27, the Iraqi division broke contact and fled from the 
battle field. 
The 7th Corps launched the shorter hook aiming for reserves held north of Kuwait city. 
The corps moving on a front of 90 km and ably supported by scout helicopters, were able to 
cover a distance about 200 kms, first going north and then turning east to entrap the Iraqi 
reserves. 
The Saddam line was nothing inore than a 10 foot high sand wall and without any troop 
defending it. The much talked about Iraqi defecnes were pierced easily with earth beams being 
breached. The Iraqi army was expected to give spirited battle from its prepared defecnes and 
inflict heavy casualties on the attacking forces. But without any worthwhile surveillance 
capability, close air support and a will to resist, the Iraqis decided against sacrificing themselves 
needlessly or fighting a lost battle. 
Saddam Hussein, who was oblivious of the actual ground conditions in the main 
defecnes, finally budged under massive onslaught by the allied forces and ordered the 
withdrawal of his forces from Kuwait. The withdrawing troops were caught defenseless on the 
Kuwaiti-Basra border. Their weapons and equipment was destroyed from the air. Even after the 
a cease-fire was declared, the allied corces' alrcrafts kept pounding the retreating Iraqi forces.It 
was only on February 28, a presidential decree ended the carnage. 
Iraq's 4000 out of 4280 tanks, 1856 out of 2750 APCs, 2140 out of 3110 artillery pieces 
were destroyed in 100 hours of ground offensive. Besides, 450 out of .650 aircrafts were lost 
in the war. over 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were captured as POWs and over 1,00,000 killed and 
wounded. The allies' casualties were relatively light, being 311 dead, 66 missing, 13 captured 
as POWs and 45 planes and 15 helicopters lost in action ( 98). 
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The war was a one-sided affair. The only consolation Iraq derived from it was that it 
managed to sustain enormous loss of men and material for about 44 days. While the most 
disastrous aspect of Iraqi performance was that it did not put up any resistance where it was 
expected to be the strongest.Iraq's miserable performance in the war can be attributed to a 
number of factors. Saddam became the prisoner of his own defense strategy. The Iraqi army had 
turned Kuwait and south of it into a fortress by building powerful fortification along the Kuwait-
Saudi border and as weU as along the coast and laying extensive minefields. Because of this very 
reason, the Iraqi forces were easily cut off and encircled by troops advancing over undefended 
or poorly defended Iraqi territoiy in the direction of Nasiriyah and Basra. So says Babic 
Manojlo, " history has shown that ever since war becamemobite maneuvering wars, no 
fortification produced the desired results" ( 99). 
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Topography the region also played its role in the defeat of Iraq. The Iraqiforces had only 
one route —Aramaic to Basra— open for their retreat. Between Nasiiyah Amarah and Basra there 
are vast marshes which exposed almost entire remaining Iraqi motorized unites to air attacks 
along that single road. Herein comes the importance of air support factor. Being attacked from 
air while returning and without adequate anti-aircraft defenses as well as air protection, the Iraqi 
army had no chance to disengage and deploy. Shortly after the arrival of coalition troops in Saudi 
Arabia, most of Iraqis aircrafts were pulled back from air bases in southern Iraq and deployed 
further north out of easy range of opposing strike aircraft in the region. Hardly any Iraqi aircraft 
took to air, leaving the allied forces enjoy unhampered air supremacy. The allied forces could 
attack Iraqi forcesat their will and prevent surveillance of their activities. 
US space and electronic medium played an important role in Iraq's defeat. These jammed 
Iraqi air surveillance, making it easier for the allied forces to move unmonitored on the one hand 
and expose the Iraqi incapability to match and neutralize US superiority in the field of precision 
guidance. Absence of foreign advisors and shortage of spare parts also had a telling effect on 
Iraqi fortunes in the war. 
Another tactical mistake the Iraqis committed was to spread themselves all along the 240 
km Kuwait-Iraq border, thus the entire length of defenses was held very thinly. The result was, 
what Von Clauswits had warned much before, "one who tries to hold up every ground thinly 
ends up holding nothing". 
Last but not the least, Saddam Hussein's underestimation of enemy's strength was largely 
responsible for the Iraqi defeat. Had he asked for counsel from his own intellectuals, those at 
the foreign office and military experts, there might have come advises toprepare a defense plan 
taking into consideration one's weaknesses vis-a-vis the strong points of enemy's defense 
preparedness and power to strike(lOO). 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR 
THE VICTORIOUS : THE UNITED STATES: 
From its victory over Iraq, the US emerged bestriding the narrow world like colossus with 
all others having been dawrfed before its might. Rusians lying low, Germans lost on their post 
unification reconstruction efforts, Third World, particularly the Arab countries, willingly 
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submitting tiiemselves to the US suzerainty and Iraq being told to line up or face the ignominy 
of being whipped. 
Though over a "second-rate power" ( 101) the US victory led to the establishment of the 
American hegemony over the existing international system. For, coinciding with the end of the 
cold war, the US victory meant that in the absence of a global power of its standing, America 
had the capability to punish the ambitious powers who were trying to fill the vacuum left by the 
Soviet Union's retreat. No less was it a lesson to the countries of the North which could use 
their newly gained economic strength for dominating the international political system. The 
Persian Gulf war highlighted their inability to protect their economic interests from a Third 
World Power and their compulsion to align their foreign policy behind that of the United States 
for their economic survival. 
The US victory established that neither was the multi-polarisation of the world nor the 
restructuring of the international order on economic plank was in off ing as the logical 
consequence of the end of the Cold War. In other words, the scenario that emerged from the 
end of the Persian Gulf crisis was that the country with a combination of military, economic, 
diplomatic and political assets would remain to be the leader of the world. The other contenders 
lagged far behind the US in this respect. Hardly, as the Persian Gulf war plausibly demonstrated, 
any other country was capable of being a decisive player in any conflict anywhere in the world. 
The US victory over a small-sized country, with few million population armed with aging 
Soviet weapons and battle-hardened only against a regional enemy ( Iran), can not undo the 
great 
advantages the US had reaped from it. This was the first war the US won after Second World 
War. The US fought stalemate in Korea and returned defeated from Vietnam. But the war 
against Iraq brought to focus that now equipped with laser guided bombs, spy satellites, world's 
most sophisticated aircrafts and an army capable of successfully conducting its military 
operations in far flung areas and alienated environment, the US was an indefatigable military 
power(102). 
However, the US led 'New World Order' does not look to be a 'f ixed' phenomenon. The 
role of the leadership of the world the US assumed during and after the Persian Gulf war needs 
repeated demonstrations.US intervention in a regional conflict may be blocked in the future 
by the yawing gap between the declining domestic resources and global strategic commitments. 
The US involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis was the result of a combination of 
circumstances. The crisis of the magnitude of Iraqi invasion may continue to erupt but changing 
circumstances may dissuade the US from intervening in each and every crisis. 
This is not merely presumption. For instance, the economic recession that followed and 
was ensued by the Persian Gulf war and the defeat of Bush are pointer to the fact that after 
overcoming the Vietnam syndrome (103), thanks to the victory against Iraq, the people of the 
US are under the spell of Persian Gulf War syndrome. They do not want US to play the role of 
global policeman when one's own house is not in order. The US intellectuals are divided 
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between the internationalists, who are for an unbound America defending its interests and its 
lofty ideas, like export of democracy everywhere in the world, and the isolationists or non-
interventionists who maintain that America must avoid needless external engagements misusing 
the country's power and strength to right very wrong in the world. 
There are only a few flash points in the Persian Gulf where Western Europe might be 
tempted to line up with the US. In some other conflicts, they prefer from isolation to limited 
support to the US to pursue an independent policy. Thus the US leadership of the North in each 
and every sphere can not be taken for granted. 
Of course, no other country of the world matches the combination of assets the US 
possesses. But its continuing decline as an economic power to reckon with will have its toll on 
the US foreign policy. The North dissociates its total submission to the US on security issues 
from its difference with the US on the latter's global economic interests. They shall lend their 
support to the US if a common threat haunts both of them. But they, at the same time, are 
unlikely to yield to the US on the issues of economic interests. Over and above, the US can not 
contain West Europe's economic hostility by threatening to use 
force ( 104). 
The US victory over Iraq only accentuated its economic problems. The recession-hit 
economy, fairing not up to its reputation in global economic competition and vibrant techno-
logical innovation in civilian sector (105 ), is going to affect adversely the added pressure of 
retaining the mantle of the only supper power status it acquired after defeating Iraq(106). 
The threat to the US from the Third World countries, particularly those with the weapons 
of mass destruction, ceased at least for a short after its overwhelming victory over one such 
power, Iraq. But these countries have not ceased to exist as the powers possessing the weapons 
of mass destruction. They are, in addition, resisting to their best the US diplomatic pressure to 
dismantle their weapons. This brings home the point that once the Persian Gulf war recedes into 
history, the assertion by regional bullies can not be discounted. And what about the defiant 
powers like Iran or Ukraine, which is reluctant to dismantle its nuclear weapons and is the third 
largest nuclear power (107)in the world?. Their defiance of the US, that too at a time when it 
is ruling the roosts, coupled with their strategic decision to confront the US politically only, 
unlike Iraq, is the source of a bigger embarrassment for the US. 
Beside this, growing antagonism towards the US among the Third World people, a 
logical corollary of US indiscriminate use of force against Iraq, is a cause of concern to the US 
policy makers, no matter most of the Third World governments are its allies.Since radical and 
revolutionary political/popular changes are always in store in this region, its people's disillu-
sionment with the US is a potential threat. 
The Persian Gulf war might have become a license to the US military and political 
adventures abroad. But, at the same time, it has returned the course of the US foreign policy 
towards a domestic-economic agenda. There are greater pressures to reform its economy, end 
mitigate the budget and trade deficits, increase investment in education and infrastructure 
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andregain export competitiveness. Tiiough directed towards regaining its economic superiority 
on global level, this also demands a little dissociation from political activism. 
As far as the implications of the US victory for its West Asian policy are concerned, the 
US has succeeded in arresting its waning influence in the Persian Gulf, and West Asia as a 
whole.The Iraqi invasion made up the loss of clout the US was about to undergo due to the end 
of the Soviet threat to the regional countries. Now, the regional powers know that the US 
support is equally, rather more crucial, to combat a hostile from among themselves. 
In fact, the Persian Gulf countries were never directly exposed to the Soviet threat, even 
not when the USSR invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet Union also tried to befriend the US allies. 
This gave them a bargaining power vis-a-vis the US. But the Iraqi threat was real and imminent. 
For the first time these countries realized the importance of the US to them. The fact that Iraq 
has not been written off by the US allies in the region is also going in favor of the US. 
The US can rely on a long-standing and total dependence of West Asian countries on it. 
On political front, the US has roped in Syria as one of its regional allies. On diplomatic front, 
it has for the first time succeeded in mitigating the US-Arab differences on the Palestine issue. 
The security of the supply of oil has been ensured. To quote Sreedhar "in fact some argue that 
the US has in effect become an OPEC member". ( 1 0 8 ) And a sort of informal security alliance 
with the oil-rich sates exists. The West Asian partners of this alliance are well disposed to 
provide it with all the strategic facilities as well as finance its military adventures, 
THE VICTORIOUS : AIUB SATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF: 
The Persian Gulf crisis exposed the fragility of the regional security structure of the 
GCC, to an extent that its member-states have shed their policy of not entering into an apparent 
security alliance with the US. Their rejection of a regional security structure including Syria and 
Egypt to fill the void where they lack in, has reinforced their confidence in US/Western defense 
umbrella. They have evolved a more organized pattern of the US presence in the region. Bahrain 
has consented to become the headquarters of the US Central Command in the Persian Gulf. 
Kuwait has been regularly holding joint military exercises with the US ( 1 0 9 ) . So have been the 
other GCC member-states. The Persian Gulf states have not stopped seeing Iraq as a threat. Iran 
continues to remain an untested regional power, and Islamic fundamentalism is a new and fast-
emerging threat (110 ) . They find the existing regional security system a miss-match to contain 
these threats and knowing that these are the matter of concern for the US as well , they find in 
US an ally and a far better alternative to rely upon. 
On the issue of beefing up the GCC security, the member-states have entered into 
bilateral agreements and have also decided to give hi-tech weaponry teeth to their organization 
and raising a 100,000 strong armed-force to avoid a Kuwait type invasion (111). Yet these 
efforts are no match to the kinds of threat they are faced with. Bilateral security alliance, it does 
not seem, would come into force when one of the partners would weigh its commitment to come 
to the defense of the other one in terms of the likely repercussions of it on its national security 
and integrity. It has been proved time and again that by the mere possession of hi-tech weapons 
in the absence of awell-trained armed force can not deter a regional or external threat. And the 
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raising of a strong army of 100,000 men can not materialize given the fact that such a plan would 
call for a huge cut clown inthesizeof its armed forces by each country. Thus the regional security 
through this method tends to weaken the national security of the GCC member-states. 
The Persian Gulf crisis has weakened the GCC, although to a limited extent. There is an 
urge among the smaller states to come out of the shadow of the Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has 
emerged victorious from the war at the cost of undergoing a decline of its predominance in the 
region. Its image among the Arab masses and governments of the peninsular states is that of a 
meek power, unable to defend itself despite its large size and huge military infrastructure. After 
inviting mercenaries from Christian world, Saudis Arabia's image as the custodian of the holiest 
of Islamic shrines has also suffered a blow. Thus, in these circumstances the smaller states can 
be expected to come out of the yoke of Saudi Paternalism. 
The crisis has served a useful purpose in bringing home a point to them that their 
securities are also at stake in a crisis centering around Saudi Arabia. They have reacted to this 
revelation in different manners. While some states, like Oman and Qatar, advocate inclusion of 
Iran into a regional security and political system the others, like Qatar, do not approve a 
confrontationist attitude towards Iraq. 
The GCC solidarity , in fact, came under a serious threat when Qatar threatened to pull 
out from it in retaliation to Saudi intrusions in its territory in 1992, preceded by a row between 
the two countries over the border issue. During his visit to Iran the Deputy Foreign Minister 
of Qatar Sheikh Thani was reported as saying " the Arabs should unite with Iran against 
certainWestern Powers, which are seeking their own interests in the strategic Persian Gulf 
region" . This is a pointer to a scenario in which Iran can either be successful in pulling one or 
two member out of the GCC or using them as its advocates in seeking the membership of the 
GCC. 
The Persian Gulf crisis gave a new dimension to intra-Arab rivalry. There were a few re-
alignments. Syria joining the Conservative or the Pro-West Arab fold. However, the breaking 
of old alignments was more apparent. The long and solid links between Riyadh And Amman, 
two of the West Asian premier monarchies, almost raptured. Saudi-YAR relations also turned 
hostile due to YAR's support to Iraq. 
The relations between PLO/Palestinians and the conservative Arab regimes, —the latter 
were the main financer of their struggle against Israel beside being a host to thousands of 
Palestinian workwers — got strained. The Saudi government took repressive actions against 
the Palestinian residents for their support to Iraq. The Kuwaiti government deported 350,000 
to 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 Palestinian residents when it was restored to power. Those who escaped the Sabahs' 
ire are earning 40 percent less than what they used to get prior to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 
Other Gulf countries also took repressive actions against Palestinians. The UAE and Qatar 
ousted Palestinian workers, the PLO diplomats and expelled the Palestinians holding key 
positions in government and oil companies (112). 
Like the Palestinians and the PLO the Palestinian issue,however, was not the casualty 
of the Gulf crisis. Its internationalization by Iraq persuaded the US, desperate for salvaging its 
image as aggressor, to initiate along with the USSR Arab-Israeli Peace talks which although in 
the begging proceeded slow and in uncertain manner due to the intransigent attitude of Israel 
under the Likud Government of Yitzhak Rabin but later catched the momentum after the change 
of guard in Israel (113). 
The Persian Gulf crisis paved the way for the PLO-Israel self-rule Accord last yearin the 
sense that it altered the radical position of the PLO on the Arab-Israeli issue so demonstratively 
exhibited by it not long ago in supporting Iraq against Saudi Arabia-Kuwait-US alliance. 
The defeat of Iraq convinced PLO that it was not left with any other taker of its cause 
in West Asia. The conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf region, who supported PLC's 
radical position on the issue, withdrew their support that used to come in form of financial 
assistance and political backing, from it. They after Palestinians' betrayal were willingly gave 
in, for the first time, to the US perception of Middle East Peace. 
to 
Egypt was already among the so-called pragmatists, Syria seemed to shed its hostility 
the US stand on Arab-Israeli issue. Jordan, which had come closer to Palestinians in the wake 
of its support to Iraq, began to return to its former pragmatist position (114). 
Thus the PLO, like Jordan, embarked on the policy of repairing some of the damages 
caused in its relations with the US and the Oil rich states by signaling to the US that it was 
prepared for a settlement short of an independent state of Palestine. 
As regards the implications of the Persian Gulf crisis for the GCC countries, there began 
the process of limited democratization, or political reforms, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This 
was in response to Arab people questioning the legitimacy and credibility of their countries' 
governments: The resentment against the Kuwaiti government for fleeing the country in the 
hour of crisis, leaving the ordinary Kuwaitis behind, and against the Saudi government for 
inviting "infidels" in the land of Mecca and Madina, was the major factor behind introducing 
some reforms. 
After about a year of the end of the war, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of a 
consultative council (Majlis As Shoorah) adopting of a constitution based on the Shariah ( the 
Islamic code of conduct),.Kuwaiti government promised the parliamentary election which were 
held on October 2, 1992, (115) after a gap of seven years. Kuwait was also pressurised by the 
US government for this where people were questioning the rationale behind destroying one 
undemocratic regime and saving the other. 
However, after the elections were held severe limitations were imposed by the Sabah 
regime on the newly elected National Assembly's prospects of particiapting in the governmental 
process. The Kuwaiti government invoked the constitution of 1962 which did not empower the 
National Assembly with appointing the Prime Minister and other ministers. The Crown Prince 
Sa' ad Bin Abdullah was appointed as the Prime Ministwer who then on his decoration appointed 
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10 to 12 ministers into cabinet from outside the National Assembly. The Kuwaiti government 
also clipped the wings of the National Assembly as 35 out of the 38 seats were won by the 
opposition. 
Against all expectations Arabs' resentment against their governmentsfor funding a war 
launched by Allied armies from Islamic lands against a Arab and Muslim country did not burst 
into an Arab-Islamic resurgence. But that the gap between the ruling elites and the masses has 
widened is visible and poses to be a potential threat for the future. For it is feared that if any 
time the Islamists consolidate their position, the support of the Arab masses to them would 
automatically become overt. Growing public consciousness, people's disillusionment with 
ruling elites, which were not used to be noticed on such a scale prior to the Persian Gulf crisis, 
will be additional factors in their support inclination towards rebels as and when their movement 
catches momentum. So says Singh K. R. "It should not be forgotten that while President Sadat 
was assassinated only by a handful of extremists, his funeral was boycotted by the masses, who, 
by their action, put a seal of approval on the action of the extremists" (116). 
On the other hand, in Iraq the rebels have failed to cash in upon Saddam's defeat. Saddam 
has demonstrated to them how public opinion can be moulded in favor of the government by 
arousing general anguish over foreign intervention and external hegemony. 
In the Arabian Peninsular countries the resentment against the local governments is 
manifested not only in general masses alienationbut also in the frustration expressed by 
intellectuals and technocrats. A Large section of Arab Intellectuals publicly calls for the 
removal of Royal families and princely dynasties. Press is growing critical of these govern-
ments' policies.And technocrats, have demanded greater participation in the public affairs ( 
117). 
Iran has benefited most from the Persian Gulf crisis. The destruction of Iraq has left a 
vacuum which has made room for Iran to step in. It has restarted its large scale military build 
up by augmenting its air force, navy, surface-to-surface missile program, and non conventional 
warfare capabilities. Since the US presence in the region would not facilitate Iran to fulfill its 
regional aspirationsby intimidating other regional countries, it has presently embarked on a 
policy of non confrontation in the region eyeing on a role in the Persian Gulf security system. 
From Iraq too, Iran has secured concessions of wide-ranging importance. All the Iranian 
territory and the POWs have been returned by Iraq and its claim to half of the river Shatt 
waterway has been recognized(118). 
For the first time, since the dawn Iran of Islamic revolution Iran finds Itself being sought 
after in the regional and international politics. The only untoward development being the raising 
of its border dispute with the UAE in April 1992. Iranian action would have been precipitated 
under extra regional-prompting. Iran wanted to probe the GCC states' " capabilities and 
intentions after recent security arrangements with the US and its Western allies" (119). The 
relations with Saudi Arabia have constantly improved. All the Hajj seasons since the end of the 
Persian Gulf crisis have passed off peacefully. In 1992, Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah 
U l 
Kahminie issued a Fatwa that stated that performance of any ritual by Shias, which created 
discords among the Muslims or weakened Islam, was Haram. This was an indication to Iranian 
Haj pilgrims to stop holding political demonstrations in Riyadh during the Haj. The relations 
between Iran And Saudi Arabia and Iran and the UAE have strengthened on economic front 
too.The trade between Iran And Arab countries of the Persian Gulf has 
doubled. 
For Egypt, the Persian Gulf crisis paved the way for its re-entry into the Arab fold. Since 
then it is being acknowledged as diplomatic heavyweight in the region. Western assistance, both 
economic and military, have reinforced its position in the Arabworld. 
However, on economic front, Egypt suffered from the crisis. Expulsion of workers from 
Iraq cut down Egyptian earnings from remittances (120). Added to it was the problem of the 
rehabilitation of the returnees.Economic embargo against Iraq has caused a decline of traffic 
to Suez and tourism. The reduction of tanker traffic is estimated to have reduced the revenue 
by 16 percent. Loss of revenue door to the decline in tourists arrival was estimated to be at $ 
29 million as against the projected revenue of $ 600 million (121). 
The Price-hike in the wake of the Persian Gulf crisis, however, increased the Egyptian 
earnings from oil from $ 3 million a day to $ 5 million. The US waived off its debt over Egypt 
amounting to-S 7 billion. In addition, the USA signed five grant agreements of $ 2789 million 
on August 21st 1990 with Egypt to " strengthen the infrastructure base of the country" (122) . 
These helped Egypt not to crumble under economic pressures caused by loss of remittances, 
reduction of traffic to Suez, tourism and stopping of trade with Iraq and Kuwait. 
The Persian Gulf crisis abetted the financial problem Jordan was facing prior to its 
reputation. According to official estimates, Jordan was to incur worth $ 12.4 billion loss due 
to the loss of exports, transit fees, subsidized oil, remittances, debt repayment and aid ( 123). 
Non-official sources put this loss at $ 3 . 5 billion only. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the main 
financial backers of Jordan's economy and the main source of remittances. Iraq was the largest 
customer of its foods and industrial goods. Hundreds of Jordanians were expelled from Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia also decided to cut off the oil supply to Jordan to some 33,000 barrels a 
day. 
Beside economy, Jordan's external relations also suffered in a big way. Relations with 
Syria and Saudi Arabia, who also happened to be its strategic partners against Israel, were 
eroded and its links with the West were almost snapped. The only consolation to Jordan was 
that 
it m a n a g e d to preserve it internal unity . T h i s a l so he lped Jordan In m o d e r a t i n g the radical 
a t m o s p h e r e and reduc ing the pol i t ical i n f l u e n c e o f I s lamic groups , 
However, after the war, relations of Jordan with the West got repaired as the latter 
preferred the survival and stability of the Hashmite in view of rising Islamic fundamentalism in 
that country. The West has come to understand that denial of economic assistance to Jordan can 
hamper its ability to cope with economic problems, the continuation of which might increase, 
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in turn, the popularity of the Islamic movement among the Jordanians. But the rehabilitation of 
relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has yet not taken off , thusthe chances of receiving aid 
from these countries so as to overcome its economic problems are still remote. 
Syria was one of the few regional countries which benefited economically from the 
Persian Gulf crisis as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pumped in $ 1.5 billion. The West European 
governments promised Syria economic aid, removed the sanctions imposed on it because of it 
being branded as a terrorist state. On politico-diplomatic front, Syrian success is equally 
impressive.lt has enhanced its ability to influence regional developments. Its main rival has been 
defeated, its relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia have become friendly. The Syrian admin-
istration indicated that it was willing to participate in the West Asian peace process which, the 
Syrian government assumes, would prompt the US to get it back the Golan Rights, an issue 
hitherto ignored by the US. Syria has also used its enhanced position to consolidate its position 
over Lebanon. 
T H E V A N Q U I S H E D : IRAQ 
Iraq met the fate of those powers who launch a war of conquest and without being able 
to envisage the possibility of a defeat and its after-effects. Putting up a miserable show Iraq, 
lost the credibility it held in the eyes of the US as a threat to its supremacy. The US has after 
its victory treated Iraq in a most barbaric manner, by continuing economic sanctions against 
Iraq, 
abetting Shie and Kurdish revolts, publicly befriending anti-Saddam internal opposition, 
restricting Iraq's sovereignty on its own lands, keeping on decimating Iraq's military strength 
in the guise of the United Nations and carrying out military attacks against it whenever it 
pretends to be stubborn. 
Saddam's hope to emerge as the leader of Arabs through unleashing force and with the 
help of coercion have been dashed to the wall. Failing which it tried to bring Arab countries on 
its side by attacking Israel during the war, but it too failed to pay off. So did Saddam's diplomacy 
as his linkage theory did not find any taker among Arab governments. Arab peoples remained 
sympathetic to Iraq but were not swayed by his call to rise and revolt against the puppet and 
pro-West governments. 
Arab powers, who were titlted towards Iraq during the war cooled off their relations 
after the altter's dismal performance. The PLO and Jordan turned away from it and got involved 
rapproachment with the US. After securing half of the Shatt, its territories and its soldiers held 
as POWs by Iraq, Iran condemned it for being responsible for doing irreparable damage to the 
world of Islam. It, in addition, also retained Iraqi front-line aircrafts and took an open part in 
the Shie revolt inside Iraq. 
Thus after the war Iraq was left isolated, regionally and internationally. Relations with 
the other Arab powers of the Persian Gulf region embittered over the question of massive war 
reparations and US-UN imposed boundary demarcation between it and Kuwait, 
The only edge over the neighboring Persian Gulf countries Iraq has managed to retain 
244 
is that it continues to be a regional threat for four factors: Saddam is still in power, Iraq 
possesses 
a formidable arsenal, deadlier than those of the many Arab Gulf countries and an strong army, 
more experienced, trained than rest of the Arab countries' in the Persian Gulf, the regional 
security system is relatively weaker and shall remain so unless Iran or Israel or both are included 
into it, which is remotest of the possibilities. 
T H E V A N Q U I S H E D : T H E THIRD W O R L D 
Apparently, one of the Third World countries—Kuwait— won the war and another — 
Iraq—suffered humiliation. But, in fact, for the Third world as a whole, thePersaian Gulf crisis 
was not a good omen. It set a precedent for international intervention in the Third World. For 
the first time since the inception of the UN all the five major powers acted in concert.Far more 
significant for the future, however, is the endorsement by all five nations of resolution 687 on 
April 4, 1990, which requires Iraq to accept UN controls in violation of its rights as sovereign 
nation" ( 124). 
The war comes as a reminder to the Third World countries that they can not dare to 
oppose the US and its western allies due to their far weaker position in the area of arms 
technology, as reflected in one of Bush statements "this war would be the last war as no nation 
will be allowed to challenge the might of the US". Moreover, the absence of a Soviet Union from 
the international scene means that now the US would not face a formidable opposition to its 
policy interfering in a Third World Conflict. Thus it would be free to exacerbate, or prevent 
from occurring, a conflict between the two Third World countries. 
OIL: 
Due to the Gulf crisis, 4.2 million barrels (125) per day of oil, which accounted for 7.8 
percent of the global supply, was withdrawn from the world oil market. This resulted into price-
hike, caused mainly by panic buying on the presumption that in the eventuality of seizure of 
Saudi oil fields the world oil market would be deprived of about 20 percent of its total supply 
(126). Thus the oil prices reached the $ 30 per barrel mark. Following the landing of the US 
forces in Saudi Arabia, these began to come down as with this the chances of Iraqi seizure of 
Saudi Oil fields had receded. 
The oil consuming states from the West expected Saudi Arabia , the UAE, Qatar and 
other OPEC countries to step up the production to meet the supply gap. It was estimated that 
Saudi Arabia could alone meet 2 million barrels per day, the UAE 600, 000 to 700,00 barrel, 
Venezuela 500, 000, Nigeria 280,000 and possibly Libya 200, 000 to 300, 000 barrels 
The Persian Gulf crisis did not aggravate oil crisis in the way as it was made out to be. 
The crisis that ensued was manegeable. With 100 million barrel of crude in commercial stock 
and 900 million barrel (only US and Japan) in strategic stock, the OECD countries had enough 
oil to ward off the oil shortages for a considerable period of time. Thus the main issue of concern 
to the western economies was not the immediate shortage of the oil ( 127) but the specter of 
Iraq sitting on the world's largest reserves of a commodity which was poised for regaining its 
significance in the global energy consumption from the mid-1990s. In long term, it would have 
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meant Iraq replacing Saudi Arabia as swing producer, unconcerned to tlie healtii of the Western 
economies and calling tiie shot in the matters of price and production when the OECD countries 
would be importing 65 percent of their consumption and the bulk of which would come from 
the Persian Gulf. Moreover, oil imports accounted for 50 percent of trade deficit of the US and 
other oil importers of the west. The hike in oil prices would have further accentuated the deficit. 
However, the end of the Persian Gulf crisis restored the pre-crisis price ( June 1990) 
despite the continuing absence of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil from the market(128). Even due to the 
'oil glut' caused by stepping up of production by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries 
coupled with the on-going recession supply overawed the demand. The prices have kept on 
slumping. The OPEC has of late tried to evolve a unanimous policy on each member state 
capping its production so that price can become reasonable. Yet, no tangible results have 
occurred so far. Kuwaiti re-entry has again flooded the market. Its plea that it be spared from 
the quota system has caused embarrassment to other OPEC countries .Once the sanctions are 
withdrawn from Iraq, the prices shall climb down further. Thus, there is no oil crisis at present 
as far as the oil consuming states are concerned. 
After three years of the end of the war, the oil producing and oil consuming nations are 
interlocked in a conflict of interests. Saudi Arabia, the swing producer and a moderate among 
the OPEC countries, has, despite being obliged to the US, looks in favor of price-rise, and 
keeping the supply proportionate to the demand. Whereas, the more the West is envisaging an 
increase in its dependence on oil, particularly the Persian Gulf oil, after 1995, the more it is 
interested in a a scenario of supply exceeding the demand. 
The Inter-OPEC rivalry has not subsided. The member-states have not tried to manage 
their production in a way that their supplies commensurate with the demand. Instead, 
capitalising on the disappearance of Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude they increased production to 
maximize their oil revenues. This created tension between Saudi Arabia, which doubled its 
production since 1990, and Iran which after seeing that the former was not to amend its policies 
declared that it would no longer observe the OPEC quota. 
The oil shall remain an contentious issue between the regional countries, sometimes 
conflagrating into war when some of the countries richest in oil happen to be militarily weaker 
than their neighbors relatively poorer in oil resource but a covetous, overbearing militant 
power. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conflict and cooperation have come to stay as permanent dynamics in the Persian Gulf 
region. Both of these are, in fact, complementary to each other than opposites. Issues 
concerning cooperation have been the source of new differences, causing strains in the relations 
between two states or more. For instance, the smaller states have always been apprehensive of 
Saudi domination, both political and economic, through the GCC. Hence, their enthusiasm to 
participate in the grouping has been marked with caution. 
Very often these countries have been found to send positive signals to the countries 
regarded as common threats: Iran and Iraq. The main objective of this policy of the smaller 
states is to placate the hostile powers and offset the Saudi paternalism. This indicates that they 
do not consider the existing mechanism of regional cooperation a fool-proof safety valve 
against national security threats. In fact, they have evolved their policy towards the GCC in 
the backdrop of their relations with Iran and Iraq. 
UAE did not try to score points at Iran's cost over the three disputed islands by 
extending full support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. It was the Arab country Iran had the 
best relations with, during the war. Iran's relations Saudi Arabia and other actors in the GCC 
were rather hostile in constrast. 
The call to induct Iran or Iraq into the GCC has also come from the smaller member-
states of the region. Qatar advocated for the induction of Iran into the post-Persian Gulf war 
security set up. Qatar was also the first country to have decided to normalize relations with Iraq 
after the latter's withdrawal from the region. The latter issue invited severe criticism from 
Saudi and Kuwaiti governments. Border skirmishes with Saudi Arabia in 1992, prompted Qatar 
to threaten to withdraw from the GCC. The disenchantment with Saudi Arabia before the 
border skirmishes started would have also directly or indirectly determined Qatar government's 
decision or indecision to bid farewell to the GCC. 
However, conflicts amongst member countries themselves and those with countries 
outside the GCC have also spurred cooperation. 'Common threat perception' has been the most 
important factor in convincing the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to freeze the disputes among 
themselves if not to settle it once and for all. Without going into the details whether the GCC 
was the direct corollary of the Iran-Iraq war or not, one cannot deny the fact that the War helped 
the GCC grow. It at the least turned the GCC into a security grouping even if not as formidable 
as warranted. In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the member-states decided to 
give it more teeth by both, strengthening the common defense network and seeking to involve 
Egypt and Syria ( also Iran by some countries) into it. 
If the cooperation in the region has been only a little more than half-hearted, conflicts 
in the region have, by and large been little less than of threatening dimensions. This may sound 
strange but given the fact that only two of the scores of regional disputes have graduated into 
a war, one might feel to approve this contention. The Iran-Iraq and the Persian Gulf wars, the 
former due to its longevity and the latter because of its implication for region, tend to give an 
impression that the region as a whole has been conflict-prone. 
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This is true to some an extent. But an important aspect of regional politics should not 
go unrecognized . That is, part of the Arab peninsular region which is included in the Persian 
Gulf region has remained peaceful particularly in view of the fact that there are several conflicts 
still existing to be resolved. The Iran-Iraq war was a factor contributing to the subsiding of 
inter-state conflicts in that region. In the Persian Gulf crisis the Arab peninsular countries were 
the party to the dispute. But at the same time, the Iraqi invasion is said to have prevented the 
eruption of various boundary disputes which was feared to have taken place in the aftermath 
of the end of the Iran-Iraq war. 
The coming to the fore of Qatari-Saudi dispute after about a year of the defeat of Iraq 
substantiates this contention. Cracks have even begun appearing in the relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over the issue of oil quota. The latter demands that since it is a special 
case, it should not be subjected to the production quota regulations. Saudi Arabia, which had 
led the Arab opposition to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, does not sympathise with the Kuwaiti 
government's plea. Moreover the democratization in Kuwait has also been resented by Saudi 
Arabia as it fears that it would indeed have a spill over effect. It would not be out of place to 
mention that the differences over political reforms in Kuwait have come up in the background 
of the demonstration of an extraordinary cooperation in preserving the oneness of their political 
systems by the GCC countries in the 80s. 
The extent of the role of external powers in abetting as well as resolving conflicts and 
their contribution to the process of cooperation in the region have been less than what was 
expected. This must not be confused with their involvement with a particular state or a group 
of states in ordinary circumstances. For, 'bilateralism' has determined the superpowers' active 
involvement in the region in ordinary circumstances. But, the conflicts and cooperation in the 
Persian Gulf have been the outcome of interplay of typically regional forces. For instance, the 
border disputes in the Persian Gulf are entrenched in the historical and geographical dynamics 
of that area. The intricacies involved in these disputes limited the superpowers' scope in 
preventing their eruption or in their resolution. For instance, the US allies in the region can not 
compromise the issues which are directly related to their sovereignty on the excuse that they 
belong to same power bloc. The US at best can get itself assured that it would use its leverage 
to let these disputes remain subsided. Similarly, Iraq did not pay heed to the Soviet Union's 
advice to refrain from attacking Iran and invading Kuwait. This was because the objective 
behind Iraqi attempts was purely regional i.e. the regional ambitions. So much so, that Saddam 
became blind to the international reaction. 
Cooperation in the Persian Gulf has been an attempt to avoid total identification with 
a superpower ally if not to lessen dependence on it. the GCC countries' dependence on the US 
is , as far as the security issues are concerned, almost total, yet that organization can not be 
termed a brainchild of the US as was the case with CENTO. It is not all true that the US itself 
avoids becoming part of a regional grouping in Persian Gul f . It tried to establish an informal 
group, known as strategic consensus, of allies under its leadership. It would not be averse to 
have a similar one in the present circumstances. After fighting from the Arab soil a war against 
an 
Arab country the fears of an anti-US backlash from the Arab people in case of US over 
involvement allies are removed. 2 ^ 7 
Tlie way tlie US is consolidating its strategic presence in the region after the end of the 
Persian Gulf war and the way it has coaxed its allies to give their stamp of approval to Israel-
PLO accord further shows that it has finally discounted that fear. Yet the US also did not 
figure in the GCC countries' aborted bid to form a West Asia wide security organization after 
the Persian Gulf war. Even in economic spheres, the protectionist tendencies are increasing in 
the GCC countries. Faced with the prospects of the exhaustion of oil, they are demanding 
technology transfer from the US and the West in exchange for oil. it seems that the oil rich Arab 
countries of the Persian Gulf shall not provide oil at a price as palatable as in the past, except 
in the interests of national security in a crisis period, in order to capitalize on the increasing 
demand of the Persian Gulf oil in the near future and in their drive to earn maximum from oil 
before it exhausts. 
As far as the future of the conflicts and cooperation in the Persian Gulf is concerned, 
it is safer to refrain from predicting. The defeat of Iraq will discourage the ambitious regional 
states from repeating Saddam's folly. But this self-restraint will be practiced so long as the US 
continues to maintain a unipolar world order ( would it be able to do so and how long if so is 
very unlikely to predict). Once and if multipolarism sets in, the regional countries may flare up 
those very unresolved disputes which have formed the alibis in previous battles fought for 
regional domination. Thus, the greatest danger to peace and stability in the Persian Gulf are 
unsettled disputes. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Iran, and Iraq having not 
ceased to be a threat to the regional countries barring Iran, and Saudi Arabia also trying to join 
the bandwagon by importing CSS-II missiles from China, a 'War for Domination' may take the 
stage in the region sooner than later. 
The chances of cooperation involving all the regional countries are remote. Of course, 
the GCC is not at all threatened from within, though the pace of the cooperation may remain 
slow and achievements a few only, but it seem to continue to be a misnomer as neither the 
member-states would want both Iran and Iraq or either of the two inducted into it, nor can the 
two countries join one regional organization or tolerate either's presence in the the GCC. 
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